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Towards a more efficient and constructive Assembly through amendments to the Rules of Procedure

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1. INTRODUCTION

The parliamentary debate is a reflection of the country's political culture and is a key factor in defining the quality of parliamentary life. Abuse of parliamentary mechanisms, which undermines the prerequisites for sound parliamentary debate, results in poor legislation and generally poor public perception of the work of the Assembly.

In modern Macedonian history, since gaining independence in 1991, the Assembly has on several occasions been a place of manifestation of political tensions, partly triggered by the abuse of parliamentary procedures. These are activities that disable the work of the Assembly and include deliberate abuse of the established Rules of Procedure and legislative procedures in the Assembly. Such activities include: disabling opposition MPs from exercising the right to legislative initiative; disabling the right of MPs to ask parliamentary questions; delaying or disabling initiatives submitted by opposition MPs to interpellate members of the executive branch; abusing the right to submit amendments to proposals for laws; deliberately disabling or limiting the regular processes in the Assembly; and abusing the right to speak of MPs, known as filibustering.

The parliamentary procedure has been abused by several political actors who decided to circumvent parliamentary procedures during a certain period. So far, in the Assembly, there have been four worrisome cases of filibustering concerning the Law on Defenders from 2012, when the enactment of this Law was blocked for 40 days; the Law on the Budget from 2013 ended with the events of December 24th and the removal of the opposition from the Assembly; the election of Talat Xhaferi as Speaker of the Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia in 2017 and the dismissal of Marko Zvrlevski as State Attorney General in 2017.¹ On several occasions, attempts to block the Assembly's work included boycotting the MPs by leaving the Assembly and not participating in its work. Beginning in May 2022, MPs boycotted the Assembly's work demanding early elections², which later escalated during the vote on the French proposal, designed to unlock the EU accession veto from the Republic of Bulgaria. At the time, the opposition announced an "active boycott", saying that "this means that we will not support harmful laws and will activate all possible tools. This means that we will fight and support only solutions that would benefit the citizens, the higher salaries for which we are fighting or the protection of the standard for which we insist."³ After the adoption of the negotiating

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- 1 Meta.mk. All our blockades of the Rules of Procedure: The four extreme cases of Macedonian filibustering. Accessed on <<https://meta.mk/site-nashi-delovnichki-blokadi-chetirite-ekstremni-sluchai-na-makedonski-filibaster/>> (last visit: 29 September 2022)
 - 2 Radio Free Europe. Blocked Assembly to save the country or for destruction? Accessed at <<https://www.slobodnaevropa.mk/a/%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE-%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5-%D0%B7%D0%B0-%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%81-%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%B4%D1%80%D0%B6%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0-%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D0%B7%D0%B0-%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0-/31833919.html>> (last visit: 29 September 2022)
 - 3 Plusinfo. WE WILL VOTE FOR HIGHER SALARIES AND STANDARD PROTECTION, VMRO-DPMNE clarifies what active boycott means, Accessed at <<https://plusinfo.mk/e-glasame-za-pogolemi-plati-i-zashtita-na-standardot-od-vmro-dpmne-po-asnuvaat-shto-znachi-aktiven-bo-kot/>> (last visit: 29 September 2022)

framework by the Assembly, the opposition continued the boycott of the work of the Assembly by demanding that early parliamentary elections be organized. Following the rejection of the referendum motion by Speaker Talat Xhaferi,⁴ the party Levica announced a new referendum motion that, if rejected, would lead to a complete blockade of the Assembly.⁵ The constant blockade of the work of the Assembly suggests that political actors are willing to abuse all provisions of the Rules of Procedures for pursuing political goals.

