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
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I Introduction

Dear readers,

You have in your hands the fifty second issue of the journal "Political Thought" published, as up to now, through the collaboration of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation with the Societas Civilis Institute for Democracy from Skopje. Our regular readers will immediately notice that this issue has been changed in many aspects compared to the previous issues of the journal. To begin with, the visual aspect of the journal has been improved with the aim of making it visually more agreeable for our readers. Even though the changes are not major compared to the previous issues, the Editorial Board of the journal wanted to offer a more bracing and better visual aspect, this being the first thing that every reader notices.

As for the Editorial Board of this issue, it has undergone a fundamental change, initiated by the dynamics of topics and scope that the magazine wants to have in the future. In this sense, some of the Editorial Board of the journal has remained the same, but some have been changed. With gratitude to those who have participated in the Editorial Board of the journal, the director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the representatives of the Societas Civilis Institute for Democracy of Skopje thought slight refreshment in the composition of the Editorial Board must be introduced. Prominent figures in the field of political sciences of the country, the region and from Europe and the USA were contacted. With great pleasure we would like to announce that experts and academics who were offered a place in the Editorial Board accepted our offer and in the future will take major decisions not only about the acceptance of the texts and the structure of the journal, but also on finding experts and academics in the field of social sciences that will permanently cooperate with "Political

Thought" in improving the already received texts. The existing team of experts and professors who are working on the improvement and revision of the texts remains, and its expansion goes towards covering as many topics and academic areas as possible related in one way or another to the topics of political science, this continuing to be the basis of the journal.

In this issue the Editorial Board decided to make a big step forward regarding the journal which will now be formatted following the pattern of the best academic and analytical journals in the field of social sciences. Namely, instead of thematic numbers, "Political Thought" opens to a format that will not have such limitation, but intends to address topics that are current at the moment in political theory, social events or related fields. This means that the next issues will not have a striking theme around which the texts would gravitate, but each author would be contributing to a topic in any area that is prevalent at the time the issue of the magazine is published. This in no way means that the editorial board of "Political Thought" will not initiate extraordinary thematic numbers, but it will be solely guided by the relevance of a particular topic that may need to be accessed from different aspects.

This format entails a change in the frequency of publishing the journal. Given its open format, the editorial board considered that the number of publications should be reduced and streamlined from four to two issues a year. Two issues are enough to cover all desired topics without the contents becoming repetitive and too detailed, yet without an essential contribution to a particular topic.

Along with this change, the Editorial Board of "Political Thought" introduces a novelty which should greatly enhance the quality of the journal, seriously raising the academic standards in the area that "Political Thought" covers, and it is most certainly the area of political and related social sciences. The process of receiving texts and their revision is reinforced in the direction of the famous "double blind" model of double revision of texts by two different experts in order to avoid bias and increase the quality of the received texts, both in content and structure. In this regard the Editorial Board wishes to point out that in the future the number of purely theoretical texts will decrease on behalf of texts containing specific case studies and analytical contents. This aims to promote "Political Thought" as a journal that offers not only more practical but also more applicable content for an audience that covers a large target group, ranging from the Academy, the politicians and the NGO activists, representatives of the international community and diplomatic corps in the country and abroad, to students in the areas covered by the journal. The rule from the previous format remains that an author cannot publish several times in the course of a year but only as an exception, i.e., at the invitation of the editorial board of "Political Thought".

In this issue "Political Thought" offers a colorful range of topics from different fields of political science and related sciences. The fifty-second issue of "Political Thought" covers topics of identity policies arising from the approach to archeology as a science, liberal theory, diplomacy, international relations and organizations, public opinion and the theory of conflict resolution. Each of these topics, through mostly original and review scientific articles, provides specific views of particular subjects. The authors in this issue are established domestic names from the academic community with whom "Political Thought" has been cooperating for some time now and who more than deserve to be presented in this issue. Thanking them for their contribution to the new format of the journal, the new Editorial Board of "Political Thought" thanks mostly its faithful readers who continue to follow us, a fidelity that "Political Thought" will reward not only with greater relevance of topics but also by constantly raising the quality of the journal.

Furthermore we would like to take the opportunity and invite all alert readers to share with us their views, comments or suggestions by contacting us directly to our email address: Skopje@kas.de or contact@idscs.org.mk.

Sincerely,

Johannes D. Rey, KAS

Prof. Dr. Nenad Markovic, IDSCS



Short Biography

Ambassador **Ljuben Tevdovski** is international expert, lecturer, diplomat, archaeologist and cultural policy advisor with almost two decades of experience on leading positions in educational, scientific and governmental institutions and nongovernmental organizations. His core fields of expertise incorporate anthropology, theory and history of archaeology and classical archaeology. His research and analyses also involve the scientific areas of cultural studies, cultural and public diplomacy and international relations. Tevdovski served as Macedonian Ambassador to Canada, Public Diplomacy Advisor and Member of the Foreign Policy Council of the President of Macedonia, and Chief of the Department of National Priorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He also worked as Deputy Director of Research of the Holocaust Fund of the Jews from Macedonia and Director of the Museum of the City of Skopje and served as Member of the Governing Board of the Macedonian National Dance Ensemble. Tevdovski is Chairman of the Scientific Board of the Institute of Cultural Heritage and Archaeology and President of the International Cultural Relations Institute. He is first generation lecturer of Cultural and Public Diplomacy on the Macedonian Diplomatic Academy and Assistant Professor in Classical Archaeology and Archaeological Theory on the Institute of History and Archaeology, UGD. He also taught Ancient Myths and Religions, Classical Civilizations, Byzantine Culture, Archaeology of the Middle East, Balkan Archaeology and Medieval Archaeology. Tevdovski is Editor-in-chief of the Journal of Archaeology, History and Anthropology and the Review of the Institute of History and Archaeology, UGD. He also served as member of the International Editorial Board of the scientific journal Macedonian Heritage and member of the Editorial Board of the Macedonian Journal of Foreign Policy Crossroads.

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Љубен Тевдовски

BETWEEN CLASSICAL ARCHAEOLOGY AND NEO-ORTHODOXY – TRANSFORMATIONS, IDENTITIES AND CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL ELITES IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE

INTRODUCTION

Interest for the past, ancient symbols, and traditions, represents a remarkable feature of various civilizations and historical periods. Deferent researchers in the fields of philosophy, psychology¹ and related social sciences have argued

¹ Janet Coleman, *Ancient and medieval memories: studies in the reconstruction of the past*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1992), p.600-614

in favour of a close link between this affinity and the underlying processes of human self-awareness and self-consciousness.²

The analyses of sociologists, anthropologists and historians have additionally noted that references to cultural, social and societal achievements and traditions are closely connected with the process of self-identification and the urge for legitimacy of the positions or aspirations of individuals and groups in a given society and the wider environment.³ In this regard, the conclusion of Professor Thomas W. Smith is very illustrative, unambiguous and worth mentioning. In his broader analysis of the relationship of history and international relations, Smith concludes that “people in power invariably espouse a certain view (version) of history.”⁴

This particular set of reasons and dynamics is to blame for the almost inevitable link between various forms of societal and intellectual activity, including scientific research of the past and cultures, as well as creative and artistic research, re-creations and the inspirations from them in arts and culture, with the political

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- 2 The ontological relationship between history and identity has been analyzed by many authors and in different epochs. One of the influential and notable analyses of this topic is the essay “On Use and Abuse of History for Life” by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. This essay represents important critique of historicism, which, interestingly enough, comes from a classical philologist in the epoch when historicism and influence of history on society is most thriving in Germany and Europe. Yet, besides his critique of historicism, and more importantly in this context, Nietzsche in this essay instigates philosophical analysis on the interactive relationship between history and the needs, aspirations and identity of individuals, giving suggestions and recommendations for appropriate usage of historical knowledge and traditions. However, it is not Nietzsche, but another great German philosopher that is unavoidable and still quoted in this regard. Hegel has constructed a theoretical relationship in which history is asymmetrically dominant and greatly influential over identity, self-cognition and life of the individual. Hegel’s extensive theoretical focus on this matter will lead towards important and unequivocal conclusion that: Any human society and all human activities, including science, art and philosophy are predetermined by their history. Thus, Hegel transforms history into main causal force of any human activity, arguing that every person and every culture is a product of its time. This philosophical view, known as Historicism, is also a significant field for debate in contemporary philosophy and social sciences. At the same time, this continuous interference of the past with the present and the future are of great relevance for the contemporary research in the fields of social psychology and social anthropology as well. Hofstede and Minkov, for example, elaborate extensively on the impact of symbols, heroes, rituals and traditions as part of the mental software of modern man and his understanding of himself and others. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Use and Abuse of History for Life, 1873*, translated by Ian C. Johnston, (Liberal Studies Department, Malaspina University-College, Nanaimo, British Columbia, 1998), p.11
Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, Michael Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations – Software of the Mind: Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival*, (McGraw-Hill, NYC, NY, USA, 2010), p.4-16
- 3 History, as a scientific discipline, and historians are familiar with the practice of self-portraying of the elites through references to traditions and identities from the past. The classical antiquity provides us with the illustrious examples, such as: the reference to the tradition of Homeric Achaean heroes by the Hellenic (Athenian) elites during the conflict with Persian empire, a reference to their mythological progenitors, like Dionysus, Heracles or Orpheus by the Macedonian dynasts, the call of the Romans on their Trojan origin, the call of Eastern Mediterranean dynasties dependent or semi-dependent on Rome on the direct legacy and blood lines from the Macedonian Seleucid and Ptolemaid dynasts, or the call of the Parthian dynasties on the direct legacy of the Persian dynast Darius. The medieval and modern history of humankind has provided even more illustrious examples of these tendencies. Contemporary trends in history and various related scientific disciplines place great emphases on this relationship, both in the researches focused on the distant past and those focused on modern history. Professor Diaz-Andreu, an archaeologist, is among those prominent historians of social sciences and humanities that elaborate extensively on the diverse connections between the self-identification and the needs and aspirations of the modern elites and the development, transformations and the overall professional history of different scientific disciplines and focuses. Margarita Diaz-Andreu, *A World History of Nineteenth-Century Archaeology, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Past*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.32,41-43,57-58
In terms of sociology, particularly illustrative are the observations of Friedrich Nietzsche, who directly connects the desire to explore the past with the aspirations and views on life of each individual. His analysis which elaborates on the motives for the interest for the science of history will hint the possibility that the motivations affect the view on history. In his essay on this topic the philosopher noted: “If a man who wants to create greatness uses the past, then he will empower (and portray) himself through monumental history... the man who wishes to emphasize (or preserve) the customary and traditionally valued cultivates the past as an antiquarian historian...(while a man) oppressed by a present need and who wants to cast off his load at any price (and overcome his difficulties) has a need for critical history.” The text in brackets is additional intervention by the author of these lines in order to clarify other potential contexts. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Use and Abuse of History for Life, 1873*, translated by Ian C. Johnston, (Liberal Studies Department, Malaspina University-College, Nanaimo, British Columbia, 1998), p.11
- 4 Thomas W.Smith, *History and International Relations*, (Routledge, London, UK & New York, USA, 1999), p.4

needs of various elites,⁵ and, even more importantly, through them with the collective identities through history.

Such socially engaged elites are often referred to or qualified under the category of “political elites.” According to political scientists and sociologists, they include “group(s) of people, corporations, political parties and/or any other kind of civil society organization who manage and organize government and all the manifestations of political power.”⁶ According to the renowned American political scientist and researcher of political elites John Higley, these groups not only promote their views of the past and the identities and symbols associated with it, but “by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to regularly and substantially affect (the) outcomes”⁷ of social debates and developments in this area.

This study analyzes, on the specific case of the modern Greek society, the undoubtedly significant “interest of the political actors for culture” and the importance of “cultural identities” in the “creation and enhancement of group cohesion, as well as maintaining of the political communication⁸,” and through them the overall development and perspectives of society. Focused on the identities and tendencies of contemporary Greek political elites, this paper locates and substantively analyzes the roots of their diversity and inconsistencies in socio-political relations developed since the establishment of the Greek kingdom. However, the analyses in this work are not restricted to the goal of making a credible portrayal of the identities of contemporary Greek elites. Their wider focus is rather directed towards identifying some of the features and qualities of these groups that are important or crucial as capacities or liabilities of Greek society and its leadership to respond to the multifaceted challenges that modern Greece, the wider region and the world face.

5 The relationship of prominent intellectuals, scholars and artists, and the process of creation of their cultural, scientific and other products and accomplishments, whose importance surpass by far their time and epoch, with the needs, political ambitions and projects of certain political and societal leaders, their close ties and patron dependency are present and well documented in different periods through history. One may just recall the illustrative examples in antiquity, such as Pericles and Phidias, Ptolemaic dynasts and Manetho, or Seleucid dynasts and Berossus, in order to comprehend to tremendous impact of such relationship for the global developments in art, culture or science. Exactly “in this context” reminds us Professor Strootman “one may also think of Berossos’ *Babyloniaca*, a history of Mesopotamia commissioned by Antiochos I, Manetho’s *Aegyptiaca*, the same for Egypt, and the translation of the Thora that Ptolemaios II ordered.” Yet, this important interconnectedness of transcendent artistic or scientific achievements and the political needs and aspirations of a concrete political elite and epoch persists through history from antiquity to modernity.

Rolf Strootman, PhD thesis, under mentorship of W.H. Gispen, *The Hellenistic Royal Courts: Court Culture, Ceremonial and Ideology in Greece, Egypt and the Near East, 336-30 BCE*, (Department of History, University of Utrecht, Netherlands, 2006/2007), p.213-215

On the later and different uses of the work of Manetho and Berossus for the identifications and clashes of the elites see:

Anthony Kaldellis, *Hellenism in Byzantium: The Transformations of Greek Identity and the Reception of the Classical Tradition*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 2008), p.126

6 Luis Garrido Vergara, *Elites, political elites and social change in modern societies*, *Revista de Sociologia* No. 28, (Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Chile, 2003), p. 33

7 Ibid.

8 Bucken-Knapp analyzing the scientific approaches to the matter refers to the arguments of the professor of political science at Stanford, David D. Laitin

Gregg Bucken-Knapp, *Elites, language, and the politics of identity: the Norwegian case in comparative perspective*, (State University of New York Press, Albany, USA, 2003), p.146-147

CASE STUDY OF MODERN GREECE

Different aspects of the “case of Greece” are almost inevitable topics of modern analyses of the interaction of archaeology and archaeological heritage with politics and identities. While most studies of postmodern science related to this case are focused on the impact of identities, perceptions and prejudices of the scientific and political elites in the development of modern science and policy, already a significant amount of papers analyze the other side of this equilibrium. The latter research focus aims to explore the impact of archaeology, as part of the wider spectrum of scientific and cultural activities and processes, on the development of the culture and identity of elites and modern societies in general.⁹

In this context, one might view the particular motives and the challenge to focus this research on the case of modern Greece. This particular modern society represents an important and illustrative case of a small country influenced by archaeology and archaeological heritage, but at the same time it possesses characteristics and creates implications much wider and significant than these obvious dynamics. Namely, one of the paradoxes of modern Greece is that while this modern society, according to many researchers, is essentially modeled by the views, visions and archaeological projects of Western non-Greek elites, at the same time it, or the ideas about, still represents a significant core of the supranational identity of Western elites in the globalizing world. At the same time, modern Greece is facing a chronic and dramatic security and economic instability and insufficiency, and the perception of it among international political elites still remains one of the most stable symbols and brands in contemporary international relations. Finally, it is particularly interesting that in many aspects of its historical and cultural development and its contemporary reality, Greece stands out from the “Western world” and yet represents its core conception, milestone and meaning.

This identity and the essential division of Greek history and modernity is particularly noticeable in recent years as the economic collapse and significant social and security challenges before the state and society, instigated by instability in the Middle East and the rapid migration processes, reveal serious issues and future dilemmas in this modern society.¹⁰

Many analysts and scientists include Greek political elites and their identity and culture among the key factors responsible for the current situation. Their specific cultural “conservatism” and the general reticence towards globalization processes, according to one of the most eminent British experts for the Balkans

9 Effie F. Athanassopoulou, *An “Ancient” Landscape: European Ideals, Archaeology, and Nation Building in Early Modern Greece*, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Volume 20, (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, 2002), p.277

10 Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical antiquities and their uses at the time of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium *Greece / Precarious / Europe*, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.5-6

James Pettifer, is the first factor that contributes to the contemporary challenges of Greek society. Professor Pettifer lists the “the centrality of a few political extended families within the political elite- the parataxis of the families of both major party leaders- the strength of Marxist and quasi-Marxist ideology and political parties, (and) the political and economic influence, if not direct unmediated power, of the Greek Orthodox church” as the basic problems of Greek society, followed by the relationships with neighboring countries, the traditional problem of the fragmented Greek landmass and islands and the long-term dependence on external finance.¹¹

But the Greek political elites are not the only local and national elites that opposed, faced and were frightened by the globalizing waves.¹² At the same time, they are not the only ones trying to preserve and present their “cultural and national fable” as part of the international dialogue and the preservation of its interests in the postmodern world of “geo-perceptions.” Therefore, the specifics of this culture, the cultural identities and symbols of identification of the Greek elites, responsible for, or at least influencing, the patterns and directions of the development of this society, significantly different from the prevailing European tendencies, are increasingly drawing the attention of researchers of various social sciences.

In this context, an illustrative element of the wider corpus of issues, connected to any scientific effort to define the performance and characteristics of this society, represents the inconclusive research of its true nature. The two centuries of scientific focus on Greece have constructed two different and completely opposed fables. One created and sustained by the classical archaeology and the classical philology and another by contemporary multidisciplinary approach and socio-cultural anthropology.

Classical archaeology, which was conceived and occasionally reinvents itself precisely upon the territory, the concepts and historical phenomena associated with Greece,¹³ has transformed, through its scientific paradigms, both modern Greece and the modern world. The historical and cultural fable that classical archaeology created and, in some aspects, maintains is in diametrical opposition to the contemporary scientific approaches and understandings of the culture of Greece, and culture in general, of researchers in the fields of anthropology, political science, cultural studies and related disciplines. Yet, the long history of this scientific focus and particular approach, as well as the plethora of hypotheses, artifacts and materials created in this process, inevitable lead to the creation of two parallel stories and perceptions of Greece. At the same

11 James Pettifer, *The Greek Crisis – A Pause, The Balkan Series*, (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, UK, 2010), p.3

12 Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, (Picador, New York, USA, 1999), p.29-43

13 Anthony Snodgrass, *What is Classical Archaeology? Greek Archaeology* in the edition Susan E. Alcock, Robin G. Osborne, ed., *Classical Archaeology*, (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Malden, MA, USA & Oxford, UK, 2012), p.13-29

time, this scientific development made dramatic impression on the creation of ideas, culture and identity of both Greek and international elites. Therefore, it represented and remains main ideological matrix in the construction of the contemporary Greek society and the creation of all policies designed and implemented by and related to the Greek state.

The “stereotypical notion” and perception of Greece created by classical archaeology and classical philology can be summarized in short as: the oldest European civilization;¹⁴ authentic European culture and identity with a millennial continuity, as well as a critical impact on the development and values of the “west”; a determinant of “western” geography, history and world domination.¹⁵ In contrast, the second fable and historical perception of Greece created in parallel by modern scientific trends and contemporary political experience is diametrically opposed and essentially denies the first. It can be presented in short as: Greece is very small, non-compact; a territory disconnected from and inaccessible by land; that because of this, and because of its climate and relief features does not have natural resources and is condemned to surviving on trade. Historically it is an area of the continuous mixing of different cultures and foreign influences, which are in a constant game of supremacy and continuously create the multicultural and particularistic context of this territory.¹⁶

The first “history of Greece” is the fruit of the early enthusiasm and most important projects of early classical archaeology. It is the most typical expression of prejudices and conceptions of European colonial and imperial elites, influenced by the ideas of racism and nationalism.¹⁷ In contrast, this by-product of the early development of modern scientific thought remains one of the most attractive brands, which through its distinctiveness unites as a communication code the scientific, political and social elites in Greece and the world.

The second “history of Greece” is a product of modern development of science and society. It has built in itself modern understandings, knowledge and pluralistic tendencies in the broader field of social sciences, but also a contribution to it has been given by the most modern archaeological research, made possible by the long presence of a multitude of archaeological teams, national and international archaeological institutions on the territory of Greece.¹⁸

14 Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical antiquities and their uses at the time of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium *Greece / Precarious / Europe*, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.2

15 Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.284-294

16 Ibid., p.299-300

17 Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical antiquities and their uses at the time of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium *Greece / Precarious / Europe*, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.1-3

Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.293-294

18 Carol Dougherty, Leslie Kurke, *Introduction: The Cultures within Greek Culture, in the edition* Carol Dougherty, Leslie Kurke, ed., *The Cultures within Ancient Greek Culture: Contact, Conflict, Collaboration*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 2003), p. 1-16

The “modern Greek fable” anticipates the inter-disciplinary, self-reflective and systematic approach of modern science, but at the same time, it is a result of the new open worldviews held by the intensively communicating elites of the globalizing world.¹⁹

It demystifies one of the largest and most outdated archaeological and historical myths of the Eurocentric world, thus paving the way for Greek society to move from a position of “sad relic”²⁰ of European imperialism, to contemporary society that actively and flexibly uses the symbols and past experience in line and parallel to the overall development of its capacities and infrastructure.

From here, many pose the question whether the Greek society is able to modernize and reinvent itself without having the Greek elites face the complex global transformations on social, economic, cultural and security level and their implications on Greek society and reality.

In the increasingly popular criticism of Greece, Western elites highlight the static, conservative and “thoroughly unmodern” character of the Greek society,²¹ while expecting the reform process that will bring the “Europeanization” and approximation of the society and the reality in Greece to those in other geographical regions of Europe.²² However, it seems that in their enthusiastic and often conceited desire to help Greece part of the European elites today, as two hundred years ago when they created the “old fable about Greece” remain unaware or insufficiently interested in the local reality, and the culture and aspirations of local elites in modern Greece.

In this sense, only an overview of the substantial misunderstandings between the foreign elites and the Greek elites throughout the history of modern Greece has the capacity to address some of the complex issues arising from the contemporary political, cultural and security challenges, which both Greek and European political elites will inevitable have to face.

