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METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH IN THE SURVEY ON POLITICAL CULTURE

In the period May–November 2011 the research unit of the Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” Skopje (IDSCS), with the support of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, office in Skopje, implemented a project: a nationwide Survey on Political Culture in the Republic of Macedonia. The Survey consisted of three parts:

- **A nationwide opinion poll** (a quantitative instrument) involving a stratified, representative sample of the population in the country (1,100 interviewees). The goal of the opinion poll was to gather statistically relevant data on the main parameters and benchmarks of political culture in the country among the general population.
- **Focus groups with citizens** in order to further examine the data gathered by the opinion poll from a qualitative viewpoint and clarify potential statistical frequencies, as well as specific phenomena in the field.
- **Individual interviews and one focus group with experts** (the quantitative part) in the field of political culture (politicians, analysts, journalists and professors). The role of the experts was to comment on the results of the opinion poll in order to determine the phenomenology behind the statistical indicators and gain quantitative ground for analysis.

The origins of the approach

The methodological approach of the academic team of the IDSCS in the Survey on Political Culture is based on previous global and European surveys implemented by renowned political scientists in the field of political culture. The starting standpoint in the methodology is the world-renowned research project from the 1960s by the two Stanford University scholars Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, named *The Civic Culture* (Almond et al. 1989).

Additionally, one of the most popular and up-to-date methodologies in the field of political culture is displayed in the work of two German scholars, Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, dating from 2006, by the name of *Democratic Communities in Europe: a Comparison between East and West*, which is a part of a broader academic effort under the name of *Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe* (Klingemann et al. 2006).

Besides these two renowned research projects on political culture, several other articles and publications were used, mostly as sources for an adequate formulation of the research questions. These articles and publications are the following:

European Values Study (EVS 2008), a vast research project implemented on an annual basis in all European countries – suitable for extracting adequate formulations of research questions (as well as adequate coding).

A series of publications on civil society, political culture and values by the Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC/MCMS) – used for localizing certain topics and research questions. Given the quantity of information, these publications are also adequate for preparing longitudinal data in certain areas (and for comparative statistical control as well).

Ronald Inglehart’s article “How Solid Is Mass Support for Democracy: And How Can We Measure It?” (Inglehart 2003)– used mostly as a methodological guide in measuring the democratic capacity of a country.

Structure of the questionnaire

Given factors such as local context, methodological constraints and planned outreach (mostly local and regional), and based on the previously mentioned methodological experiences, the academic team of the IDSCS decided to focus on the following topics in the opinion poll questionnaire:

- I. The level of politicization of society
- II. Support for a certain type of regime/rule
- III. Support for political system versus the support of violence for political purposes
- IV. Political socialization and values (responsibility, entrepreneurship, gender, family)
- V. Social capital and associational capacity
- VI. Social clientelism/patrimonialism
- VII. Legalistic culture/civic activism
- VIII. Religion vs. secularism
- IX. Attitudes on ethnic issues
- X. Support (solidarity) for marginalized groups

The analysis of quantitative and qualitative data gathered using the methodology explained is presented in the following chapter(s) of the Survey on Political Culture.

Disclaimer

The results are reported in a descriptive manner. The term “insignificant minority” is used to refer to the answers of less than 10 percent of the

sample, “small minority” for answers that range between 10 percent and 30 percent, “minority” for the range between 30 percent and 50 percent, “majority” for 50 percent to 70 percent and “large majority” for more than 70 percent. Percentages lower than 5 percent, as well as the N/A category, are not mentioned: thus the percentages will not always add up to 100 percent. Social, ethnic, gender or other sociodemographic characteristics are emphasized only if they differ from the general trend within the answer.

If one assumes a scale where “fully agree” corresponds to 1, “agree” to 2, 3 is the middle ground and “disagree” and “strongly disagree” are 4 and 5 respectively, then we can use the mean value (average) to show a tendency with a single figure. Any mean value below 3.0 therefore shows that the sampled respondents tend to agree with the statement, and conversely, any value above 3.0 shows a tendency towards disagreement.

I. THE LEVEL OF POLITICIZATION OF SOCIETY

The first topic in the Survey on Political Culture was the general level of politicization of society in the Republic of Macedonia. This section was examined through five questions regarding communication of political topics among the population, the recognition of the importance of politics in personal life, perceptions of the predominance of the political process in solving problems of public interest, a general interest in politics and a capacity for overcoming political differences in building personal relations.

The first question regarding the level of politicization of society in the country concerned the communication of political issues among the general population. The data obtained through the public opinion poll

percent of the respondents agree or fully agree with this statement, while 45.7 percent disagree or completely disagree (21.9 percent were neutral). This means that almost half of the population admits to actively engaging in communication on political issues, additionally taking into consideration one fifth of the answers that take a neutral stance, which might indicate reserve in admitting to discussing politics within the immediate surroundings.

Cross-tabulations show the following findings: men display a slightly higher tendency to discuss politics than women do; the youngest and oldest members of the population discuss politics the most; more educated layers of society show a slightly greater interest in discussing politics; people in high managerial or CEO positions discuss politics the most out of all occupations; the greatest interest in discussing politics is present among the Orthodox population (although there is an almost identical percentage of negative answers among Muslims), as well as ethnic Macedonians and Roma. It is important to make one disclaimer: these categories show the highest statistical value, despite the statistically insignificant differences between various categories of citizens.

The second question concerns the role of politics in the personal life of the examined respondents. *Politics has an important role in my life* was the exact formulation based on which one can observe that the majority of people deny recognition to the importance of politics in the personal sphere (53.1 percent of the respondents disagree or completely disagree). The counterweight of positive answers is only 29.5 percent, with 17.4 percent of the respondents showing a neutral stance. It is noticeable that the general gravity of the question inclines towards a denial of the role of politics in personal life, with less than one third disagreeing with such a position.

Table I. 1 *Politics has an important role in my life.*

	Frequency	Valid percent
Fully agree	150	13.9
Agree	169	15.6
Neither agree or disagree	188	17.4
Disagree	382	35.4
Strongly disagree	191	17.7
Total	1,080	100.0
Don't know	10	
Total	1,090	

indicate that there is a fair amount of interest among the respondents regarding politics, meaning that when asked to consider the statement *I never discuss politics with the people in my surroundings* only 32.3

Analysis of the cross-tabulations with the demographic categories within the responses of this question reveals that the greatest statistical prevalence is given to the following categories of respondents: female

respondents tend to deny the role of politics in their personal lives more than male respondents; the role of politics in life is denied most among the oldest population group; the higher the education of the respondents, the less they deny the role of politics in their personal lives; those in low-qualified professions tend to deny the role of politics in personal affairs more than those in highly qualified professions; other categories that show the highest tendency to deny the role of politics in personal life are ethnic Macedonians and Roma and people from the Pelagonija and northeastern regions; almost identical statistical proportions of Orthodox Christians and Muslims deny the role of politics in their personal lives (around 52 percent).

The third question of the first section in the Survey on Political Culture tries to examine the perceptions of the respondents regarding the importance of the political process in society, thus asking whether *most issues of public interest are resolved through politics in the country*. This indicator directly answers a vast proportion of the questions of the politicization of society in the case of Macedonia, yielding a strong tendency towards positive answers, which make up 74.7 percent of cases. Only 11.6 percent of the respondents deny that most issues of public interest are resolved through politics in the country, while 13.7 percent are neutral on the topic. This clearly speaks of a strong recognition of the importance of the political process in the country in resolving societal issues, i.e. a recognition of the political process as the basic mechanism for resolving public concerns.

politics: precisely 55 percent of the respondents disagree or strongly disagree with the statement, while an additional 18.9 percent stay neutral on the issue. Only 26.1 percent of the respondents agree or fully agree with this statement, which speaks sufficiently about the prevalence of the answers in this category.

The negative reaction is mostly present among men, the age group between 30 and 44 years, and the unemployed and farmers. It is interesting to observe that there is a direct correspondence between the level of education and the negative stance towards interest in politics: the negative attitude lessens as the education level rises, with a small exception among the population with higher education. Also it is noticeable that Orthodox Christians are less interested in politics than Muslims, Roma and Turks are less interested in politics than Albanians and Macedonians, and left-wing voters (both SDSM and DUI) are less interested than right-wing voters (VMRO-DPMNE and DUI).

The last question of the first section on the level of politicization of society concerns the capacity for overcoming political differences in building personal relations. The indicators collected through the public opinion survey indicate a very positive attitude among the population when asked *Would you become friends with someone of an opposing political persuasion?* Namely, as many as 86.1 percent of the respondents agree or fully agree with this idea, with an additional 6.4 percent of neutral responses. Only 7.5 percent of the respondents

Table I. 2 *Most issues of public interest are resolved through politics in the country.*

	Frequency	Valid percent
Fully agree	405	37.2
Agree	387	36.5
Neither agree or disagree	145	13.7
Disagree	81	7.6
Strongly disagree	42	4.0
Total	1,060	100.0
Don't know	30	
Total	1,090	

As regards the cross-tabulations, the following categories hold the statistical primacy of positive answers: women, senior citizens (group above 60), people without finished primary education, Orthodox Christians, ethnic Macedonians and Roma, and respondents from the Vardar and the southeastern region of the country.

Direct interest in politics was measured through the fourth question, where the examined population was asked to agree or disagree with the statement *Generally speaking, I am very interested in politics*. Once again, as in the second question, a solid majority denies interest in

would not befriend a person with opposing political views. This shows a very high democratic capacity among the populace for making a clear distinction between their personal life and their political beliefs.

The most liberal milieu in this regard can be located among men, the youngest age group, and miners and construction workers. Moreover, Orthodox Christians would more easily accept friends with opposite political beliefs than Muslims would, while Roma (100 percent) and Macedonians show a slightly more positive capacity in accepting friends with a different political orientation than the Turks and the Albanians

do. As regards the cross-tabulations with the political orientation of the respondents, it is noticeable that supporters of VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM would more easily accept friends with opposite political standpoints than the supporters of DUI and DPA would.

The first section on the politicization of society reveals several interesting facts from the perspective of the qualitative analysis of the political phenomena present in Macedonian society. On the one hand the vast majority of respondents clearly recognize the role of politics in the public sphere (Q3) and communicate frequently about it (Q1), but on the other hand a very significant number of respondents deny its role in the intimate sphere (one's immediate surroundings) and in general terms the majority of respondents deny that they have any interest in politics at all (Q2 and Q4). This might indicate a negative attitude towards a present and obviously potent social phenomenon such as politics, but also a confused political public that is ready to legitimize politics as a predominant societal force, but not as something that is desired to interfere in personal matters.

The answer to this apparent conundrum might lie in the explanations of the experts consulted for the qualitative analysis in the framework of the Survey on Political Culture. Firstly, experts agree that this indicators might exhibit a "submissive political culture whereby the individual citizens are only aware only of the outputs of the political process, and not aware of the inputs, i.e. one's own role in creating politics, leading to a lack of participatory democracy and the presence of fragile civil society" (Siljanovska, Lazarevski). This is followed by the

throughout the years" (Klekovski).