Besides active boycotts and abuses of Rules of Procedure provisions, the Assembly is not yet a real forum for debate. The data from the IDSCS report on the quality of debate in the Assembly (January – June 2022)⁶ show that the conditions/parameters for the parliamentary debate are not met for the parliamentary debate to be considered a constructive and deliberative debate. Additionally, the data from My MP for August-December 2021 show that many MPs do not participate in the plenary debates and are not members of the committees.⁷

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- 4 MIA. Referendum motion rejected, the decision for VMRO-DPMNE is unfounded, SDSM backs it. Accessed on <<https://mia.mk/%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B1%D0%B8%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0-%D0%B7%D0%B0-%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%84%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B4%D1%83%D0%BC/>> (last visit: 29 September 2022)
 - 5 Radio Free Europe. A new initiative for a referendum or a complete blockade of the Assembly? Accessed on <<https://www.slobodnaevropa.mk/a/%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0-%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B0-%D0%B7%D0%B0-%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%84%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B4%D1%83%D0%BC-%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D1%86%D0%B5%D0%B-%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B0-%D0%B-%D0%B0-%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%BE-/32036894.html>> (last visit: 29 September 2022)
 - 6 Vlora Rechica and Nikola Donev. Parliament Watch: Monitoring report on the debate quality in the Parliament (January – June 2022). Accessed at <https://idscs.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/WEBA4_Kvalitet_na_debata_januari_juni_2022MKD.pdf> (last visit: 29 September 2022)
 - 7 Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia My MP, August - December 2021. Accessed on <<https://www.sobranie.mk/content/Mojot%20pratenik/Mojot%20pratenik25.pdf>> (last visit: 29 September 2022)

2. RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

Any attempts to improve the work of the Assembly must include an analysis of the mechanisms provided for in the Rules of Procedure and whether they are suitable for the institutional resolution of certain conflicts between the members of the parliamentary majority and the opposition. The work of the Assembly is regulated by the Rules of Procedure, which stipulate the organization and functioning of the Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia and the working bodies. This right of the Assembly to regulate its work is guaranteed by Article 61 of the Constitution of the Republic of North Macedonia. The wording of the 2008 Rules of Procedure, currently in force, consists of 240 articles, along with some changes and amendments made in 2010 and 2013.

The following are regulated in the framework of the Rules of Procedure: the procedure for constituting the Assembly; the rights and duties of the MPs; the election and powers of the President, Vice-Presidents and Secretary General; holding a session of the Assembly; the working bodies and the legislative procedure along with special procedures for certain laws such as the Law on the Budget. Further, following the constitutional competencies of the Assembly, the Rules of Procedure also stipulate the procedure for amending the Constitution, determining the responsibility of the President of the Republic and the relations with the government, i.e. the issue of trust, resignation and dismissal.

2.1 Why Can the Rules of Procedure be Easily Abused?

The Venice Commission issued an opinion in 2009 concerning the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia. The Commission notes that the text of the Rules of Procedure meets the standards prescribed by the Council of Europe, but the extensive wording of 240 articles describes rather complicated procedures. In certain places, the Commission notes that the language of the Rules of Procedure is unclear, especially in the allocation of competencies and determining proportional representation of opposition parties, which could lead to implementation problems.⁸

The complexity of the procedures and the ambiguous wording open up a greater possibility of abuse of the Rules of Procedure, thus preventing the effective work of the Assembly. Most often, such mechanisms are exploited by opposition parties because of dissatisfaction with their involvement in the decision-making process. Thus, when it comes to filibustering, the Rules of Procedure do not prescribe clear mechanisms to prevent these forms of abusing the Rules of Procedure.

8 Venice Commission. Opinion of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (CDL-AD (2009)025). 2009

3. COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW: MECHANISMS IN THE RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR PROTECTION FROM FILIBUSTERING

There are multiple possibilities, regulated in the Rules of Procedure, for overcoming the conditions of blocking the work of the Assembly. One potential mechanism is the possibility of controlling or suspending deliberations in the Assembly. Looking comparatively, such mechanisms exist in some Rules of Procedure with varying degrees of regulation. Thus, the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Serbia set a time frame for the speeches during the committee debates; however, at the request of a committee member, these debate time limits can be shortened, extended or not limited.⁹ In Article 97 of the Rules of Procedure, during the basic procedure¹⁰ for adopting a law, the general time provided for discussion is five hours allocated to the parliamentary groups.¹¹ The Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia, in the various procedures, provide for time frames of speeches but do not leave the opportunity to amend them at the MPs' request.