THE IDENTITY AND CULTURAL “MISUNDERSTANDINGS” IN MODERN GREECE

One of the key episodes in modern Greek history that will predetermine the path of confrontations and contemporary cultural transformations is the

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- 19 Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.94
- Carol Dougherty, Leslie Kurke, *Introduction: The Cultures within Greek Culture, in the edition* Carol Dougherty, Leslie Kurke, ed., *The Cultures within Ancient Greek Culture: Contact, Conflict, Collaboration*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 2003), p. 1-16
- 20 Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical antiquities and their uses at the time of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium *Greece / Precarious / Europe*, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.,2-3
- 21 Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical antiquities and their uses at the time of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium *Greece / Precarious / Europe*, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.,2-3
- 22 James Pettifer, *The Greek Crisis – A Pause, The Balkan Series*, (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, UK, 2010), p.2

intervention of the Great Powers in the early nineteenth century, which resulted in the formation of a new political entity and social reality in the territories of the southern Balkans. Among contemporary scholars in this matter, the creation of the Kingdom of Greece is considered a “complex and controversial”²³ clash of identities, cultures and societies of the East and the West. It is the result of the imposition of the big idea of European humanism, associated with identities and social relations in Western Europe²⁴ on a small rocky, poor and long-term unstable region of the Ottoman Empire. The creation of a new Christian and European Atlantis, extracted from the sea of the “mystical Orient” and its “barbaric” context²⁵, at the same time represents a distant asylum that conservative European rulers would offer to the revolutionary anti-monarchist elites of Europe in the nineteenth century.²⁶ These elites, ideas, trends and needs of the Western world, despite the serious objections of the local population, will transform this micro-territory with crypto-colonial status²⁷ on the coastal

- 23 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.205
- 24 Today in modern science the consensus rules that “Hellenism, as a cultural *topos* (“place/category”), was an intellectual product of the Renaissance, which was subsequently renovated (and modified) through intellectual trends ranging from the Enlightenment to the Romanticism” in Western Europe. The construction of Hellenism in Western Europe and its adaptation to the needs of different trends and social transformations in the West, has been elaborated by several renowned authors at the end of the twentieth century (Turner 1981; Lambropoulos 1993; Augustinos 1994; Hadas 1960; Marchand 1996; Miliori 1998), and the XXIst century has seen extensive, elaborate and numerous analyzes of all aspects of this topic from the most renowned authors and scientific centers in the US, Europe, Greece and beyond. Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.205
- 25 In The first half of the nineteenth century “there was a highly interesting utopian moment, in which Friedrich Thiersch (classicist and educator) and Ludwig I of Bavaria (as well as other European idealists) thought Greece could be ‘a cornerstone of European freedom and the protectress of Christianity in the Orient (the East).’ Suzanne Marchand, *What the Greek model can, and cannot, do for the modern state: the German perspective*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)*, (Centre for Hellenic Studies King’s College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 2009), p.35
- 26 For the intellectuals of the Enlightenment, like Voltaire, the (idea of) Greek liberation did not mean (was not expect to bring) the “creation of independent Greece, but the victory of reason and human rights” over the absolutism of the empires and monarchies. After all, Western “philhellenic writers like Voltaire and Hölderlin really hoped that a Greek revolution would free them” and many “philhellenes who fought in the Greek War of Independence, especially the French and Italian volunteers, had been involved in revolutionary movements in their own countries and in Spain before they landed in Greece.” David Roessel, *In Byron’s Shadow: Modern Greece in the English & American Imagination*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002), p.15, 29
- 27 Contemporary authors, including several prominent Greek scientists, use for the case of the formation and development of the Greek kingdom in western protectorate(s) the terms “colony” and “colonialism,” “crypto-colonialism,” “pseudo-colonialism,” “informal-colonialism,” “protectorate” and the like, but most of these authors agree that even today we see aspects of the development of post-colonial society in Greece. (Margarita Diaz-Andreu, Michael Herzfeld, Yannis Hamilakis, Robert Holland, Diana Markides, Alexander Mirkovic, Nina Athanassoglou-Kallmyer) Margarita Diaz-Andreu, *A World History of Nineteenth-Century - Archaeology, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Past*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.99 Yannis Hamilakis, *Decolonizing Greek archaeology: indigenous archaeologies, modernist archaeology and the post-colonial critique*, in the edition Dimitris Damaskos, Dimitris Plantzos, ed. *A Singular Antiquity: Archaeology and Hellenic Identity in Twentieth-Century Greece*, (Benaki Museum, Athens, Greece, 2008), p.273-284 Robert Holland, Diana Markides, *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850–1960*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2006), p. 45,65 Alexander Mirkovic, *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.147-157 Nina Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, *Excavating Greece: Classicism between Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, во научниот журнал *Nineteenth-Century Art Worldwide*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (Association of Historians of Nineteenth-Century Art, CAA, New York, US, 2008), p.3

southern end of the Balkans into the true homeland of the classical illusions of the European elites.²⁸

One of the parties, disproportionately more powerful in this “clash of civilizations” were the Western elites, led by the foreign king and administration²⁹ appointed by them, which enthusiastically created on this limited territory a reality from the most modern western European myth of the day,³⁰ “the ideal and free” ancient “Hellas.”³¹ This myth represented a valuable tool for self-identification and self-representation of the German, as well as other European elites, which felt threatened by the French imperialistic endeavours. At the same time, it suited well the interests and worldviews of the growing and strengthening merchant class all over Europe, which was deeply inspired and encouraged by the anti-monarchist ideals of the French revolution.³² This overenthusiastic European philhellenes, indoctrinated through the scientific dogmas of the classical history and early classical archaeology, elevated the myth of “classical Greece” to such heights, that they were virtually convinced that all Europeans and “their” civilization, as opposed to the “East”, could trace their roots in these rocky cliffs of the most southern corners of the Balkans. In such a state of mind, these elites perceived the liberation of Greece as a process of rediscovery of the true nature of Europe.³³

Consistent to the European colonialist mentality of the nineteenth century, the new Western rulers perceived the local population as consisting of “degenerated” or uncultivated “barbarians” that Europe was obliged to civilize.³⁴

28 In recent decades, many authors have extensively reflected on the Roman background and contribution to the creation of the “imagined” ancient identity “Greeks,” and its relation to the ancient Hellenes. These analyses connect the ancient idea and concept of “Greek” with the “transformative power of the Roman imagination,” and the self-reflective nature that this determinant had for the Romans, that connected it to the civilized world and high culture of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Ronald Mellor, *Graecia Capta: The Confrontation between Greek and Roman Identity*, in the edition

Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.79-126

29 Robert Holland, Diana Markides, *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850–1960*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2006), p. 45,65

30 Marios Hatzopoulos will call Hellenism “the European dearest ideal of that time” (the period before and about the independence of the new kingdom), which will be useful for the desired local autonomy of the Christian population, to assert itself later on as a completely “new belief about identity.”

Marios Hatzopoulos, *From resurrection to insurrection: ‘sacred’ myths, motifs, and symbols in the Greek War of Independence*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.81-83

31 David Roessel, *In Byron’s Shadow: Modern Greece in the English & American Imagination*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002), p.13-41

32 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition

Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.207

Margarita Diaz-Andreu, *A World History of Nineteenth-Century - Archaeology, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Past*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.79-80

33 The later Western analysts of the hellenophilia of the Western intellectuals at the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, see it as a “consequence of the French Revolution,” and due to the features of the search for own ideals in the idyllic and unknown they call the philhellenism of the Western elites the “illegitimate sister of freedom.” Professor David Roessel will summarize that “philhellenism was built on the fact that the freedom in Greece was linked to the idea (desire) for some kind of transformation in the rest of the Western world.” David Roessel, *In Byron’s Shadow: Modern Greece in the English & American Imagination*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002), p.30

Roderick Beaton, *Introduction*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.3-4

34 Margarita Diaz-Andreu, *A World History of Nineteenth-Century - Archaeology, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Past*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.127-128

But unlike the other conquered territories, where the West saw significant natural resources and trade opportunities, in the new Kingdom of Greece the Western elites looked for their own “imagined” and glorified identity, represented through the illusion of the classical Hellenes.³⁵ Therefore, the local population in the new kingdom, “even though physically in Europe and (living in a space whose ancient history was) for centuries the focus of European Enlightened imagination, were treated more like colonial subjects.” At the same time, this “subaltern” people and their elites “had to live their everyday lives in the ...’imagined community’” ... of “the European Neo-Classical dream.”³⁶

The local population of this new and particularly symbolic Western “property”³⁷ - Greece played a relatively passive and unimportant role in the expensive “theatre” for self-representation of Western elites. Yet, for many liberal intellectuals, as well as for the later conservative supporters of the “Greek project” in Western governments, the identity or origin of these local people remained an important aspect in the wider maintenance of the mythological idea of restoring the ancient roots of the “ever-dominant” colonial Europe. Thus, while many European scientists, artists, statesman and travelers to the Kingdom argued that the contemporary population had nothing in common with “classical Greeks” and had descended from the “mixture” of the new demographic waves in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages³⁸, the philhellenic enthusiasts insisted on certain continuity. However, even the protagonists of the continuity among the Western scientific and layman publics were using “every occasion” to specify that the modern heirs of the classical Greeks were “degenerated” and “debased.”³⁹ Even so, this represented no obstacle to the European elites who were actively transforming this land of “savages”⁴⁰ into their imaginary “Classical Greece”.⁴¹ The expectations of the Bavarian rulers, through the words of Georg Ludwig von Maurer, were for the locals to follow the example, because “all the Greeks have

35 Andromache Gazi, *Archaeological Museums and displays in Greece 1829-1909: A First Approach*, in the scientific journal *Museological Review*, Vol.1, No.1, (Department of Museum Studies, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK, 1994), p.52, 69

36 Alexander Mirkovic *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.147

37 Alexander Mirkovic *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.152

38 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.231, in Roderick Beaton, *Introduction*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.4-5

Nina Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, *Excavating Greece: Classicism between Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, *Nineteenth-Century Art Worldwide*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (Association of Historians of Nineteenth-Century Art, CAA, New York, US, 2008), p.4

39 Andromache Gazi, PhD thesis, *Archaeological Museums in Greece (1829-1909). The Display of Archaeology, Volume One*, (Department of Museum Studies, University of Leicester, 1993), p.37

40 Nina Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, *Excavating Greece: Classicism between Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, *Nineteenth-Century Art Worldwide*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (Association of Historians of Nineteenth-Century Art, CAA, New York, US, 2008), p.4

41 Professor Liakos explains that “Hellenism as a cultural construct (imagination) of Western civilization was coined by Philhellenes (the West) as resuscitation (revival) of the ancient in modern Greece.”

Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.207-208

to do in order to be what they used to be (the idealized classical Hellenes), is to mimic the Germans.”⁴²

Despite all the Western illusions and misconceptions, the population they encountered in these poorest regions⁴³ of the Ottoman Empire in Europe had pre-existing elites, identities, values, myths and aspirations. Although being in a disadvantaged position in the general process of the development of the Kingdom of Greece, the local population, with its elites, was constantly making attempts to articulate at least partly its own worldviews in regard to the construction of the society and the new state. For this local multilingual and multi-confessional population, which usually identified itself with the Romaioi identity⁴⁴ and its historical memory reached to certain symbols, figures and concepts of the Roman (Byzantine) Empire, the values brought by the Western elites and rulers were less known and often more unacceptable than those of the Ottomans. Even the mere identities “Hellene” and “Greek”, which the West triumphantly imposed in the new kingdom, were unknown in the population, whereas the elites educated in the “Romaioi” Orthodox spirit saw these “Western” names as anti-Christian and pagan tendencies which insulted the grounds of their identity.⁴⁵

As attractive location for instability and piracy, these peripheral regions, with weak and instable land communication lanes with the continental centers of the empire, were for centuries habitually affected by the wider volatility and power struggles in the Mediterranean. Led by pro-Russian elites⁴⁶ and supported by diverse Orthodox Slavic speaking, Vlach speaking and Albanian speaking elites and outlaws in the Balkans, the local chieftains, who had long been semi-independently surviving due to smuggling and piracy in the Aegean and beyond, started the insurgence, later referred to as “Greek Revolt”.⁴⁷ While many researchers relate the western intervention to the situation that the local

42 Georg Ludwig von Maurer was a member of the regency council of minor King Otto.

Alexander Mirkovic *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.149

43 Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 1997, first printed 1992), p.48

44 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), pp.214,220-221

45 Not only throughout the Middle Ages, but also by the end of the eighteenth century and later, the views of many local intellectuals and leaders remain consistent. One such example is the evangelist Kosmas o Aitolós, who was spreading among the people of Epirus the “Christian language” - Greek while at the same time reminding the Epirots that: “you are not Hellenes” because “you are not unbelievers, heretics, atheists, but you are pious Orthodox Christians.”

Dimitris Livanios, *The Quest for Hellenism: Religion, Nationalism, and Collective Identities in Greece, 1453-1913*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), pp. 256-258, 264

46 Marios Hatzopoulos, *From resurrection to insurrection: 'sacred' myths, motifs, and symbols in the Greek War of Independence*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.81-86

47 Marios Hatzopoulos, *From resurrection to insurrection: 'sacred' myths, motifs, and symbols in the Greek War of Independence*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.81-86

pirate elites preyed on shipping,⁴⁸ the Anglo-French pressure and facilitation and the measures of the later Bavarian led government did not stabilize the rugged coastline. In the following years, through the “Bavarocracy” and after, these local elites would cause constant instability, through mutual conflicts, armed clashes and ruthless executions, and deeply rooted mistrust and divisions along the lines of the linguistic and religious differences, but above all on the bases of the local and tribal identities. Living on the edges of the empire, they were accustomed to living in the volatile Aegean and did not easily adapt to attempts for centralization and functionality of the new Greek Kingdom.

A particularly important aspect of cultural “misunderstandings”⁴⁹ with the new Western rulers was the fact that the local majority, led by the Orthodox elites, as well as many local leaders associated their identity with the orthodox traditions in the Ottoman empire, inherited from Byzantium. Therefore, they viewed the new kingdom only as a hotbed of conflict and support to the restoration of the Orthodox Romaioi Empire.⁵⁰ The “imaginary Hellada”⁵¹ born in the conscience of the Western liberal elites⁵² as a compact state entity did not exist even in the distant “classic history”, hence it had neither state traditions nor symbols around which the local people or the elite of the wider region would create their own mystifications.

In such conditions, the history of modern Greece represents two centuries long “cultural war”. As defined by the prominent historian from the University of Athens, Professor Liakos, it was a “struggle over memories”⁵³, between the multicultural traditions of the local elites of this important crossroad of cultures in the Mediterranean and the oppressive idea of “pure”⁵⁴ and “perfect” classical culture and authentic mimesis of the imagined “ancient Hellada.”⁵⁵

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- 48 James A. Wombwell, *The Long War Against Piracy: Historical Trends*, (Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA, 2010), p.6
- 49 Suzanne Marchand, What the Greek model can, and cannot, do for the modern state: the German perspective, во еднцијата Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.41
- 50 Marios Hatzopoulos, *From resurrection to insurrection: ‘sacred’ myths, motifs, and symbols in the Greek War of Independence*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.83-85
- 51 Ronald Mellor, *Graecia Capta: The Confrontation between Greek and Roman Identity*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.79-126
- 52 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.207-208
Suzanne Marchand, *What the Greek model can, and cannot, do for the modern state: the German perspective*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.33-42
- 53 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.234
- 54 Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.94
- 55 Constanze Guttenke, *Placing Modern Greece: The Dynamics of Romantic Hellenism, 1770-1840*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2008), p.2-3
Dimitris Livanios, *The Quest for Hellenism: Religion, Nationalism, and Collective Identities in Greece, 1453-1913*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p. 267-267

This process began and received its institutional dimensions when the “Protecting Powers’ imposed a monarchical form of government on Greece and young Otto, the second son of King Ludwig of Bavaria, was appointed (by them) King of Greece.” The new kingdom was ruled by a council of foreigners, and these new rulers “showed little (or no) understanding and sensitivity for the Greek reality,” and the identities and aspirations of the local elites.⁵⁶

On the contrary, the advent of the new western king in these poor lands which were predominantly populated by Romaioi,⁵⁷ who spoke several different languages, meant complete reorganization and transformation of this geography. It was focused on creating and imposing the almost unknown classical Hellenic name, the classical identity and values in the space of the new kingdom, as well as erasing the traditions of local elites. As in the case of all colonies of the nineteenth century, these local elites were called barbaric and unworthy subjects. In this context, the words of the Bavarian state (royal) architect, who welcomed King Otto, are more than illustrative. He would salute his patron with the words: “Your majesty stepped today, after so many centuries of barbarism, on this celebrated Acropolis”, where “all the remains of barbarity will be removed.”⁵⁸

The project of Europeanization project of the new kingdom began with significant political symbolism and specific ceremonial. Abandoning the centres and traditions of the local community and the “Greek uprising,” the Bavarian administration placed the capital of its new king “Otto of Greece” in a small village in the predominantly Arvanitic speaking Attica, which was located on the site where once upon a time in the “classical eras” ancient Athens⁵⁹ was situated. One of the most eminent scholars of modern Greek history, the British historian Richard Clogg, rightly concludes that this political gesture “symbolized the extent to which cultural orientation of the new state was to be influenced and indeed distorted by the burden of (Western romantic visions of) the Greek classical past.”⁶⁰

In the following period, the Western rulers and mentors set up the “entire ideological structure of the new state as a reminder of the ancient Greek world.” This activity meant that from “Ancient Athens,” the “Hellenic” western kings broke down the traditions, culture and identities of local elites throughout the

56 Andromache Gazi, PhD thesis, *Archaeological Museums in Greece (1829-1909). The Display of Archaeology, Volume One*, (Department of Museum Studies, University of Leicester, 1993), p.44

57 Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 1997, first printed 1992), p. 48

58 Alexander Mirkovic *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.152-153

59 Hamilakis associates the process also with the rebuilding of Sparta, as the “second city in the kingdom” Yannis Hamilakis, Eleana Yalouri, *Sacralising the Past – Cults of Archaeology in Modern Greece*, *Archaeological Dialogues - Volume 6*, Issue 02, (1999, (Cambridge University Press, UK), p.125

60 Andromache Gazi, PhD thesis, *Archaeological Museums in Greece (1829-1909). The Display of Archaeology, Volume One*, (Department of Museum Studies, University of Leicester, 1993), p.45

kingdom, replacing them with their “classical illusions.” As the royal architect promised his King Otto, “all the remains of barbarity (including toponymy, architecture, language, culture, traditions and symbols of the population) will be removed ... in all Greece, and the remains of the glorious (classical) past will be brought in new light, as solid foundation for glorious present and future.”⁶¹

One of the aspects of the “de-barbarization” of the new kingdom was the extensive change of toponymy with which the new rulers and elites close to them put their hand on one of the most important aspects of pre-national identity, in order to integrate a wider territory in the image of the “restored Hellada.” This policy of “acculturation” encompassed even the “names that had acquired a commemorative value, particularly since the Revolution of 1821”, that “were often replaced by obscure, antiquated denominations (like Tripoli in place of Tropolitza, Aigion in place of Vostitsa, Kalamai in place of Kalamata, Amphissa in place of Salona, Lamia in place of Zitouni, Agrinion in place of Vlachori), etc.”⁶² The fact that in 1909 there was a proposal for one third of the villages in Greece to change their names speaks about the extensive modification of the local toponyms and culture, in order to remove all the “non-classical” names, and with them the non-classical aspects of the past in modern Greece.⁶³

Finally, many of famed topoi of the “Greek uprising” were transformed into auxiliary areas, in which local villagers lived with the dynamics of the activities of the French, English, German or American diplomats, archaeologists, tourists and enthusiasts who intensively dug out of the ground the classical cities and artifacts. The magnitude of this overwhelming transformation is shown by the fact that one of the remarkable Balkan regional leaders from Thessaly, regarded as the most significant early protagonist of the Greek state project, had to enter into the Greek national pantheon under a changed name. Thus, the Vlach speaking Riga from Velestino, because of the Slavic name of his birthplace, was inscribed in the Greek historiography according to the name of the ancient Thessalian city Pherae, and posthumously called Riga of Pherae (Feres).⁶⁴

61 Alexander Mirkovic, *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.152-153

62 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.232

63 Margarita Diaz-Andreu, *A World History of Nineteenth-Century - Archaeology, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Past*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.106
 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p. 231-232
 Pavlos Hatzopoulos, *The Balkans beyond Nationalism and Identity: International Relations and Ideology*, (I.B.Tauris & Co, London, UK & New York, USA, 2008), p.10

64 This way the Vlach speaking ideologist of the Romaioi Empire in the second half of the eighteenth century, through the classical archeological site close to his birth place, will be connected to the new Hellenic identity of the Kingdom.
 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.232-233

Tourists and itinerants, already heavily influenced by classical tomography, now drew the modern Greek reality moving through the extensive network of archaeological sites that classical literary tradition had transformed into an exciting reality of modernity.⁶⁵

The creation of this imaginary “classical” nation, through the “Hellenization of Modern Greece” did not limit itself to “hellenization of the space” of the kingdom.⁶⁶ Shortly after the proclamation of the kingdom, the Romaioi language, which was the language of high culture of all Christians in the Balkans, was named “barbaric” or “barbarized”.⁶⁷ The “pure” language of the realm had to be connected to the artificial language of classical literature, familiar to classically educated Western elites and the fictional link with the ancient identity suggested tendencies of absolute mimesis,⁶⁸ which is best illustrated by the ideal of the period: “that if any ancient Greek were to rise from the dead, he would (should) recognize his language”.⁶⁹

Modern science states that “the first fifty years of the life of the Modern Greek state (1830-1880) could be described as a period of Hellenization of the Greek language” that “purged [the language] of words and expressions of Turkish, Italian, Slavic and Albanian origin.”⁷⁰ Thus, during the nineteenth century, the modern Romaic language called Romeika (Roméika),⁷¹ from spoken language, that was a “daughter” of ancient Hellenic language and the imperial Koine,⁷² was transformed into an artificial redesigned copy of ancient literature. This form was not only unrecognizable to the Vlach speaking, Slavic speaking, Albanian speaking people and residents of the kingdom, but was not near to any of those elites and groups who spoke the Romaioi language.⁷³

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- 65 Suzanne Marchand, *What the Greek model can, and cannot, do for the modern state: the German perspective*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.40-41
Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.289
- 66 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.230-234
- 67 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.220,225
- 68 Peter Mackridge, *A language in the image of the nation: Modern Greek and some parallel cases*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Centre for Hellenic Studies King’s College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 2009), p.181
- 69 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.222
Nina Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, *Excavating Greece: Classicism between Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, во научниот журнал *Nineteenth-Century Art Worldwide*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (Association of Historians of Nineteenth-Century Art, CAA, New York, US, 2008), p.12
- 70 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.224
- 71 The advocates against “Hellenization” of the modern language in Greece use the term also during the nineteenth and twentieth century. Tassos A. Kaplanis, *Antique Names and Self-Identification*, in the edition Dimitris Tziouvas, ed. *Re-imagining the Past: Antiquity and Modern Greek Culture*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2014), p.85
- 72 Peter Mackridge, *A language in the image of the nation: Modern Greek and some parallel cases*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Centre for Hellenic Studies King’s College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 2009), p.180
- 73 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.222-223

These and such efforts towards acculturation and “civilizing” the inhabitants of the Kingdom according to the ideas and criteria for the “Classics” of its new rulers intensively changed the space and culture, but also met with obstacles and opposition in the aspirations, perceptions and values of the weaker side in the “cultural war” on this limited territory on the margins of the Balkans. While the new Western rulers “civilized” Greece with great commitment and enthusiasm, the local population and elites expressed their “resistance (and refused to live in) this European neo-classical dream.”⁷⁴ Opposing the new government and its policies, local and Orthodox elites articulated different and multifaceted political and ideological alternatives to the process of “Hellenization” that systematically removed their traditions, culture, symbols, identity and local social relations.⁷⁵

The misunderstanding of these representatives of the two “civilizations” and the various social groups and individuals who favoured them, created a deeply divided society. According to the scientific community, this division originated from their different love and understanding of the same country.⁷⁶ While for the ruling Europeans, “Greece was the cradle of (their) culture and valuable antiquity,” for the local elites “it was home that they spilled their blood for,” and that they aspired to independently manage and develop according to their local interests and traditions and more freely than ever.⁷⁷

The local population and many representatives of their elites gave different forms of resistance to changes in the toponyms, architecture, language, culture, traditions, symbols and identity of the population. For many representatives of the local elites, key aspects of their culture were the lineal ties and the closed patriarchal communities at the Greek banks that have been particularized for centuries. They opposed the various trends of centralization early, whereas the confrontation with the “European Hellenism”⁷⁸ took place on the issue of changing the names of places that, together with the religion, were the most important aspects of their pre-modern identity. An additional problem for the process of change was the demotic movement that for more than a century

74 Alexander Mirkovic *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.147

75 Yanna Delivoria, *The notion of nation: the emergence of a national ideal in the narratives of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ Greeks in the nineteenth century*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Centre for Hellenic Studies King’s College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 2009), p.109-120

Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition

Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.220-230

76 Alexander Mirkovic *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.147

Yanna Delivoria, *The notion of nation: the emergence of a national ideal in the narratives of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ Greeks in the nineteenth century*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Centre for Hellenic Studies King’s College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 2009), p.109-120

77 Alexander Mirkovic, *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.156

78 Yannis Hamilakis, *Double Colonization – The Story of the Excavations of the Athenian Agora (1924-1931)*, *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Vol. 82, No. 1, *Special Issue: Philhellenism, Philanthropy, or Political Convenience?* (American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Greece, 2013), p.161

enjoyed unparalleled local support in the resistance to the fictional “ancient” language “Katharevousa”, which was inapplicable to the modern times.⁷⁹ Part of the local elites and the Greeks of the Diaspora persistently noted that this artificial language was an obstacle to the development of education and promoted illiteracy among the general population of the kingdom.