It is obvious that this duality of intimate denial and public recognition of the importance of the political process is tightly connected to a very specific type of politicization of society. This means that the political culture is structured in a way that allows for a realistic perception of the importance and the presence of the political process, but this perception is followed by a disappointment in the political process itself, accompanied by a feeling of personal powerlessness and futility of political participation among large sectors of the populace in the country. This negative phenomenon results in insufficiencies in terms of personal responsibility and a negative attitude towards entering the political arena.

II. SUPPORT FOR A CERTAIN TYPE OF REGIME/RULE

A large minority of respondents prefer democratic practice as a mode for resolving social issues. The majority of respondents chose one of the two less democratic modes (strong leader or expert rule). When asked, 42.4 percent of the respondents said that democratic practices are better means for resolving social problems than other alternatives. These alternatives include "strong leader" (28 percent) and "expert government" (25.2 percent) and are almost equally distributed between the remainder of the respondents.

Table II. 1 Social problems are better resolved with:

	Frequency	Valid percent
Democratic political means	462	42.4
Strong leader	305	28.0
Expert (technocratic gov.)	275	25.2
Don't know	48	4.4
Total	1,090	100.0

present "feeling of a lack of power on the part of the citizens to change something in the political process" (Sekjerinska) and the recognition that "people do not want to enter politics due to the negative perception related to it i.e. involvement in political parties as the sole modus for participation in politics" (Simoska). Additional light on the problem can be cast by the explanation that "Macedonian society leans towards a phenomenon known as 'uncertainty avoidance' manifested in the lack of capacity to undertake individual responsibility. Politics is important in the public sphere, but there is an obvious apathy towards (and/or distrust in) participating in any organized form of political life such as parties, NGOs etc. This leads to distrust in institutions due to their irresponsiveness and inefficiency, which has been built up

Cross-tabulation analysis shows that the greatest support for democratic political means is found within the respondents older than 60, where 49.4 percent of this cohort chose this answer. Furthermore, groups with slightly more frequent support for this option include workers, managers and business owners, as well as pensioners. This is the case with Orthodox Christians, ethnic Macedonians, SDSM supporters and residents of smaller towns.

The support for "government by experts" is more visible in (albeit within the statistical margin) the age cohort between 30 and 60, those with university education, clerks and the unemployed, non-voters and those from large cities. Factory workers and those in sales, as well

as the unemployed, are slightly more inclined to support a “strong leader” than other groups. The same category includes Muslims, ethnic Albanians, DUI supporters and those living in Skopje.

These attitudes are further contextualized when the respondents are asked about how an ideal politician solves issues. Half of the respondents would prefer politicians to use knowledge and expertise instead of debate and consultation, while those choosing the latter amount for less than a third of the respondents (27.4 percent). A fifth of the respondents chose

favor knowledge and expertise more than other respective groups (religious or ethnic) do, and the same phenomenon can be seen with persons living in larger cities. Younger people favor debate and consultation to a greater degree than other age groups do. This is also the case within the highly educated respondents, management, Muslims and ethnic Albanians, as well as those in smaller towns.

This support for expertise and knowledge is confirmed in the next question. A large majority of the respondents show support for the idea that experts and intellectuals, rather than politicians, should make

Table II. 2 *The ideal politician deals with issues by:*

	Frequency	Valid percent
Using debates and consultation	299	27.4
Strong will	224	20.6
Knowledge and expertise	548	50.3
Don't know	19	1.7
Total	1,090	100.0

“strong will” as a better attribute than the other two.

Cross-tabulation shows that women favor knowledge and expertise slightly more than men; those between the ages of 45 and 60; secondary education; retired respondents; Orthodox Christians and

decisions for the benefit of the state. A majority of those respondents strongly support this idea, which shows a significant degree of distrust in politicians and favors intellectuals (experts) as decision-makers. The set of contrary attitudes towards the statement amounts for less than 10 percent of the respondents (7.6 percent).

Table II. 3 *Intellectuals and not politicians should make the best part of decisions for the wellbeing of the state.*

	Frequency	Valid percent
Fully agree	482	44.7
Agree	366	33.9
Neither agree or disagree	149	13.8
Disagree	54	5.0
Strongly disagree	28	2.6
Total	1,079	100.0
Don't know	11	
Total	1,090	

ethnic Macedonians as well as respondents living in larger cities.

Cross-tabulation shows that women favor knowledge and expertise slightly more than men do. Similarly, those between the ages of 45 and 60 are more in favor of knowledge and expertise than other cohorts, and the same thing can be observed in respondents with secondary education. Similar observations can be made concerning those respondents who are retired. When the religious and ethnic dimensions are considered, Orthodox Christians and ethnic Macedonians tend to

The mean value for responses to the statement *Intellectuals (and experts) and not politicians should make the best part of decisions for the wellbeing of the state* is 1.87. The cross-tabulation analysis shows that respondents older than 60 tend to agree more than other age groups. This was also the case with unemployed respondents, as well as managers and business owners, Muslims, ethnic Albanians, supporters of DUI and DPA, non-voters and residents of Skopje.

However, when the respondents were asked to respond to the statement

that in spite of its problems, democracy is the best political regime, a large majority agreed. More than 70 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement, with 40.2 percent agreeing strongly. A very small minority did not agree with the statement and 15.2 percent neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement.

between 15 and 29, which shows the highest grade of disagreement. Less educated respondents tend to agree more than those who are well educated. Managers, business owners and clerks tend to disagree more than other groups.

About a half of the respondents agree that socialism was better than

Table II. 4 *In spite of the problems that it faces, democracy is the best political system.*

	Frequency	Valid percent
Fully agree	434	40.3
Agree	348	32.3
Neither agree or disagree	164	15.2
Disagree	97	9.0
Strongly disagree	34	3.2
Total	1,077	100.0
Don't know	13	
Total	1,090	

The average value for responses to this statement was 2.02. Analysis of the cross-tabulations shows that various types of workers tend to agree less with the statement than the total average, in contrast to the unemployed and the managerial groups. This is also the case with party supporters, who tend to agree more than non-voters.

The next question tested the respondents for their support of the statement that the military should take over running the state in extreme situations. The mean value on this question was 2.99. About a third of the respondents did not agree with the statement and less than 10 percent disagreed strongly. Almost a quarter of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed, while 19 percent agreed with the statement. Another 16.2 percent strongly agreed with the

the current political system. Out of the total number of respondents, 28.2 percent strongly agreed and another 22.1 percent agreed with the statement. The contrary position is present in 29 percent of the respondents, with only 7.6 percent of the total number strongly disagreeing with the statement. About a fifth of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement.

The cross-tabulation analysis shows that those aged over 60 agree significantly more than other groups, with the youngest age category agreeing the least, albeit still below the middle value of 3.0. Orthodox Christians agree more than Muslims, and this is also reflected within ethnic groups, with ethnic Albanians agreeing less than Macedonians. Furthermore, VMRO-DPMNE, DUI and DPA supporters agree less than

Table II. 5 *In extreme situations, the military should take over running the state.*

	Frequency	Valid percent
Fully agree	168	16.2
Agree	197	19.0
Neither agree or disagree	244	23.5
Disagree	335	32.2
Strongly disagree	95	9.1
Total	1,039	100.0
Don't know	51	
Total	1,090	

proposed statement.

The cross-analysis shows that respondents older than 60 tend to agree more with this statement, unlike the youngest cohort, that of those

those supporting SDSM. More supporters for this statement can be found in Skopje, while the rural areas hold the least number of supporters.

Table II. 6 *Socialism was better than the current system.*

	Frequency	Valid percent
Fully agree	287	28.2
Agree	225	22.1
Neither agree or disagree	210	20.7
Disagree	217	21.4
Strongly disagree	77	7.6
Total	1,016	100.0
Don't know	74	
Total	1,090	

The last question in this section deals with exploring the preference of the respondents when it comes to a choice between economic security and freedom. The respondents were asked to say how much they agree with the statement that economic security is more important than freedom. About two fifths (44 percent) of the respondents agree with the statement, while 35.8 percent do not agree with the statements. Moderate answers in both camps are more frequent than the more radical “strongly agree/disagree” answers. Furthermore, there are a significant number of respondents, 20.2 percent, who neither agree nor disagree.

only based on experience but also on certain ways in which politics is imagined. Although making informed and expert decisions is not necessarily a bad thing, many of the interviewees comment that this might shift authority from democratic decision-making to that of technocratic leadership. Klekovski adds that this understanding is based on different social capital gathered by educated people in a society with a large mass of uneducated population. Furthermore, he claims that it is based on the “communist” model of imagining politicians as educated technocrats. According to others, the mechanism is the need for authority, which is then easily given to knowledgeable experts

Table II. 7 *Security (economic and personal) is more important than freedom.*

	Frequency	Valid percent
Fully agree	198	18.7
Agree	269	25.4
Neither agree or disagree	214	20.2
Disagree	240	22.6
Strongly disagree	140	13.2
Total	1,061	100.0
Don't know	29	
Total	1,090	

Economic security is more valued within the older population (specifically those older than 60), Orthodox Christians, ethnic Macedonians and Roma groups, and supporters of SDSM and to a lesser extent those of VMRO-DPMNE. Conversely, ethnic Albanians and Muslims tend to disagree with the statement, as do supporters of both DUI and DPA.

The results from this section are confirmed in the in-depth interviews, as well as the focus groups. The respondents consider that democracy is a comparatively better political system, yet they tend to favor expertise over public debate and consultation. A significant contribution to such a situation is the perception of politics as a domain of corrupt behavior and decision-making. This, according to the interviewees, is not

paving their way as technocrats.

This is, of course, a significant contributing factor. Comparatively speaking, it would not be unsafe to say that Macedonia is not very different from the rest of its neighborhood (WVS 2009 Comparison with Bulgaria, Slovenia, Serbia and Turkey). The long experience with a corrupt political process has made it easy to turn to the other side and invest political (and social) trust in the educated (expert) elites. These rarely had the chance to test their abilities in the decision-making process, which makes it easier to maintain their social capital.

The fact that half of the respondents still favored socialism over the current democratic system involves many contributing factors. It is a

commonplace to regard this affection as nostalgia. This understanding is also visible in the interviews and focus groups. Nostalgia is certainly a contributing factor. Since support for socialism is more distributed within the older age groups, such a conclusion is understandable and reflects nostalgia for imagined better times (Klekovski).

This still-existent support for socialist times does not just result from paternalistic expectations that the state can act as a parent. It is also based on disillusionment with the idea that the current system can provide certain important welfare benefits (see Kacarska et al. 2012 p. 3).

III. SUPPORT FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM VERSUS THE SUPPORT OF VIOLENCE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES

This section discusses citizens' attitudes towards the political system. The issue was addressed through two general sets of questions. The first depicted people's evaluation of the possibility of using violent instruments and supporting revolutionary means to achieve political goals. The second measured people's perceptions of the institutions

that compose the Macedonian political system.


In general, the support for the current (democratic) political system is widespread among the population. On the first question, Do you justify the use of violence for achieving political goals?, approximately 73 percent of the respondents (strongly) disagreed with the idea of this. Conversely, 16 percent answered that sometimes it is legitimate to use violent methods for achieving political goals or benefits. This question assumes a particular relevance if we consider the recent events in the country. Analyzing the data from an ethnic point of view, we can conclude that the two largest ethnic communities in the country share the same views on this issue. As a matter of fact, results cross-tabulated by ethnic breakdown of the respondents show that more than 71 percent of ethnic Macedonians and 82 percent of ethnic Albanians do not justify the use of violent methods for achieving political goals.