In the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of Slovenia, the mechanisms for allocating the time for debate are regulated in Article 67. This article provides minimum limits for the duration of a speech. It should be noted that according to Article 74, authorized persons may request suspension of the debate and rescheduling the item on the agenda for the next session.¹²

The Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia in Article 81 provide for the possibility for the President to suspend the session if there is no quorum or at the request of a coordinator or deputy coordinator of a parliamentary group to suspend session for one hour – such suspension is a request for a break. The Assembly may decide to suspend the session at the request of the chairperson of a working body or the coordinator of a parliamentary group to hold a session of a working body. The President determines the time when the suspended session will resume.

In addition, the Rules of Procedure do not set general time frames for the duration of the deliberations within the committees or plenary sessions but set deadlines for the submission of materials for the further conduct of the legislative procedure. Also, it regulates the duration of participants' speeches in the deliberations depending on the participant's status as defined in Article 86 and additional articles.

9 Article 78 in conjunction with Article 75 and 77 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Serbia

10 The regular procedure is divided into basic and shortened. By analogy with the envisaged legislative procedure in the Republic of North Macedonia, the basic regular procedure is a regular procedure in the context of the Republic of North Macedonia, and the shortened regular procedure is a shortened procedure for the adoption of a law in the context of the Republic of North Macedonia.

11 Rule 97 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Serbia

12 Article 74

(1) The Chairperson, the parliamentary group, the proposer or the Government where it is not the proposer, may propose that the discussion or decision on the matter under consideration be postponed until a subsequent session. A postponement of an item that has been placed on the agenda in accordance with paragraph three of Article 59 of these Rules of Procedure for a subsequent session may be proposed only by the parliamentary group on whose proposal the item has been placed on the agenda. The National Assembly shall decide on such a proposal in accordance with the procedure provided for in paragraph nine of Article 64 of these Rules of Procedure.

(2) After exhaustion of all items on the agenda, the National Assembly shall close the session.

In a broader context, one can single out the mechanism to suspend the debate in the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly and the Senate in France. According to Article 38, when at least two speakers express a different opinion during the general debate, except in the cases specified in Article 29-b, authorized persons may propose closing the discussion and rescheduling it after holding a conference of chairpersons.¹³ Additionally, in its Rules of Procedure – Rule 25 (2), the German Bundestag stipulates that "the Bundestag may suspend the deliberation or conclude the debate if there is such a proposal by a parliamentary group or by five per cent of the present Members of the Bundestag. The proposal to close the debate can be put to the vote only after each parliamentary group has been given the floor at least once."¹⁴ Such mechanisms do not exist in the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia.

It is important to note that **the regulation of deliberations must not be an obstacle in the deliberation process among MPs. Overregulation in this regard would mean a loss of the democratic spirit in the Assembly.**

Thus, the Venice Commission points to the opposition's right to block or delay a majority decision of particular importance. This is particularly important when it comes to constitutional changes and the need for a qualified majority to reach a broader consensus and protect the interests of both the opposition and the minority. Additionally, the Commission gives examples of mechanisms for prolonging decision-making: " An example is Article 41 (3) of the Danish Constitution, which entitles the qualified minority¹⁵ of 2/5 to request that the third and final debate on legislative proposals be postponed up to 12 days to give time to the opposition to initiate a public debate. A more radical provision is Article 42 of the same Constitution, which entitles the 1/3 qualified minority to demand that a law passed by Parliament be put to a public referendum before it is enacted. This competence has only been used once (1963), but its existence is still claimed to have some political effect. A third example is Article 12 of the Swedish Constitution, which gives a qualified minority of more than one-sixth of MPs the opportunity, with certain exceptions, to postpone the debate for up to twelve months regarding laws affecting fundamental rights and freedoms."¹⁶

Such regulation of the duration of deliberations on certain items on the agenda is not a guarantee and protection against the abuse of the Rules of Procedure. Resolving conflicts between the majority and opposition MPs must be done peacefully and institutionally. Potential changes to the Rules of Procedure should entail the establishment of mechanisms for resolving conflicts by involving the opposition in managing and drafting the agenda of the Assembly.