Nevertheless, the confrontation of the western Hellenism “installed”⁸⁰ in the new kingdom with the local culture of its subjects did not have only local and personal implications. On the contrary, “the new national name, Hellenes, also constituted an obvious discontinuity with the past 1500 years (and all the traditions, culture and symbols associated with it) and created enormous tension between the Hellenism and the Romiosyni (local Christian identity), which will present itself as difficult to overcome.”⁸¹

The Romaioi identity, dominant in the tradition of local elites in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, remained a prominent political alternative to the intensively promoted Hellenic identity. This local concept of identity, associated with the terms “Romiosyni” or “Romaioi”, “dissociates modern Greek identity from the Classical past, and adopts (and advocated) a more diffused, popular and immediate feeling for identity” among the local population, linking it to the tradition of “self-nomination of Greeks (Orthodox Christians) during the Byzantine and Ottoman centuries.”⁸² The proud and long time independent elites that carried the Greek revolt found early their allies in Constantinople and continental cultural elites of the Romaioi cultural context of the Ottoman Empire. These elites who viewed the Greek kingdom as a hotbed of the liberation movement of Christians in the Ottoman Empire were reluctant to abandon their visions for a Romaioi Kingdom and Romaioi identity. At the beginning of the twentieth century (in 1909), the first integrated “History of the Romaioi” was published in Athens, sparking a lively debate in Greek society. Of course, the main opponents of such a historical view and literary undertaking were the classic archaeologists, who until that moment experienced the climax of their organization and social visibility in the kingdom of Greece.⁸³

79 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.222-223

80 Tassos A. Kaplanis, *Antique Names and Self-Identification*, in the edition Dimitris Tziouvas, ed. *Re-imagining the Past: Antiquity and Modern Greek Culture*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2014), p.97

81 Tassos A. Kaplanis, *Antique Names and Self-Identification*, in the edition Dimitris Tziouvas, ed. *Re-imagining the Past: Antiquity and Modern Greek Culture*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2014), p.95

82 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.214

83 Daniel Paul Payne, *The Revival of Political Hesychasm in Greek Orthodox Thought: A Study of the Hesychasm Basis in the Thought of John S. Romanides and Christos Yannaras*, dissertation, Mentor Derek H. Davis (J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, USA, 2006), p.417

GREEK POLITICAL ELITES AND NEO-ORTHODOXY

A considerable number of representatives and groups of local elites in the Greek kingdom were in constant confrontation and rebellion against the new “Western” rulers since kingdom’s establishment. Through this struggle, they acquired significant aspects of their modern identity. Tying their identity to Constantinople and Asia, they produced the Greek “Great Ideal” early in the kingdom’s history. Called sometimes the “Megali Idea,” this conception, at least in theory, connected the lost “Romaioi” world of the locals, urging for its credentials as an indigenous culture of the broader Eastern Mediterranean cultural space. At the same time, this collective vision was seen by groups and members of the local elites and certain political leaders as an opportunity for this poorest⁸⁴ part of the “Greek world” to become self-sustainable and overthrow western domination.⁸⁵

These and such anti-Western overtones⁸⁶ and traditions were further strengthened by the development of leftist ideas in the world and certainly contributed to their great popularity in Greece. In this sense, the efforts and ideas of many Greek communists and anarchists can be placed in the wider corpus of the anti-colonial movement in the world in many respects.⁸⁷ In contemporary Greece, more and more, as in the Middle East, local cultural and religious traditions question the identity, symbols and culture imposed by the “Western colonialists”.⁸⁸

However the specific case of Greece has important features that make this issue more complex for the future of Europe and the wider trends in international relations. Namely, in other entities of the eastern and southern Mediterranean, which were also subjected to identity change influenced by European “classical” ideas, such as Persia, Syria, Phoenicia, Egypt, Libya, etc., the Christian elites, as in Greece, were among the most dominant in the acceptances of the western

⁸⁴ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 1997, first printed 1992), p.48

⁸⁵ Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008),

⁸⁶ Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p. 267-269

⁸⁷ James Pettifer, *The Greek Crisis – A Pause, The Balkan Series*, (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, UK, 2010), p.2-5
Yannis Hamilakis, *Double Colonization: The Story of the Excavations of the Athenian Agora (1924–1931)*, *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Vol. 82, No. 1, Special Issue: Philhellenism, Philanthropy, or Political Convenience? *American Archaeology in Greece* (January-March 2013), pp. 153-177

⁸⁸ Lynn Meskell, ed. *Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, politics and heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*, (Routledge, London, UK & New York, USA, 2002), p. 143-167
Yannis Hamilakis, *Double Colonization – The Story of the Excavations of the Athenian Agora (1924-1931)*, *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Vol. 82, No. 1, Special Issue: Philhellenism, Philanthropy, or Political Convenience? (*American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Greece, 2013), p.161
Michael Herzfeld, *Anthropology through the looking-glass – Critical ethnography in the margins of Europe*, (Cambridge University Press, New York, USA, 1987), p.198

culture and identities in order to emancipate themselves from the rule of Muslim rulers.⁸⁹

In reaction to this colonial past, in these regions in recent decades we witness revival of the pre-colonial identities, culture and of social relations,⁹⁰ while Christian minorities often fall victim to this radical side-effect of the western domination.⁹¹ In Greece, however, a small territory with very limited human and natural resources, the Christian population did not emancipate from the Muslim rulers, as in other regions of the spacious “Old world.” Muslims in this region were eliminated during the “Greek uprising.” The contradiction of this development was that the new Western elites, unlike in other regions, in Greece ruled not over the predominantly Muslim religious or mixed populations but over the Orthodox Christians that the West had consistently called Greeks for centuries. Thus, in Greece the Christian, not the Muslim, elites show long-term animosity towards the West and the social and cultural phenomena associated with its influence.

Today, many researchers, analysts and concerned observers are puzzled with the picture of the united front of the far-right and far-left voices in Greek society, on the basis of their anti-western sentiments, as well as the pro-Russian sympathies and political inclinations. The roots of these recently amplified overtones and developments are deeply embedded in the political constellations in pre-War and Cold-War Greece. The ideological isolation from Western liberal trends, mastered for decades by the totalitarian right-wing regimes ruling over Greece added new aspects in the Greek misunderstanding with the West. At the same time, equally crippling were the deep mistrust and the long-term grudge towards the West of the suppressed leftist opposition. Additionally, during the Cold War era and after, prominent Greek scholars and professors, such as John S. Romanides and Christos Yannaras, “articulated the neo-Orthodoxy as an alternative Greek Orthodox identity vis-à-vis the West”, thus transcending the religious misunderstandings with the West, into wider ideological and political clash.⁹²

In the new challenging and increasingly multi-polar global realities, and in the light of certain weakening and short-comings of the Western global influence, the concept of Neo-Orthodoxy⁹³ amplifies its scope and political implications.

89 Lynn Meskell, ed. *Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, politics and heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*, (Routledge, London, UK & New York, USA, 2002), p. 146

90 Michael Herzfeld, *Anthropology through the looking-glass – Critical ethnography in the margins of Europe*, (Cambridge University Press, New York, USA, 1987), p.198

91 Lynn Meskell, ed. *Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, politics and heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*, (Routledge, London, UK & New York, USA, 2002), p.165-167

92 Daniel Paul Payne, *The Revival of Political Hesychasm in Greek Orthodox Thought: A Study of the Hesychasm Basis in the Thought of John S. Romanides and Christos Yannaras*, dissertation, Mentor Derek H. Davis (J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, USA, 2006), p.442

93 Seraidari underlines the positions of the Orthodox churches in Greece, but also in the post-communist countries in the wider region that “build their influence upon the rejection of pro-European and supposedly “corrupting” values, serving thus as a medium for the fears and discontents produced by social changes.” Katerina Seraidari, *Religious Processions in the Aegean (Greece). Issues of Gender, Social Status and Politics*, *Ethnologia Balkanica, Journal for Southeast European Anthropology*, Volume 16, 2012, p. 240

These tendencies in the “Slavic-Orthodox sphere,” where Huntington’s notorious article places Greece, as well,⁹⁴ certainly find fertile soil in the pre-national identities and the traditional anti-Western sentiment of Greek society. In such a context, the unification of the radical left option SYRIZA⁹⁵ and the radical right party “Independent Greeks” in the governmental “double-populist coalition”, whose only common ground are the “pro-Russian tones in Athens”, represents an important indicator of the challenges and political dilemmas that the Greek society faces today.⁹⁶

Equally representative parameters for certain aspects of the worldview of Greek political elites are the positions of the leaders of the particularly influential Orthodox Church in Greece,⁹⁷ presented and propagated through public comments and arguments, like those of the Athenian bishop Christodoulos. He suggests, in line with the post-colonial syndrome and in the framework of the “Eastern” stereotype, that the history and culture of Greece (with a focus on “Hellenic” Byzantium) should not be analyzed under the influence or in relation to contemporary Western and non-Greek scholars. After privatizing and nationalizing the Byzantine cultural heritage and suggesting that it is not a part of the Western world, the archbishop contradicts his previous positions by claiming that it is the basis for the creation of the European identity. For the modern historians, sociologists and anthropologists in Greece and the world underline that “this attitude (and the more general line of the Greek Orthodox Church) could be compared with modern Islamic attitudes on history” and as such represents an example par excellence of the post-colonial aspects of Greek culture and identity.⁹⁸

A prominent historian of Athens University and Chairman of the Board of the International Commission for History and Theory of Historiography, professor Antonis Liakos, compares such attitudes on the part of the Greek social and spiritual leaders with those revisionist Islamic elites, who often point out that “Islamic history is influenced by Western education, (which is unable) to understand Islam, (because) the mind that will judge Islamic life must be Islamic in its essence.” Thus, according to Liakos, in these post-colonial societies there is a “move from the suppression of entire past periods, located outside the Western cultural canon, to the idealization of these same periods as distinct

94 Dimitris Tziouvas, *Beyond the Acropolis: Rethinking Neohellenism*, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Volume 19, Number 2, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), p.208

95 In contrary to the expectations of a dramatic confrontation of the radical left and the conservative and overwhelmingly influential Greek Church, the trends are moderate and dissimilar to those in other societies. Andreas Karicis, doctor of philosophy and member of Central Committee of SYRIZA has elaborated this ideologically unusual symbiosis with the words: “What separates the Church and Syriza is much less important than what unites them,” adding that “in this time when (Western) neo-liberalism attacks European societies, these two forces (SYRIZA and the Church) are naturally found on the same side: that of resistance and human values.” <http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/why-syriza-leftists-play-nice-with-greek-orthodox-church>

96 *Macro Update: Greek chaos, Italian success, Russian risk*, Berenberg Macro Flesh, (Joh. Berenberg, Gossler & Co., London, UK, 2015), p.3

97 James Pettifer, *The Greek Crisis – A Pause, The Balkan Series*, (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, UK, 2010), p.3

98 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.209

cultural features (of these societies) and as (their) contributions to universal civilization.”⁹⁹

| GREEK ELITES AND CLASSICAL GREECE

The complex aspects of the contemporary Greek national and cultural narrative, implying inherent animosity towards some of the values, symbols and traditions, that the European continent and its elites consider to be the basis of their identity, are important, but not the exclusive aspect of the modern identity of the Greek elites and the Greek society. The analyses of such trends should not overestimate their overall impact, whereas their drastic forms of occurrence in modern Greek politics and society should be analyzed in terms of the wider crisis of social values and identities in Europe. These aspects of anti-colonial, anti-Western and anti-European sentiment make up only one of the layers of contemporary Greek identity. At the same time, one should bear in mind that the values and symbols brought or imposed by the Western elites in the last two centuries already represent the integral and equally influential aspect of the identity of contemporary Greece.

In this context, any analysis of the contemporary Greek society should take into account the results of the intense process of acculturation “during the nineteenth and twentieth century, (when) modern Greece was “Hellenized” and “Hellenism” acquired a modern Greek version.”¹⁰⁰ Thus, nowadays the “imagined Hellas” of the Western idealistic intellectuals of the eighteenth and nineteenth century is being transformed into and monopolized by a real state, that places great emphasis on the identities and symbols of “Hellenism”, once imported from the West.

Moreover, certain modern scholars would underline that from today’s perspective, many Greeks cultivate the exact attitude and “sense of the past (which) was imported in Greece by Western Europe”, because “the awe in which the Western world has held the classical tradition has shaped and reshaped (thus succeeded in transforming) Greek apprehension of their own past.”¹⁰¹

Therefore, despite the findings of contemporary researchers that the creation of the modern Greek identity “was not connected (as in some other cases in the nineteenth century) with the process of ‘inventing the community’ or ‘inventing the tradition’ by the (local elites) Greeks” but with the “Germans

99 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.209
Dimitris Damaskos, *Archaeology, National Identity and the Greek Museum*, (Ann Arbor, Kelsey Museum of Archaeology, USA, 2010)

100 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.229

101 Professor Andromache Gazi cites several European authors on this subject.
Andromache Gazi, PhD thesis, *Archaeological Museums in Greece (1829-1909). The Display of Archaeology, Volume One*, (Department of Museum Studies, University of Leicester, 1993), p.37

imagining Greece, or more precisely, with the Germans imagining Germany (in Greece)", further development and transformations have shown certain indigenous tendencies.¹⁰² The early process of appropriation of western identity, symbols and the mythologization of Hellenism is associated with the needs and aspirations of the "Greek Diaspora." These individuals, directly affected by the stigma and the negative perceptions of the West regarding the backward Orthodox believers, called Greeks, enthusiastically embraced the idyllic mystification of their supposed "Hellenic" origin.¹⁰³ Yet, later on, the nationalist historiography, written under the German and Western impressions, but with Greek signatures, had a wider and more significant influence, offering an important avenue for the unification of the new nation.¹⁰⁴ In this context is the statement of Professor Kaplanis from the University of Thessaloniki, that: "The only way to explain why generations of intellectuals in the nineteenth and twentieth century would try to make a case for the continuity of the Hellenes, based on 0.3 per cent of (historical sources) the evidence, while at the same time so obstinately ignoring the other 96.5 per cent (that Kaplanis proves to be pointing to the centuries long continuous Romaioi identity) is to admit the power that the national narrative exercises over its subjects."¹⁰⁵

Finally, in the twentieth century, not only the elites, but also the broader structures of the local population had the opportunity to solidify their national feeling, through education, high culture and national symbols, as well as through confrontation with other identities and national projects in the region. Throughout the twentieth century, inspired by the fables of classical history, the "barbarians" who were Hellenized under a Western-European government were transformed into fanatical protagonists of the "assimilation policy through Hellenization" of the Christian population in the north of Olympus and in Asia Minor.¹⁰⁶

As a result of this complex process, today modern Greek national and state identity, which unites significant part of Greek citizens and various groups in the Diaspora, undoubtedly rests on the narratives and symbols of classical Greece. The Hellenic language, as opposed to modern Romaioi, was considered the language of antiquity until the nineteenth century, while today it represents

¹⁰² Alexander Mirkovic, *Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identity in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843)*, in the scientific journal *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.157

¹⁰³ Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical antiquities and their uses at the time of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium *Greece / Precarious / Europe*, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.2

¹⁰⁴ Ioannis Koubourlis *European historiographical influences upon the young Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)*, (Centre for Hellenic Studies King's College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 2009), p.53-64

¹⁰⁵ Tassos A. Kaplanis, *Antique Names and Self-Identification*, in the edition Dimitris Tziouvas, ed. *Re-imagining the Past: Antiquity and Modern Greek Culture*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2014), p.95

¹⁰⁶ Lynn Meskell, ed. *Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, politics and heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*, (Routledge, London, UK & New York, USA, 2002), p.49

a term used for the language of modern Greeks.¹⁰⁷ At the same time, the liberalized use of the demotic language in Greece from 1980 by the left-wing reformers of the totalitarian society of the Greek military junta is not returning to the language of the leaders of the “Greek uprising,” but is accepting two centuries cleansed, under classical impressions, Romaioi language.¹⁰⁸ Today, the pre-national culture, religion and the reactions of Western domination are substantially balanced by Athens, the Acropolis, the produced “classic” touristic toponymy and numerous archaeological sites across the country. All of these contemporary “evidence” confirm that Hellas is not just a romantic illusion of foreign elites, but a modern nation proud of its own history and culture.

In strengthening its state and national sovereignty, especially during the twentieth century, the Greek state utilized, with high fanaticism, the installed foreign “classical myth” not only in its relations with neighbours, but also, and even more drastically, in the policies of integration and acculturation applied to its citizens.¹⁰⁹ In the attempts to create an integrated and sustainable nation, especially on the territories where there was cultural diversity and aspirations of residents towards other national and state projects, the national identity preserved by the puritan norms of the classicists was transformed into a symbol of repression and totalitarian tendencies in Greek society.¹¹⁰ In the twentieth century, the traditional instability in Greece was complemented by periods of radical dictatorships, with ideologies integrating elements of the most radical forms of nationalism, xenophobia and racism.¹¹¹ The ideal of “classical Greece”, which at the end of the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth century was designed as a radical liberal movement in Western Europe,¹¹² was transformed into a “national” identity with racist connotations by the European conservative governments and their colonial mentality in the nineteenth century¹¹³ and in the twentieth century was further transformed into a radical doctrine to “protect” the identity of the unstable Greek state against the new waves of global liberal

107 Antonis Liakos, *Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space*, in the edition Katerina Zacharia, ed. *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.208-210

108 John Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict*, (SAGE Publications, London, UK & Thousand Oaks, California, USA & New Delhi, India, 2005), p.81

109 Pavlos Hatzopoulos, *The Balkans beyond Nationalism and Identity: International Relations and Ideology*, (I.B.Tauris & Co, London, UK & New York, USA, 2008), p.59,77

110 Dimitra Kokkinidou and Marianna Nikolai, *On the Stage and Behind the Scenes: Greek Archaeology in Times of Dictatorship*, in the edition Michael L. Galaty Charles Watkinson, *Archaeology under dictatorship*, (Springer Science+Business Media, New York, USA, 2004), p.157-158 Erik Sjöberg, PhD thesis, *Battlefields of Memory: The Macedonian Conflict and Greek Historical Culture*, (Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden, 2011), p.90-97

111 Dimitra Kokkinidou and Marianna Nikolai, *On the Stage and Behind the Scenes: Greek Archaeology in Times of Dictatorship*, in the edition Michael L. Galaty Charles Watkinson, *Archaeology under dictatorship*, (Springer Science+Business Media, New York, USA, 2004), p.163

112 Modern scholars, such as Olga Augustos, extensively elaborated the goals and ideas of early Western European Hellenism, which had no national or geographical aspirations and did not advocate for “the creation of an independent Greece, but the victory of reason and human rights” over the authoritarianism of empires and monarchies in Europe and the world.

David Roessel, *In Byron's Shadow: Modern Greece in the English & American Imagination*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2002), p.15, 29

Effie F. Athanassopoulou, *An “Ancient” Landscape: European Ideals, Archaeology, and Nation Building in Early Modern Greece*, in the scientific journal *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Volume 20, (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, 2002), p.279-280

113 Margarita Miliori, *Europe, the classical polis, and the Greek nation: Philhellenism and Hellenism in nineteenth-century Britain*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Centre for Hellenic Studies King's College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 2009), p.68

and revolutionary ideas. At the end of the sixties and early seventies of the twentieth century, as liberal ideas of pacifism and human rights spread from Woodstock to Prague and beyond, transcending national, ideological, cultural and other barriers, Greece remained isolated under an extremely repressive military dictatorship. The “value system of the (Greek) junta (in the seventies) is crystallized in the phrase: ‘Torture is necessary to protect our civilization’ that one of the dictators expressed in response to the allegations by Amnesty International in respect of breaches of human rights in Greece.”¹¹⁴

Yet, even today, for the modern Greek political elites the classical archaeology and archaeological sites and artefacts connected to it, provides certain identity alternative to Orthodoxy and the socially influential Church, with its omnipresent religious objects, rituals and events. The classic historical fable appeared as a “new religion”¹¹⁵ from the very beginnings of the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece, and the “classical archaeology” constituted and still constitutes a bridge for the Greek political and intellectual elites to the western world, society and values. In this context are the analyses of Professor Martin Millett on classical archaeology and its contemporary connection to Greek national identity. The prominent British archaeologist and academic, referring to the role of Classical Greece, underlines the new scientific and societal realities, with the words: “Although from a contemporary (scientific) perspective this clearly distorts the evidence, creating nothing more than a modern myth, it remains politically powerful, as witnessed in the manipulation of the Classical past for the opening ceremony of the Athens Olympics in 2004.”¹¹⁶

While modern trends in archaeology and social sciences in general continuously adjust the analysis, questioning the fundamental tenets of classical archaeology,¹¹⁷ the vibrant infrastructure of foreign archaeological centres and teams, originated from the classical focus, represents even today an important avenue of intellectual dialogue of the Greek elites with the world. Finally, “the secular religion of Hellenism”, built on the narratives of classical linguistics and materialized in the findings and interpretations of classical archaeology, represents even today an important aspect of the self-cognition of Greek elites and as such intertwines, complements and democratizes the growing Neo-Orthodox tendencies in Greek society.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ Dimitra Kokkinidou and Marianna Nikolai, *On the Stage and Behind the Scenes: Greek Archaeology in Times of Dictatorship*, in the edition Michael L. Galaty Charles Watkinson, *Archaeology under dictatorship*, (Springer Science+Business Media, New York, USA, 2004), p. 173

¹¹⁵ Yannis Hamilakis, Eleana Yalouri, *Sacralising the Past – Cults of Archaeology in Modern Greece*, *Archaeological Dialogues - Volume 6*, Issue 02, (1999, (Cambridge University Press, UK), p.127-130

¹¹⁶ Martin Millett, *What is Classical Archaeology? Roman Archaeology*, in the edition Susan E. Alcock, Robin G. Osborne, ed., *Classical Archaeology*, (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Malden, MA, USA & Oxford, UK, 2012), p.34

¹¹⁷ Anthony Snodgrass, Martin Millett, *What is Classical Archaeology? in the edition* Susan E. Alcock, Robin G. Osborne, ed., *Classical Archaeology*, (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Malden, MA, USA & Oxford, UK, 2012), p.11-50

¹¹⁸ Yannis Hamilakis, Eleana Yalouri, *Sacralising the Past – Cults of Archaeology in Modern Greece*, *Archaeological Dialogues - Volume 6*, Issue 02, (1999, (Cambridge University Press, UK), p.127-130

| CONCLUSION

The complex development of the society and identity in modern Greece, according to the internationally prominent American historian, professor Suzanne Marchand, is a result of the artificial imposition of European values and identities on the Greek elites of the nineteenth century. This caused long-term “misunderstandings” about the values, standards and social relations between Greece and the Western world that have “until today already taken deep root.”¹¹⁹ This line of thought is also followed by the Greek classical archaeologist at the University of Ioannina, professor Dimitris Damaskos, who explains the abuses of historical symbols and narratives by modern Greek political leaders in the twenty-first century, noting that such trends “are well known in cases of states which have gained their independence after being a satellite of some larger power or which are going through the process of decolonization”¹²⁰ In this way, Damaskos portrays a complex picture of Greece in the twenty-first century, where more than one hundred and eighty years since the proclamation of the Greek kingdom of Otto, the local and “installed”¹²¹ foreign identities and cultures create tensions, instability and divisions between political elites and radical social movements that will continue to transform and change this society in the years to come and through it, the wider region located between Europe and Asia.