The same holds true for political parties' sympathizers, who in the vast majority also do not approve of the use of violent methods for achieving political goals. This is the case for 76 percent of VMRO-DPMNE sympathizers, 68 percent of SDSM sympathizers, 86 percent of DUI sympathizers and 78 percent of DPA sympathizers. According

Table III. 1 *Use of violence for achieving political goals is always illegitimate*

	Percent
Strongly agree	44
Agree	30
Neutral	10
Disagree	11
Strongly disagree	5

Chart III. 1 *Support for revolutionary means for social changes*



to the results of the Survey, the sympathizers of political parties with predominantly ethnic Macedonian supporters – VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM – are more inclined to back the use of violent methods for achieving political goals. This position is shared by approximately 18 percent of VMRO-DPMNE sympathizers and by 24 percent of SDSM supporters.

Political party affiliation also determines a clear distinction in people's approach to social changes. Supporters of the largest political parties with a predominance of ethnic Macedonian members believe in almost equal proportions that society should be changed through revolutionary means. On the other hand, the stronger support for revolutionary methods for social changes comes from the supporters of

Table III. 2 Political party sympathizers' support for social changes through revolutionary methods

	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	DPA
Strongly agree	17	18	22	30
Agree	19	18	38	25
Neutral	20	26	30	25
Disagree	31	23	6	18
Strongly disagree	13	15	4	2

From a regional perspective, residents of the southeastern region more strongly reject the use of violent methods for achieving political goals (90 percent), while, on the other hand, this is supported by 28 percent of residents in the Pelagonija region.

Strictly connected with this first question, respondents were asked to assess the achievement of social changes through revolutionary methods. The attitudes of the respondents towards this question significantly differ from those towards the previous one. Although most citizens do not justify violent methods for achieving political goals, and legitimize the democratic election of state institutions and governance, 43 percent of all respondents would justify the use of revolutionary upheavals or turmoil to initiate social changes. Conversely, approximately 32 percent of respondents rejected this option. More insights are offered by the cross-tabulation of results. This operation helps in particular to assess which of the demographic categories composing Macedonian society support the use of revolutionary means for social changes, and to what extent.

About half of the male respondents are in favor of the use of revolutionary means for initiating social changes. The same position is shared also by 35 percent of female respondents. As regards religious affiliation, 55 percent of the representatives of the Muslim community believe that society should be changed through revolutionary turmoil, while this is true for 37 percent of Orthodox Christians. Looking at the ethnic background of the respondents, the ethnic Albanian and ethnic Serbian communities are those more in favor of pro-revolutionary changes in society (60 percent and 50 percent respectively). The ethnic Macedonian community supports revolutionary changes with a percentage of 37.7 percent. Across the continuum, the Roma and Vlach communities declared themselves not in favor of the use of revolutionary means for social changes (84.6 percent and 55.4 percent respectively).


the political parties with a predominance of ethnic Albanian members.

Finally, in the last of this first set of questions, respondents were asked to comment on the acceptability of violent protests as a tool to express a sense of dissatisfaction on the part of the citizenry against the political situation in the country. 42 percent of the citizens answered that it is acceptable to protest violently when they experience a sense of dissatisfaction with the political situation, while 43 percent (strongly) disagreed with the sentiment. The highest support for violent protests in the case of dissatisfaction with the political system can be found in the male population, in the population of 15-29-year-olds, in citizens without formal education, in representatives of the Turkish, Vlach and Albanian ethnic communities, and in the party supporters of DPA, SDSM, VMRO-DPMNE and DUI (54 percent, 49 percent, 42 percent and 32 percent respectively).

In the second set of questions, respondents were asked to determine their level of confidence about the institutions composing the Macedonian political system.

In general, the data bring us to the conclusion that citizens have stronger confidence in institutions with enforcing powers (government, police and the army) and in the international community than in bodies with direct citizens' representation (Parliament, local government and the President).

Analyzing the results from a comparative point of view, it may be noted that the greatest level of confidence is placed in the army (56 percent) and in the police (45 percent). On the other hand, representative bodies such as the Parliament, local government and the President enjoy a lower level of confidence among citizens, in the percentage of 32 percent, 37 percent and 39 percent respectively. One of the most serious concerns refers to the judiciary, in which the majority of citizens – 56 percent of respondents – do not have confidence.

Chart III. 2 Confidence in institutions of the political system

Cross-tabulation of the results provides a clearer picture regarding people's support for state institutions. The ethnic background of the respondents, as well as their party affiliation, makes up the set of variables that mainly determine citizens' attitude towards political institutions. Namely, looking at the level of support for the Parliament, ethnic Macedonians have full or partial confidence in the proportion, respectively, of 14.2 percent and 20.4 percent. 25 percent of the citizens are unsupportive of this institution. Approximately 40 percent of ethnic Macedonians do not have confidence in the Parliament. Ethnic Albanians are much more skeptical and have less trust in the work of the Parliament: only 24 percent of them expressed confidence in this institution, while 56 percent do not share this opinion and expressed no confidence.

Analysis of the political affiliation of the respondents showed that the majority of VMRO-DPMNE supporters have confidence in the work of the Parliament (56 percent), while SDSM and DUI supporters have much less trust in this institution (22.2 percent and 20.4 percent respectively). The supporters of these two political parties also share the highest level of mistrust in the Parliament's activities (both parties' supporters approximately 61 percent).

From a regional perspective, it is worth mentioning that citizens in the southeastern region of Macedonia have the highest level of confidence in the Parliament (67.7 percent), while the lowest level of confidence can be found among the citizens living in the southwest regions of Polog and Pelagonija (55.6 percent, 54.7 percent and 53.1 percent respectively).

The support for the government reaches its peak among ethnic Turks and ethnic Macedonians (52 percent and 45.2 percent respectively),

while approximately 46 percent of the members of the ethnic Albanian community do not have confidence in its work. With regard to the party affiliation of the respondents, VMRO-DPMNE sympathizers express the highest level of trust in this institution (76 percent), while both SDSM and DUI supporters declared a high level of mistrust in the work of the government (both parties by approximately 60 percent of no confidence).

In general, 40 percent of citizens declare themselves to be confident about the work of the President. Cross-tabulation of the results shows that the highest trust in the President is to be found among the representatives of the ethnic Macedonian community and some smaller ethnicities such as Turks, Serbs and Roma, among VMRO-DPMNE supporters (70 percent), among citizens of the southeastern region (66.6 percent) and among citizens of the capital, Skopje (47 percent).

As mentioned above, one of the most problematic fields when talking about confidence in the political system is the judiciary. Only 28 percent of the respondents expressed trust in its work, while more than half (51 percent) do not believe in the judicial institutions. This position is shared by almost all ethnic communities on an equal basis. At the same time, the political affiliation of the respondents shows that SDSM sympathizers are the most dissatisfied with the work of the judiciary (66 percent). From a regional perspective, the judiciary is mostly evaluated as being unsatisfactory in the southwestern region of Pelagonija and in the Skopje region (in both cases in a proportion of 60 percent).

Despite the fact that the decentralization of power represents one of the most important state reforms introduced in Macedonia since

2001, the majority of citizens still lack confidence in the work of local government institutions. Around 37 percent of the respondents have declared confidence in the local government activities. In particular, the greatest proportion of positive answers is shared by citizens of the Albanian and Turkish ethnic communities (43 percent and 65 percent respectively), and by the supporters of VMRO-DPMNE and DPA (48 percent and 52 percent respectively). From a regional perspective, citizens from the Vardar (around 50 percent), Polog (45 percent) and Pelagonija (40 percent) regions are most confident with the local government.

In contrast, the majority of Macedonian citizens have confidence in the army and, to a smaller extent, in the police. The main point is therefore

these topics through 14 questions regarding the internalization of political attitudes in the family and how people share views among family members. In this light, the perceptions of parental authority and the father figure from the perspective of a patrimonial political culture were targeted as well. Furthermore, entrepreneurial attitudes were scanned regarding the individual business motivation and preferences of the respondents. The expectation towards the state's role in providing extensive social welfare in contrast with the personal responsibilities of citizens was the next aspect the Survey focused on. Finally, in this section the Survey analyzed the issue of gender equality in social life, in marital relations and on the labor market.

The first question on political socialization tested the level of

Table III. 3 Do you have confidence in the police?

	TOTAL	Macedonians	Albanians	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	DPA
Yes	45.6	41.4	53.4	55.5	29.8	50	62.2
Neutral	18.5	19.6	16.4	16.3	24	14.1	17.8
No	35.9	39.1	30.3	28.2	46.1	35.9	20

to show the reasons why Macedonian citizens have a stronger trust in power-enforcing institutions than in political-representative institutions. Some insights can be found by looking at the different categories of citizens who share the highest confidence in the police and in the army.

The fact that citizens have more confidence in repressive and security institutions than in democratically elected bodies might find an explanation in the assumption according to which, for the majority of people, personal security is much more valuable than individual and political liberties (Siljanovska). Phrased somewhat differently, citizens are prepared to tolerate or justify certain institutional forceful actions if they are conducted to the advantage of the common good.

IV. POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND VALUES

The fourth topic of the Survey analyzed the processes of political socialization and the value system based on four aspects: responsibility, entrepreneurship, gender and family. This section thoroughly examined

agreement with the statement *share common political values with my family*. A significant majority of the respondents completely agree with this statement; however, more than 18 percent have different political views in their families. In the latter category, males form the majority, whereas there is a greater gender balance in the positive answers to this statement. Common political values are slightly more frequent among older family members aged from 45 to 59 and above. With regard to age, those who disagree with this statement are predominantly younger respondents. Common political views in the family are equally present among Orthodox Christians and Muslims, whereas atheists mostly tend to have different political standpoints from their family members.

The communication about politics analyzed in the next question showed that 43.6 percent of the respondents openly discuss politics in their home. Those belonging to the next-largest segment of the population (28.2 percent) do not discuss politics at all in their family. With regard to common political values in the family, this shows that there are a significant number of families where common political

Table IV. 1 How do you discuss politics in your home?

	Frequency	Valid percent
We discuss politics openly	475	43.6
We confront each other's attitudes	175	16.1
We tend not to confront each other	122	11.2
We do not discuss politics at all	307	28.2
Don't know	11	1.0
Total	1,090	100.0

values are silently inherited or internalized rather than being formed in an open discussion. 11.2 percent of the respondents tend not to be confrontational on political issues with other family members, while 16.1 percent answered that they are open about their views. Males and females have equal shares in the distribution of answers regarding this question. Respondents who are not politically affiliated (31 percent of the population) mainly said that they openly talk about politics in their family or they do not talk at all. The latter group comprises the apolitical segments of society, while the former discuss politics the most, compared to others affiliated to a political party. Supporters of the ruling party (VMRO-DPMNE) tend to talk more openly about politics than those affiliated with parties in opposition, something that can be explained by the theory of a spiral of silence where the majority who share common attitudes tend to express them more frequently or more “loudly” (Noelle-Neumann, 1993).