13 Article 38

1. When at least two speakers with different opinions have intervened in the general discussion of a law, except under the provision laid down in Article 29b, for a whole article or in explanations of vote for an amendment, article or the entire text under discussion, the President, chairperson of a political group or chairperson of the referral committee may propose that the discussion be closed.

2. The President shall ask the Senate to vote by show of hands. Approval of the proposal would lead to an immediate suspension of the session and the convening of a conference of chairmen.

3. The Conference of Presidents shall vote on the organization of the continuation of the deliberations. A three-fifths majority is required.

4. If there is any disagreement, the closing will take place immediately after the speaker for each group can speak, at their request, for five minutes.

5. In the event of a request for reclosure, the President shall consult the Senate by show of hands. If closure is accepted, the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall apply to the meeting..

14 Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag – Rule 25 (2)

15 Even though there is no definition on qualified majority, such mechanisms are found in the general parliamentary procedures or in special procedures for certain matters, most commonly in the procedure for parliamentary oversight and control over the executive branch..

16 Venice Commission. Report on the Role of the Opposition in a Democratic Parliament (CDL-AD (2010)025).2010

4. INVOLVEMENT OF THE OPPOSITION IN THE WORK OF THE ASSEMBLY

The involvement of the opposition is carried out according to certain principles. Thus, the Venice Commission has established important principles concerning relations between the parliamentary majority and the opposition. First, respect for pluralism and freedom – meaning that criticism by the opposition cannot be seen as a destructive element against the state's interests. There must be constructive cooperation between the different state institutions in the balance set by the system of checks and balances regardless of which political factor has dominance. A particularly important principle that the Commission notes are the shared responsibility of the majority and the opposition toward society as a whole. "The majority, precisely because it is a majority, must behave in the practice of power with restraint and respect for the opposition, inclusively and transparently, bearing in mind that it is likely to become, in the future, following democratic rules, an opposition group. At the same time, the opposition or their deputies should not abuse their procedural rights and, criticizing the policy of the majority, not call for violence, engage in violent actions or physically obstruct the work of the Assembly. But the opposition must not be reasonably prevented from using tactics that delay or complicate the political process, which is allowed by the rules of procedure or are part of the country's political tradition."¹⁷

Additionally, the system should allow for effective decision-making. In the decision-making process, a fair balance must be struck between the legitimate interests of the majority and the opposition but not jeopardize the ability of the majority to implement its political agenda, i.e., "the minority should have its say, and the majority should have its way."¹⁸

Regarding the inclusion of the opposition in the Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia, the Venice Commission notes problematic points in two parts. **The proportional representation of smaller political parties and the rights of the opposition when it comes to the governance of the Assembly.** In this section, the Commission addresses, in particular, the number and competence of the Vice-Presidents and the relationship between the leadership and the MPs groups.

Initially, the Commission notes that the criterion of "adequate representation" in Articles 20, 108 and 206 is unclear because it does not guarantee that all political groups would be represented according to the number of deputies. Proportional representation of opposition parties in leadership positions as vice-presidents of the Assembly or chairpersons of committees allows the opposition's involvement in building the Assembly agenda. When it comes to the election of Vice-Presidents, the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly do not regulate the number of Vice-Presidents, but that number is determined by the proposal of the President, and they are elected by the Assembly. Unlike our RoP, the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in Croatia stipulate 2 to 5 Vice-Presidents.¹⁹ This type of regulation allows predictability in the number of vice-presidents, instead of full discretion being in the hands of the President of the Assembly.