In this sense, the identity buried in outdated premises of classical archaeology, as well as the neo-orthodox tendencies in the society which are often presented as diametrically opposed tendencies of Greek society, represent a unity, seen in terms of the reactions of local elites before the big waves of cultural, economic, demographic and security transformations and challenges of the globalizing world.

One of the internationally prominent Greek archaeologists, professor Hamilakis, reminds in his analyses that the “integration into the European Union and the increasing number of immigrants from Balkan countries, from Asia and from Africa, may produce a society (in Greece) that is again as multi-cultural as it was before the nineteenth century”¹²², whereas the rapid global changes would, at the same time, intensively transform the main economic, political and ideological paradigms of all European societies. In this new reality, the Greek political elites are confronted with two different paths of response. They may either use their conserved ideological and social positions in order to “potentially undermine

119 Suzanne Marchand, *What the Greek model can, and cannot, do for the modern state: the German perspective*, in the edition Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. *The Making of Modern Greece Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896)*, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.41

120 Dimitris Damaskos, *Archaeology, National Identity and the Greek Museum*, (lecture) (Kelsey Museum of Archaeology, Ann Arbor, MI, USA, 2010), p.19

121 Tassos A. Kaplanis, *Antique Names and Self-Identification*, in the edition Dimitris Tziouvas, ed. *Re-imagining the Past: Antiquity and Modern Greek Culture*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2014), p.97

122 Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p. 300

the effectiveness of institutional reforms¹²³ or they can try to effectively “affect political outcomes”¹²⁴ that will provide answers to the challenges of the society and the citizens of “Greece (that), of course, is constantly changing”.¹²⁵

On the other hand, European and Western elites, concerned with the situation in Greece, but also in other troubled regions, through the experience of modern Greek history, are confronted with the question, if the “multi-cultural ideologies, the (self)critique of Eurocentricity, ... and the cultural and demographic changes in western societies”¹²⁶ are able to create open, modern, democratic and developed societies or will they additionally increase differences, tensions and prejudices. Even more importantly, this historical lesson should help the process of reevaluation of the contemporary practices of insistent imposing of Western ideas, values and narratives. It certainly provides arguments that some of these contemporary practices represent reminiscence of the mistakes of the nineteenth century and the ignorance for the visions and aspirations of the local elites.

Finally, for the scientific community, the example of the modern Greek society once again strongly confirms and questions the key aspects of the “relationship of the political elites and the representation: first, that “political elites have a need to manipulate cultural identities”; second, that “certain cultural identities, are fitted candidates for manipulation, and others are not given any chance”; and third and particularly important in contemporary dynamic global reality that “certain aspects of the identity become especially important at certain times and politically irrelevant in others.”¹²⁷

123 Luis Garrido Vergara, *Elites, political elites and social change in modern societies*, Revista de Sociología No. 28, (Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Chile, 2003), p. 32

124 Luis Garrido Vergara, *Elites, political elites and social change in modern societies*, Revista de Sociología No. 28, (Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Chile, 2003), p. 33

125 Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p. 300

126 Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2007), p. 300

127 Gregg Bucken-Knapp, *Elites, language, and the politics of identity: the Norwegian case in comparative perspective*, (State University of New York Press, Albany, USA, 2003), p.146





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PLURALISM IN THE POLITICAL PROCESSES OF STATES AND SHARED COMMUNITIES

INTRODUCTION

In political theory it is widely recognized that political liberalism is the practice of recommending the principles of political pluralism as a way to resolve disputes and move towards a pluralistic society. The ideas of political liberalism are widely present in the political and economic systems of most European Union member states. In fact, the shared community of the European Union functions on the ideals and premises of political liberalism. However, the political pluralism within member states and the complex supranational network of institutions and decision making processes of shared communities do not necessarily share the same characteristics. According to the principles of political liberalism, truly plural societies should not expect free and equal citizens to agree on a general and all-inclusive concept, but rather that they would reach a consensus amongst themselves to serve as a model of functioning plural societies that would interlink pluralism and rational approaches in a consensual way (Latifi, 2008: 113).

One of the primary aims of liberal societies, as in the case of shared communities, is to identify and set up real elements of cooperation among free

and equal citizens within a democratic society. Only democratic societies with well-established political pluralism and equally free citizens can be functioning parts of shared communities as they are in fact models of advanced plural societies based on recognized and functional diversities.

WHAT DO WE MEAN BY POLITICAL PLURALISM?

In contemporary societies, constitutional democracies may function in many forms depending on various factors, including how the governments use the powers authorized to them by their constitutions. Most democratic systems function along the premise of a parliamentary system operating by the majority vote of the electorate and listening to the feedback of the citizens regarding the actions of the Government. This practice can take various degrees.

One such way a democratic system may function under is pluralism. In pluralist political systems, the legitimacy of diversity in various social and political groups is recognized first. In these systems, every citizen and group enjoy the same rights to involvement in the open political and decision making processes in society through discussions and negotiation, especially among more vulnerable groups in relation to the decisions that have the potential to directly affect them.

In comparison with models of “monism” attributed to communist regimes, political pluralism recognizes more than one ultimate principle. In the same way, political pluralism is distinguished from monism by incorporating a system of political ideas and thoughts which recognize more than one party within the party system. The term pluralism was introduced into political science by the scholar Harold Laski in essays published during his time teaching at Harvard University between 1916 and 1920. For his concept of pluralism, Laski recalled the pragmatist philosophy of William James in his book, *A Pluralistic Universe* (1909), which Laski hailed as of ‘vital significance for political theory.’ (Hirst, 1989)

The ideas that Laski advanced under the scope of pluralism were taken largely from a heterogeneous group of legal historians and political theorists. Among the most notable were the German medievalist Otto Von Gierke, the English preeminent legal historian Frederick Maitland, J. Neville Figgis and Laski’s Oxford tutor, Sir Ernest Barker. Barker coined the terms ‘polyarchism’ and ‘the new federalism’ to describe these new concepts in 1914.

In theoretical political science debates, there is often confusion regarding political pluralism due to the confusion associated with pluralism in terms of philosophical debates. The term pluralist is particularly confusing because it is often applied to those who conclude that power in a given locale is dispersed rather than determined. Pluralism can be used to describe either an empirical

reality, in which there is widespread power and negotiation rather than classified decision-making, or a normative model to such dispersed power. However, it does not help to call those scholars who find dispersed power 'pluralists.' The fundamental dilemma of a pluralist democracy, in Dahl's view, is that autonomous associations, groups and organizations are highly desirable and yet, they are also capable of doing great harm if not controlled by a central authority. (Dahl, 1961 and Dahl, 1982)

FUNCTIONS OF PLURALISM IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND SCENE

Constitutional democratic models of political systems may function in various ways, depending on how the governments use their powers. In most democratic systems, the governments have many opportunities to establish consultations and to discuss with various groups of the electorate minor and major potential changes to the nature of the system or decision making processes. Three alternative ways for the functioning of a system within the political processes or political scene include the following: pluralism, corporatism and centralism (Latifi, 2008: 23). These are the three approaches used to define politics within the democratic systems.

In pluralist political systems, the legitimacy of diverse social and political groups is recognized. Everyone has an equal right to involvement in open political processes within the formal or informal political scene for decision making in a society. This includes various ways of open discussion and negotiations used to achieve compromises with the groups affected by these decisions.

In the processes and scenes where various levels of powers exist, political pluralism follows the principle of subsidiarity. These processes are typical in shared communities like the European Union, which has a complex system of levels of powers including the local, national, regional and supra-national levels. For instance, within the political processes and institutions of the Netherlands, such principles of subsidiarity have become firmly entrenched with contemporary central governments, while coalition governments have been reduced to largely setting the procedural rules for local policy-making communities (Frissen in Tensey, 2002: 185). In fact, this example closely resembles pluralism as a political ideal promoted by a group of authors around Sir Ernest Berker in early 1960s. One may find numerous parameters within a political process that may describe political pluralism as an exaggerated optimistic arrangement approaching the political scene in many liberal democracies. However one would establish a framework of the parameters to compare pluralism with the other two models of corporatism and centralism, it is obvious that political pluralism is not an exaggerated optimistic arrangement

for typical European democracies, especially those that had to reform and synchronize their legislations for the EU membership. Rather, political pluralism is much closer to functioning democracy as a concept and practice. The normal political processes and scenes of democracies cannot be conducted under democratic values and principles without the functions of the political pluralism either in democratic states or functional shared communities.

Some stages of the political processes in liberal democracies first appear not to be associated with pluralism, especially in those situations in which decisions have been adopted behind closed doors, as in the instance the politics of White Hall and Westminster in Great Britain. However, even in such cases, it is a matter of the way in which political pluralism has found its functions in the political process prior to the decision making process. As far as there exist consultations and certain networks of official advices and unofficial agreements with representatives of professional bodies, academia and syndicates, pluralism is the most realistic choice compared to the other alternatives in democracy.

Similarly, even within the institutions of the European Union in Brussels, the political processes are often conducted behind closed doors, especially in the decision making phase. Even the agreements among member state delegations of national powers, the supranational representatives in the European Commission and representatives of organized European interest groups occur out of public view. However, functional political pluralism still exists along the principles of the shared community regardless of the level of openness in which decision making or negotiations are conducted. This process may be different in its dynamics and transparency when compared to the standard functions of political process in certain democracies, due in part to the strategic motives or efforts to provide a balance with the other alternatives to pluralism in terms of the ideological determination of certain political actors or because of pragmatic reasons. However, within the levels of the political and decision making processes of the European Union, there are no kinds of conflict or contradictions of a pluralist corporatism approach and a concept including supra-nationalism as a specific level of these kinds of shared communities, as in the case of the European Union.

The differences between pluralism in the political processes of a state and in shared communities such as the EU taking into consideration the markers of political pluralism.

Political pluralism, in principle, is identified by two major markers: political diversity and political freedom. This is suggested by the political theory which refers to political pluralism in terms of political processes within states. These markers are also attributed to the political processes of shared communities, however they are insufficient to describe a wider and complex range of

processes. Additionally, there seems to be a third component which marks political pluralism in shared communities: the nature of decision-making process. It is the visible marker of political pluralism in shared communities, especially in the way the shared communities are formed. For example, in case of the EU, former hostile countries in the Second World War joined forces to reconcile and restore peace in post-war Europe. Due to the various levels of the decision-making process, bearing in mind the complexity of these levels, the process included local, regional, national and supra-national levels of decision-making.

The nature of the decision making process as the third component of political processes in shared communities is not only an indicator of compromises. Rather, it is an expression of other markers and situations as well, such as the consideration of feedback and resistance of pressure groups or member states following proposals for political decisions or certain laws waiting final approval; the level of freedom of people, politicians and governments of the member states under which decisions are going to be conducted; the dialogue between the opposing groups to achieve a compromise for certain decisions in a supra-national context; etc. Often as certain laws or decisions are being considered in a European institution, citizens can be seen demonstrating the right to voice their opinion and participate in the decision making process through protests, blockades, and other forms of demonstrations. It is important that decision-makers recall the principles of pluralism that are key to the functioning of the European Union, in terms of political freedom and consensus in decision-making principles.

Although the level to which the voices, resistances and other demonstrations of political freedom by citizens are actually considered by European decision makers remains unknown, the continuation of such actions indicates they do, in fact, produce some results. It might be considered a controversial issue between the two markers of political pluralism, the freedom and nature of decision making process, when one recalls that the continuity of these kind of protests highlights the level of the functioning marker of freedom of political pluralism allowing groups under pressure to be equally free in expressing their views. However, it may also emphasize the fact that decision making process eventually ignores opposite views, which would mean that there is no synchronization between freedom and decision making as two markers of pluralism. It may also reveal that the decision making process, in principle, is not against working under an atmosphere of diversity and still deciding in pragmatic ideals, meaning a formal preservation of the third marker of pluralism.

Furthermore, the differences between the political pluralism of states and shared communities can be observed along the lines of political values which seem to be different in states and shared communities, which are more specific,

complex and unique. In the case of states, political pluralism may take on the dimension of a shaped and developed value, while in shared communities, like the European Union, it is typical and logical for political pluralism to take on a dimension of the shared value. In fact, the shared way of functioning of supranational organizations like the EU is based on shared community rules and pluralism is a way of manifested diversity, which is then established strongly as a value. Therefore, shared pluralism in the case of the EU is a shared value.

In comparison to the pluralism of political processes of non-member states of international organizations where an ambiguity exists between the links of pluralism and democracy, in the case of the political processes of shared communities like the European Union, strong twinned links of the pluralism and democracy exist. These links became strong within the European Union following the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty of 2007.

THE UNIQUE CONCEPT OF SUPRA-NATIONAL POLITICAL PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A SHARED COMMUNITY

The political pluralism of the European Union is of a unique nature. From the very beginning, the European Union was marked by multi-level ways of functioning like no other state or international organization. Each member state is committed to the shared community and, at the same time, the shared community is considered to be one of the pillars of supra-national institutions as well regardless that seems to be a quite complex issue to maintain a balance at the same time.

The developed text of the Treaty on the European Union (originally signed in Maastricht) highlights the significance of major markers of political pluralism in political processes that each EU member state is committed to and, at the same time, it highlights the nature of the unique concept of twinned links between markers within the shared community. For instance, in the Article 2 of the *Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union*, it is stated that the EU is “founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities (Official Journal of the European Union C 326/17, 2012: 5).” Although prior to that, Article 1 as a general introduction establishes the European Union “on the basis of the European Community and lays out the legal value of the treaties.” In the rest of the text, the principles of the function of the European Union as a shared community and pluralism are regulated as central principles in the Treaty. In fact, it even highlights pluralism are taking a leading role in the functioning of the shared community. It states that member states are committed to share a “society in which pluralism, non-discrimination,

tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (Ibid., 4).”

The roots of this strong commitment by the EU to political pluralism should not be identified as only going back to the initial European project after the Second World War, but they should be searched even in the neo-functional claims as a theory of regional integration in the 1970s, built on the work of German-born American political scientist Ernst B. Haas. His *technocratic automaticity model*, described the way in which the supranational institutions set up to oversee the process of integration will themselves take the lead in sponsoring further integration as they become more powerful and more autonomous of the member states as integration proceeds. In his model, he especially highlights pluralism as one of four main elements influencing the integration process. According to the model that Haas developed with Schmitter, the “size of unit, rate of transactions, pluralism, and elite complementarity are the background conditions on which the process of integration depends (Haas and Schmitter in Mazzeo, 2014: 124).”

One more aspect that makes the pluralism of the EU a unique case is related to its twinned values with democracy. Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union states that, “the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (Official Journal of the European Union C 326/17, 2012: 5).”

Furthermore, there is a strong link between the commitment of the EU to democracy and markers of political pluralism, even in the activities of the shared community. This occurs on the field of foreign and security policy with the other states and stated explicitly in Article 21 of the General provisions on the Union’s external action and specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy. “The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law (Official Journal of the European Union C 326/28, 2012: 16).”

However, discussing the wide range of democracy within the supranational system of the EU, including the issue of political pluralism, did not make much sense until the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. Among many reforms, it empowered the

issue of pluralism and democracy in the work priorities agenda of the EU in the future.

The renewed commitment of the EU to pluralism and democracy under the Lisbon Treaty has two components. First, it is designed to increase the powers of citizens through strengthening the role of the European Parliament. In fact, the enhancement of representative democracy consists of a central element of the democratization of the EU as provided in the Lisbon Treaty, which gives weight to the vote of European citizens who may influence the course of European political affairs. Voters are able to directly influence the political bias of the President of the Commission and his or her team. The same applies to the political choices of the college. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament, that is the only community institution to be elected by direct universal suffrage, will see a radical increase in its powers and its political weight within the “institutional triangle” of the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (The Lisbon Treaty: 10 easy-to-read fact sheets, 2007: 11).”

Second, in order to bring citizens closer to the decision making process in Europe, the Lisbon Treaty uniquely introduces details which foster citizen participation in the democratic life of the EU. With that, it creates more functional conditions for the strengthening of the pluralism of and within the EU. First of all, the Lisbon Treaty creates the right of citizens’ initiative by allowing citizens to ask the Commission to propose a “draft law” if they gather at least one million signatures from a significant number of Member States (Ibid., 12). Among others, the reforms acknowledge the importance of dialogue between citizens, civil society associations and the EU’s institutions. With that, it enhanced the possibility of organizations and civil society associations to take part in EU decisions.

DISADVANTAGES OF PLURALISM FOR STATES NOT INTEGRATED IN THE EU

Pluralism may be essential to the functioning of large-scale democracies, but that does not mean, as Dahl himself emphasizes, that pluralism is without disadvantages. The main problem with pluralism is related to the ambiguity of the group autonomy when analyzed within the framework of organizational pluralism. Namely, all groups are not created equal as organized interests have an advantage over unorganized interests and some interests are easier to organize than others. Recognition that group autonomy may only serve the interests of the most powerful groups is a potent argument against the radically anti-statist vision of the English pluralists, but not nearly so troubling to the pluralist vision of post-war American political scientists, such as the New Deal Democrats (Ellis, 2001: 11518–11519). Though the problems of group autonomy are real, they should be counterbalanced with an appreciation for the equally

real limits of central control. Without the articulation of group preferences and the mobilization of group interests, a central political authority would define who was a group and what were legitimate interests. Without group pressures, the state would find it difficult if not impossible, to gauge the intensity with which preferences are held (Ibid.). Group autonomy without central control may be bad, but it is no worse than central control without group autonomy.

This disadvantage for the pluralism in the domestic political process of the former socialist states in Europe which are still not integrated in the EU can be overcome by membership in the shared community. In this shared community, supranational control is not possible without a group autonomy because of its nature and shaped values with the Treaty on the European Union itself and even more with the nature of decision making process. Therefore, claimed democracy in these countries is not a guarantee for functioning pluralism in every segment of society as there are often serious problems of central state control without a group autonomy which is still possible to be exercised either under the umbrella of pluralism or via the channels of the pluralism's miss-communicated markers.

In countries that still are not integrated into shared communities in the era of globalization in Europe, at least some level of the supra-national control could serve to neutralize central state control to some extent. However, the risk still remains that pluralism may be misused by group leaders who may dominate or oppress weaker members, instead of being used as an advantage and opportunity for everyone and as a guardian of democratic ideals, particularly where the costs of leaving the group are high. Less ominously, the group's elites may fail to represent the opinions of its members as elites may be more conservative or more radical, more compromising or confrontational, than the rest of the membership (Ellis, 2001: 11518–11519). Far from treating large groups as if they were homogenous, as is sometimes alleged (Kariel, 1968), Bentley and other American group theorists were keenly aware, as described by Odegard's, that all groups 'are themselves almost infinitely divisible into subgroups whose interests are not always congruent or compatible with one another (Odegard, 1966).'

George Schopflin, in reference to some of the new states that emerged in the Balkans following the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, suggests that islands of pluralism could survive behind an authoritarian system using a democratic facade. In these cases, the main legitimizing discourses of pseudo-charismatic and authoritarian leaderships would, obviously, be nationalistic and possibly populist. They are only likely to become militarized if the counter in question were to be involved in hostilities (Schopflin, 2002) and all the time covered under the umbrella of pluralism disadvantages.

PLURALISM VS. MULTIPARTY SYSTEM IN THE MULTI-ETHNIC COUNTRIES OF THE BALKANS AFTER THE BREAK-UP OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

The main theoretical, political, practical and historical problems of multi-ethnic states are characterized by internal political and inter-ethnic crises and raise questions of how to achieve internal cohesion. This is typical in the new multi-ethnic states that emerged following the dissolution of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and in those states still not members of the EU in the second decade of the 21st century. During the socialist regime, internal cohesion was mainly achieved through ideological repression but also included some other utopian forms. With the appearance of democracy in the region, which occurred coincidentally as the former Yugoslavia began to dissolve, the issue of internal cohesion returned to the agenda for the stability and future of the new multi-ethnic states. It was hoped that with the introduction of the multi-party system, pluralism would be established by default. However, the process of democratization in the region didn't introduce pluralism as expected. Instead, there was a democratic transition from a mono-party system to a multi-party system only.

Most of the former post-communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe successfully transitioned according to a reasonable dynamic. Today, most of them are integrated in the EU and committed to the principles and values of the shared community. In addition to democracy being introduced by the multi-party system, it was consolidated and strengthened by the commitment to functional political pluralism in terms of providing equal approach and political freedom for everyone, while continuing to recognize diversities. This approach played a vital role on their path to synchronization and compatibility with pluralist principles and values of the shared community of the EU. However, many countries in the Balkans have failed to follow this lesson.

There are several positive outcomes to be expected for the countries of the Balkans that are still not members of the European Union: Albania, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro. Their membership in the EU would actually introduce sustainable pluralism in parallel with consolidated democracy.

In case of the Balkan's multi-ethnic states, the introduction of multi-party systems did not guarantee a functioning political pluralism. It goes beyond that. There are still problems regarding political freedom and democracy regardless of the right and left wings. The legacy of the inherited communist mindset in the organization of political processes has the strongest influence still and political diversity often seems to be only a façade and camouflage. Furthermore, organizing and running regular elections in each country does not necessary

mean that political pluralism works prior to or after elections regarding free political organization without intimidations and pressures by the authorities.

The only hope for the multi-ethnic countries of the former Yugoslavia is to introduce a real pluralism in society and for political processes to be conducted sustainably and monitored in a way only possible if their integration in the EU and NATO becomes a reality. Only this can guarantee the accepted values of the shared community and fully recognize the diversity and freedom of every group and individual. Therefore, the establishment of a functional pluralism in the political processes of these multi-ethnic states is a long-term solution not only for objective democracy but for achieving internal cohesion, as well as integration into the EU and NATO. The case of each country in the former socialist block of Eastern and Central Europe demonstrates this.

Unfortunately, political pluralism in the Balkans, following the fall of communism, is being introduced as an improvisation or as a mono-ethnic pluralism associated with nationalist attributes and chauvinist dozes (Latifi, 2008: 260). Among these nationalist principles, it has not been possible to construct a new realistic internal cohesion in the multi-ethnic societies of the Balkans. With the fall of the former Yugoslavia, the new states that emerged expected to build democracies upon the principles of pluralism, but in fact they introduced democracies attempting to be ethno-centric ones attempting to impose nationalist codes as leading coordinates for a new internal cohesion. That was a direct obstruction to pluralism itself and created a false picture of pluralism, showing later through their delayed transition and EU membership serious systematic difficulties. These difficulties suggested that pluralism was never developed or shaped in the political processes of these states in realistic ways, but with some quasi-markers of pluralism only.

CONCLUSION

In comparative approaches of the main differences in political pluralism of the political processes of the EU, a typical case is to pit the shared community against the case of states that are part of the EU or states aspiring membership, obviously highlighting that political diversity and freedom issues are the two main markers of political pluralism in identifying the political processes of both members states and aspiring countries. In the case of shared communities like the EU, the decision-making process is a third additional component and a most visible marker of the shared community. The latter especially comes into expression in the case of shared communities in the way the shared community is formed. How the EU functions due to its various levels of the decision-making process which are complex and include the local, regional, national and supra-national levels of decision-making process. In the case of the state, political

pluralism takes on the dimension of developed values, while in the case of the EU political pluralism takes on the dimension of shared values. However, the pluralism of political processes of the non-members of shared communities experience an ambiguity between the links of pluralism and democracy, in the case of the shared communities like the EU there exist strong twinned links of pluralism and democracy and these links became even stronger in the EU following the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. Regardless of the ambivalences between political pluralism and multiparty systems which has existed in the Balkan states after the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, (these states are now seeking membership in the European Union), however for both states and shared communities, political pluralism is desirable for the democratic functioning of the political processes.

