North Macedonia and Albania: Two Balkan Paths Toward the West

For nearly two decades, North Macedonia and Albania have walked parallel, though not identical, roads toward EU integration. Their foreign policy priorities are shaped by shared goals, EU accession, NATO cooperation, and alignment with democratic norms, but their individual strategies reflect different historical burdens, domestic politics, and geopolitical calculations.^[1]

The Brussels Horizon

The European Union has remained the main strategic objective for both countries, though their routes have been different in tempo, tone, and obstacles. For North Macedonia, the road has been turbulent, shaped by prolonged bilateral disputes which have postponed the opening of accession negotiations despite broad popular support for the EU path. The 2018 Prespa Agreement significantly changed this trajectory, and the country’s subsequent NATO membership reinforced its Western orientation.

Albania, meanwhile, has pursued a more consistent EU integration path, free from high stakes blockades but equally constrained by the slow and technocratic nature of enlargement. In October 2023, Tirana hosted the Berlin Process Summit, the first time this high-level gathering was held in a Western Balkan country.  The summit marked a significant milestone for Tirana, underlining both its commitment to regional cooperation and its aspiration to play a central role in the Western Balkans’ European future.

Both countries are not only EU candidates but also NATO members and signatories to Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the EU. Their international engagement extends well beyond, as they are members of a wider network of organisations including the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the World Trade Organisation, and the World Bank. They have often been praised for their full alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Despite this, the persistent delays in enlargement have opened the region to competing narratives and rival geopolitical influences.

Washington’s Partners

While the EU remains largely stalled, the region has progressed in its NATO integration. Both countries maintain diplomatic relations with Washington, although the nature of these relationships differs. North Macedonia’s political elite engaged intensively with the US during its NATO accession process, marked by high-level visits, public diplomacy campaigns, and joint military cooperation​. A significant milestone in this partnership was the initiation of the U.S.–North Macedonia Strategic Dialogue in June 2022.  Building on this framework, the two sides signed a 10-year roadmap for defense cooperation in 2023.

Albania’s relationship with the US has historically been deeply rooted in long-standing political networks. The two countries signed the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership in 2015, outlining cooperation in defense, security, and democratic development. This partnership was further solidified during the first U.S.-Albania Strategic Dialogue held in Washington in October 2022, where both sides reaffirmed their commitment to regional stability and bilateral priorities.

For much of the past three decades, US engagement in the region was largely confined to supporting institution-building, civil society development, and security sector reform, often leaving the lead on enlargement and political reforms to the EU. The core US interest, namely the region’s stability, has remained constant, but since the mid-2010s, the geopolitical interest in containing the Chinese and Russian influence has increasingly gained prominence.

The Fading Shadow of Moscow

Russia’s influence in both countries has declined, particularly following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Both North Macedonia and Albania have taken clear and firm stances against Moscow’s aggression. North Macedonia notably expelled Russian diplomats in 2022 and backed EU sanctions packages​. Albania has mirrored this stance, expelling Russian diplomats, fully backing EU sanctions, and actively cracking down on pro-Kremlin disinformation networks within its borders.

Moscow’s influence in the region has traditionally hinged on historical Orthodox and pan-Slavic narratives, soft power diplomacy, and its use of proxies. Yet neither North Macedonia nor Albania, both NATO members, have allowed Russian influence to establish itself in their domestic politics or strategic sectors. Analysts characterize Russia today as a “spoiler power” in the Balkans, exploiting political instability, spreading disinformation and reinforcing nationalist narratives. These tactics are largely ineffective in Albania, where cultural and historical affinity with Moscow is absent. In North Macedonia, Russia’s attempts to exert soft power are also weakened by societal fatigue with pro-Russian rhetoric and the population’s generally pro-Western orientation.

In both cases, Russia is no longer seen as viable alternative to the Western path, but rather as an actor whose influence is carefully managed. Its presence in the Western Balkans is more about contesting EU and NATO influence than about offering a real geopolitical alternative​.

Between Ankara and Beijing

Turkey and China both have their spheres of influence, but their presence is more strategic rather than dominant. Turkey, in particular,      holds a longstanding cultural and historical connection to the region and actively invests in preservation of the Ottoman cultural heritage, financing the renovation of mosques, monuments and the construction of new religious buildings in areas that have a Muslim-majority population, notably in western North Macedonia and across Albania.      Albania’s ties with Turkey are marked by cultural and educational initiatives, military cooperation and strong diplomatic presence. In North Macedonia, on the other side, Turkey’s influence is visible through cultural heritage restoration and religious outreach.

China’s strategy, on the other hand, is predominantly economic. China’s investments in the region are concentrated in strategic sectors like infrastructure, energy, and natural resources. Both countries have welcomed infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative, though often with limited long-term results. Projects have sparked concerns about environmental and labor standards, and lack the transparency that typically accompanies EU investments​. Chinese companies have shown skill in taking advantage of weak social structures, sometimes involving corrupt practices and building close relationships      with political and business elites that support the investments despite public criticism and controversies.      However, despite the visibility of Chinese economic involvement, however, neither North Macedonia nor Albania, have allowed this to develop into political alignment.

The Big Picture: Convergence or Divergence?

Both countries continue to demonstrate a strong commitment to the Western geopolitical framework, though their foreign policy strategies vary in emphasis and style. Both remain vigilant against Russian influence and manage relations with Turkey and China pragmatically. Тhese differences may narrow as EU membership talks progress, but they also reflect the adaptability of each country’s diplomacy to a region where loyalty to the West must be constantly reasserted, and external influences must be carefully managed.

[1] Disclaimer: This article draws on data from the GEO-POWER-EU INTERDEPENDENCE DATABASE (2025) to assess foreign policy trends and external influences in the Western Balkans.

This blog post includes insights derived from the database developed as part of the GEO-POWER-EU project. The project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 10113292. The content of this post does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission. The EC is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained herein.