The next question asked the respondents to point out the reasons

Macedonia is that the state should have a strong social component. This attitude is generally evenly distributed among all socio-demographic categories and reflects the predominately patrimonial aspect of the political culture, as well as the ideological legacy from the socialist political system. Moreover, in terms of political affiliation, regardless of the respondents' position on the political spectrum (left-wing, center or right-wing) social state is a general preference.

The notion of spare time as a value was replaced by the perception of free time as an asset for profit. Asked whether they would sacrifice their spare time for financial benefit, the majority of the population (50.8 percent) answered that they completely agreed or that they agreed (28.7 percent). An insignificant minority of the interviewees (10 percent) neither agreed nor disagreed. Males are slightly more willing to sacrifice time for profit than females are, and the respondents who indicate such willingness are mostly aged between 30 and 44 and have completed secondary education. This finding relates to significant

Table IV. 2 *It is an obligation of the state to take care of its citizens.*

	Frequency	Valid percent
Strongly agree	739	68.2
Agree	275	25.4
Neither agree nor disagree	41	3.8
Disagree	18	1.7
Strongly disagree	11	1.0
Total	1,084	100.0
Don't know	6	
Total	1,090	

why some people lack sufficient financial resources. The available answers were lack of luck, laziness/lack of willpower, society being unjust or such things happening naturally. The majority of respondents answered that reluctance (35 percent) and societal injustice (35 percent) are the main reason why some people are deficient in their financial status. An insignificant minority found a lack of luck and natural events as reasons. Within education, the respondents (48.4 percent) with unfinished primary school said that society is unjust, while the highest percentage of those without formal education (66.7 percent) said that unlucky people are financially vulnerable. In terms of the ethnic background, the ethnic Macedonians answered “lack of willpower,” whereas the most frequent answer among ethnic Albanians was the injustice in society.

The next attitude that was tested regarded the role of the state in taking responsibility for its citizens. A significant majority of the respondents (68.2 percent) strongly agreed that this is an obligation of the state. If we consider that the rest of the sampled respondents agreed with this statement, it can be inferred that generally the stance of the citizens of

societal expectations of men regarding the responsibility for the family income. As regards their occupation, respondents employed in less profitable sectors such as small trade, construction and mining, as well as factory workers, are mostly inclined to sacrifice their spare time.

However, in the light of significant support for the idea of the state's responsibility for social wellbeing, more than 80 percent of the people either completely agree or agree that they personally are responsible for their success in life. Interestingly, young people represent the lowest percentage of those that strongly accept personal responsibility for success. Those who have never been married show less individuality in this sense than those with experience of married life. In terms of occupation, public administration employees and professional workers in a higher percentage than owners of private business answered that they individually are responsible for their life success. Those who are employed in the low-income production and manufacturing sectors make up the lowest percentage who strongly agree with this statement. Ethnic Macedonians are more positive on this issue than ethnic Albanians are, and this is reflected in the religious denomination

as well.

The perception of marital partners' participation in family income was tested through the statement Both parents should contribute to the income of the family. The level of agreement with this statement revealed slight conservative and patriarchal inclinations in the family relations regarding gender equality. The share of female positive responses to this question is larger than that of males. Seen through the prism of gender, 47 percent of males and 57.1 percent of females strongly agree that both parents should contribute to the family income. This is a clear illustration of the inequalities in the perception of feminine and masculine identity. One interesting finding is that, when seen from the angle of age, the agreement with this statement becomes proportionally greater as the age of the respondents rises. Younger and unmarried respondents are inclined to give answers that support gender inequality. Older and married respondents are more in favor of an equal contribution of the marital partners. The view that there should be gender equality in family earnings is more favored among ethnic Macedonians (more than 85 percent strongly agreeing or agreeing) than among ethnic Albanians (77 percent strongly agreeing or agreeing), and this is reflected in the cross-tabulations with religion as a variable also.

The patriarchal family values were furthermore analyzed through the statement The primary duty of women is to take care of the children and the family. In this case a significant majority of respondents, more than 79 percent, answered that they either strongly agreed or agreed. 10 percent more males find this statement true. The youngest segment of the sample, aged between 15 and 30 years of age, are the least represented in this category of answers (strongly agreeing or agreeing). Orthodox Christians (more than 66 percent) are less in favor of this statement than Muslims are (more than 76 percent), with atheists being slightly more restrained over the idea that women's

supporters of the leftist social democrats do. This situation once more illustrates the ideological inconsistencies of both the political agendas and voter preferences.

Asked if they agreed that Men and women should receive equal pay for equal jobs/positions, a significant majority of respondents supported the statement. However, women slightly more frequently think that both genders should have equal income and equal job opportunities. The positive stances regarding this statement created a supporters' profile that is composed of citizens over 60, pension-holders with unfinished primary education. There are no significant differences between political parties' affiliates, although there is a 10 percent difference in affirmative attitudes in favor of ethnic Macedonians and Orthodox Christians in contrast to ethnic Albanians and Muslims.

The next question was focused on the patriarchal dimension of the family values. Asked if they agreed with the statement The father is the head of the family, a significant majority of the respondents answered positively, although more males supported the answer. A small majority of the respondents are ambivalent on the issue. As regards age structure, citizens over 60 are the least supportive regarding the dominant father figure. There is a big difference between the religious communities, whereby more than 60 percent of Muslim respondents see the father as the head of the family, compared to 39 percent among Orthodox Christians. This difference is reflected in the comparison between the answers of the ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian respondents. The notion of the father figure is also predominately internalized among the inhabitants of rural regions.

Readiness to participate in the maintenance of the household constructs once more the profile of family members regarding their responsibilities. Although a significant majority of the population expressed a willingness to involve themselves in cleaning, dishwashing, cooking and so on, the Survey's results showed women to be more

Table IV. 3 *The primary duty of women is to take care of the children and the family.*

	Frequency	Valid percent
Strongly agree	468	43.6
Agree	276	25.7
Neither agree nor disagree	144	13.4
Disagree	145	13.5
Strongly disagree	40	3.7
Total	1,073	100.0
Don't know	17	
Total	1,090	

primary duty is child care The supporters of the ruling Demo-Christians (VMRO-DPMNE) have less support for this statement than the

inclined towards these household duties. Looking at the previous questions on attitudes regarding family matters, it appears that older

marital partners (above 60) and Orthodox ethnic Macedonians are more gender-sensitive. On the other hand, the younger population, under 30

so-called “second shift,” i.e. to work outside the home as well. It is again something inherited (from the socialist period) perspective that

Table IV. 4 Would you engage in household tasks (cleaning, cooking, dishwashing, ironing etc.)?

	Frequency	Valid percent
Strongly agree	559	51.9
Agree	310	28.8
Neither agree nor disagree	109	10.1
Disagree	77	7.1
Strongly disagree	22	2.0
Total	1,077	100.0
Don't know	13	
Total	1,090	

years of age, engaged in low-profit sectors, are less motivated to share family responsibilities. On this question, right-wing political supporters express a slightly stronger eagerness to participate in family matters.

Lastly, respondents were asked to express their level of agreement with the statement One has to respect one's parents, no matter what their qualities and faults. When it comes to respect towards parents, regardless of their personal qualities or disadvantages, there were no statistically significant differences between any socio-demographic variables. Respect for parents is an absolute, indisputable value strongly supported by all groups in the sample.

The findings above were additionally analyzed through qualitative interviews with experts and focus group discussions on the most relevant conclusions from the field survey. Seen through the prism of family values and the family as a political socialization agent, it can be inferred that there is a strong traditional, patriarchal component in the Macedonian family. This might be a precondition for nurturing nationalism (Siljanovska), and support for strong political leaders and strong expectations of the social role of the state. This is a legacy from the former socialist regime and can be exemplified with organized protests, which are always directed at state institutions (parliament or government). In other words, although private entrepreneurs are directly responsible for people's problems, the public's main criticism is exclusively directed towards the government, as an institutionalized “father figure” that is expected to be responsible for the family (Simovska).

As regards the gender distribution of family duties, there is an imaginative patriarchal and cultural assumption of gender equality. Experts comment that Macedonian society has not reached a satisfactory level of gender sensitivity. The woman is still the main pillar in the household maintenance, but she is expected to do the

women are treated equally if they are able to conduct non-household work (Kolozova). Yet this situation only reproduces conservatism, and exploits the female position in society. Declaratively women are considered equal but when it comes to equal income and job opportunity the social expectations are focused on men.

In terms of political discussion inside the family, the authoritative father figure is still influential in the formation of the political attitudes of family members. This contention is supported by the high level of responses that acknowledge the father as head of the family, where different political views are seldom openly discussed or confronted, and, in addition, the high rate of responses suggesting that common political views are shared in the family. There is a problematic division between the individual self and the collective self, and hence there is a tendency to consider success only with reference to foreign achievements, while actually by doing so we justify our own failures (Klekovski).

Additionally, there is a kind of exclusivity of one's truth, and hence one considers one's own religion or political standpoint as the only trustworthy one. Patriarchal societies are characterized by a great aversion towards uncertainty, and they avoid creating it by engaging in religious or stable political arrangements or expectations from the state (Klekovski). This aspect of patrimonial political culture is also manifested in the attitudes of those younger segments of society who are not significantly inclined towards more liberal views.

I. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ASSOCIATIONAL CAPACITY

[WHY DO THE CHAPTER NUMBERS START ALL OVER AGAIN AT I FROM THIS POINT? THEY DO IT AGAIN AT WHAT WAS ONCE IX, TOO.]

The section on social capital and associational capacity explains the previously indicated uncertainty and distrust among people in making social arrangements. The question that analyzed this aspect of the social capital sphere asked whether one can trust other people or one should be cautious. A small minority of respondents (only 11.9 percent) said that people generally can be trusted, while a significant majority of them (86 percent) answered that one should be careful in establishing relations with other people. Highly educated people are less inclined towards distrust in new social arrangements, and public servants and those that own private businesses generally have more trust in people. On the other hand, again considering occupation, the unemployed and professional workers have the most uncertainty in establishing relations with other people. In this regard, there are no significant differences between people according to place of residence, religion, ethnicity or political affiliation.

On the statement I would associate with other people to pursue my own goals it is evident that a minority of people (41.7 percent) completely agree, although there were 33.5 percent of respondents who gave less support (they "agree"). If one considers the previously stated uncertainty in establishing social arrangements, there is a seemingly greater readiness in starting a partnership for personal gain. When it comes to religious distinctions, Orthodox Christians are more willing to associate, in comparison with Muslims. These findings hold true for ethnic Macedonians as well, who show a greater associational capacity than their ethnic Albanian fellow citizens. Residents of urban places (bigger cities and Skopje) express greater readiness for association as well.

were members of the following organizations: political parties, NGOs, sports clubs, trade unions or other organizations. Data aggregation provided the following findings: 38 percent of the respondents were not members of any organization, while 34 percent are member of a political party or an NGO (18.3 percent) and 7.6 percent are involved in a sports club. Men are significantly more involved in political parties and sports clubs than women. Respondents older than 44 are the age category that is the least involved in associations, and they usually have an unfinished primary education, while younger citizens are more engaged in sports associations. In terms of participation in political parties the greatest proportion of the population is between 30 and 59 years of age.

