A Life for Tomorrow
Social Transformations in South-East Europe

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Oni se brinu za moj mali život
Oni brinu za moju budućnost
Kažu mi da živim za bolje sutra
Probudite me...

Probudite me onog jutra
Kad dodje to sutra

Prljavo Kazalište (1979)

Transitional change in the past two decades is only part of an unending sequence of socio-politico-economic changes through which the countries of the region have gone in the past 100 years. Older members of these communities have often, without a change to their place of residence, been citizens of five or six different states, experienced multiple changes of political systems, ideologies, constitutions, legal systems and accompanying institutions, and borne witness to the creation of new entire social classes and strata and the destruction of old ones. This continuous vortex of transformation, which prevents the stabilization of social structure and which makes formal institutions particularly fragile and thwarts strategic action, has been accompanied by an almost incredible inability of these societies to change and a surprising stability of social practices. It is as if wars, revolutions, and the dissolution of entire world-orders create ripples on the surface of the practices of these societies, which then slowly revert to their established course.

This state of affairs is linked to four groups of factors which characterize these societies. First, that systemic changes which have taken place in them have not been primarily the result of internal social dynamics, but have, instead, mainly come about as a consequence of external influences, in particular, global events and trends concomitant with realigning of power relations at the world level. In that sense, the creation of the socialist societies in the region of Southeast Europe was largely a corollary of WWII and the political and military rise to power of the Soviet Union, more so than the development of a workers’ movement in the societies in question. Similarly, current transition to a market economy and parliamentary democracy owes more to the fall of the Berlin Wall,

1 “They worry about my small life, they worry about my future, they tell me that I live for a better tomorrow; Wake me... Wake me up on the morning, when that tomorrow comes”. “Prljavo kazalište” (“Dirty Theatre”) is an early punk group from Croatia.
which marked the dissolution of the socialist states’ block, and to the process of integration of these countries into the EU, than it does to the existence of social forces in these societies which fought to bring these changes about. In this essential inductivity of the most important social changes in them, more than in anything else, is reflected the semi-peripheral character of these societies.

Social changes thus generated have led to two significant consequences. On the one hand, these societies find themselves in a state of “constant transition”. In the last century there were several attempts by the modernization-oriented elites to induce changes in all segments of social life through the “transplantation” of systems of formal institutions created in other - from the ideological point of view of these elites - more developed societies. Although the actors and objectives changed, the structure of these attempts at transformation was practically identical.2 In each attempt the antecedent condition (the past) was judged highly negatively, the future promised by the current attempt at modernization was represented as the realization of the ultimate goal which would “finally” lead the societies and peoples of Southeast Europe out of their “backwardness” and enable them to reach the “civilizational level”, while the present was viewed solely as the arena for the struggle to achieve this “tomorrow”. As goals were never achieved and as they were, instead, replaced by other goals with every social breakdown, these societies found themselves in a state of “never-ending transition”. A contributing factor to the utter confusion in the sphere of everyday life was, in particular, radical discontinuity with previous attempts at change – diametrically opposed ideological orientations of the modernizing elites and of proposed models of formal institutions.

This has also resulted in a specific attitude of the citizens of these societies toward change. As the experience of the lack of success of multiple attempts at fundamental social change in these societies is not only a part of collective memory, but is, rather, frequently a part of personal experience, a specific buffer culture3 developed, which made survival possible under conditions of turbulent social changes. It is largely based on informal practices specific to these societies and “lubricates“ and makes possible actions of informal social networks of family, kin, symbolic kin, and friends. The paradox of buffer culture, however, is that in enabling people to survive under unfavorable conditions, it simultaneously prevent the improvement of these conditions.4

2 See Markovikj, this volume
3 See Sedlenieks, this volume.
4 See also Ledeneva, on modernization trap of informality, in „Can Russia Modernize? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance“, Cambridge University Press, 2013
Finally, as a result of the previous factors enumerated, the fourth important factor in these societies is the gap between formal institutions and informal social practices, which results in the existence of an “almost parallel society“. Faced with the impossibility of finding a basis for stability and continuity in the constantly changing legal, political, and economic order, citizens seek this foundation in informal institutions through actions led by “practical norms“ and “unwritten rules“. Instead of looking for jobs in the job market, they find employment through political parties; instead of full-time employment being the foundation of their household budgets, they survive on the basis of remittances, informal economy, and self-provisioning; instead of relying on the rule of law for the protection of their rights, they protect their interests by looking for powerful guardians or by relying on clan- or kin-related structures. This is the aspect that confers on the societies of Southeast Europe their stigmatized, “Balkan” reputation.