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MACEDONIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC ISSUES (1991-2015)

SOCIO-POLITICAL CHANGES IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY

The 1990s in Europe began with a great amount of optimism. After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, reunited Germany was determined not only to achieve its own internal socio-political consolidation, but also to further unite and develop the rest of Europe. It became clear that the socio-political conditions at this time in Europe and around the world were challenging the status quo of the North-Atlantic Treaty and Warsaw's Pact. As a result of these events, the Soviet ideology at the moment of its final collapse lost its place within the Western world in both economic and military aspects, significantly influencing the development of the Eastern-European geopolitical sphere, which was starting to fall behind. Therefore, it is evident that after the collapse of the socio-communistic doctrine in 1989, the countries of Eastern Europe started to face enormous challenges - SFR Yugoslavia as well, was greatly influenced by the development of these events. The strategic position which Yugoslavia held as a buffer-zone between the two military-political blocks positioned as East versus West. This country had a policy of equidistance both ideologically and politically, but this policy could not be maintained after the dissolution of the

bipolar structures at the end of the Cold War. This was also accompanied by the developing sense of nationalism in the Yugoslav republics and the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Still, because of the specificity of the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, it cannot be compared with the other examples of dissolution, such as the one of the Soviet federation, although its breakdown caused an enormous influence over the international stage, including Yugoslavia as well.

The fall of the iron curtain brought the influence of the powerful liberal-democratic wave, which was a serious test for the unity of the republics and provinces of the Yugoslavian federation. As a result of this influence, the SFRY territory experienced massive military clashes and blood massacres at the beginning of the 1990s. These clashes started with the war in Slovenia, gradually growing and spreading towards even bigger blood shedding clashes at first in Croatia, and a bit later in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well.

These military clashes between the states which had formerly been united under the slogan of “brotherhood and unity”¹ foreshadowed the end of the Federation.² As a result of the same dissolution tendencies, the first democratic elections were held in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia in the 1990s after the unsuccessful attempt of the filed suggestions within the Collective presidency for restructuring of the Yugoslav federation into a looser confederation.³ Attempts to establish greater levels of liberalization were not accomplished, mostly because of the powerful central resistance by Serbia, which controlled Montenegro and the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Therefore, on the elections in the remaining federal republics won the supporters which stood for independence of the republics.⁴

This paper refers to the Republic of Macedonia as the state that resulted from changes to the international order in 1989, after which the first democratic pluralistic elections held in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia on November 1990. From the parties which took part in the elections, the majority of the seats in the Parliament were won by the four largest political parties, including oneparty representing the Albanian minority. Therefore, in January 1991 the first constitutional session of the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia

1 (personal note) The maxim of the Yugoslavian brotherhood which was an embodiment of the internal order in the Federation and marked the equality of the federal units in the country, with a socialistic prefix to its state policy.

2 “The Constitution of the SFRY from 1974, can be characterized as an attempt to create a looser federation, with bigger part of the power on the central level being transferred to the federal republics and the two autonomous provinces, and with that the federal units by then, i.e. the republics and provinces, gained a bigger autonomy. With this decentralization, a subject of discussion became the process of passing the decisions in the Federation, because the same was transformed into the principle of consensus between the republics’ leaderships, which on their side, started to unite following the ethnic lines.” See more in: Vojvodic, Natasja, *Inhibition, instrumentalization and inevitability: Ethnic nationalism and the breakdown of Yugoslavia*, University College London, School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, 2012. pp. 6.

3 “The decentralization with the Constitution from 1974 was supposed to be expressed also in the functioning and the structure of the collective Presidency of Yugoslavia, for which it was in fact envisaged to be created. As a result of these changes in the constitutional-political development of Yugoslavia, many analysts consider that: “This Constitution marked the beginning of the end of SFRY.” See more in: Ванковска, Билјана, *Политички систем*, Бомат графикс, Скопје, 2007. pp. 194.

4 Pestic, Vesna, *Serbian nationalism and the origins of the Yugoslav crisis*, United States Institute of Peace, Peace works No. 8, 1996. pp. 15.

was held.⁵ The most important document passed immediately after the constitution of the Macedonian Assembly was the *Declaration of sovereignty of SR Macedonia* on 25th of January 1991. This Declaration was the first document to emphasize the sovereignty of the country in addition to the possibility of its constitution as an independent and autonomous state.⁶ Soon after, the election for president of the state was held in the Macedonian assembly. Although a majority of votes from the members of Parliament for a candidate was not obtained in the first round of voting, Kiro Gligorov was elected in the second round held on 27th of January 1991 as president of SR Macedonia with a majority of votes.

The next step towards Macedonian independence happened on 20th of March 1991 as the Assembly of SR Macedonia passed the *Decision for election of the Government of Republic of Macedonia*.⁷ This decision was passed four months after the first multiparty parliamentary elections took place. The first elected Government was led by Academician Dr. Nikola Kljusev. This first government was also known as “expert-government” due to its politically undetermined members (only two of which declared to be members of political parties) and its composition of experts from a ranged of different fields. After the constitution of the Government, the members started to look for solutions to the major questions connected to the Macedonian independence, including peaceful separation from the former Federation and issues connected with the protection of the territorial integrity, economic and social security of Macedonia. Even though this expert government was in place for only a short period of time, it is still remembered for the historically important decisions it made regarding the sovereignty and independency of the Republic of Macedonia. Two of the most important measures were the decisions to allow the peaceful withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army from the territory of Republic of Macedonia and the decision to withdraw the Macedonian soldiers from its ranks.⁸ In addition, the processes for economic and monetary independency of Republic of Macedonia from the federal monetary system of Yugoslavia took place. The adoption of the *Law for monetary unit of Republic of Macedonia*, by the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia on 26th of April 1992, as well as the *Law for using the monetary unit of RM*, introduced the Macedonian monetary currency “denar”, which accomplished the monetary and financial independency of the Republic of Macedonia.⁹

In a state-legal sense, besides the passing of the first document in which was emphasized the sovereignty and the possibility to form an independent

5 Mircev, Dimitar, *The Macedonian foreign policy 1991 – 2006*, The European University of Macedonia, Skopje, 2006. pp. 92.

6 Official Journal of SRM.1991. No. 5.

7 Official Journal of SRM.1991.No. 38/90.

8 Official Journal of SRM. 1991. No. 08-3796/1.

9 Official Journal of RM. 1992.No.26.

Macedonian country, i.e. the *Declaration of sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia*, in June 1991, the Macedonian Assembly removed the term “socialist” from the name of the state and established the constitutional name as the Republic of Macedonia.¹⁰ Because the Macedonian government advocated for peaceful solutions to all issues pertaining to the dissolution of the Federation, the Assembly of Republic of Macedonia passed a *Decision for announcement of referendum* in Republic of Macedonia on 6th of August 1991.¹¹ With this decision, the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia were given the right directly on the following question: “*Are they for sovereign and independent state, with the right to enter a future union of sovereign countries of Yugoslavia?*” This formulation of the referendum question resulted from the political and military crisis in Yugoslavia and after lengthy negotiations in the Macedonian Assembly, the members of the parliament voted to hold the referendum on 8th of September 1991.

The majority of Macedonian citizens voted for an independent and sovereign Macedonian state in the referendum. The appointed election commission for implementation of the referendum did not find any irregularities regarding the method in which the referendum was conducted. On the contrary, the commission confirmed the majority of the citizens with the right to vote supported a sovereign and independent Macedonian state. As a result, 8th of September was announced as the day of independence of the Republic of Macedonia.¹²

The process of the Macedonian independence continued with the adoption of a new Constitution of Republic of Macedonia upon the suggestion of the President of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov. After several months of public discussion, the Macedonian Parliament adopted the new Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia on 17th of November 1991.¹³ The Albanian representatives in the Macedonian Parliament abstained from the vote for the new Constitution because they considered demands for certain constitutional issues as unmet. However, the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia was adopted. For the first time in the legal history of Macedonia, the Republic of Macedonia was defined as an independent, sovereign, democratic and social state for all Macedonian citizens. Therefore, the road to liberalization and introduction of a democratic system in Republic of Macedonia was opened. Also, with this step, the internal political consolidation of independent Macedonia was completed, after which the country continued towards the challenges brought by these new historical processes.

10 Official Journal of SRM. 1991. No. 27.

11 Official Journal of SRM. 1991. No. 29/73.

12 “According to the official data, from 1.495.807 citizens with the right to vote, 1.132.981 or 75.74% of the total electorate of the Republic of Macedonia participated in the vote and from this number, 1.079.308 (95.26% of the turnout) voted for an independent Macedonia.” Шкарик, Светомир, *Македонија на сите континенти – мир, демократија, геополитика*, Унион Трејд, Скопје, 2000. pp. 46.

13 Official Journal of SRM. 1991.No. 52.

| BUILDING THE DIPLOMATIC NETWORK (1993 – 2001)

After the adoption of the fundamental constitutional elements of the independent Republic of Macedonia, Macedonian intellectual and state leadership started the process of international recognition for the Macedonian state. For this cause, President Kiro Gligorov sent a letter to every head of state or government in the world to recognize Republic of Macedonia in December 1991.¹⁴ This move was complemented by the passing of the *Declaration of international recognition of Republic of Macedonia* as a sovereign and independent state by the Assembly of Republic of Macedonia on 19th of December 1991. This was followed by the discussions regarding the Declaration for Yugoslavia and the Declaration for the directions for recognition of the new countries in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, brought by the Council of ministers of the European community.¹⁵ A heavy blow for the Republic of Macedonia was the move by the European community under the severe pressure by Greece. Regardless of the positive report of the Badinter's commission for international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia and the constitutional changes made by the Republic of Macedonia for the same cause, the European Council on the summit held in 1992 in Lisbon, decided that the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia can happen only under a constitutional name in which the term "Macedonia" is not included. This was followed by fierce reactions by the Macedonian state leadership and a great disappointment among the Macedonian public.¹⁶ This decision began the harsh and exhausting struggle for the recognition of Macedonian independence. The first state to recognize the independence of the Republic of Macedonia was the Republic of Bulgaria, on 15th of January 1992, which led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The same year, the Republic of Turkey also recognized the independence of the Republic of Macedonia, followed by recognition from Croatia, Slovenia, Lithuania, etc.¹⁷

On 29th of July 1992, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia adopted the *Decision for the entry of Republic of Macedonia into membership in the United Nations*.¹⁸ Under this decision, President Gligorov sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, requesting the admission of the Republic of Macedonia as a member-state of the United Nations. President Gligorov also submitted a statement for the complete acceptance of the obligations and the principles which are contained in the UN Charter. Greek leadership was severely opposed to this decision and attempted to stop the

14 Дојчиновски, Киро, *Запаметено минато, Македонија во втората половина на XX век – хронологија 1944 – 2000*, Матица Македонска, Скопје, 2001. pp. 288.

15 Declaration for international recognition of Republic of Macedonia; Assembly of Republic of Macedonia. No. 08-5099.

16 *Documents for the statesmanship of the Republic of Macedonia*, Agency for information, M-grafika, Skopje, 2002. pp. 142.

17 *Документи за Република Македонија 1990 – 2005*, едисија документи за Македонија, книга III, Правен факултет „Јустинијан Први“, Скопје, 2008. pp. 317.

18 *Ibid.* pp. 503 – 504.

admission of the Republic of Macedonia in the UN due to its participation under its constitutional name, which for this country was unacceptable because Greece disclaimed the name Republic of Macedonia. Greece successfully obtained a delay of the procedure for acceptance of the Republic of Macedonia in UN in 1993, and due to these obstructions and negative propaganda, the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia was significantly delayed. In January 1993, the Greek minister for foreign affairs, Michalis Papakonstantinou, sent a Memorandum regarding the application for admission of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the UN to the Secretary-General of the UN. This memorandum contained the Greek positions regarding the application for admission of the Republic of Macedonia in the UN, supplemented with articles from Macedonian history which were supposed to show the alleged territorial pretensions of the Republic of Macedonia towards the neighboring countries from the past. The Memorandum and other Greek initiatives were aiming at preventing the admission of the Republic of Macedonia in UN, claiming that this act would cause destabilization in the southern Balkans and threaten the peace and stability of the entire region. Of course, the part which highlighted the differences regarding the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia and its use on the international level was not omitted.

One month after the Greek memorandum was sent to UN, President Kiro Gligorov sent a letter to the Secretary-General regarding the application for admission of Republic of Macedonia in UN, in which he emphasized the resentment of the Republic of Macedonia regarding the pre-conditions for the admission into membership, in which Macedonian side of the dispute was not anticipated in the UN Charter. In addition to the letter, a Memorandum prepared by the Ministry for foreign affairs of Republic of Macedonia was sent as an answer to the Memorandum of Greece sent to UN, whose aim was to prevent the admission of the Republic of Macedonia in the United Nations. The Macedonian memorandum contained contra-arguments of the Greek memorandum sent to the UN, and the same enlisted all the efforts done by the Republic of Macedonia to obtain an international recognition, as well as to maintain the peace and stability in the region.¹⁹ In order to achieve progress in the relations between Macedonia and Greece, the international community had to oversee long negotiations and exercise powerful international diplomatic pressure. Eventually, the two sides agreed to accept a provisional name, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which was supposed to be a compromise for temporary use until the differences regarding the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia were resolved. On 7th of April 1993, after the certain diplomatic pressure, the compromise was accepted by both Macedonian and Greek side; therefore, the Security Council of the UN adopted the Resolution 817 which recommended the General Assembly admit the Republic of Macedonia

¹⁹ Ibid. pp. 517.

into the UN membership under the provisional name FYR Macedonia.²⁰ The Republic of Macedonia became the 181st member of UN and unfortunately, to this day the reference FYR Macedonia is still in the official use within the United Nations.

In this regard it is significant to mention another example which happened for the first time since the existence of the UN, and resulted by the Greek obstructions towards the Republic of Macedonia. Namely, because of the Greek denial of the state flag of the Republic of Macedonia, it was not allowed to display its flag before the UN headquarters in New York until October 1995, i.e. until a new state flag of the Republic of Macedonia was adopted.

The new state flag of Republic of Macedonia was a result of the agreement between Macedonia and Greece known as the *Interim Accord* (or the "Accord of the first and the second side"), which was signed on 13th of September 1995 in New York.²¹ The draft of the Interim Accord was prepared under mediation by the special delegate of the Secretary-General of UN, Cyrus Vance and his collaborators. Because of the significant success of the Interim Accord, it gained the epithet "pearl of the diplomacy."²² The agreement was signed by the ministers of foreign affairs of both sides, Karolos Papoulias, representing Greece, and Stevo Crvenkovski, representing Republic of Macedonia. The Assembly of Republic of Macedonia ratified the convention on 9th of September 1995.²³

With the signing of the Interim Accord, the Republic of Macedonia was obliged to change the state flag, which was the symbol of the Vergina Sun and was completely unacceptable for the Greeks. However, the agreement contained no obligation regarding the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia. Under the accord, both sides agreed to build friendly relations and to protect the human and cultural rights through the promotion of understanding and good neighborliness, economic collaboration and trade. Additionally, Greece agreed not to obstruct any possibility for the membership of the Republic of Macedonia in any international, multilateral and regional institutions or organizations of which Greece was a member.²⁴ As it can be concluded from the above stated, the negotiations regarding the dispute of the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia have continued under UN mediation and are still ongoing without positive or definitive results.

²⁰ Ibid. pp. 540 – 545.

²¹ *Документи за државноста на Република Македонија*. (quoted above). pp. 173.

²² Чепреганов, Т., А. Шукарова, М.Б. Панов, Д. Ѓорѓиев, К. Битовски, И. Катарџиев, В. Стојчев, Н. Велјановски., *Историја на македонскиот народ*, САН-СТИЛ, Скопје, 2008. pp. 336.

²³ Official Journal of RM. 1995.No. 48.

²⁴ *Документи за државноста на Република Македонија*. (quoted above)pp. 164-172.

THE BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS

One of the most significant features of the external policy of the Republic of Macedonia has been the building of peaceful relations with its neighbors. The neighboring countries had problems ranging from the recognition of the constitutional name of the country, the recognition of the Macedonian minority or the denial of the Macedonian language and national identity. Nevertheless, the Republic of Macedonia successfully established diplomatic relations with all of its neighboring countries: Republic of Bulgaria, Republic of Albania, SR Yugoslavia, as well as with the Republic of Greece, although this occurred under obviously difficult conditions.

After the positive opinions of Badinter's arbitrary commission for the Republic of Macedonia were published and as Macedonia met the criteria foreseen in the Declarations of the European community for international recognition, on 15th of January 1992, the Republic of Bulgaria passed a decision to recognize the Republic of Macedonia under the *Note for recognition of the independence of the Republic of Macedonia from Bulgaria*.²⁵ With this move, Bulgaria became the first state to recognize the independence of the Republic of Macedonia, which also established diplomatic relations between the two states. First of all, an *Agreement between Republic of Macedonia and Republic of Bulgaria for establishing of consular relations and opening of general consulates in both countries* was signed and on 20th of December 1993, the *Decision for establishing of diplomatic relations between Republic of Macedonia and Republic of Bulgaria* was enacted and a Macedonian embassy was opened in Sofia.²⁶ However, in spite of the positive developments in diplomatic relations between the two countries, the latent conflict between the two states remained regarding the Bulgarian denial of the Macedonian identity and language, along with the denial of the Macedonian national minority in Bulgaria. These denials have led to periodic destabilizations in Macedonian-Bulgarian relations over the years.

The Government of the Republic of Albania recognized the independence of the Republic of Macedonia on 26th of April 1993. This act was followed by several official meetings between representatives from both countries, aiming to establish bilateral diplomatic relations. At first, a protocol was signed between the two countries to open consular offices in Skopje and Tirana. On 27th of December 1993, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia passed the *Decision for establishing of diplomatic relations between Republic of Macedonia and Republic of Albania* at an embassy level.²⁷ For the Albanian leadership,

²⁵ Ibid. pp. 226 – 242.

²⁶ *Interests and Options for Cooperation Between the States of South-Eastern Europe, Vol. 1, State- National and Sub regional Interest of the States of South-Eastern Europe*, Edited by Maria Chavdarova, PUBLISHING COMPLEX-UNWE, Sofia, 2012. pp. 65.

²⁷ Official Journal of RM. 1993. No. 81.

the independence of the Republic of Macedonia did not present a problem, however, the rights and the treatment of the Albanian minority living in the Republic of Macedonia was under constant observation by Albanian state leadership. The support given to the Macedonian Albanians and the Albanian political parties in the Republic of Macedonia was often excessive and resulted in the occasional chilling of the relations between the Republic of Macedonia and Republic of Albania.

A special place in these historical diplomatic processes holds the politics lead by Greece towards the Republic of Macedonia. The history of diplomatic relations between the two countries resembles the former experiences of the Republic of Macedonia regarding Greek obstructions of its international recognition and membership in the international organizations. The powerful opposition to and denial of the constitutional name of the country by Greece led to heavy difficulties regarding the relations between the two countries. Since 1992 to present, the official Greek institutions have continuously pushed negative propaganda against the Republic of Macedonia and have caused various pressures within the international community and organizations. An example of such difficulties with its southern neighbor includes the economic blockade from 1992-1994, aimed to lead to constitutional changes, including the constitutional name, constitutional flag, etc. At last, the economic blockade was completely lifted with the signing of the *Interim Accord* between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece on 13th of September 1995 in New York.²⁸ A Memorandum for practical measures was signed for further implementation of the Interim Accord and sometime later the Memorandum for opening offices for communication in Skopje and Athens was also signed, as well as various Protocols for visa regime, transport and communications, as well as for customs. In 1996, the offices for communication in Skopje and Athens were opened.

The Republic of Macedonia also established diplomatic relations with its northern neighbor SR Yugoslavia. An important element for the establishment of diplomatic relations was the signing of the *Agreement for regulation of the relations and for promotion of the cooperation between Republic of Macedonia and SR Yugoslavia* on 8th of April 1996 in Belgrade.²⁹ On 31st of May 1996, President Gligorov passed the *Decree for setting an associate authorized ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia in SR Yugoslavia*, after which the relations between the two states started to improve. Namely, after the independence of the Republic of Macedonia, SR Yugoslavia did not want to recognize the border with Macedonia, as it considered it to be only an administrative border. This dispute finally had its resolution with the demarcation of borders in 2001, which was a significant step forward for

²⁸ Official Journal of RM. 1995.No. 48.

²⁹ Official Journal of RM. 1996.No. 28.

normalization of the relations between the two countries. Still, regarding the biggest problem between the two states to date has remained the dispute regarding the independence of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, for which still there is no positive conclusion in sight. The denial of the Serbian Orthodox Church regarding the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church is a subject of constant reaction and criticism by the Macedonian political leadership and the Macedonian public.

| NATO

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the first activities for the Macedonian membership in the NATO Alliance were started by the Association of the Atlantic Treaty from 1991/92.³⁰ This effort by the Macedonian intellectual elite was motivated by the possibility which resulted from the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, where in article 10 it was established that “the Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.”³¹ Also, this step was motivated by the general transformation of the geopolitical situation in Europe, which imposed new imperatives for the security of NATO member states. As a result, the Macedonian Assembly voted in favor of the Resolution for accession of the Republic of Macedonia into NATO in 1993 and in November 1995, Macedonia signed the Agreement for its accession to the Partnership for Peace, through which the solid foundations of the transatlantic commitment of the Macedonian state were established.³² These efforts were undoubtedly influenced by the long period of instability in the region of Southeastern Europe and the military conflict of 2001, which obstructed the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Republic of Macedonia. Therefore, the following section will review the most important political moments regarding the accession of the Republic of Macedonia to the NATO alliance.

At the Washington jubilee summit of 1999, the ten state-aspirants for accession to NATO Alliance: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Macedonia established strategic steps for accession as part of the Vilnius Group, to which in 2001 accessed Croatia as well,. After the reception of seven of these countries in 2004, Republic of Macedonia became a member of the informal regional tripartite Adriatic group, which consisted of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia.³³ These three countries signed with the USA the Adriatic Partnership Charter in Tirana on 2nd of May 2003. In Istanbul in 2004, the Alliance

³⁰ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htmViewed on 11.06.2016.

³¹ Ibid (Founding countries of NATO are: USA, Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Norway, Portugal, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Iceland and Belgium)

³² Official Journal of RM. 1996.No. 29.