Having found evident inconsistencies between low social capital and high association potential, experts comment that the latter is of a declarative nature. The explanation lies in societal expectations that respondents want to meet, and thus they declare affinity with, but do not engage in, an association, something that is indicated in the deficiency of solidarity as a value. Moreover, going back to the concept of "uncertainty avoidance," people tend to circumvent associations because they are afraid of the unknown, the foreigner, the Other.

II. SOCIAL CLIENTELISM/PATRIMONIALISM

The sixth section of the Survey on Political Culture concerns the specific phenomenon of social clientelism and patrimonialism as an inherent aspect of political culture. This section was examined through three questions that directly concern three crucial aspects: perceptions of favor return, merit vs. social connections in the local context, and views on obedience to authority. These three aspects (especially if they are highly correlated) could offer a more general viewpoint of the type of political culture in Macedonia, given social clientelism and patrimonialism as vital parameters explaining its very structure.

Table IV. 1 A favor should be returned, no matter what.

	Frequency	Valid percent
Fully agree	290	27.1
Agree	378	35.3
Neither agree nor disagree	223	20.8
Disagree	149	13.9
Strongly disagree	30	2.8
Total	1,070	100.0
Don't know	20	
Total	1,090	

The last question in this section analyzed the actual realization of the association capacity of the citizens. Respondents were asked if they

The first statement given to the respondents in this section was A favor should be returned, no matter what. The data collected with regard

to this question clearly speak of a very clientelistic and submissive mindset among the respondents: as many as 62.4 percent of the respondents agree or fully agree with the statement. An additional 20.8 are neutral and only 16.7 percent show some dose of skepticism towards the unconditional return of favors.

Statistically speaking, the most prevalent groups of respondents that perceive the unconditional return of favors positively are the following: men more than women; the age group above 60 years of age; people with the highest degree of education (postgraduate); Orthodox Christians more than Muslims; ethnic Turks and Macedonians; supporters of DPA and SDSM more than supporters of DUI and VMRO-DPMNE; people from the capital and the bigger cities more than people from villages and smaller cities.

One must, however, point out that there are very small differences in the cross-tabulation in this question: the unconditional return of favors is seen positively by a large majority of the population within all demographic categories.

The second part of the section concerning social clientelism and patrimonialism demonstrates an opposition between merit and social connections in the Macedonian context. The respondents were asked to fully agree, agree, disagree, fully disagree or stay neutral regarding the following statement: Who you know is more important than what you know in our society. This question gave probably one of the most worrying indicators: 84.9 percent fully agree or agree with the statement. Only 9.1 percent disagree, while 5.9 percent stay neutral. The percentage of positive answers, the high polarization (in direction of support of the statement) and the low conformism (neutrality) clearly speak of a disillusioned political culture affected by pressing social clientelism and patrimonialism. The fact that almost 90 percent of the respondents recognize personal connections as more important than merit clearly speaks of a towering perception of "personalization" of social processes based on clientelism far more potent in the public arena than knowledge and skill.

As regards the demographic cross-tabulations, one may note that this perception of deeply enrooted social clientelism is mostly present among men, the oldest population group, transport workers, Orthodox Christians (more than Muslims), Roma (100 percent), right-wing voters (VMRO and DPA), respondents from the Vardar and the southeastern region, as well as people from smaller towns.

The final topic concerns the submissiveness of the populace to superiors by asking whether one should follow instruction by superiors in all cases. The situation is more optimistic than that in the previous two questions: the examined populace exhibits a higher potential for critical reserve when asked to consider this statement. Still 48 percent of the respondents fall into the category of positive answers, while 28.5 percent fall into the category of negative answers. Only 23.5

percent are neutral. This shows that more people tend to avoid direct answers than they do when asked the previous question, but still more people would agree with such a statement than argue against it.

Cross-tabulations show that submissiveness is mostly present within the statistical categories of women, the most educated part of the population (postgraduates) and people from the Skopje region and the villages. Very interesting results appear when analyzing the age cross-tabulations as well as the occupational cross-tabulations. Namely, the more senior the respondents are, the higher is their submissiveness towards superiors (43.8 percent of positive answers among the youngest generation, 58.6 percent of positive answers among the oldest age group). This clearly speaks of positive social dynamism in this segment. However, what is unpleasant is the fact that speaking from the standpoint of occupations the most submissive group comprises the clerks, administrative workers and government employees, with 55.7 percent of positive answers. This speaks of the mindset of the bureaucratic apparatus in a country that is highly submissive to superiors, which often goes hand in hand with a lack of transparency or of a service-oriented approach. With regard to political orientation, the supporters of the two biggest ethnic Macedonian parties (VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM) show significantly higher tendencies towards submissiveness to superiors than the supporters of DUI and DPA.

The sources of such highly expressed political clientelism and patrimonialism have to be traced to the roots of the political culture in Macedonian society. Siljanovska sees the source of such political clientelism in "the fact that the state is the biggest employer of all, as well as the complete lack of real market mechanisms and principles" (Siljanovska) aided by "oligarchic political tendencies, cronyism, the spoils system, administration recruitment etc." (Siljanovska). On a more philosophical note, Kolozova adds that such high levels of clientelism and patrimonialism imply a "lack of sovereignty of the subject i.e. omnipresent social infantilism" (Kolozova). This is tightly connected to the "lack of basic personal responsibility due to a predominant matrix of political culture where everybody is used to fawning on others, causing general hypocrisies in society. This spawns a pattern of thinking whereby "I am the best and only other people are evil" (Lazareski). All in all, experts agree that the deeply enrooted social clientelism and patrimonialism is mostly a result of the lack of individual responsibility in society as well, and has a long tradition in Macedonian society, creating patterns of negative solidarity and corrupt patterns of social capital.

III. LEGALISTIC CULTURE/CIVIC ACTIVISM

The first question in this section measured the degree to which respondents agreed with the statement that tax evasion is sometimes justified. More than 60 percent of the respondents do not agree with the

statement, with about a third of them (21.2 percent of total) strongly disagreeing. A small minority of the respondents (24.9 percent) agreed with the statement and 14.8 percent remained neutral.

Cross-tabulations show that older people disagreed more than the two

business owners, Muslims, ethnic Albanians, and SDSM, DUI and DPA supporters. Conversely, non-voters as well as VMRO-DPMNE supporters tend to support this statement less than the average.

The results on these questions show that people follow, manifest or

Table VII. 1 *It is sometimes justified to avoid paying taxes.*

	Frequency	Valid percent
Fully agree	82	7.6
Agree	187	17.3
Neither agree nor disagree	160	14.8
Disagree	423	39.1
Strongly disagree	229	21.2
Total	1,081	100.0
Don't know	9	
Total	1,090	

younger age groups. Muslims tend to disagree less with the statement than other religious groups, which is the case with ethnic Albanians too, as well as DUI and DPA supporters. Less than average disagreement can be found in the regions of Polog, Skopje, and southwestern as well as eastern Macedonia. It seems that respondents from rural areas tend to agree more with the statement than others.

The next question asked the respondents to what degree they agree with the statement that it is justified to make use of public benefits even if one does not qualify for them. The majority of the respondents (60.1 percent) did not agree with the statements. The majority of them chose the moderate degree of disagreement with the statement. Another 18.3 percent of the total number remained neutral, while a total of 21.6 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement.

perform socially acceptable behavior. The questions of tax evasion or misusing public benefits are certainly issues that are deemed to be socially unacceptable. Yet the degrees to which these practices are accepted (one in four and one in five) are still very high. One of the factors contributing to this situation is certainly the high degree of distrust in the institutions. This is most evident within the ethnic Albanian community but is also dependent on party affiliation.

The next section involved a set of questions designed to measure a degree of civic involvement, mainly through exploring whether the respondent has participated in various forms of activities. Some of the questions were in a binary "yes-no" format, while others (the last two) counted more categories.

The first question in this set tested whether the respondent had ever

Table VII. 2 *It is justified to receive benefits even when one is not qualified.*

	Frequency	Valid percent
Fully agree	90	8.4
Agree	141	13.2
Neither agree nor disagree	195	18.3
Disagree	407	38.1
Strongly disagree	235	22.0
Total	1,068	100.0
Don't know	22	
Total	1,090	

When seen with regard to specific socio-demographic aspects, it can be seen that less educated respondents tend to disagree less. This is also the case within some types of worker groups, as well as

been involved in signing a petition. The results show that almost six out of ten respondents have never signed a petition. Cross-analysis shows that men are slightly more likely to have been involved in signing

petitions than women. This is also the case with younger respondents, those who are more educated, managers, Christians, Macedonians, political party supporters and residents of Skopje.

The second question tested whether the respondent had participated in demonstrations. The results reveal that 29.7 percent have participated, while 67.1 have never participated in a demonstration. As expected,

ethnic Macedonians, those supporting SDSM and those living in Skopje.

When asked if they have filed a complaint against a state institution, 18.1 percent of the respondents said that they have done so, while 79.2 have not filed such a complaint. Slightly more men than women would file a complaint. Similarly, middle-aged respondents have reported so more than other cohorts, Muslims, ethnic Albanians, non-voters and

Table VII. 3 Have you ever: Signed a petition?

	Frequency	Valid percent
Yes	417	38.3
No	648	59.4
Don't know	25	2.3
Total	1,090	100.0

again, a larger percentage of men had been involved in such activities than that of the female respondents. This is also true for those between the ages of 15 and 29, Christians, Macedonians, party supporters and those living in smaller towns or Skopje.

Conversely, 69.2 percent of the respondents claim that they have been present at a public gathering, while 30.1 percent said that they have not. Analyzing socio-demographic categories reveals that men had been involved more in public gatherings, which is also true for farmers and managers, Muslims, Albanians and those living in rural areas.

those living in Skopje.

The next two questions explored the degree of involvement of the respondents in voluntary work or organizations. Out of the total number of respondents, 10 percent reported that they frequently do voluntary work and another 18.2 said that they have been involved a few times. Another 10.1 percent said that they have done voluntary work only once, while six out of every ten respondents said that they have never done voluntary work. Those involved would typically be younger, the better-educated, public service clerks, and those living

Table VII. 4 Have you ever: Attended demonstrations?

	Frequency	Valid percent
Yes	324	29.7
No	731	67.1
Don't know	35	3.2
Total	1,090	100.0

Another question explored whether respondents have been involved in a strike at their workplace. From the total number of respondents 18.5 percent reported that they have participated, while 79.8 percent claimed that they have never been involved in such action. A typical case of a respondent involved in strikes consists of the middle-aged cohort, the better-educated, those working in sales or manufacture,

in any type of urban areas. From those respondents that have done volunteering work at least once, 55.6 percent have been involved in local activities, and 17.5 percent have done volunteering work on a regional level, while 16.1 percent have been involved nationally.

In an aggregated analysis, results show that in 15.1 percent of cases there has been no involvement in any of the queried activities.

Table VII. 5 Have you ever: Attended a public gathering?

	Frequency	Valid percent
Yes	754	69.2
No	328	30.1
Don't know	8	0.7
Total	1,090	100.0

Table VII. 6 Have you ever: Participated in a strike at work?