We believe, however, that it would be erroneous to view the situation in these societies as the existence of a mere “façade” of formal institutions, behind the scenes of which one finds still active the “primordial” informal rules resulting from an “unchangeable” culture of these societies.

Our starting premise is that in every cycle of important changes in these societies, in the course of time there comes about a specific intertwining of formal and informal institutions (which are defined in relation to formal institutions), which henceforth regulate social life jointly. We can, therefore, say that in the widest sense, the object of our study is social life which has come about as a result of this most recent merging of formal institutions created in the process of neo-liberal transition and European integration of Southeast European societies and of informal institutions shaped in part by cultural tradition, in part by experiences from the socialist period, and mostly by adjusting to, confronting, and evading the formal rules of the emerging game.

Studies of transition experiences in the region have, thus far, unless the authors approached them as an opportunity to express their ideological position in relation to transition, been aimed in the main at the study of WHICH TRANSITION MEASURES DO NOT WORK and WHY. Following the simple, yet methodologically very productive dictum of Alena Ledeneva,5 we have focused on studying WHAT in Southeast European societies DOES WORK and HOW. And we have set as our objective the study of “today“ — what these societies really look like at present — not what they should look like “tomorrow“.

One more shared characteristic of our approach is that we relied on the advantages of a comparative method. After almost a quarter of a century, following the dissolution of the unified country in which they had lived together for almost seventy years, the societies of South-Eastern Europe are still similar enough, and yet different enough to allow the comparative method to offer extremely interesting results.

Most of the papers in this book were presented at the international conference held in Skopje (Macedonia) in July 2013, organized by the Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” and the Department of Political Science of the Justinianus Primus Faculty of Law, Sts “Cyril and Methodius” University. The conference was a part of the project “Resistance to Socio-Economic Changes in Western Balkan Societies. Testing Two Theories of Social Development”, carried out by the Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-East Europe (Serbia), Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” Skopje (Macedonia), Social Research Kosova (Kosovo) and Centre for Social Research “Analitika”(Bosnia-Herzegovina). This project was realized in 2012-2013 within the framework of the Regional Research Promotion Programme in the Western Balkans (RRPP), run by the University of Fribourg upon a mandate of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, SDC, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. Following the conference, an open call for papers was put out to other authors who study the social, political, economic, legal, cultural, religious, demographic, educational, and media changes in the societies of Southeast Europe in the transition period.

Keeping this in mind, the fragmentary and mosaic character of this study should come as no surprise. Besides sharing a focus on the careful research of the phenomena which characterize the quotidian of Southeast European societies and a non-ideological approach to the study of transition processes, the authors represented in this volume come from a wide variety of different disciplines (political scientists, sociologists, economists, anthropologists, philosophers) and apply the most varied methodological approaches and research techniques.

This volume, as we see it, is made up of four informal wholes. The first group of papers, “Who Likes this Change? Perception and Evaluation of Socio-Economic Changes in Western Balkan Societies“ (Cvetičanin, Popovikj and Nedeljković), “Civic and Political Activism in the Western Balkan Societies“ (Mangova and Popovikj) and “Beyond the Incomplete: Dynamics of Social Change in Kosovo“ (Krasniqi), is directly based on the results of the research project “Resistance to Socio-Economic Changes in Western Balkan Societies.
Testing Two Theories of Social Development” and is geared to the study of the attitudes of the citizens of the Western Balkans toward transition changes and the changes to their practices under new social conditions. The second whole includes the papers “The Inability to Change: Dogmatic Aspects of Political Ideology in the Macedonian Context“ (Markovikj), “Transition in the Balkans – Struggles of Homo Balkanicus and Homo Politicus“ (Irena Rajchinovska-Pandeva) and “G. W. F. Hegel on Dayton accords or State (that of Dayton) of Bosnia between positive and natural right“ (Sokolović), which deal, at various levels, with the (in)ability of the societies of Southeast Europe to change and the resulting dangers which this poses to their future. The third part of the book focuses on the position of women in transition processes in the societies in the region. The paper “The determinants of gender differences in responses to unemployment in post-transition countries: the case of Macedonia“ (Nikoloski and Adnett) analyzes the trends in the unemployment of women in the countries of the region and the strategies they employ to cope with it. The other paper, “Retraditionalization or Reflexive Modernity: A Sociological Explanation of Fertility Trends in Mature Transitional Croatia“ (Tomić-Koludrović, Petrić, Zdravković) is an attempt to explain the specific fertility trends in Croatia by linking them to a mixture of the socialist heritage regarding work practices, increasing self-expression values among young and educated women, and continued existence in Croatia of the pre-austerity welfare state mechanisms related to maternity leave. Finally, the fourth, and in many ways central, part of this volume, deals with the issues of informal practices and institutions of Southeast Europe. The paper by Klavs Sedlenieks “Buffer culture in Montenegro: bratstvo, kumstvo and other kin-related structures” traces the overarching presence of informal kin-related structures in Montenegrin society. In their paper “The Importance of Clientelism and Informal Practices for Employment Among Political Party Members After the 2000 in Serbia“, Stanojević and Stokanić explore the specific role which political parties play in the job market in Serbia, while Gjuzelov, in the paper “The Role of Informal Connections in Macedonian Society: Social Capital or Corruption?“, questions the forms which informal connections take in Macedonian society.