Since the procedure for electing vice-presidents is the same as for a president, i.e., candidates may be proposed by 20 MPs or the Committee on Election and Appointments Issues, also requiring an absolute majority (61 deputies), the procedure does not provide a guarantee that they will be elected. At the same time, it limits

17 Venice Commission. Parameters for the relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a democratic parliament CDL-AD (2019)015. 2020

18 Ibid., p. 8.

19 Article 31 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Croatia

the right of those parties that do not have 20 deputies to be able to propose their candidates. Article 21 in paragraph 3 regulates that one of the vice presidents is elected from among the main opposition party. In the current composition of the Assembly, this is not the case because there is one vice-president from among the majority.

The Venice Commission makes further remarks concerning the governance of the Assembly itself. This concerns, to the greatest extent, the establishment of the agenda. It is established in coordination with the coordinators of the various parliamentary groups, but the prerogative is with the President, as described in Article 69. At the same time, the President determines the order of speeches. This is the case, even though paragraph 3 of Article 69 provides a minimum guarantee that the President is "obliged at every second regular session to enter one item in the proposed agenda for the session of the Assembly upon the proposal of the members of the opposition, which meets the conditions established by these Rules of Procedure". This introduces a certain guarantee of inclusion of items proposed by the opposition, but the prerogative is still with the President.

To ensure better coordination and involve the opposition in building the agenda, the Venice Commission suggests the establishment of a "conference of presidents" consisting of the coordinators of the parliamentary groups, the chairmen of the committees, the Vice-President of the Assembly and the Secretary-General. The role of this conference would be decisive in terms of the agenda. This is the case in the rules of procedure of Serbia, Croatia and Germany. That is, the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in Serbia provide for establishing a collegium where the President, the Vice-Presidents and the coordinators of the parliamentary groups in the Assembly participate. The collegium meetings are also attended by the Secretary General of the Assembly and other participants at the call of the President. Article 34 of the Croatian Rules of Procedure establishes the presidency of the Assembly. Article 36 stipulates the powers of the presidency, while paragraph 2 stipulates that decisions are taken by a majority vote. The German Bundestag Rules of Procedure provide a Presidium composed of the President and the Vice-Presidents.²⁰ Additionally, the Council of Elders acts as an enlarged body that includes members appointed by parliamentary groups and has its responsibilities. The body serves to control the powers of the Parliament.²¹ Such mechanisms provide an opportunity for the opposition to effectively contribute to the governance of the Parliament. Additionally, it allows for the establishment of a parliamentary agenda through consensus.


20 Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag

21 Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag

5. THE ROLE OF THE ASSEMBLY ACCORDING TO THE CITIZENS' PERCEPTION


The Institute for Democracy (IDSCS), within the framework of the Parliament Support Programme (PSP)²², surveyed citizens' perceptions of the work of the Assembly. According to it, the majority of citizens (65%) believe that a boycott is not the right way of expressing political views in the work of the Assembly. The opposite is thought by only a quarter (28%) of the respondents. The attitude regarding this question has been almost constant in the last four years (2019 - 2022).

Chart 1. Do you think that boycoting is the right way to express political views in the Assembly? (%)



Regarding filibustering, two-thirds (65%) of citizens do not believe that stalling and prolonging a debate in order not to pass any law or decision is the right way to express political views in the work of the Assembly. Such a practice is acceptable to only a quarter (25%) of the citizens. Citizens' perception regarding this practice of MPs has remained unchanged in the last four years (2019 - 2022).²³

Chart 2. Do you think that prolonging and delaying the debate in order to prevent the adoption of a law or decision is the right way to express political views in the work of the Assembly? (%)