	Frequency	Valid percent
Yes	202	18.5
No	870	79.8
Don't know	18	1.7
Total	1,090	100.0

About one in every five respondents had participated in at least one of the offered activities. More than one in every four respondents had participated in two, 18.3 percent in three and 10.3 in four of the activities. An insignificant minority of cases show participation in five

ones, although when involved, older generations tend to be involved in more activities. Ethnic Macedonians tend to be involved in more activities than ethnic Albanians. Furthermore, respondents supporting VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM tend to be more involved than those

Table VII. 7 Have you ever: Filed a complaint against a public institution?

	Frequency	Valid percent
Yes	197	18.1
No	863	79.2
Don't know	30	2.8
Total	1,090	100.0

or all of the activities.

Cross-tabulation showed that women have not been involved in any of the activities in a larger proportion than men. Younger generations are more likely to have been involved in one or more activities than older

supporting DUI or DPA and those who are non-voters. Respondents living in urban areas out of Skopje tend to be less involved than respondents from Skopje or rural areas.

The results from this section show that people are rarely involved in

Table VII. 8 Have you ever: Volunteered in any type of organization?

	Frequency	Valid percent
Frequently	109	10.0
A few times	198	18.2
Once	110	10.1
Never	658	60.4
Don't know	15	1.4
Total	1,090	100.0

Table VII. 9 If so, has it been at:

	Frequency	Valid percent
Local level	232	55.6
Regional level	73	17.5
National level	67	16.1
Other	17	4.1
Don't know	28	6.7
Total	417	100.0
Not asked	673	
Total	1,090	

Table VII. 10 Aggregate: Number of activities per respondent

	Frequency	Valid percent
none	165	15.1
one	245	22.5
two	286	26.2
three	199	18.3
four	112	10.3
five	49	4.5
six	34	3.1
Total	1,090	100.0

activities that signal increased civic activities. An approximation of the results would suggest that between five and seven people out of ten never participate in signing petitions, writing petitions, and participating in strikes and demonstrations. The only activity where a majority of respondents had been involved was that of public gatherings, which in most cases tends to be the most passive and least focused public activity. Concerning voluntary work, again, only six out of ten respondents had been involved, which signals the practice that free time is mostly spent on leisure. It further signals the respondents' detachment and alienation from the political process. It is expanded by the high level of distrust in politics in general, which results in suspiciousness in political action. In more than one interview with the experts and analysts, the example of protests against police brutality was given (Klekovski, Simovska). In their view, the movement showed how the skepticism towards the political process and struggle to keep away from it did not allow the movement to fully develop. Therefore one might suggest that this futility of social action is one of the factors that keep the citizens away from civic action.

Another factor that was mentioned by the interviewees is the paternalistic understanding of the state (and politics) (Klekovski, Simovska, Kolozova), which keeps the citizens in a somewhat adolescent stage. This "relationship" constructs the citizen as a passive one ultimately waiting for the public institutions to take care of his/her interest.

IV. RELIGION VS. SECULARISM

The part of the Survey that contained the largest proportion of examined variables is the eighth section, on religious vs. secular values. This is no surprise, since the structure of political culture in every society is highly affected by the level and nature of the religious beliefs of the population. In the case of Macedonian society this link between religion and political culture is even more interesting given that Macedonia is home to all major religions but predominantly Orthodox Christianity and Islam. The section contains eleven

questions, examining the vital aspects of the religious identification of the population, as well as attitudes connected to practicing religion, the rights of religious groups, the influence of religious authorities over the population, the desired profile of politician (religious or not), religious education in schools, and religion and the private sphere, along with attitudes on ethically divisive social issues such as divorce, abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, prostitution, same-sex marriage and suicide.

The first topic directly addresses the issue of the religious identification of the respondents. Asked whether they considered themselves religious, as many as 85.3 percent of the examined population answered positively. Only 7 percent of the population declared themselves atheist and an additional 2.4 percent declared themselves agnostic (don't know: 5.3 percent). The most religious groups, seen via demographic cross-tabulations, can be located through analysis of the following categories: men and women are almost identically religious; the most religious group is that of young people between 15 and 29; the level of religious identification significantly drops as the education level rises; most religious people are married people; the least religious is the divorced group; the greatest religious identification can be found among the Muslims; Orthodox Christians, Protestants and Catholic Christians follow; the most religious ethnic groups belong to the Muslim religion: Turks, Roma and Bosniaks; supporters of VMRO-DPMNE are the most religious populace, followed by supporters of DUI, SDSM and DPA; the Pelagonija and the northeastern region are the most religious regions; people from bigger cities are more religious compared to people from smaller towns, who are the least religious group.

The second question reveals a slightly different situation from the first one. Namely, when asked How often do you go to religious temples? it is visible that the religiousness of the population is more declaratory than of a practicing nature. Only 12.7 percent of the population visit religious temples every day and an additional 12.5 percent visit them once a week. Several times a month is the answer for 13.4 percent of the population, while 12.7 percent visit religious temples once a

Table VIII. 1 I consider myself a religious person.

	Frequency	Valid percent
Yes, I am religious	930	85.3
No, I am an atheist	76	7.0
I am an agnostic	26	2.4
Don't know	58	5.3
Total	1,090	100.0

month. The biggest statistical group is the group of respondents that visit religious temples only on major religious holidays: this comes to 41.2 percent of the respondents. This speaks of a relatively low level of religious practice among the population, as well as a more "laissez-faire" understanding of religious obligations.

However, those that practice religion every day (most committed believers) are statistically located predominantly in the categories of men (much more than women), respondents with primary education, the age group between 30 and 44, Muslims and Catholics, Albanians and Bosniaks, and supporters of DPA, as well as people from Skopje and people geographically located in the northeastern and Polog regions.

If the first and the second question create a relatively ambiguous situation, then the third question creates an additional perplexity in explaining views on religious matters. To be exact, the third question requires that the respondents answer the question of whether religion should be a predominant force in society. Given the high percentage of religious identification in Macedonian society (although vast proportions of the population are not committed to religious obligations) it is surprising to see that 51.7 percent of the respondents do not agree (fully or partially) with the statement that religion should be a/the predominant force in society. An additional 18.5 percent stay neutral, while 29.9 percent gave positive answers to the statement. This clearly speaks of a separation of individual religiousness and perceptions of religion as a social force among a large proportion of the examined population.

After cross-tabulations with the demographic categories, the greatest skeptics towards religion as a leading social force can be located among both men and women (almost equally), the oldest age group, Christians of all denominations (unlike Muslims), Macedonians and Roma (unlike Albanians and Turks), as well as supporters of SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE (unlike supporters of DUI and DPA) and people from smaller towns and bigger cities in the country. What is highly noticeable are the vast ethnic and religious differences within the topic. As regards these differences, it is visible that the weight of the skepticism towards religion as a predominant social force is among the Christian population, and hence ethnic groups belonging to the Christian denomination (Roma are a slight exception). Macedonian Muslims, as well as Albanians, Turks and Bosniaks, support religion as a predominant force in society much more than Christians (Macedonians, Serbs, Vlachs etc.) do. This clearly speaks of a very different perspective in the two biggest religions (Orthodox Christianity and Islam) in the country, which could also reflect differences in the structure of political culture.

Analyzing religious perspectives precisely, it is important to explain the gap that appears as rather visible between the declaratory religiousness of the population and the reserve that respondents show towards religion as a predominant social force. Experts explain that part of the answer to this dilemma lies in the fact that "once again distrust in institutions appears. People have faith in God but not in religious institutions per se. Religiousness is not the cause – it is a consequence due to the fact that society is conservative and inward"

Table VIII. 2 Religion should be a predominant force in society.

	Frequency	Valid percent
Fully agree	155	15.5
Agree	165	15.4
Neither agree nor disagree	198	18.5
Disagree	344	32.1
Strongly disagree	210	19.6
Total	1,072	100.0
Don't know	18	
Total	1,090	

(Klekovski). Other experts add that “people have the need to believe but they are not certain whether religion provides for that” (focus group with experts).

Religious experts on the other hand have a different viewpoint on the matter. Both representatives of the Macedonian Orthodox Church and those of the Islamic religious community have similar standpoints. Miteski explains that this is more or less a normal occurrence due to “misjudgments regarding the role of the Church, because it is seen as a political institution, which the Church should not be” (Miteski). Not denying the fact that among Orthodox Christians there are many non-practicing believers among whom religion is “mostly based on tradition and inheritance, not beliefs,” Miteski adds that “there is also widespread skepticism because of the fact that expectations are high concerning the religious institutions à propos pressing social issues” and often “religious institutions cannot have a standpoint on every social matter” (Miteski). Representatives of the Islamic religious community agree with the perception concerning the skepticism towards the religious community by the general population, but locate the reasons in “active negative campaigning by the political parties and the state” (Bikena) due to the “feeling of threat in occupying the social space by the religious communities that is traditionally reserved for the political parties” (Bikena). All these factors lead to widespread skepticism and reserved feelings towards the religious institutions, even though religion is a fundamental part of the identity of the population in the country.

This evident reserve towards religious groups in their relation to the state is present once again in the fourth question of the section on religious matters, where respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the following statement: Religious groups should influence the legislation in accordance with their prescriptions. As many as 67.2 percent of the respondents do not agree (fully or partially) with this statement, and 17.1 percent stay neutral. Only 10 percent partially agree and 5.8 percent of the respondents fully agree. This clearly speaks of the secular standpoint of the population when it comes to legislation drafting, i.e. a very distinctive striving to separate the legislative process from the religious influences.

Once again, differences based on ethnic and religious provenance are visible among the two biggest ethnic and religious groups. Namely, analyzing the demographic cross-tabulations one comes to the following statistical indicators – only 9.1 percent of the ethnic Macedonians support the statement that religious groups should influence the legislation in accordance with their prescriptions. The same indicator for the ethnic Albanians is 32.8 percent, for the Turks 30.4 percent, for the Roma 23.5 percent, for the Serbs 7.1 percent, for the Vlachs 11.1 percent and for the Bosniaks 50 percent. As regards religion, only 9.5 percent of the Orthodox Christians agree with this

statement, whereas the proportion for the Muslims is 32.6 percent, for the Catholics 20 percent, and for the Protestant denominations 0 percent (their small statistical representation has a vast influence over this indicator). Both religious and ethnic cross-tabulations show that Macedonian Muslims and ethnic groups belonging to the Islamic religion (Albanians, Turks, Bosniaks) have a visibly higher degree of respondents (although still below 50 percent) who would prefer religious groups to have more influence over legislation, as compared to the Christians and ethnic groups belonging to Christianity (Macedonians, Serbs, Vlachs etc.).

The trend towards somewhat secular viewpoints on the part of the population is evident in the fifth question as well. Here respondents were asked whether religious representatives have influence over their own views. A large majority of 79.3 percent of the respondents deny the influences of religious representatives over their own views, while only 9 percent confirm such an influence. This also shows that apart from the religiousness of the population in general in the country, people still distance themselves clearly from the influence of organized faith (religion), which is in line with the explanations of the experts regarding the omnipresent skepticism towards religious institutions and not skepticism towards religion as such.