We choose not to attempt to briefly summarize these papers so as not to simplify complex analyses and distort results to any degree. We are more inclined to invite you to enjoy reading these papers as much as we have done so ourselves.

Editors
“Transition” in the societies created after the breakup of the former Yugoslavia has been taking place under rather unique circumstances, in any case quite different from those in other Eastern European societies - under the shadow of war and immediate pre-war and post-war political authoritarianism, under conditions of extreme and multiple social crises. This has, understandably, had an effect on both the course of social-political-economic change itself and citizens’ attitudes toward change.

Wars in the region of the former Yugoslavia have contributed to socio-economic changes (usually labeled ‘transitional’) in many of these newly created states starting only at the end of 1990s and and early 2000s. This is why sociological and economic studies which have dealt with this part of Europe often speak of ‘late’ or ‘blocked’ transition. However, as wars do not stymie the redistribution of social wealth and establishment of new power relations, but are, rather, an excellent opportunity for such undertakings (a factor that has contributed significantly to their engineering in this region), it may be more apt to speak of ‘hidden transition’ or ‘transition-under-the-shadow-of-war’. Namely, in some of these states, at the moment when, following the wars, transition “officially” began, almost all key socio-economic changes had
already been played out (social property divvied up, the multi-party state inaugurated, a new religious-national dominant ideology created and ownership control over the media established). With power relations that had already stabilized, establishing new rules of the game (new formal institutions) encountered significant resistance at every turn.

As for citizens’ attitudes toward change, due to everything previously mentioned, it is clear that almost none of the euphoria and enthusiasm brought on by the “fall of the Berlin Wall” and “end of history”, so characteristic of Eastern European countries during the 1990s, could be encountered in this region. Additional difficulties for both creators of transitional policies and the citizens of the states were generated by the world economic crisis of 2008, which turned the so-called “soft-underbelly of transition” (the critical and relatively short period of very high unemployment, insufficiently efficient functioning of new institutions and of anomie) into something resembling a permanent state. This is the context within which we have attempted to study socio-economic changes in the societies of the Western Balkans and citizens’ attitudes toward them.

However, our intention was not to explore the trends of economic indicators in these societies or to undertake pooling surveys to gauge how satisfied or dissatisfied citizens were at that time with socio-economic changes and, in particular, not to give our own evaluation of how successful transition in Western Balkan societies has been. The goal of our project was to try to use these specific cases to explore and try to understand the processes of transition in Southeast Europe and, beyond that, to further the knowledge of the processes of social change and social development in general.

This paper is based on the results of the regional research project “Resistance to Socio-Economic Changes in Western Balkan Societies” which was jointly realized in 2012 and 2013 by the Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-East Europe from Niš, Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” from Skopje, Center for Social Research “Analitika” from Sarajevo, and Social Research Kosova from Pristina. The project represented an attempt to study transitional changes in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Kosovo from the perspective of two theories of social development which are usually treated as mutually exclusive.

One perspective is that of contemporary modernization theories (primarily, Ronald Inglehart’s “revised theory of modernization” and Urlich Beck’s theory of “reflexive” modernization). More specifically, following the lead of
Inga Tomić-Koludrović (Tomić-Koludrović, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2007), we were engaged in observing and documenting the influences of simultaneous and conflicting processes of re-traditionalization, first and second modernization taking place in the region on the activities of people and their assessment of socio-economic changes.

On the other hand, we view responses to these changes in Western Balkan societies from the perspective of theories of practice, as exemplified in the works of Pierre Bourdieu, Charles Taylor, Ann Swidler, or Theodor Schatzki. Although theories of practice are often treated as theories of continuity which stand in contrast to development theories,¹ we attempted to show that they can be used to study social change (and resistance to change) from a specific point of view.

