In modern democracies, political pluralism plays a vital role in establishing a system of checks and balances among political actors. Unlike several European nations, North Macedonia has a relatively short history of political pluralism. Following the transition from the Yugoslav one-party system and the adoption of its Constitution, political pluralism was established as a “fundamental value of the constitutional order of the Republic of Macedonia.”
However, each election cycle demonstrates that in Macedonian society, political pluralism is still viewed merely as the coexistence of multiple political parties, rather than a system designed to ensure fair and equal opportunities for all participants, free from unjustified legal or administrative barriers. Traditionally, the political arena has been heavily dominated by major political parties, while smaller parties, independent candidates, and civic initiatives frequently face numerous legal, institutional, and practical hurdles. Despite these issues being raised repeatedly, lawmakers consistently fail to address them.
The root of most problems for both candidates and institutions lies within the Electoral Code itself. Given its foundational importance to elections and democracy, electoral legislation must be stable, predictable, and built upon a broad political and societal consensus. As has been pointed out many times, frequent amendments to the Electoral Code (over 30 times since 2006) create legal uncertainty and loopholes. This poses serious challenges for both election administration bodies and less-privileged political actors. Furthermore, it fosters a public perception that the rules of the game are changed to suit the immediate interests of major parties rather than to advance democracy and pluralism.
Since the Electoral Code came into effect in 2006, the Constitutional Court has struck down provisions as unconstitutional on five occasions, often citing discrimination and a direct undermining of political pluralism. Recently, two smaller parties challenged the constitutionality of provisions regulating media coverage and public funding for political advertising. The Court is expected to rule on this matter in its upcoming sessions.
- Independent Candidates vs. Political Parties: A Higher Hurdle for Signatures
Although the proposal nominally lowers the signature threshold for independent candidates -from 1% to 0.8% of registered voters in a given constituency for parliamentary elections, or the municipality for local elections – the requirement remains significantly higher than it was prior to the 2024 pre-election amendments.
Establishing or re-registering a political party requires a mere 1,000 signatures nationwide. Once registered, a party can field candidates for parliament, mayoral offices, and municipal councils across the entire country without collecting any additional signatures.
Consequently, even with the reduction from 1% to 0.8%, citizens running as independents must gather a daunting number of signatures. For instance, submitting an independent list for parliament in Constituency 1 requires 2,505 signatures (0.8% of 313,183 voters), while an independent list for the Skopje City Council requires 3,731 signatures (0.8% of 466,456 voters).
This means an independent candidate must secure several times more signatures than the number needed to form an entire political party, tilting the competition heavily against independents.
In practice, this can pressure or even force independent movements to register as formal political parties simply to bypass these electoral barriers. In other words, the system may force civic initiatives to undergo “partisanization” just to survive politically. This is highly problematic. In a true pluralistic system, political parties should be just one of many avenues for political organization, not the only viable pathway to participation. Excessive barriers for independent candidacy restrict citizens’ access to the ballot, reduce political diversity, and ultimately erode pluralism.
- A Significant Raise in Campaign Donation Caps
The new legal framework nearly doubles the maximum cumulative donation limits for election campaigns: raised from €3,000 to €6,000 for individuals and from €30,000 to €50,000 for legal entities.
Simultaneously, it removes an essential safeguard against untraceable campaign funds: the requirement that anonymous or untraceable donations have to be transferred to the state budget within five days.
Given that every election cycle already places a significant financial burden on citizens—through both public funding of elections and private campaign financing—raising donation caps risks triggering an aggressive fundraising arms race. This not only amplifies the influence of wealthy donors but also widens the gap between well-funded political giants and underfunded smaller parties or independents. Consequently, electoral competition may increasingly hinge on fundraising prowess rather than the quality of policy proposals and genuine grassroots support.
- A Seemingly New Advertising Model with Unresolved Contradictions
Under the proposed amendments, the status quo for distributing public funds and advertising space on TV, print, and digital media remains unchanged (retaining the 45%/45%/7%/3% split). The only adjustment is providing equal access to billboards and public advertising boards for all political players.
While this looks like a step toward equity on paper, it does little to address the fundamental imbalance. The existing allocation formulas continue to disadvantage smaller parties with parliamentary groups (such as ZNAM and Levica) and push non-parliamentary parties and independent candidates to the sidelines. This structural flaw was previously highlighted by the OSCE/ODIHR International Election Observation Mission in its preliminary findings and conclusions.
This very issue is the focus of the recent challenge brought before the Constitutional Court, which postponed its ruling to an upcoming session. Since these changes are once again being rushed through parliament, there is a real risk that the law will be passed as is, only for the Constitutional Court to later declare the disputed provisions unconstitutional. Such an outcome would deal another blow to the legislature’s credibility, proving that election rules are being rewritten without adequate legal review or consideration for constitutional alignment.
- Open Lists: A Missed Opportunity for Voter Choice
Unfortunately, the proposed amendments fail to introduce open lists. Yet, they represent an inevitable shift, slowly becoming the standard across European democracies. They empower voters by allowing them to directly choose individual candidates, giving them the power to override candidate rankings predetermined by party leaders. Like any major reform, this could be introduced gradually – for instance, by allocating only a portion of seats through open lists initially, before transitioning fully over subsequent election cycles.
Conclusion
While it is commendable that, for the first time in several election cycles, these amendments are being introduced well ahead of potential elections – aligning with Venice Commission recommendations – serious questions remain about the quality and inclusivity of the legislative process itself.
Fast-tracking these amendments to meet Reform Agenda commitments and deadlines, rather than pursuing a thorough and consensus-based reform of the electoral framework, constitutes a missed opportunity. This approach leaves key structural deficiencies unresolved, increasing the likelihood of future recurring criticism from the Constitutional Court and the OSCE/ODIHR election observation missions.
This public policy document is part of the project “Promoting the Debate on Accountability and AntiCorruption”, which aims to contribute to the reform processes in North Macedonia by strengthening the role of the Assembly in the fight against corruption and in establishing reforms in the rule of law. In doing so, it facilitates dialogue between political parties and youth, as well as between parliamentarians and civil society. The project is supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.
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