To a smaller degree, ethnic and religious differences also appear when analyzing this question when cross-checked against the demographic categories. Only 5.5 percent of the Orthodox Christians admit to being influenced by religious representatives, while the same indicator for the Muslims is 17.2 percent. Additionally, 5.3 percent of the Macedonians admit being influenced by religious leaders, while the same indicator for the other ethnic groups is as follows: Albanians – 16.9 percent; Turks – 17.4 percent; Roma – 13.3 percent; Serbian – 7.1 percent; Vlachs – 22.2 percent and Bosniaks – 50 percent (once again, the statistical significance decreases as the statistical size of the examined group decreases).

The above-mentioned reserve towards religion as an organized form of faith is confirmed in the question where respondents were asked to answer whether religion should be limited in the private sphere. A firm majority of 63.7 percent of the respondents (16.2 percent neutral, 20 percent negative answers) support this idea, clearly in line with answers to previous questions.

More Muslims than Orthodox Christians disagree with this statement, and also the Albanians, Turks, Serbs and Vlachs tend to agree less than the Macedonians with the standpoint on limitation of religion. Supporters of ethnic Albanian parties (DUI and DPA) tend to disagree more with the statement than the supporters of SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE do.

A proof that the reserve shown in the previous questions is not towards religion as a symbol of moral values but more towards religion as an

institutionalized form of belief lies in the viewpoints of the populace regarding the following statement: A good politician should be religious. Almost half of the population would agree with such a statement (47.3 percent), while 21.4 percent of the respondents are neutral, with an additional 31 percent of the respondents holding negative attitudes. Although there is no strongly expressed statistical weight among the answers, it is clear that the viewpoints of the population incline towards positive opinions on the matter. This could be interpreted as a situation where on the one hand religiousness is a desirable quality that people who represent public values should possess, and on the other hand a brief overview of previous indicators in this section visibly shows the differences in the approach towards religion as a value (assigned to politicians for example) and religion as an organized and potentially influential social form present among the population.

The demand for religious politicians is mostly present among the following categories of respondents: men; the age group between 30 and 44; Muslims (much more than all Christian denominations); Albanians, Turks, Roma and Bosniaks; people from the northeastern and southeastern regions and from Skopje.

As regards the qualitative aspect of this question, the interviewed religious experts tend to agree that the demand for personal religiousness on the part of the politicians is connected to the perception that religious beliefs might serve as an impediment to the corrupting influences brought to bear by politics (Bikena). This speaks of a positive perception of religion as a system of values that improves personal morals and provides for more responsible behavior by the politicians in the public sphere.

The section on religion and secularism in the following block of three questions (Q7, Q9 and Q10) examines the perceptions of the population regarding religious education in public schools. The seventh question directly addresses the issue by asking the respondents whether religious education should be obligatory in schools. Clearly there are divided opinions regarding the issue, since a very small majority of 50.8 percent answer positively, while 31.6 percent of the respondents fully or partially disagree with this statement. A neutral stance is present within 17.6 percent of the population. This speaks of a relative positive prevalence regarding this question, but also speaks of a divided public opinion far from a convincing majority to support the idea. The fact that there is a relatively large neutral population regarding the question speaks further in this direction.

When it comes to standpoints on the question What is the modality through which religion should be taught in schools? the statistical distribution of answers speaks of a lesser degree of polarization of public opinion than in the previous question. Namely, 62.3 percent of the answers incline towards the solution whereby students would

learn about all major religions and only 30.7 percent of the respondents think that students should only learn about the religion they belong to. This once again confirms that the majority of people see religion as a positive system of values that young people should learn from, with a relatively open attitude among the majority of respondents who are open towards learning about the value system of religions other than their own.

The last question in the subsection on religious education concerns the people who should instruct religious education in schools. Once again, respondents tend to take a more "secular" view on the matter: a large majority of 72.9 percent of respondents think that professors of religion should instruct religious education in schools, while only 21.1 percent of the examined population think that instruction should be given by people sent by the religious institutions.

As regards the cross-tabulations concerning the subsection on religious education with the demographic categories relevant to this part (ethnicity and religion), the following conclusions could be reached: In 74.3 percent of cases Muslims tend to think that religious education should be obligatory in schools, while only 41.5 percent of Orthodox Christians and 40 percent of the Catholics share their opinion; members of ethnic groups belonging to the Islamic religion (Albanians, Turks and Roma) are more convinced that religious education should be obligatory (all far more than 50 percent of cases) than Macedonians and Serbs (below 50 percent of cases); supporters of DUI and DPA (Albanian ethnic parties) are also visibly more inclined towards religious education in schools than supporters of the Macedonian ethnic parties are (although VMRO-DPMNE supporters are more positive towards religious education than SDSM supporters); in 52.4 percent of cases Muslims tend to think that students should learn all major religions and in 43 percent of cases they think that the students should learn only the religion that they belong to – the same statistical indicators for the Orthodox are 67.4 percent and 25.1 percent respectively; the most convinced groups that students should learn only about the religion that they belong to are ethnic Turks and Albanians, while the least convinced are the Roma and the Macedonians; there is a relatively visible consensus among all major religions that professors of religion should instruct religion in schools. Differences in the perceptions of members of different religions are insignificant; this opinion is also almost equally shared among all ethnic groups.

The view of the consulted religious authorities for the needs of the Survey on Political Culture is that religious education should be generally present in the schools, both in the form of learning about other religions and that of learning about one's own religion (Miteski, Bikena). Both interviewees point out that there is no substantial difference between theologians and professors of religion, since they "have more or less the same type of religious education" (Bikena).

In the opinion of the religious authorities, “religious education would enhance morality and tolerance, especially among the young population, making them less aggressive” (Bikena).

As regards the last subsection in the section on religion, one may consider that it concerns what is known as “ethically divisive social issues.” Although this subsection could be a section on its own, it was placed in the part on religion in an attempt to see whether the religious ethos of the population influences their standpoints on these issues. It concerns perceptions of the population in the country à propos divorce, abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, sexual work (prostitution),

right-wing and left-wing voters; with these topics, the dividing line (in relative terms) is one of ethnic and religious identity, and not ideological convictions.

Explaining the source of the evidently conservative standpoints on the socially divisive issues ranging from divorce to suicide, the main dilemma that appears is whether the political culture in the country à propos these topics is influenced by the religious ethos or the source of this political energy is somewhere else. The interviewed experts on these topics have different opinions but mostly agree that the large amount of neutral answers points to “fear in expressing a direct

Table VIII. 1 *Would you condemn a person that:*

	Condemn	Support	Neutral
Is divorced	14.8 percent	53.2 percent	32 percent
Had an abortion	36.8 percent	34.8 percent	28.3 percent
Supports euthanasia	42.8 percent	25.3 percent	31.1 percent
Is homosexual	57.3 percent	17.3 percent	25.4 percent
Is a sexual worker (prostitute)	67.5 percent	11.4 percent	21.1 percent
Supports same-sex marriages	73.4 percent	10.4 percent	16.2 percent
Has committed suicide	86.9 percent	5 percent	8.1 percent

same-sex marriage and suicide. Respondents were asked to answer whether they condemn or accept these phenomena, and the answers show the following frequencies¹:

The gradation of answers is obvious in the table, and it is also obvious that in all questions except same-sex marriages and suicide there is a large statistical mass of neutral answers (above 20 percent) that additionally speaks of the ethical gravity of these views. Given the percentages collected through the research, one could reach the conclusion that, apart from divorce and to some extent abortion, all other social phenomena are mostly condemned by the examined populace. The least accepted occurrences are suicide and same-sex marriages, while homosexuality and prostitution also provoke very negative feelings in the public.

In terms of the demographic cross-tabulations, several trends are visible: in all categories, the respondents who belong to the Islamic religion express visibly more negative attitudes towards the examined categories than Orthodox Christians; similarly, respondents belonging to ethnic communities that are predominantly Muslim (Albanians and Turks mostly) show visibly more negative viewpoints towards the examined categories; the analysis of negative answers reveals that the ideological scale is irrelevant when it comes to these questions – in most of the answers left-wing and right-wing Macedonian voters show almost identical attitudes. The same goes for the Albanian

opinion” (Koložova) and that these standpoints are more a “result of conformism with one’s community of belonging than of religious ethos” (Koložova). Simoska agrees that the source is far from religious (except maybe in the case of suicide) i.e. that these standpoints are based “purely on stereotypes” (Simoska). Siljanovska pinpoints the problem in the “patrimonial and parochial political culture present in the country where (...) there is frustration with social reality among the population, which creates intolerance towards the Other; consequently stereotypes become part of the traditional society” (Siljanovska).

On the other hand, religious authorities from both major religions in the country explain these standpoints as relatively normal, underlining the fact that the religious organizations do not have a completely exclusive standpoint on these issues (especially homosexuality, abortion and euthanasia) but they work in line with “correction of these occurrences and not condemnation, appealing for change” (Miteski). Although unacceptable for the religious groups in the country, as well as for the general population, the specific public lens on these social phenomena drives one to conclude that the source of this specific matrix of political culture resides less in the religious ethics and values and more in the irrational fears and stereotypes of the population due to the general lack of acceptance of “otherness” as a concept.

¹ Perceptions are ordered from the most accepted to the least accepted social phenomenon.

I. ATTITUDES ON ETHNIC ISSUES

Inter-ethnic relations are one of the most discussed topics in the public discourse and, certainly among the most sensitive and fragile issues in Macedonia. Two general approaches have been used in this section in order to explore the relationships between different communities both at the personal (individual) level and in the public sphere.

In general, ethnic provenance is still perceived by Macedonian citizens as one of the main factors that determine relationships among individuals who are members of different ethnicities. At the same time, prejudices and stereotypes towards different ethnic communities are still significantly present in Macedonian society. Prejudices and stereotypes are in most cases based on lack of knowledge and information about the “others,” and they cause groundless “fear” over others’ ethnic provenance. In Macedonia, segregating education policies and the perpetration of divided political and social realities are among the main reasons for the low level of familiarization with the different ethnic groups (Sekerinska, Siljanovska).

In the Survey, the first set of questions on the attitudes on ethnic issues addressed the field of personal relationships. In the first instance, respondents were asked whether they would be comfortable having


representation of ethnic Macedonians might significantly influence the overall picture. All ethnic communities are mostly comfortable having friends from their own community and, in different measures, friends from other communities. For this reason it is important to analyze the answers of the respondents in the light of their ethnic provenance.

According to the cross-tabulation of the results, all representatives of the Turkish, Serbian and Roma community (100 percent) would prefer to strike up a friendship with ethnic Macedonians. Most representatives of the ethnic Albanian community (approximately 90 percent) are comfortable having friends from the ethnic Macedonian community.

The respondents who proved to be more comfortable having ethnic Albanians as friends are members of the Turkish community (95 percent), the Macedonian community (85 percent), and the Roma and Serbian ethnic communities (82 percent and 78 percent respectively).

Approximately 94 percent of the members of the Roma community declare themselves to be comfortable having friends from the Turkish community, while 86 percent declare themselves to be comfortable having friends from the Albanian community. Almost 90 percent of ethnic Macedonians are comfortable having friends with Turkish origins. Conversely, the Roma community is the most marginalized

Chart X. 1 *Would you be comfortable having friends from other ethnic groups?*



friends from other ethnic communities. The Survey's results show that members of the Macedonian ethnic communities are mostly considered as acceptable, with the only exception being the Roma community, which is on the contrary considered to a great extent as unacceptable.