³³ (personal note) In 2004, members of NATO Alliance became: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

confirmed that according to article 10 of the Washington treaty, the policy of “open doors” refers to the aspirants from the Adriatic group, i.e. to Macedonia, Albania and Croatia.³⁴

After the conclusion of the military conflict in Republic of Macedonia during 2001 and the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, Macedonian state officials took on a proactive role for the accession of the three remaining countries into the NATO Alliance in the next round of its extension. Regarding the strategic treatment of the Balkan aspirants, the Republic of Macedonia played an especially significant role, mainly due to its specific multiethnic model. In this sense, it is significant to point out the action plan for NATO membership of the Republic of Macedonia during 2006. However, in the period between 2005 and 2008, Macedonia gradually lost the leading position within the Adriatic group. As a result of this slowdown within the so called Adriatic group, in March 2006 during the visit of the American ambassador in the NATO Alliance, Victoria Nuland, by her part had been transferred the recommendations and the obligations for the Macedonian state, which were addressed to all political elites. During her visit, she emphasized the significance of free and fair elections and the necessity for the elections to end during the same spring, so the new Government could be constituted during the summer and beginning with the autumn, the state could continue with further implementation of reforms. The recommendation also covered the reforms in the judiciary, the passing of a new law for the police, the struggle against corruption and organized crime, the bettering of the economic achievements, reinforcement of the Center for crisis management, reinforcement of the regional collaboration, the implementation of the National action plan for integral border management, reforms in the intelligence, transformation of the defense forces and participation in the peace operations, etc.³⁵

As a result of these recommendations and the positive policy of Macedonia during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, along with the changes which were implemented in the socio-political order after the signing of the Ohrid Agreement in 2001, from 2006 to present, the Republic of Macedonia has evolved from importer of security into an exporter of security, by sending its soldiers to the peace missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result of these efforts by the Republic of Macedonia regarding its intention for Atlantic integration, the Yearly national program for membership in the NATO Alliance emphasized that: *the Republic of Macedonia, de facto, acts as a member of the Alliance, by its active participation in the defense of the mutual values shared by the member states of NATO. The Republic of Macedonia participates in the global war against the*

³⁴ <http://www.mia.mk/mk/Inside/RenderSingleNews/279/132204823?pageID=1>

³⁵ <http://vecer.mk/makedonija/vo-nato-koga-kje-bideme-podgotveni> Viewed on 11.06.2016.

*terrorist threats to the security, which are: the international terrorism and the spreading of the weapons for mass destruction.*³⁶

With the taking over Government, led by the rightist party VMRO-DPMNE in 2006, significant improvements were felt in this regard. In 2007, the reforms which were expected by the five chapters recommended by the Annual national program for membership in the NATO Alliance were concluded. Therefore, during the visit of the American ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland in the spring of 2007, the three blocks of obligations for the Government of the Republic of Macedonia were marked. These obligations referred to: the finishing of the foreseen reforms within the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001, implementation of the May agreement between the parties VMRO-DPMNE and BDI and the continuation of the process for resolving of the naming dispute with Greece regarding the constitutional name, under the mediation of the representative of the UN, Matthew Nimetz.³⁷

In addition to the accession to the security alliance, for the international representatives and especially the USA, a priority issue was opened for which was expected an immediate solution. This issue was regarding the differences about the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia with its southern neighbor. These efforts came from the reasonable doubt by the USA because regardless of the fact that for a short period of time in Macedonia was established a political dialog between the government and the opposition, as well as successful integration of the EU legislative into the state's laws, and also the country returned on the path towards meeting the recommendations for accession to NATO, still the small Macedonian state was faced with the danger from Greece which threatened to block its membership into the Alliance.

These fears were not unsubstantiated and could be felt even in 2005, when during the Conference of the North-Atlantic Council, the minister of foreign affairs of Greece, Dora Bakoyannis, pointed out that: "Greece, as an old member of the NATO Alliance, will use all the available means to prevent the accession of the Republic of Macedonia, regardless if the Republic of Macedonia will accept the invitation under the reference FYR Macedonia."³⁸ Still, during 2007 and at the beginning of 2008, within the Alliance still prevailed the opinion that Athens will not use the right of veto at the consensual deciding for accepting the Republic of Macedonia in NATO still prevailed within the Alliance. It was supposed that Greece would strive to delay the procedure for acceptance, aiming to force the Government of the Republic of Macedonia to accelerate the process to change its constitutional name, according to the principle ergo omnes. However, despite

³⁶ Ружин, Нано, *НАТО во современите меѓународни односи*, Фондација Фридрих Еберт, Скопје, 2010. pp. 215.

³⁷ Марковиќ, Ненад, Поповиќ, Миша, *Политички дијалог*, Конрад Аденауер Фондација и Институт за демократија Societas Civilis, Скопје, 2015. pp. 25 – 27.

³⁸ Macedonian Information Agency (MIA), 27.10.2005.

the optimistic expectancies regarding the expansion of membership, on the first day of the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008, three of the five candidates for accession were denied.

This was a significant turnover because the American president George Bush, had announced the night before the opening of the Summit that: "NATO will decide whether the three Balkan countries – Croatia, Albania and Macedonia will be invited to join the Alliance. The United States of America strongly supports the invitation of these countries in NATO. These countries walked the heavy path of reforms and built developed free societies. They already make significant contribution to the missions of NATO and their citizens deserve the security which is brought by the membership of NATO."³⁹ However, only Croatia and Albania got the opportunity to join the Alliance, while the Republic of Macedonia was blocked by NATO member states that supported Greece. This negative answer was an exceptionally powerful strike against the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Republic of Macedonia and the country was subsequently faced with a forceful wave of discontent and growing NATO-skepticism among Macedonian citizens.

The failure of the Bucharest Summit in 2008 resulted in the disbanding of the Macedonian Parliament and the scheduling of early parliamentary elections the same year, as a new series of processes and turbulences in the both internal and external politics of the Republic of Macedonia were opened.

We can freely conclude that the Republic of Macedonia in the so far ten cycles of the Yearly program for membership in the NATO Alliance achieved progress. We already mentioned that from 2003-2006, Macedonia emerged as a leader among the three state-aspirants for membership and signed the Adriatic Partnership Charter. A significant indicator for the unjust treatment by this security alliance refers to the indisputable argument that all the three members of the informal Adriatic group fully accomplished the conditions which were requested of them, within their action plans for accession to the NATO Alliance. For these reasons, the disappointment regarding this plan in the Republic of Macedonia was enormous, because it was expected that the country would receive the invitation for membership, which was disabled because of the old Versailles principle of action in the international relations, by the application of the mechanisms which were not a characteristic for the era of the concert diplomacy. This placed Macedonia in front of the uncertain future in which to this day it expects the change in the political climate and the well deserved invitation in this most significant security Alliance.

Also, the significance of the NATO Alliance for the region of Southeastern Europe is undoubted, because beginning with the dissolution of the former Yugoslavian

³⁹ <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/nato/Viewed> on 11.06.2016.

federation, it has been present throughout many events. NATO intervened to stop the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, in Kosovo in 1999 and in Macedonia in 2001. As a result of its involvement, there are still two active peace missions in the region, including: Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). In almost all of the Balkan countries, membership in the NATO Alliance is considered a main strategic determination, which enables the chance for further integration into the European Union.

| CONCLUSION

The aim of this paper is to analyze research and present the processes which took place as a result of the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation and the process of independence for its republics, with a special focus on the Republic of Macedonia and its transition in the 1990s from a Yugoslav republic to a sovereign state. A special subject of analysis is the case of the Republic of Macedonia regarding its role in the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation, as well as the method of gaining of its independence, international recognition and the process of accession of the Republic of Macedonia in the United Nations (UN). In addition to this, we explained the relations of the Republic of Macedonia with its neighboring countries after its independence as well as the establishment of diplomatic relations with them.

It is evident that Republic of Macedonia as one of the federal republics participated with its own representatives in all the institutions of SFRY; however its political leadership did not take a single step to contribute to a violent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. On the contrary, the Republic of Macedonia was a loyal member of the Federation up to the referendums for independence in Croatia and Slovenia and the military activities which were started in these republics. Both of these factors significantly influenced the start of the process for independence in the Republic of Macedonia. The state leadership of the Republic of Macedonia during the dissolution of Yugoslavia contributed to its separation from the Federation in a peaceful and democratic way without a war occurring. Also, a significant move by the Macedonia political leadership was the agreement for the peaceful withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army from the territory of the Republic of Macedonia without any specific requests being made by the Macedonian side. This way, the transformation of the socialistic system opened the way to construct an independent Republic of Macedonia and to build a parliamentary democracy, starting with the event of the first democratic parliamentary elections.

In this way, the foundations of the Macedonian statesmanship were established with the passing of the new Constitution of Republic of Macedonia on 17th of November 1991. Under the new Constitution, essential changes were made

regarding the former system of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Macedonia for the first time was defined as independent and sovereign state, aimed towards a democratic development and parliamentary system, with its own national symbols such as flag, coat of arms and hymn.

After the building of the main elements of independence for the Republic of Macedonia, the wish of the Macedonian political leadership for its place on the international stage became more obvious and all the possible efforts were made for the Republic of Macedonia to be recognized as an independent and sovereign state. The Republic of Macedonia demonstrated readiness and preparedness to accept the conditions given by the European community in order to receive international recognition. However, it is also obvious the European community was either not ready or lacked the will, to recognize the Macedonian independence *a priori*. Aside from meeting the conditions of the Declarations of the European community for international recognition of the countries from Eastern Europe and the Yugoslav republics which decided to form themselves over a democratic foundation and accept the prescribed international obligations and the receiving of a positive opinion by the Badinter's Arbitrary commission for the recognition of the independency of the Republic of Macedonia, the European community decided, in a session of the European Council in Lisbon, with a declaration, not to recognize the independence of the Republic of Macedonia, i.e. to recognize it only without a name which does not include the term *Macedonia*. It is obvious that this decision was made under pressure by Greece who had an issue with the constitutional name of Republic of Macedonia. It should also be mentioned that because of the Greek reactions and pressures, the European community recommended that Macedonia makes constitutional changes which should help with international recognition. However, all the changes on the Macedonian side achieved weak results in the relations with the European community, although the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations was positive with a big number of countries recognizing the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name. It is interesting that in spite of the conduction of peaceful politics by the Republic of Macedonia and it being a special case due to its peaceful dissolution from the SFRY, while simultaneously accepting all the democratic principles in the building of its independency, the European community allowed one of its members to obstruct its economic development and international recognition.

The hard conditions which the Republic of Macedonia faced on its path to the international community did not stop it from continuing with efforts for international affirmation and for securing membership in the international organizations. In spite of the disappointment caused by the attitude of the international community with the denial of the Republic of Macedonia and the numerous obstructions set in front of the young Macedonian state, it

had to develop a strategy for conducting its external policy. These external negative influences over the development of the Republic of Macedonia were complemented with the politics led by its neighbors regarding its independence, identity and language of the Macedonian people, the Macedonian minority and its church. In fact, even though the Republic of Macedonia faced certain issues with its neighbors during its independence, it succeeded to establish diplomatic relations with all of its neighbors and to surpass all threats to its territory and sovereignty.

For these reasons, we can conclude that Republic of Macedonia, by surpassing the regional crisis, the numerous obstacles to its independency and the road to the international recognition, as well as the international negative influences and the internal disagreements, still continues to move forward and to develop itself politically, economically and socially.

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THE FORGOTTEN IDEALS: MANIFESTATIONS OF ELITISM AND PAROCHIALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

The present paper analyses the value system of the EU and the nature of the European Council as the newly established institution of the EU, how the future EU development directions presented (at a pragmatic level). In that sense, the research is based on three research questions (RQ). The first RQ is, what do the basic values of the EU encompass? It is ascertained that the basic values of the EU encompass a wide legal and political spectrum of universal values stipulated in its constitutive treaties that act in one synergy to characterize the EU as an original community of values with its value interest (*raison de valeur*).

The second RQ asks, how are elitism and parochialism manifested in the context of the EU? This does not conclude that within the EU there is institutional and extra-institutional type of elitism. Institutional elitism is most evident in the functioning of the European Council as an institution comprised of the heads of

state and governments of the EU member states. Whereas extra-institutional elitism is manifested in the behavior of the more powerful EU member states in terms of circumvention of the EU institutions, suppression or circumvention of its fundamental values and the instrumentalisation of the EU institutions in favor of their own national (parochial) interests. In both cases, parochialism (precedence of national interests at the expense of the EU value interests) has a destructive effect on the credibility and functionality of the EU as a whole.

The third RQ investigates how the EU can (re)arrange or (re)define itself in order to justify the reasons for its existence. It is ascertained that there are a number of different routes of development and apparent uncertainty regarding the process of European integration. Nevertheless, the EU needs to be redefined through the reaffirmation of its forgotten values and ideals, which should be articulated through democratically established and democratically controlled supranational institutions.

■ EUROPEAN UNION AS A COMMUNITY OF VALUES

Throughout its development, the European Union has tried to produce a unique system of values and has incorporated them into its constitutive agreements.

RQ1) What do the basic values of the EU encompass?

The fundamental values of the EU can be summarized as: freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. These are not always identified as “values”, but can sometimes be referred to as “goals”, “objectives”, “principles”, “obligations” and so on, and as such they indisputably possess the power of value. Thus, in Article 2 of the Treaty for establishing the European Community (and then in the Treaty establishing the EU) incorporates the following basic “principles”:

To promote...harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.¹

1 The Treaty for establishing the European Community, http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E_EN.pdf [2015]

These same values, perhaps improved, prevail more and more in the current and future agreements of the EU, but as we said before, under a different name. In the Treaty establishing the EU and in the Treaty of Maastricht, the values of the EU are specified in Article B, under the title “objectives”, where it states:

The Union shall set itself the following objectives: to promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable, in particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.²

It is interesting to present the value frame of the draft in the text of the European Constitution, Part I, Article 2 thereof, where despite the aforementioned, the following “values” are systematized: respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.³ The draft text of the constitution also incorporated other “value targets” such as: peace, security, sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty, protection of human rights (in particular the rights of the child), development of international law, the promotion of scientific and technological advance, combating social exclusion and discrimination, the promotion of social justice, than equality between women and men, the promotion of economic, social and territorial cohesion, respect of cultural and linguistic diversity, etc.⁴

The same value matrix is reflected in the Lisbon Treaty as an effective constitutive EU treaty. This agreement reaffirms and proclaims the core values, principles and objectives of the European political union. It provides that the functioning of the Union shall be based on the principles that inspired its creation, development and enlargement including “democracy, rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect of the principles set out in the UN Charter and international law.”⁵

Namely, the value frame of the EU constitutes a wide legal and political spectrum of universal values that through the politics, policies and institutions of the EU, shall categorize it as a community of values with its own value interest. We can

² *The Treaty for establishing the European Union*, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html> [2015]

³ *The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe*, http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/objectives_en.htm#VALUES [2016]

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *The Treaty of Lisbon*,

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF> [2016]

define the interest of the EU as “*raison de valeur* or interest directly derived from its value grounds, stipulated in its constitutive treaties.”⁶

ELITISM AND PAROCHIALISM: MANIFESTATIONS

The author John McCormick, bases elitism in the context of the EU on the fact that “a huge number of *decisions* are taken by *unaccountable* European bureaucrats and leaders of member states without special hearing sense for public opinion.”⁷ Whereas, despite the “use of national referendums and the growing power of the European Parliament, as well as the rise of lobbying by many interest groups that helped the process of policy making become more open, democratic deficit (lack of institutional openness and direct accountability of EU institutions) remained a problem and a topic for discussion.”⁸

One of the biggest pro-European philosophers and intellectuals, Jürgen Habermas, resolutely claims for the eminent “Spiegel”: “The European project can no longer function in an elitist way.”⁹ In his work «On Europe’s Constitution - An Essay», he appeals to politicians that they «must stop the management of the European project behind closed doors, as they did until now, and descend it to the lowest level in order to have a noisy and a reasoned exchange of views in the public sphere.”¹⁰ His appeal to politicians is caused by their insularity, narrowness and their apparent reluctance to do something significant in the interest of Europe interest. He accuses them of «cynicism and turning their back to the European ideals.”¹¹ Or as it is described by prof. Mario Chiti, «Europe is managed by many small men and women with small visions...It is impossible for such politicians to connect with citizens.”¹²

RQ2) How are elitism and parochialism manifested in the EU context?

First, elitism can be sized on two levels:

- Institutional (formal) elitism (exists in the EU institutions, especially within the European Council as unelected body); and

6 Goran Ilik and Marjan Gijurovski, *The axiological foundations of the European Union foreign policy*, HORIZONTI, University “St. Clement of Ohrid” – Bitola, Year X, No. 16, September 2014, p. 165

7 John McCormick, *European Union Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 302

8 Ibid.

9 Georg Diez, *Habermas, the Last European: A Philosopher’s Mission to Save the EU*, SPIEGEL ONLINE, 25.11.2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/habermas-the-last-european-a-philosopher-s-mission-to-save-the-eu-a-799237.html> [2016]

10 Foreign Rights, *Jürgen Habermas, On Europe’s Constitution - An Essay*, http://www.suhrkamp.de/buecher/on_europe_s_constitution-juergen_habermas_6214.html?d_view=english [2016]

11 Georg Diez, *Habermas, the Last European: A Philosopher’s Mission to Save the EU*, SPIEGEL ONLINE, 25.11.2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/habermas-the-last-european-a-philosopher-s-mission-to-save-the-eu-a-799237.html> [2016]

12 Thomas Darnstaedt, Christoph Schult and Helene Zuber, *The Great Leap Forward: In Search of a United Europe*, SPIEGEL ONLINE, 24 November 2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-great-leap-forward-in-search-of-a-united-europe-a-799292.html> [2016]

- Extra-institutional (informal) elitism (characterized by the predominance of the strongest EU members states, and thus bypasses or ignores the institutional structure of the EU decision-making process and policy creation).

Institutional elitism is most apparent in the functioning of the European Council as an institution composed of the heads of state and governments of the EU member states. According to Jürgen Habermas, “power slipped from the hands of the people and passed into the bodies of questionable democratic legitimacy, such as the European Council.”¹³ Unlike the other EU institutions, the European Council (the Council) is a body (a kind of presidium) composed of leaders who are not selected via pan-European elections, but through national level elections of the member states. For the irony to be bigger, Article 15 of the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that, “the European Council shall provide the necessary impetus for the development of the Union and define the general political directions and priorities thereof.”¹⁴ The decisions adopted by the Council, as a rule, are adopted by *consensus* behind closed doors (on camera), which implies a serious lack of democratic legitimacy. In this case, EU citizens do not possess any tools for direct participation in policy-making as a democratic contribution to defining the political guidelines for EU development.

Thus, instead of this institution, which was for the first time institutionalized by the Lisbon Treaty, serving as the engine of EU development, it mutated into a sort of *intergovernmental leviathan* that quietly usurped the content of the EU, including its values, ideals and institutions. Therefore, Habermas believes that the institutionalization of the European Council and its position as one of the central political institutions of the EU is an “anomaly” of the Lisbon system of the EU.¹⁵ The anomaly lies in the fact that the EU, instead of going in the direction of supranational, post-modern and post-national development, has become a prisoner in the hands of nations-states and parochialism through local and national interests of the member states surpassing those of the EU.¹⁶ Theoretically, this means *enthronization of modernity* as a political concept, which puts forward the interests of the national states (*raison d'état*) instead of the value interests of EU (*raison de valeur*). In this game, EU citizens and the EU as a whole are the ones that loose.

13 Georg Diez, *Habermas, the Last European: A Philosopher's Mission to Save the EU*, SPIEGEL ONLINE, 25.11.2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/habermas-the-last-european-a-philosopher-s-mission-to-save-the-eu-a-799237.html> [2016]

14 *The Treaty of Lisbon*, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF> [2016]

15 Georg Diez, *Habermas, the Last European: A Philosopher's Mission to Save the EU*, SPIEGEL ONLINE, 25.11.2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/habermas-the-last-european-a-philosopher-s-mission-to-save-the-eu-a-799237.html> [2016]

16 Postmodernism is best described with the following words: “nationalism and national markets are increasingly replaced by cosmopolitanism and globalized economy, national interest has been replaced with concern for humanity and the environment, the principles of non-interference and sovereignty are undermined by the common pooling of sovereignty, while the *realpolitik* principle is replaced by the importance of the cognitive / normative and value perceptions.” Rokas Grajauskas and Laurynas Kasčiūnas, *Modern versus Postmodern Actor of International Relations: Explaining EU-Russia Negotiations on the New Partnership Agreement*, 2009, p. 4, www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/2009-22/Grajauskas_Kasciunas.pdf [2016]

Instead of EU citizens participating in the creation of EU policies, they are reduced to ordinary “observers” who do not have any tools to influence the decision making processes in this body.¹⁷ In the interest of the paper, an on-line survey was conducted with 111 respondents on Twitter and Facebook over a period of seven days, resulting in very interesting answers. This survey does not provide representative (taking into account the size of the sample, the manner of its conduct, etc.) but only indicative results, singling out the tendencies in the public opinion present on the before mentioned social networks (Table 1). The survey results indicate that among 54.1% of the respondents, the idea prevails that EU citizens do not possess institutional capacity to influence the decision-making processes, which implicitly suggests the perceptions of the respondents about the EU and its democratic deficit.

Table 1.

Do you think that EU citizens do not possess sufficient tools to participate in decision-making in the EU?		
	Number of answers	Answers in %
Yes	60	54.1
No	32	28.8
Maybe	19	17.1
Total:	111	100%

While the right of citizens to participate may be suspended in the European Council, this is not the case in other European institutions, at least not to such an extent. For example, EU citizens directly participate in the election of members of the European Parliament through general, direct, secret and democratic elections. Regarding the adoption of EU legal acts (regulations, directives, etc.), the citizens possess the right to a *European citizens' initiative* (its initiation requires the support of at least 1 million EU citizens with the right to vote), instigating the European Commission to enter into a process of proposing a legal act and its processing in a mechanism of the regular legislative procedure (or a co-decision procedure between the European Commission, the Council of the EU and European Parliament). On this basis, it can be concluded that the installation of the European Council by the Lisbon treaty did more damage than benefit to the development of the EU by turning into the main obstacle to the process of democratization in a political union. In this regard, the former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi said:

¹⁷ Georg Diez, *Habermas, the Last European: A Philosopher's Mission to Save the EU*, SPIEGEL ONLINE, 25.11.2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/habermas-the-last-european-a-philosopher-s-mission-to-save-the-eu-a-799237.html> [2016]

“The EU was transformed from a “union of minorities” into a “coalition of states”, a direction that completely changed its functioning and plans for its future. While working in the [European Commission] when someone turned on some channel with news from a member state, it was always about the Commission. Today, they only speak about the European Council.”¹⁸

He also mentioned that as “member states grabbed the power from the Commission, the voice of national governments became louder in the running of European affairs with dramatically uneven results.”¹⁹ This situation was also described by the theorist Anthony Giddens with the words, «the Union is not transparent at the highest level due to the existence of EU2 as key decisions are essentially made behind the scenes by key leaders of the states.”²⁰ When he talks about EU2, Giddens considers the EU to be managed by the informal “President of Europe”, Angela Merkel, who runs a “cabinet” composed of leaders of several influential member states, plus the President of the European Central Bank and one or two officials of the International Monetary Fund, as a typical composition which was first formed at the beginning of the euro zone crisis.²¹

In contrast, the democratic process was put aside and even “suspended.»²² As an illustration of this was when the former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi resigned as prime minister in 2011. Immediately after this, the technocrat Mario Monti was “installed” to implement the necessary reforms in Italy, after approval and orchestration led by Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund.²³ The same case, even more explicit and brutal was typical of Greece. Or as Romano Prodi said himself, “the [resolutions of the] Greek crisis was not a Brussels-Athens decision, it was a Berlin-Athens decision.”²⁴ Recognizing the unfolding of events, former Minister of Finance in the Government of Greece, Yannis Varoufakis, disassociated himself and established the movement for the democratization of the EU - *DiEM 25 (Democracy in Europe Movement in 2025)* after his short mandate as minister.