22 Vlora Recica and Aleksandra Jovevska Djordjevic. Parliamentary Watch: Citizens' perceptions of the work of the Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia – 2022. Accessed on: <<https://idscs.org.mk/mk/2022/07/12/%d0%bf%d0%b3%d0%bb%d0%b5%d0%b4-%d0%bd%d0%b0-%d1%81%d0%be%d0%b1%d1%80%d0%b0%d0%bd%d0%b8%d0%b5-%d0%bf%d0%b5%d1%80%d1%86%d0%b5%d0%bf%d1%86%d0%b8%d0%b8%d1%82%d0%b5-%d0%bd%d0%b0-%d0%b3%d1%80%d0%b0/>> (last visit on September 29, 2022)

23 Ibid

The functionality of the Assembly is reflected in the active debate and exchange of views between MPs. Citizens are looking for an active Assembly and MPs debating rather than using tools such as filibustering and boycotting. This perception points to the important role of the Assembly in the country's political life, confirmed by the fact that more than two-thirds of the citizens surveyed (71%) believe that the Assembly plays a significant role in the country's political life.

Chart 3. What is the role of the Assembly in political life in North Macedonia? (%)



6. RECOMMENDATIONS

The active participation of MPs in parliamentary life is of particular importance; therefore, improving the work of the Assembly means active participation of all parliamentary parties, appropriate consultations and regulatory impact assessment before the adoption of legislation.²⁴ **Developing an active political culture of reasoned and constructive debate is important because it enables the adoption of quality laws of importance to citizens.** It is necessary to overcome this situation to develop a real parliamentary culture with responsible and active MPs.

Worrisome abuses of the Rules of Procedure can be prevented by amending the Rules of Procedure, i.e., by introducing **provisions by which a qualified minority could initiate a continuation or a complete termination of the debate. In doing so, the same mechanism must not impede the opposition's right to participate effectively in the debate.** This mechanism **must also be used only in the case of worrisome and destructive forms of filibustering**, which would be an assessment of the Assembly itself.

Preventing abuse of the Rules of Procedure and filibustering can be achieved through the effective involvement of the opposition in the governance of the Assembly. Determining the number of vice presidents could contribute to better representation of opposition parties in the leadership of the Assembly. Additionally, a mechanism for electing vice presidents is needed, with a lower selection threshold than an absolute majority.

The Assembly's governance and the agenda's determination must be achieved by consensus. The establishment of a collective body consisting of the President, the Vice-Presidents and the representatives of the political groups in the Assembly will contribute to more effective control of the competencies of the President. This body must also have decision-making power and certain competencies.

To conclude, when it comes to overcoming political crises, **"the main political parties should find a mechanism for overcoming future crises, in cases where the opposition uses boycott..."**²⁵. In such instances, the public interest must be placed before the party system. In a deliberative democracy, all political actors are responsible for contributing to an effective decision-making process in the interest of citizens to ensure the protection of democracy and the rule of Law.

24 Westminster Foundation for Democracy. Parliamentary boycotts in the Western Balkans, Accessed on <<https://www.wfd.org/sites/default/files/2022-05/wfd-wb-boycotts.pdf>> (last visit: 29 September 2022)

25 Ibid

Information about the project

The Swiss Parliament Support Programme (PSP) will support the efforts of the Parliament of the Republic of North Macedonia for independence by building consensus, implementing structural reforms and capacity building in the institutional development of Parliament; in its legislative and oversight roles; and in its institutional transparency and accountability. PSP is implemented by the National Democratic Institute, the Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis" - Skopje and the Centre for Change Management for the purposes of supporting Parliament's strategic planning; reforms in human resource management; improved impact assessment of procurement regulations and processes; commitment to open data and by measuring public opinion and monitoring reform efforts, also for the purposes of increased civil involvement in policy-making processes.

Information about IDSCS

IDSCS is a civil think-tank organisation researching the development of good governance, rule of law and Macedonia's European integration. IDSCS has the mission to support citizens' involvement in the decision-making process and strengthen the participatory political culture. By strengthening liberal values, IDSCS contributes towards coexistence of diversities.

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