Although this is the perception of the majority of the population, due to the type of sample used for the purposes of the Survey, the dominant

ethnic group in the country. Most representatives from the other ethnic groups expressed hesitation in having friends from this community. Approximately 35 percent of ethnic Albanians would not feel comfortable having friends from the Roma community. This proportion falls to 21 percent when dealing with representatives of the Serbian community. Approximately 76 percent of the members of the ethnic Macedonian community would feel comfortable having friends

from the other ethnic groups in the country.

With regard to business relations, most respondents do not have any problems doing business with representatives of the other ethnic communities. The vast majority of citizens (85 percent) are willing to enter into professional relations with members of other communities.

However, when asked whether it would represent a problem to have a husband or a wife of a different ethnicity, most respondents (57 percent) answered positively. On the other hand, 30 percent of the citizens declared that having a partner with a different ethnic provenance would not be a problem.

Citizens' perceptions of ethnic issues within the public sphere are much more divergent than are their attitudes expressed in relation to the private sphere. Asked about the possibility of voting for a candidate of a different ethnicity, 42 percent of the citizens would not give their vote, in contrast with 40 percent of respondents who would vote for a candidate of a different ethnicity. In 16.7 percent of cases citizens have declared that it is not important whether the candidate is of a different ethnicity. Representatives from the ethnic Turkish, Roma and Serbian communities in a greater proportion are prepared to give their vote for a candidate of a different ethnicity (82 percent, 88 percent and 64 percent respectively). For representatives of the ethnic Macedonian community and ethnic Albanian community this would happen, respectively, in 40 percent and 33 percent of cases. The breakdown of the party affiliation of the respondents shows that almost 50 percent of SDSM supporters are ready to vote for a candidate with a different ethnic background, while this is the case for almost 40 percent of VMRO-DPMNE supporters. Sympathizers of the political parties with predominantly ethnic Albanian supporters are willing to a smaller extent to give their votes for candidates of another ethnicity. Namely, 30 percent of DIU supporters and 28 percent of DPA supporters would vote for such a candidate. Citizens in Skopje and Pelagonija regions are mostly willing to give their vote to candidates of a different ethnicity (both 56 percent).

any exception declared their willingness to learn the language of the other ethnic communities, while they showed more reluctance to listen to their music. This is the case for 60 percent of ethnic Albanians. The other ethnicities would listen to different music in the proportion of almost 80 percent.

On the question concerning the self-perception of belonging to a certain group, the majority of citizens said that they feel themselves to be citizens of the Republic of Macedonia (66.8 percent); 23 percent of respondents declared themselves members of their ethnic community, and the rest of the respondents as members of different categories listed in the questionnaire. Approximately 77 percent of ethnic Macedonians feel that they are firstly citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, while this holds true for 40 percent of ethnic Albanians. The majority of ethnic Albanians predominantly perceive themselves as members of their ethnic group. All other ethnic communities represented in the Survey defined themselves to a greater extent as citizens of the Republic of Macedonia.

The greater part of the citizens agreed that minorities should have the same rights as the majority. This is the case with 65 percent of the respondents, while about 20 percent disagreed with the above statement. Nevertheless, asked whether some ethnic communities are treacherous for the national interest, the majority of the answers were positive (57 percent). This opinion is mostly shared among the members of the Serbian, Macedonian and Turkish ethnic communities (90 percent, 56 percent and 60 percent respectively), while among the members of the Albanian ethnicity the proportion is approximately 30 percent.

For 45 percent of the surveyed respondents some nations are better than others. This generalization is present in an equal proportion also in the view on the part of the citizens according to which some national characteristics influence the behavior of individuals. These views are mostly present among the representatives of ethnic Macedonians, while the representatives of ethnic Albanians are more skeptical

Table IX. 1 *Would you learn the language, listen to the music or visit museums of a different ethnic community?*

	Language	Music	Museum
Yes	87	76	88
Neutral	7	12	8
No	5	12	4

The citizens' willingness to interact in a proactive manner by learning more about the history, habits and customs, traditions and culture of the other ethnic communities in the country was surveyed through several different questions. The table below provides a clear picture of citizens' readiness to actively integrate into the multicultural society.

With regard to the language, almost all ethnic communities without

towards these statements.

There are significant distinctions among the different ethnic communities with regard to the level of homogenization and identification of ethnic groups with family relations. The majority of ethnic Albanians perceive their ethnic community as a family (approximately 70 percent), while this is the case with 32 percent of

the ethnic Macedonian respondents. The views on homogenization and unification of territories populated by the same ethnicity are mostly shared among the members of the ethnic Turkish community (48 percent), of the ethnic Macedonian community (33 percent), and of the ethnic Albanian community (17 percent).

II. SUPPORT AND SOLIDARITY TOWARDS MARGINALIZED GROUPS

This section explored the attitudes of respondents towards different types of minorities, as well as stigmatized groups. The questions were divided into two sets: the first one exploring the attitudes of respondents towards the presence of such groups in their own communities; the second set explored the attitudes towards the need of increasing their rights.

The first question asked the respondents whether they would like or dislike living nearby a certain group. The results show that most respondents, at least 8 out of every 10 respondents, would not mind living in the same neighborhood with poor people, or those with a different religion or political affiliation. More than half of the respondents would not mind living with people of a different race (68.7 percent) or immigrants (52.9 percent).

On the other hand, about a third of the respondents would tolerate living in the same neighborhoods with either nationalists or emotionally unstable people. Less than a third of cases would not mind living near people with AIDS (27.4 percent) or homosexuals (27.2 percent). About one in five respondents would tolerate living near people with drinking problems. The respondents were least tolerant to

men, specifically in cases of living near homosexuals, immigrants, or people of a different religion or political affiliation. The results concerning living near other groups are relatively similar. Younger respondents tend to be more relaxed towards living near people with criminal records and alcohol abuse. On the other hand, they are less tolerant towards nationalists and homosexuals.

University-educated respondents were less tolerant towards alcohol abusers, but more tolerant towards people of different religions, people with AIDS and homosexuals. Muslims tend to be less tolerant towards people with drinking problem, nationalists, and people with a different religion or political orientation, people with AIDS, drug abusers and homosexuals. Ethnic Albanians show less tolerance towards people from another race, alcohol or drug abusers, nationalists, people of a different religion or political orientation, people with AIDS and homosexuals.

SDSM supporters show more tolerance towards people from another race and those belonging to another religion. On the other hand, they show less tolerance towards people with AIDS and nationalists, if compared to supporters of VMRO-DPMNE. Both cohorts show a similar level of tolerance towards homosexuals.

The second set of questions in this section explored the opinions of the respondents about the rights of which groups should, in general, be improved. The results show that a large majority of the respondents think that the rights of people with disabilities (96.1), the poor (94.9) and women (81.4) should be improved. The majority of respondents also think that the rights of immigrants (51.1), prisoners (52.2) and (ethnic) minorities (63) can be improved. About 45 percent of the

Table X. 1 Groups of people you would not mind living as neighbors.

	Frequency	Valid percent
Poor people	966	88.6
Another political orientation	952	87.3
Another religion	905	83.0
Another race	749	68.7
Immigrants	572	52.5
Nationalists	351	32.2
Emotionally unstable	350	32.1
People who have AIDS	299	27.4
Homosexuals	297	27.2
Alcohol abusers	231	21.2
People with criminal records	107	9.8
Drug abusers	101	9.3

living near drug abusers (9.3 percent) or people with criminal records (9.8 percent).

Cross-tabulation shows that women tend to be more tolerant than

respondents think that the rights of substance abusers (both alcohol and drugs) should be improved and less than a third (28.9) of the respondents think the same for homosexuals.

Table X. 2 Groups that need increased rights

	Frequency	Valid percent
People with disabilities	1,047	96.1
Poor people	1,034	94.9
Women	887	81.4
Minorities	687	63.0
Prisoners	569	52.0
Immigrants	557	51.1
Drug abusers	495	45.4
Alcohol abusers	491	45.0
Homosexuals	315	28.9

Cross-tabulation shows that women, more than men, think that their rights should be improved, a view also held by older respondents more often in comparison to other age groups. The younger the respondent, the more likely is that they will support rights improvement for substance abusers, as well as prisoners and immigrants. The greatest support for improving the rights of homosexuals comes from those between the ages of 30 and 45.

Those with elementary education are the greatest supporters of improving the rights of minorities and substance abusers. Those with university education tend to support the improvement of rights for homosexuals; however, on the other hand they are less tolerant towards prisoners in this regard. Orthodox Christians and ethnic Macedonians tend to show less support for the improvement of rights of minorities than Muslims or ethnic Albanians. Muslims tend to support the rights of drug abusers, prisoners and immigrants more than Orthodox Christians. Supporters of VMRO-DPMNE tend to be more conservative on various questions in this set in comparison to the supporters of SDSM. This, among others, includes the support for the rights of homosexuals and prisoners.

The evidence from these sets of questions suggests three main findings: a) Macedonian communities remain closed to various types of marginalized or vulnerable groups; b) People adopt or learn from both positive and negative examples within the public discourse on these matters; c) there is a certain degree of correlation between socio-demographic features and attitudes and opinions towards marginalized communities.

The answers show that people are ready to accept and support the rights of people belonging to whatever society deems to be groups that need support. So far, the poor are tolerated to the greatest degree, which is something that is “taught” by a variety of socialization agents such as the family, cultural and religious narratives. Poverty is frequently on the media agenda, and, furthermore, living alongside different social classes has been the social and urban normality for a longer period of time.

On the other hand, although in an increasing trend compared with the survey made by MCIC in December 2010 (Klekovski et al. 2011), the openness towards groups like homosexuals, people with AIDS, substance abusers or those with criminal records is still weak. The situation is most dramatic in the last two categories, where only insignificant minorities would approve of being their neighbors. One way of explaining this is that it serves as a tool of constructing Self–Other relationships. The Other here serves as a threat to the community and the basis for imagining and constructing communities. The degree to which these other categories are not tolerated is in correlation to their perceived danger. As one of the focus group experts claims, “the threat of safety and health is used first. [...] It is a type of community that protects itself against contamination” (Cvetkovik).

Following this logic, the perceived immediate threat of insecurity by offenders and drug addicts is therefore most important, followed by categories that are perceived to endanger health, such as people with AIDS or homosexuals. Therefore, the societal spheres remain relatively closed to these groups. Other categories are perceived as less threatening and thus gather a higher approval rate. Comparatively speaking, as regards most of these categories of groups, Macedonian public opinion remains one of the least tolerant in the region (WVS 2009 Comparison with Bulgaria, Slovenia, Serbia and Turkey).

The growing degree of tolerance towards people with AIDS or homosexuals suggests that civil society’s efforts, as well as media coverage of various related controversies, have started a trend of increasing sensitivity on these issues. Figures are erratic at this stage, but this phenomenon is exemplified in increased acceptance of ethnic and religious difference, although these categories of the Other might also serve as threats to the community. The increased tolerance comes from lessons learned through experience, civil society activism mediated through the means of communication, and political party agendas.

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