These examples reveal the extra-institutional elitism, which is characterized by the existence of one or more dominant EU member states (a kind of “directorship”), which informally (through political pressure, economic blackmail, etc.) create policies under the guise of EU which circumvent the existing EU institutions and usurp its fundamental values and ideals. At the 2016 debate on

18 Alberto Mucci, *Romano Prodi: 'My Commission is over'*, POLITICO, 28.11.2016, <http://www.politico.eu/article/romano-prodi-european-commission-eu-berlaymont/> [2016]

19 Ibid.

20 Anthony Giddens, *Turbulent and Mighty Continent: What Future for Europe*, Polity Press; 1 edition (11 Oct. 2013), pp. 18-19

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Alberto Mucci, *Romano Prodi: 'My Commission is over'*, POLITICO, 28.11.2016, <http://www.politico.eu/article/romano-prodi-european-commission-eu-berlaymont/> [2016]

Euro Finance in Vienna 2016, Yiannis Varoufakis pointed out that not only were the EU institutions circumvented, but the Commission and its commissioners were humiliated by various sorts of ministers of member states. Earlier, the EU was identified by the European Commission, today this is no longer the case. Now the European Council is on the scene, specifically through the leaders of the member states and the members of the Euro group.

This is also confirmed by the theorist Ulrik Beck:

As long as we are leaving European integration in the hands of the states, Europe will not be able to come to the fore...More precisely, the central role of the European Council in the management system of the EU is a system fault to find European solutions...European solution does not work because it refers to 'national interests'.²⁵

Taking into account the behavior of the powerful EU member states not only in the European Council, but also outside of it, the instrumentalisation of the EU in favor of parochial interests and the continued circumvention of EU values, in fact, paved the way for populism, regardless of whether it comes from left or right ideological affiliation.²⁶ With its appearance, the liberal and democratic character of the EU and its basic values were seriously challenged, with clear trends for its redefinition in the new post-democratic era, as said by Juergen Habermas himself.

The anger arising from this situation is most vividly presented in the question of the leader of the eurosceptic Italian party "Movimento 5 Stelle", Beppe Grillo: "Why is only Germany getting richer?"²⁷ In this statement, he alluded to the effects of the euro zone crisis, the strengthening of the position of Germany in the EU and the obvious circumvention of the EU institutions in solving European problems.

Namely, in the answer to this question lies the "factory fault" of the Lisbon EU, with all its concomitant anomalies that call into question its survival and that of its fundamental values. Such a Europe is reminiscent of a «triple perversion of all the values to which the EU is committed and for which the EU was awarded the Nobel Prize for peace: freedom, democracy and social-market economy. As a result, Europe is suffering from its own negation: when Europe apparently is giving up its values, Europe cannot exist! Europe does not functioning, at

²⁵ Ulrike Guerot, *Europe as a republic: the story of Europe in the twenty first century*, OpenDemocracy, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/ulrike-guerot/europe-as-republic-story-of-europe-in-twenty-first-century> [2016]

²⁶ The best overview of the elements of populism and populist movements today (particularly in Europe) is best given by the writer Paul Taggart, through the following six attributes: 1) intolerance towards representative democracy, 2) "the people" as the core - the center of the populist ideology, 3) lack of fundamental values, 4) chameleon tendencies, 5) occurrence in response to the feeling of extreme crisis, and finally 6) self-limiting qualities of populism. See more in: Tom Bryder, *Xenophobia, Politics and Right Wing Populism in Europe*, University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Social Science/Department of Political Science, Winter 2009, pp. 6-7

²⁷ Jeevan Vasagar, *Beppe Grillo warns that Italy will be 'dropped like a hot potato'*, THE TELEGRAPH, 13 Mar 2013, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/9927448/Beppe-Grillo-warns-that-Italy-will-be-dropped-like-a-hot-potato.html> [2016]

least not like this. Therefore the time has come for Europe to turn the head to remember what it was originally supposed to be.”²⁸

DIRECTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT

Motivated by all this, the critics of the EU, even the most modest ones, are becoming increasingly vocal in proposing models for its redefinition.

RQ 3) How can the EU (re) arrange or (re) define itself, in order to justify the reasons for its existence?

- Depending on the connotation, either pro-European or anti-European, several paradigmatic directions of future EU development can be marked, including:
- A loose type of Union unlike the existing one, entailing such actions as leaving the euro and focusing only on the single market;
- A Union that is remodeled in a specific way, for example, the EU becoming more democratic or decentralized, which is a direction with many opportunities which are, in part, dependent on the national context;
- A free trade area and in line with and nothing more than NAFTA or ASEAN;
- One or more states to withdraw from the EU, like Britain, based on the wishes of each the individual country, no matter what happens with the rest;
- Completion of the EU’s dissolution and return to a Europe of nations states in its pre-existing form;²⁹ or
- A vanguard Europe implying that the new EU should be based on a *core* and an *orbit*. The core will create a federation, while the orbit would create an association. The avant-garde or core member states are supposed to be “the decisive factor in promoting the integration process that will eventually culminate in a European federation.”³⁰

The European Union is facing a serious challenge; each of the stated directions of development constitutes a possible scenario for its future. However it is important to emphasize that the only way for the EU to justify its existence is to redefine or *re-institutionalize* itself. As in the motto of the movement Democracy in Europe Movement 2025, “Europe will democratize. Or will disintegrate!”³¹

For these reasons, an initial step towards its redefinition would be a “return” to its forgotten values and ideals (peace, freedom, justice, equality, rule of law, etc.) and their articulation as an own value interest (*raison de valeur*) through

28 Ulrike Guerot, *Europe as a republic: the story of Europe in the twenty first century*, OpenDemocracy, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/ulrike-guerot/europe-as-republic-story-of-europe-in-twenty-first-century> [2016]

29 Anthony Giddens, *Turbulent and Mighty Continent: What Future for Europe*, Polity Press; 1 edition (11 Oct. 2013), pp. 41-42

30 *A Core, Avant-garde or Centre of Gravity and other ideas to enhance European Union Integration*, <http://slideplayer.org/slide/1330772/> [2016]

31 *Democracy in Europe Movement 2025*, <https://diem25.org/> [2016]

democratically established and controlled supranational institutions. With this, a democratic bulwark will be built against all forms of elitism and parochialism and will give a strong wind in the sails of its integration. Otherwise, the EU will become its own prey and Europe a battlefield for confrontation of the great powers.

CONCLUSION

The EU must return to its core values and restore its institutions to be based on them, in order to make them democratic, transparent and accountable. This especially concerns the European Council, an institution characterized by numerous contradictions in terms of the values of the EU. The European Council has evolved into a source of elitism, parochialism and intergovernmental supremacy in the EU making it necessary for the EU to enter into a process of a total *re-institutionalization*.

This process would entail a) supranationalization of its institutions and their autonomy in relation to the power of the member states, followed by b) the presence of strong democratic control and accountability to citizens, c) reaffirmation of the fundamental values and d) investments in reunification of Europe as the ultimate goal. This can begin by revising the Lisbon Treaty, or through the adoption of a new constitutional treaty for the EU, which would be built in these re-institutionalization lines. However, time will tell whether the trend of member states leaving the EU will be replaced with a trend to deepen its integration and its democratization.

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PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OR MANIPULATION OF ELITES

PUBLIC OPINION IN MODERN MASS SOCIETIES

Free elections through which citizens transfer the right to decide to their elected representatives or elections through which the public chooses its political elites represent one of the basic prerequisites of a functioning democracy. The public, i.e. individual citizens, makes its choice on the basis of the information provided by the media. The question posed is how the perception of the public in its choice of political elites is built, first in terms of the information that reaches the public and second in terms of public interest about the political and decision-making process.

In theory, the public should control the political elites and their actions because it elects them to office and can replace them. Nevertheless, if the public gets partial, directed or misleading information from the media or if most of the public is unaware or disinterested in the work of the elites but votes in elections, then the question would be *whether by creating information that provides desired perceptions, elites using the media manipulate the public in order to obtain the desired reaction from public opinion and then act in accordance with it*. The basic thesis of this paper will be argued by synthesis, as well as analysis, a historical and descriptive method is that in modern mass societies, through the selection and imposition of “important” topics by the elites and manipulation of

public opinion regarding these topics with the help of the media, elites actually create an illusion of public choice and thus call into question the very essence of democracy, the right to own decision. This paper will define the concepts of *mass, elite and public* and discuss mass society and its erosion, as well as public versus mass opinion, the role of public opinion in modern mass society and its manipulations.

| ELITE

The term “elite” has its roots in the French term *élite*, meaning to choose or elect. The elite is defined as a social group that stands out with “its high levels of qualification and the ability and willingness of success” or by “great value and achievement.” Elites are perceived as groups that have a decisive influence on the development of a society.¹ Overall, the elite² can be defined as a concept that is designed to distinguish the specific groups who, with their features, but above all with their influence, make certain decisions in society. They stand out from the crowd of other individuals and groups, in fact from the very society as a whole.³ Therefore, in order to have elites as a “minority” there needs to be an opposed concept, that is, a “majority” from which the elites single themselves out. When there is talk about elites on one side, there is always “mass” and “crowd”, that is, a multitude, as a majority in the society on the other.

| MASS (MULTITUDE)

According to Hartmann, from the very beginning the “discussion about the elites in the social sciences is inseparable from the discussion of the masses, like two sides of the same coin, where the elite is positive and the mass or crowd a negative concept.”⁴ The views of Gustave Le Bon also support this claim. In his most famous work, “The Psychology of Crowd,” published in the late 19th century, he writes that “civilizations are always created and managed by a small intellectual aristocracy, never by crowds. The crowd is capable only of destruction, and when the structure of civilization is rotten, the crowd is always the one that causes its decline.”⁵ According to Le Bon, knowledge of the psychology of the crowd is essential for every statesman who wants “not to manage the crowd, because it is impracticable, but not be too driven by it, because the impact of legislation on the crowd is very small and they can neither create nor stick to an opinion other than those imposed on them. The crowd cannot be managed through rules that promote equality, but only by instruments

1 Hartmann, Michael “*The Sociology of Elites*” New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 2

2 Although according to this definition there can be multiple types of “elites”, in this text the term refers only to political elites.

3 Although according to this definition there can be multiple types of “elites”, in this text the term refers only to political elites.

4 Hartmann, Michael, 2007, p. 5

5 Le Bon, Gustave “*The Crowd: a study of the popular mind*” Mineola: Dover Publications, 2002, p. xiii

that create an impression on them, or which may carry them away.”⁶ Nevertheless, if it is analyzed from a different angle, from the perspective of the crowd, people who want to impose mental unity on the crowd and place it in a social category are actually people outside the crowd or opposing it. People who are part of the crowd have the perception of diversity and a rational response to their actions.⁷

| THE PUBLIC

The negative connotation of the multitude through the terms crowd or mass in classical theory is also opposed to the concept of political public (or public sphere in politics), which is derived from the incorporation of the disintegrated representative public of the Middle Ages and the new literary public, which acts in the public sphere (being between the private sphere and the public authority) as a criticism of public authority, as debated by Habermas. Unlike a polarized society divided between elites and masses, Habermas speaks of an additional layer between them, which has an impact that can and should modify the political public opinion. If the primary partition is reduced to a state that manages and a society that is managed, that is, a small group or elite and a large group or mass, a new well-informed public appears in modern society with the development of the public press or media. The well-informed public has become a social group with significant influence as its opinion is relevant in decision-making and influences public opinion on an issue.

With the increase of literacy, availability of media and access to information, the public which had been reduced to a representative public around the aristocrats of the feudal estates in the Middle Ages, extended to included a larger group of people from the new class of capitalists, or as Habermas calls it, the bourgeois public in light of liberalism.

Modern liberal democratic societies have been modified by the introduction of the universal right to vote, which gave society the power of decision and the possibility to choose the political elites. In it there are groups who shape public opinion represented by the political elites. But «there are individuals who are uninterested, uninformed and do not participate in public or social debate, who are part of the mass and the most numerous in the new mass society, but not to the extent of ignoring the elections.”⁸ Habermas argues that it is these people who are vulnerable and subject to manipulation by political elites, who impart their opinion through the media. The mass is under pressure from the elites to the extent of creating an imposed public opinion. According to Habermas, «even

6 *Ibid.*, p. xiv

7 van Ginneken, Jaap “*Collective behavior and Public Opinion: rapid shifts in opinion and communication*” Mahwah (NJ): Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2003, p. 87

8 Habermas, Jürgen “*The structural transformation of the Public sphere*” Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1992, p. 213-214

the opinions that do not require public exposure cannot evolve in public opinion if there is no communication flow or debate of the rational public.”⁹

While the informed section of society between the elite and the mass thinks rationally and is included in discussions, it contributes very little to the creation of public opinion because it is limited to a narrow circle of participants in relatively homogeneous groups. Although elites cannot influence and manipulate their attitudes, the informed members of society cannot engage in social public debate and prevent the manipulation of the uninformed and unrepresentative public in the new mass society. Thus, it breaks down the political public arising from the literary public on political issues and slides into the new mass society that loses touch with the public debate.

EROSION OF THE PUBLIC IN MASS SOCIETY

The mass in modern society is excluded from public debate through its own choice by ignoring the available information, unlike in the past where information or usable information was limited and unavailable for broad social strata. In modern societies, the media transmitting information is partly to blame, primarily because they commercialized and replaced their initial function in order to conform to a consumer society by replacing information with entertainment. Thus, the media in modern society is transformed from public to mass media. The possibility of preserving the public, as opposed to the mass, that Habermas anticipates, exists through the animation of a small fraction of the mass society comprising individuals who think rationally and want to express their private views in public. These individuals would encourage “public opinion through the so called critical public that through intra organized public spheres can influence political decisions.”¹⁰

The problem with social erosion in the context of public debate, manifested by loss of interest of the individual to engage in public debate and to contribute to the processes that define the society, which would be a stagnation or even disappearance of the classical ideal of man as a political animal, that has concentrated its existence on community development without which it cannot exist, that is, the reasons for what may be defined as public in the modern to be transformed into mass in the contemporary society are noted by Wright Mills.

Namely, he cites four features which demonstrate the contrast between the classical definition of a public community or public and the contemporary concept of mass, from which modern mass society stems. Mills writes that these characteristics reflect the differences between the liberal and the populist style

⁹ *Ibid*

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 247-248

in politics. In public community relationship between creators and recipients of opinion was roughly equal, while in the mass those who shape public opinion are only a very small part compared to those who receive the message or information. In spite of the existence of mass media, responding to the message is too restrictive for most people in this case. Thirdly, the capacity of public opinion to influence important decisions was much larger before the mass society, with the exception of occasional manifestations of mass discontent. The fourth feature is that the degree to which institutions with power sanction and control have penetrated the public is far stronger in mass societies and therefore public opinion is shaped less by public discussion and more through mass manipulation.¹¹

| MANIPULATING PUBLIC OPINION

The manipulation of mass societies is based on limiting the scope and dosage of useful information that can influence the public opinion on politics and through the creation, amendment and shaping of basic information with the main goal being to achieve the desired effect in the mass, previously achieved by the elites, as needed. Limiting useful information should create an ignorant attitude within the masses towards political activities, while creating and disseminating important information when needed aims to encourage political action, that is, to mobilize the public opinion.

The problem with this approach to public opinion is that the deprivation continuous and useful information regarding a particular issue or policy and the release of occasional information which is incidental or purposeful makes it difficult for individuals in the mass society to rationally design opinions on an issue. This may lead either to the conscious prolongation of ignorance or the inability to take a stand due to the incomplete perception of the problem, often due to wrong interpretation of information regarding the matter.

This may result in the unsuccessful mobilization of public opinion, but also, as a result of insufficient or delayed information, may mobilize the public in a different direction than the one hoped for and assumed by the elites. This may cause the problem to intensify or result in a lack of public support for the implementation of the envisaged policy. Often these calculations and the denial of full and continuous useful information on a political issue by the elites, due to misinterpretation, can cause unrealistic or conflicting expectations regarding baseline assumptions and create dissatisfaction among the masses regarding the political elites who are unable to deliver on those expectations.

11 Hayward, Jack (Editor) *"Elitism, Populism, and European Politics"* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 14-15

Therefore, James A Stimson finds the assumption that ordinary people or the mass can be at the same time ignorant and informed and calculating in terms of policy totally wrong, depending on needs or expectations. According to him, the presumed two polarities on the perception of public opinion are unsubstantiated, with the real image lying somewhere between. Regarding the thesis of “‘informed and calculating,’ the first scientifically conducted opinion polls revealed that the image of rational and well-informed citizens who are interested and understand political developments cannot be further from the truth.” The citizens were completely incompetent or reluctant to meet the expectations of a democratic society. The difference between the expectations of a democracy from the voter and what the voter actually delivers is simply overwhelming.

However, the other extreme that says voters are totally unprepared, unfit and have no aim in politics is wrong. Some voters are interested and want to know how the elites lead the country and some will take a political stance, although not interested in what the administration does.¹² Nevertheless among those who are interested, Stimson emphasizes that only «*some*» may be a small fraction of public opinion, like the problem of *political public* in modern mass societies that Habermas speaks about. Additionally, he notes the decisive role of the media in shaping public opinion in modern mass societies, which is broadly discussed below.

■ PUBLIC AGAINST MASS OPINION

The involvement of the *masses* in the decision-making of the community imposes the dilemma whether in modern societies the terms *public opinion* and *mass opinion* can be equated, that is, whether informed individuals who rationally create their opinion based on useful information which then becomes part of the public opinion regarding an issue are the same as the uninformed individuals who have the right to vote but do not have their own opinion regarding a policy or lean toward a particular view as created by the elites and marketed through the media as information.

If a distinction is made in this respect and public opinion is equated with that of the *political public*, we can identify three types of social opinions: *public opinion*, *opinion of the mass* and *opinion of the elites*. Therefore, the question arises as to whether the mass may be considered the public and whether it is sufficiently motivated and informed to make a useful contribution to decision-making of the political establishment. According to Ferguson, proponents of full participation of society in the work of the state believe that making decisions without the

¹² Stimson, James A. “*Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics*” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 12, 14, 17-19

knowledge or support of the public opinion represents the views only of the elites, which is often influenced by lobby groups or other special interest groups.¹³ In this case, public opinion is synonymous with mass opinion as the sum of the opinions of all adult individuals in society.

In contemporary debates on this issue there exist three groups: populists, critics and modern governments. According to Ferguson, “populists believe that studies of public opinion give significant contribution towards ensuring the full participation of citizens in decision-making. Critics consider that the results of public opinion research does not reflect the public but only the elites who rule, while social constructionists argue that there is manipulation, that is, actually the media create reality to the public. Modern governments usually will not agree that they have high degree of control over either the public or the elite opinion.”¹⁴

Nevertheless, regardless of whether citizens are rationally inclined towards a particular policy or if they are referred to it by the elites and the media, the necessity of raising public awareness to cause a public reaction regarding a particular issue or policy is crucial in modern societies for it to be implemented according to dominant public opinion. According to Soroka and Wlezien, «without public responsiveness to a particular policy, there is little likelihood of policy responsiveness to public opinion. Politicians not only would have no incentive to respond to public opinion, but they would also have insufficient information to act in accordance with the public opinion, because without reaction the public opinion would be essentially meaningless.”¹⁵

Public responsiveness should not be interpreted as the close monitoring of every aspect of politics, but as a general opinion regarding the desired effects of it, since as Lipmann concludes “The goal is not to burden the public with expert opinions on all issues, but to redirect the burden to the responsible administration.”¹⁶

| PUBLIC OPINION AND MEDIA IN MASS SOCIETY

In modern mass societies, the media plays a crucial role in the formation of political public opinion given that information creates opinions that promptly reach the individual through the mass media. In assessing media influence on public opinion, the most obvious effects of certain information or direct media message of political advertising are noted, while the two other forms of more

13 Ferguson, Sherry Devereaux “*Researching the Public Opinion Environment*” Thousand Oaks (CA): Sage Publications, 2000, p. 16

14 *Ibid*, p. 16-17

15 Soroka, Stuart N. and Wlezien, Christopher “*Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public Opinion, and Policy*” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 41

16 Lipmann, Walter “*Public Opinion*” New York: Macmillan, 1922, p. 399

effective indirect impact on public opinion are usually overlooked. The first form of influence is through the publication of “information which highlights certain ideas, assumptions or beliefs and which cannot be directly classified as opinions”.¹⁷ The second media effect on the public, and thus the public opinion, is the choice of information to be published. When the New York Times was asked how they decide on what to publish, they responded: «We publish all news that deserve to be published.” This raises the question as to which news “deserve” to be published, how to select information and by what standards does an editor make the decision regarding what is newsworthy?¹⁸

This way, i.e. by selecting the information to be published, the media “may not be successful in trying to convince individuals how to think, but extremely successful at imposing what to think.”¹⁹ The decisions of the medium on how and what information to publish may or may not be instructed by the political elites, but there is a wide range of conflicts of interest in the media and among elites, especially those with business interests. “The vision of a free press threatened by the government, can easily be replaced with that of an individual who has been misled or threatened by powerful media interests. The information may be limited both by the owners of the medium or business elites and the authorities through the use of formal or informal censorship.”²⁰

DECISIONS OF ELITES AND THE PERCEPTION OF MASSES

The decision-making process of the elites that despite the attempts to influence public opinion is contrary to the current perception of the masses in democratic societies, need not always be perceived as negative. This is primarily due to inability to articulate certain information in a given time frame. For example, the generally accepted view is that “the process of European unification is initiated and run by elites. It is acceptable to have certain difference in attitudes between the elites and the voters, although the enormous gap in the policies of the elites and the perception of public opinion may threaten the position of the elite, and thus the process of policy implementation.”²¹

The difference in the perception of the masses and the policy implemented by the elites according to the elitist theories is due to the poor knowledge of the situation by the masses. As Semenova, Edinger and Best explains, the political action of masses can be decisive, only in specific historical circumstances, but rarely lays the foundation of a new political order. The elections are the institutional framework in which individuals receive the power to decide by

17 Lewis, Justin *“Constructing Public Opinion”* New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, p. 99

18 Bernays, Edward L. *“Crystallizing Public Opinion”* New York: Live right Publishing Co., 1961, p. 77

19 Lewis, Justin, 2001, p. 100

20 Hayward, Jack (Editor), 2004, p. 67

21 Best, Heinrich, Lengyel, György and Verzichelli, Luca (Editors) *“The Europe of Elites”* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 1 и 190

mutual competition for the vote of citizens. People vote for their representatives, i.e. elites, but cannot control them. Elites lead the political process and initiate changes that are reflected much later in the behavior of the masses. The political activity of elites is particularly decisive for the development and consolidation of new democracies. According to Semenova et al, opposed to the elitist are the theories of representation, that consider that there is a connection between the masses and the elites, that elections are not a mere mechanism for the selection of elites, but a complex institutional mechanism through which requests and opinions are transferred from the public to the elites, through the political parties.²² However, while it is true that there is communication between the masses and the elites, the question is raised as to who articulates the demands of the masses or public opinion and whether the public has an impact on the decision making process within the parties?

In ideal conditions, the progression or regression of a democratic society depends on the citizens because the public elects the elites. The actions of their representatives depend on the will of the voters and the perception of the citizens. Public opinion is therefore constructive in relation to a problem and the political decisions of the elites should move toward finding a constructive solution for it.

The basic problem preventing this theory from becoming practice is that public opinion is usually manipulated through the symbiotic relationship between the elites and the mass media which controls the information disseminated in the public in order to produce certain reactions. The information is compiled in a way that anticipates a desired reaction from the *masses*, so that the elites may later act in accordance with public opinion. This is generated and imposed through the selection, dosage and handling of information. The key role in the process is played by the media which constructs the public opinion by filtering the information transmitted to the audience. Therefore the goal of the elites is to have a mechanism of influence and pressure on the mass media.

In order to reduce the influence of the elites on the public, it is necessary to reduce the abuse and manipulation of and through the media and thus their corrective role is crucial in the process of selection of relevant information. This would contribute to an increased level of the activity of individuals (that is additionally increased with the level of formal and informal education) and would also increase the share of the *public* or *political public*, which are detached from the mass.

22 Semenova, Elena, Edinger, Michael and Best, Heinrich (Editors) "Parliamentary Elites in Central and Eastern Europe" Oxon: Routledge, 2014, p. 6-7

As a result, social pressure on the elites will be increased, forcing them to detect crucial social problems and start addressing them.

Nevertheless, in modern mass societies this is usually not the case and the interest of the *public* is reduced for essential problems, thus also reducing its impact. Public initiatives are often just an illusion, because they are created by elites and serve their political interests.

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Short Biography

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KURDS IN TURKEY – ON THE NATURE AND CHALLENGES OF AN ETHNIC, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND GEOPOLITICAL CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

Turkey is a multiethnic, multicultural country inhabited by almost 50 different Muslim and non-Muslim nations (Sunni Muslims, Alevi Turks, Sunni Kurds, Alevi Kurds, Circassians, Armenians, Georgians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs, Assyrians and others)¹. Since the establishment of the Republic, the State applied policies of assimilation and homogenization designed to exclude non-Turkish features from the core of the Turkish national identity that retroactively affected the members of other ethnic and religious groups to voluntarily merge into the mainstream political culture of Turkey marked by Sunni Islam and Turkish ethnic origin².

Turkish nationalist doctrine- Kemalism advocated pure Turkish national identity, where competing concepts of other national, religious and linguistic identities

¹ Ayhan Kaya, "Ethnicity and Nationalism in Turkey Before and After 2002 Elections," *Bulletin: Anthropology, Minorities, Multiculturalism*, 5 (2004): 1.

² Ibidem.

had no place. This direction was followed by Kemalism in the attempts to deal with the civil movements of the Kurdish, Alevi, Muslim and other religious communities and ethnic minorities of the non-Muslim nations. All of them constitute a threat to the monochromatic profile of the modern Turk, a heritage that determines the Turkish policy to this day. The attempts of assimilation as part of the identity politics of the Kemalism, besides denying the particularity, included use of repressive methods and resettlement for the purpose of territorial deconcentration of power³.

The Kurdish issue is probably one of the most serious internal problems in Turkey's history, which has been marked for too long as unsolvable, causing moral dilemma and is one of the most potentiated obstacles to the EU integration of the country⁴. Overall, the West locates the problem in the oppression and denial of the Kurdish ethnic minority's rights by the Turkish majority group⁵. On the other hand, for Turkey the Kurdish issue is a socio-economic problem in the southeastern part of the country and terrorist action assisted by foreign forces aimed to weaken Turkey⁶. Cornell⁷ claims that in reality, neither position is correct because a deeper research of the problem shows extreme complexity with numerous components and dimensions that only hinder the understanding of the primary characteristics of this conflict.

The Kurds are the largest stateless nation in the world and their number is estimated to be between 30 and 40 million⁸. Although Turkey is one of the four countries that have a significant number of Kurdish population, it has the most cause for concern because the largest segment of Kurds (about 12 million) are actually settled on Turkish soil and account for nearly 15% of the total population⁹. If we add the external support of the Kurds in particular that of Syria¹⁰, the Turkish caution and resistance to resolving the issue seems more feasible. Turkey believes that external support (including from the resilient Kurdish diaspora) in principle is not aimed at assisting the national struggle of the Kurds but at employing the current weakness of the Turkish state and the fact that it is prevented to militarily and / or politically solve the problem because of

3 This refers to the Alevis who were encouraged to leave rural areas and urbanize, the Jews under the Law on settlement of 1934 (2510 Act) as historical communities were displaced from areas of Edirne and the straits, the Kurds especially after the riots in 1920- 1930's and so on.

4 Svante E. Cornell, "The Land of Many Crossroads: The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics", *Orbis* 45, no. 1 (2001): 31. Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), xi.

5 Cornell, op. cit., p. 31.

6 Ibidem.

7 Ibidem.

8 Kerim Yildiz and Susan Carolyn Breau, *The Kurdish Conflict: International Humanitarian Law and Post-Conflict Mechanisms*, (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 4. Kurds easily fit into the category of "nations without history" of Miroslav Hroch's or nations that do not have a repository of independent political formation during their pre-capitalist past. Quoted according to Neophytos G. Loizides, "State Ideology and the Kurds in Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies* 46, No. 4 (2010): 513.

9 Second Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, *Turkey in Europe- Breaking the Vicious Circle*, Open Society Foundation and British Council (2009): 21.

10 Syria has not only supported the Kurdish activities but also enable the security of their leader, Ocalan in Damascus. Syria has the smallest population of Kurds compared to all countries in the region and effectively uses it to induce concessions by the Turkish side on some issues. Andrew Mango, *The Turks Today*, (London: John Murray, 2004): 67, 215, 227.

the watchful eyes of the Western public and the threat with the rejection of the European integration as a perspective¹¹.

As such, the Kurdish issue marks one of the central features of Turkey in the 20th century - balance between the eastern and western heritage. Kurds generally reject the idea of development and modernization of their identity within the Turkish state. In this regard, their identity is defined as anti-Turkish, revolutionary and primarily directed against the historical repression and violence of Turks against them. The Turkish-Kurdish relation is dialectical by nature because the historical socialization of Turks and Kurds has most naturally conditioned one with the other identity and because it generally determines the collective understanding of the “other”¹². The Kurds need the Turkish reference in order to define themselves, as is the image of the Kurd indispensable for the determination of the Turkism. After all, history shows that the stronger the subordination of the Kurdish minority from the predominantly Turkish regime, the clearer is the Kurdish identity for the Kurds¹³.

The paper analyzes the Kurdish issue in Turkey’s political history through a historical perspective from the foundation of modern Turkey to date, through the use of multiple methods. The main objective is to confirm the claim that the Kurdish issue is essentially ethnic (vis-à-vis the Turkish national identity), socio-economic (within the sub-regional Turkish socio-economic identity of the southeast part of the country and geopolitical conflict (within the regional Kurdish identity that covers several countries and spans over a larger territory than that of the Republic of Turkey). By analyzing the history of the conflict, Turkey’s EU integration and the radicalization of relations as the three key pillars of research, the intention of the paper is to descriptively show the background and complexity of the conflict.

HISTORICAL REVIEW

Historically, the cause of the problem is rooted in the idea of an independent Kurdish state, which was provided for in the Treaty of Sevres as a compromise between the then Turkish government and the major powers in the year 1920s with the Article 64¹⁴. However with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 the Turkish

11 In this sense, for example, the Kurdish diaspora in France is particularly strong (especially the organization - Kurdish Institute of Paris) which not only generates financial assistance for the Kurds in Turkey but also makes political demands on the status of the Kurds. See more on their official website Foundation Institut Kurde de Paris, accessed November 23, 2016, <http://www.institutkurde.org/en/>

12 Wayne S. Cox, “A Crisis ‘in’ Conflict for International Relations- The Case of the Turkish/Kurdish War through Neogramscian Lenses”, (Ottawa: National Library of Canada- Bibliothèque Nationale du Canada, Ottawa, 2001), accessed March 23, 2013, <http://www.nlc-bnc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/NQ52815.pdf>

13 Ibidem

14 The Treaty of Sevres envisaged establishment of an independent Kurdish state within one year of signing the Treaty. But due to change in the interests of the great powers and the fear of Soviet influence in the newly formed state support was withdrawn. At the same time Turkey was strongly opposed to this idea which among other things was one of the reasons for launching the national-liberation war which resulted in significant victories of the Turkish side and the signing of a new agreement; the Treaty of Lausanne..

got new state borders and restored sovereignty over areas dominated by the Kurds. From that moment on, official Turkey began the process of Turkification of the population of Kurdish origin:

- ban on the Kurdish language in official use (including educational institutions), and the prohibition of traditional Kurdish clothes and music by law (1924),
- new territorial division of Turkey into three parts and legally enabled relocation of the population of the third area (southeast) which was estimated to require assimilation (1934) ,
- failure for a breakthrough of the Kurdish issue at a time of growing political pluralism in Turkey mainly due to the repeated and strong influence of the military as the guardian of the Kemalist doctrine and Turkism (period after the II Second World War),
- arrest and detention of thousands of students, intellectuals, writers and representatives of the Kurds (1970-1980),
- ban on official use of the word Kurd along with language, folk songs, or giving Kurdish names to newborns (1983)..
- adopting the infamous Decree 413 which imposed censorship of the mainstream media to use the word Kurd or reporting from the region predominantly populated by Kurds (1989)¹⁵ and so on.

Apart from the political means Turkey attempted to deal with Kurdish nationalism by military means¹⁶. Nevertheless, the Turkish state had no serious military opponent until 1978 when the organization “Kurdistan Revolutionaries” later Kurdish Workers Party¹⁷ was founded by Abdullah Ocalan¹⁸. This organization in 1984 began an armed struggle that lasted until 1999. Although it was never registered as a political party in Turkey, the demands of Kurdish rebels were almost always directed by its structures. More recently the activities of this organization are mostly terrorist and Turkey reacts militarily and politically (adopted a strengthen Counter Terrorism Act) while the West, that is, Europe

¹⁵ During the reign of Ozal and the predominant political influence of the National Security Council who de facto led Turkey after the third coup. Lois Whitman, “*Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Kurds in Turkey*”, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1990): 13-19.

¹⁶ Back in 1925 and 1930 there were two uprisings of Kurdish rebels that were bloody crushed and in order to secure the situation a martial law was imposed and around 50000 Turkish troops were sent in the region.

¹⁷ Mango, op.cit., p. 215.

¹⁸ Abdullah Ocalan is the founder and longtime leader of the Kurdish Workers’ Party. After the military coup in the 1980s in order to escape the repression of the army he flees to Syria which provides support of the authorities and the government of Iraq to resolve the Kurdish issue (division of the Kurds in both countries where they have a large population and weakening Turkey). In 1984 launches a guerrilla war against Turkey through Iraqi territory. In 1998, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit threatened the Syrian government with use of force if it does not hand over Ocalan. Syria abolished support and Ocalan traveled around the world trying to get protection (Italy and Russia refused but Greece promised aid). After an effective action by Turkish commandos in February 1999, Ocalan was arrested in Kenya where he was hiding under the protection of the Greek government in their diplomatic mission with a passport provided by the Republic of Cyprus and returned to Turkey. Much of the Turkish public invoked the death penalty because during clashes over 5,000 members of the security forces were killed and about 11,000 were wounded and the war cost Turkey almost \$ 15 billion. He was sentenced to death but the death penalty was delayed pending the ruling by the European Court of Human Rights. In 2002, the Turkish Parliament abolished the death penalty and his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Ibidem. p. 98, 219.

shows support (the PKK is listed as a terrorist organization) and lukewarm disapproval¹⁹.

The denial of the special Kurdish ethnicity as one of the primary threats to Turkey's national identity has contributed, during the 1930-1940's, for them not to be named as Kurds but as "mountain Turks" because the bulk of the population inhabited the mountainous regions of Southeast Turkey. According to Heper²⁰, these were moments of a return to ethnic nationalism in Turkey as a result of several uprisings by Kurds in the period 1925-1938. Yegen²¹ argues that the official Turkish policy is trying to conceal the exclusion of Kurds as a distinct identity because of the conviction that the Kurdish issue is associated with reactionary politics, tribal resistance, regional underdevelopment and exclusiveness in terms of Kurdish identity. However, Kymlicka²² believes that the problem is not that Turkey refuses to recognize Kurds as Turkish citizens, but because they are trying to force them to see themselves as Turks. Violence in Kurdistan, as one of the longest nationalist conflicts in the world, is not because of ethnic exclusiveness but due to the forced inclusion of national minorities in a larger national group²³.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION OF TURKEY AND THE KURDISH ISSUE

Despite the popular notion that the West is sympathetic towards the Kurdish issue and that it can use it as an argument to hinder Turkey's EU integration, it is necessary to note that in Turkey's Accession Agreement, the European Union formally makes no reference to the Kurdish issue and does not mention the words Kurd or Kurdish issue or the term minority rights in relation to the Kurds²⁴. In the progress reports of Turkey as a candidate country for membership, the EU

19 Volkan Aydar, Umut Ozkirimli and Riccardo Serri, "Nationalism and the Turkey-EU Relations: Perspectives from both Sides", Heinrich Boll Stiftung Debate with guest speakers, accessed March 23, 2013, http://www.boell.eu/downloads/Nationalism_Turkey.pdf

20 Metin Heper, "Turkey between East and West", Working Paper AY0405-16, (Berkeley: Institute of European Studies, 2004): 17-18.

21 Turkish State discourse identified the Kurdish issue: with the past (whose representatives were the Sultanate and the Caliphate) as opposition to the present (for example the Republican regime), with the tradition (for example the existence of autonomous political structures), as opposition to modernity (centralized republican history), with political and economic resistance on the outskirts (smuggling and resistance to taxation and military conscription) and opposition to national integration (integrated national market economy). Mesut Yegen, "The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity", in "Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics", ed. by Sylvia Kedourie, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998): 226. Undoubtedly many of these arguments are a problem of the Turkish state. Aktan, for example, underscores that while the West continually insists on resolving the Kurdish issue it refuses to see the reality in which the Turkish state has a problem with the implementation of its laws in regions where the Kurds live as majority. For example, the law banning polygamy shows a complete failure in these regions where new generations of Kurds are rapidly increasing compared to the Turkish ethnic population that has accepted this law since its adoption. Part of the lecture of Gündüz Aktan - former ambassador of Turkey to Greece, responsible for the preparation of Turkey's application for EC membership in 1987, given during the International Summer Course at the Law Faculty of the University of Ankara, Turkey, in August 2007.

22 Will Kymlicka, "Misunderstanding Nationalism", in "Theorizing Nationalism", ed. by Ronald Steven Beiner, (Albany: State University of New York Press, Albany, 1999): 134.

23 Ibidem.

24 Gulistan Gurbey, "The Urgency of Post-Nationalist Perspectives: "Turkey for the Turks" or an Open Society? On the Kurdish Conflict", in "Turkey Beyond Nationalism-Towards Post-Nationalist Identities", ed. by Hans-Lukas Kieser, (London: I.B.Tauris, 2006): 159. See more for example in the last progress report "Turkey 2012 Progress Report", European Commission, Brussels, accessed March 2, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/tr_rapport_2011_en.pdf

talks about the cultural rights of Kurds and minorities in general, and particularly about the situation in the southeast region of the country. According to Gurbey²⁵ this elaborated approach that seeks not to name the problem and indirectly makes reference actually represents a signal to Turkey that the EU takes into account Turkey's interests.

The European Union sees the Kurdish issue primarily through the lenses of human rights violation in Turkey but also in the context of the country's democratization. In this sense, the EU does not call for providing group rights for Kurds but instead for reforms in order to promote human rights and democratization and to improve the economic and social situation in south-east Turkey²⁶. The lack of special implicit reference by the EU is not an amnesty for Turkey's responsibility and accountability although it stands as important victory of Turkish politics. There is still room for maneuver in particular regarding the adoption of measures for the promotion and protection of minority rights which according to the political and security culture of Turkey must be carried out carefully, gradually and restrictively because despite the unitary character of the state, the institutional recognition of the cultural independence of the Kurds can lead to separatism²⁷. The arguments show that no political party of the Kurds has ruled out completely the idea of independence. On the contrary by putting themselves at an equal distance from the Turkish state and the Kurdish rebels, the representatives of the Kurds only made it hard for the democratization of Turkey and further confirmed the fears of secession among Turks implying danger for the Turkish security and territorial integrity²⁸ - two grounds on which the Turkish national identity was built.

Although the advancement in the status of the Kurds can be traced back to 1990 when as a sign of non-discrimination the ban on the use of Kurdish language²⁹ was lifted, real changes occurred with the arrival in power of the Party of Justice and Prosperity. It is interesting to underline that from 1998 to 2002 the security situation in Turkey improved significantly as the percentage of citizens who believed that terror and security are major threats to the state fell from the previous 39% to 5.5%³⁰. The change in political form contributed for Turkey to start respecting its international obligations³¹, especially the decisions of the

25 Ibidem.

26 Gurbey believes that the EU stands for individual, civil and cultural rights of members of the Kurdish community. Gurbey, *op.cit.*, p. 159.

27 Ibidem.

28 Ioannis Grigoriadis, "Upsurge amidst Political Uncertainty- Nationalism in post-2004 Turkey", SWP Research Paper 11, (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2006): 10.

29 Berdal Aral, "Turkey's Insecure Identity from the Perspective of Nationalism", *Mediterranean Quarterly* (1997): 86.

30 Besides in the security culture improvement was registered also in public political discourse. See more in: Murat Somer, "Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context and Domestic and Regional Implications", *Middle East Studies* 58, No. 2 (2004): 236.

31 Although in 2002 the Turkish parliament ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Turkey put provisions outlining reservations regarding the right to education and minority rights and provided that the right of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities would be determined in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey and the Treaty of Lausanne. According to these two documents Kurds are not recognized as a minority, hence the inability to invoke international obligations or practice. See more in: Gurbey, *op.cit.*, p. 161.

European Court of Human Rights under which the state granted compensation to a third of the 350,000 displaced Kurds during clashes in the 1990s and allowed their return to their homes³². The restrictions on the expression of the Kurdish culture were partially liberalized, the freedom of use of the language in the educational system and the media (public and private) were liberalized as well as the possibility to give Kurdish names to newborns³³. The Party of Justice and Prosperity in general has done more to improve the situation of the Kurds than any previous government³⁴ but at the same time it has obtained the most support of Kurdish voters which traditionally is a space where the dominant political parties of Turkey historically had poor performance. However, although the EU recognizes some progress in the promotion of cultural rights of minorities, especially in the field of languages, the Turkish policy is regarded as restrictive. That is why the EU recommends further efforts by Turkey to strengthen tolerance and promotion of inclusiveness vis-a-vis minorities³⁵. In the last progress report, the EU emphasizes that the peace process must be reopened and that it is actually imperative for resolving disputes and termination of hostilities that have stepped up in recent times³⁶.

RADICALIZATION OF RELATIONS

The period from 1984 to 1999 was known as the first rebellion. The second rebellion lasted from 2004 to 2012 and in principle coincides with the rule of the AKP in stable mandates and governments. The announcement of reconciliation brought a relatively stable period with several attempts to overcome differences from 2013 to 2015. Namely, in late 2012 a plan was announced by Erdogan to resolve the Kurdish issue, named Kurdish-Turkish peace process - Çözüm Süreci. The negotiations resulted in agreement on a ceasefire in March 2013³⁷ although disagreements of various groups in the two blocks -Turkish and Kurdish, reached a climax with an array of organized sabotage of the process: the execution of three members of the Kurdish Workers' Party in Paris, public disclosure of recordings from the talks between Ocalan and the members of the Party and the bombing of the Ministry of Justice of Turkey and Erdogan's office at the headquarters of the AKP in Ankara³⁸.

32 Second Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, op.cit., p. 22.

33 Gurbey, op.cit.,p. 160.

34 Second Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, op.cit, p. 22.

35 Turkey 2012 Progress Report, op.cit.

36

37 On March 21, 2013 Ocalan addressed the Kurds and Turks in writing calling for a ceasefire and an end to the armed struggle, after that the Kurdish Party voiced it would respect the agreed and that 2013 will be a year of when the problem will be solved through the use of military or peacetime means. Already on April 25, 2013, the PKK announced the withdrawal of armed forces from Turkey into northern Iraq as a first step towards normalization of relations. "Öcalan calls on Kurdish militants to bid farewell to arms for a 'new' Turkey", Hürriyet Daily News, 21.03.2013 (accessed on November 22, 2016) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?PageID=238&NID=43373>

38 The event was condemned by representatives of both camps who expressed their commitment and determination to resolve the problem.

The second half of 2014 and first half of 2015 were periods of re-escalation of the conflict especially with a series of protests and subsequent riots organized by Kurds in cities across Turkey to mark disapproval of the alleged support to ISIL by the Turkish state. Since 2015 Turkey is experiencing the third rebellion of Kurds. Clashes overcome the political opposition and it becomes increasingly clear that Turkey enters into civil war. The strongest collisions actually followed after June 2015. The climax was reached just a few weeks ago when the Turkish Court ruled detention of Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Juksekdag - Co-Chairmen of the National Democratic Party, along with nine members of the Turkish parliament on charges of collaboration with the separatist PKK (Kurdish Workers Party). The detention was made possible with prior revocation of their parliamentary immunity on the basis of changes to the law proposed by Erdogan in May 2016. The situation further deteriorated after the failed coup of July 2016 when because of suspected collaboration with Fethullah Gulen - marked as enemy No. 1 of the Republic of Turkey - and organizer of the coup, more than 130,000 people were arrested, laid off or suspended. During the month of November 2016, the European Parliament voted by majority for a halt to the negotiations with Turkey on EU membership, which in itself has no power to cement the process of Turkey's accession to the EU, but sends an important political message to key institutions and EU bodies that decide on possible suspension of the process. Since 1999, i.e. when the negotiations for Turkey's membership started, the EU has a role of primary agent to encourage changes in the direction of Turkey's democratization. In this regard, it is necessary to note that in the past period a series of reforms were carried out through legislative proposals and increased respect for the cultural rights of ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey, hence the Kurds as the largest minority within its borders. However the EU's role in bridging the differences between the two countries and resolving conflict is limited for several reasons. However reaching an agreement must be in line with achieving peace because it is quite certain that in case of a conflict between the Kurdish rebels and the Turkish army, regardless of its current condition, the outcome is predictable and overwhelming and will probably only perpetuate bigger and deeper discontent among the Kurdish population and Turkey would be taken far away from the EU integration.

CONCLUSION

The Turkish political system is formed through political struggles and antagonisms which coincide with ethnic and religious cleavages in the country, because of that the degree of social polarization has increased and boosted to the extent that often Turkey is identified with a divided society in which the low level of mutual trust and cooperation and the risk of social (and Kurds) or

religious segregation (Alevi and other religious communities) are its inherent characteristics.

The Kemalist Turkish nationalism, on the one hand, was a civic nationalism because the Turkish constitution defined all citizens of Turkey as Turks. Exclusion i.e. discrimination from the Turkish national identity was not existent for all those citizens who even though were not ethnic Turks, identified themselves as Turks, spoke Turkish and assimilated in the official culture³⁹. Hence, according to this conception, all who lived within the boundaries of the “national pact” (Misak-ı Milli), who considered themselves Turks and who were citizens of Turkey could claim that they are Turks. The Kemalist Turkish nationalism was ethnically i.e. territorially defined because it required the integration of the population on its territory by developing and implementing civic culture that would replace the individual ethnic and regional identities (the state was created first, than the nation). Furthermore, the Kemalist Turkish nationalism was ethnic because it showed absolute intolerance towards the identification of another ethnic group by the Turkish people. Thus, the Kurds have become the primary target of state repression conducted in the name of the construction of a single indivisible Turkish⁴⁰.

The Kurdish issue is an inseparable part of the Turkish identity politics. Considering Turkey’s political history especially after the foundation of the Republic, we can quite reasonably argue that the root of the Kurdish issue should be sought in the concept of the Turkish state and the possible revision of modern Turkey’s structure and its institutional constitution. Accession to the EU, achieving a peace agreement and reconstruction of basic principles on which modern Turkey rests is probably the best option for resolving the three decade long internal conflict, that is, for closing the chapter on the Kurdish issue.

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39 Michelle Penner Angrist, “Turkey: Roots of the Turkish-Kurdish Conflict and prospects for constructive reform”, in *Federalism and territorial cleavages*, ed. by Ugo M. Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 2004): 411.

40 Ibidem. There are different views of the stated. For example Akturk argues that Kemalist nationalism was never ethnically but only civic or territorially defined. See more at Sener Akturk, “Persistence of the Islamic Millet as an Ottoman Legacy: Mono-Religious and Anti-Ethnic Definition of Turkish Nationhood”, *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, No. 6 (2009): 893-909.

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