The aim of this paper, based on a preliminary analysis of survey data, is more modest and rather simple. In it we explore the relationship between three groups of data: resources which people rely on (economic, social, and cultural capital), values that they hold, and their evaluation of transition processes in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Kosovo, and try to identify the social groups which support and those which oppose socio-economic changes in these four societies.

In the analysis of the survey data we have used Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) (Lebart et al., 1984; Greenacre, 2007; Le Roux et al., 2008; Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010.). This is a method developed by a group of French mathematicians and statisticians led by J-P Benzecri and made famous by Bourdieu in his seminal work “Distinction”. The starting premise of this approach, known as geometric data analysis (GDA), is that it is not acceptable to create a priori assumptions about the nature of the data analyzed (for example, by assigning data to independent and dependent variables). The idea is that data should be given the opportunity to “speak for themselves”. Therefore, MCA is conceived of as an inductive, exploratory technique the main goal of

¹ Bourdieu, in particular, is often misread as an ahistorical ‘reproduction theorist’ whose work does not allow for diachronic change or human agency. However, as has been shown by, among others, George Steinmetz (2011), Craig Calhoun (2011), and Dan Woodman (2010), Bourdieu’s main theoretical concepts (habitus, capital, and field) are inherently historical and he deploys them using a distinctly historicist social epistemology organized around the ideas of conjuncture, contingency, over-determination, and radical discontinuity. Furthermore, these authors show that, in fact, both Pierre Bourdieu and Ulrich Beck are primarily theoreticians of uncertainty and unintentionality in whose work the conflict between structure and agency plays a secondary role.
which is to identify hidden structures within the data. In this it is similar to factorial analysis, in particular, the extraction method known as Principal Components Analysis. However, with the introduction of so-called passive or supplementary variables MCA can, additionally, be used for explanatory purposes.

In our paper, following a presentation of the basic facts related to the study and the demographic characteristics of the sample, we discuss the preliminary results of our research in four steps. In the first step, we present the results of the evaluation of socio-economic changes in the transition period provided by our survey respondents, as well as their attitude to the Euro-integration of the studied countries. In the following two steps we constructed two explanatory frameworks which are specific to the theories of development we used in our attempt at understanding and explaining the attitudes towards transitional changes in the societies of the Western Balkans. In the second step, in accordance with the Bourdieusian theory of practice, we reconstructed the social space, that is, the multi-dimensional social structure of these four societies, while in the third step, in keeping with the types of analysis specific to Inglehart’s “revised theory of modernization”, we constructed maps of the value patterns found in them. In the final step, we projected standard socio-economic variables (including the age, education, income and occupation of the survey respondents), the values which the respondents hold, as well as their political affiliation (the political parties they vote for) onto the results of the evaluation of socio-economic changes provided by the survey respondents, in an attempt to determine which social groups in the societies that we studied support transitional changes and which are opposed to them.

**Research and Survey Sample Data**

For the purposes of the study, surveys in the four societies were conducted in the period from January to February 2013 on national representative multistage probability samples. The fieldwork was done using face-to-face methodology in all four countries. We surveyed 1259 respondents in Serbia, 1256 respondents in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 800 respondents in Macedonia.

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2 These analyses also helped us introduce the readers to the characteristics of these four societies, which most of the texts in this volume refer to.
and in Kosovo each (in sum 4,115 respondents). In addition, we conducted 140 semi-structured interviews (40 in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina each, and 30 in Macedonia and Kosovo, respectively).

Data on the socio-demographic characteristics of the sample are presented in Tables 1 to 4.

Table 1 – Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SERBIA</th>
<th>BOSNIA</th>
<th>MACEDONIA</th>
<th>KOSOVO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>632 (50.2%)</td>
<td>554 (44.1%)</td>
<td>424 (53.0%)</td>
<td>374 (46.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>627 (49.8%)</td>
<td>702 (55.9%)</td>
<td>376 (47.0%)</td>
<td>426 (53.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1259 (100%)</td>
<td>1256 (100%)</td>
<td>800 (100%)</td>
<td>800 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 – Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KOSOVO</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>42.67</td>
<td>16.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACEDONIA</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>43.07</td>
<td>16.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERBIA</td>
<td>1259</td>
<td>43.86</td>
<td>15.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOSNIA</td>
<td>1256</td>
<td>46.43</td>
<td>17.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 – Age groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KOSOVO</th>
<th>MACEDONIA</th>
<th>SERBIA</th>
<th>BOSNIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 – 30 years</td>
<td>268 (33.5%)</td>
<td>232 (29.0%)</td>
<td>292 (23.2%)</td>
<td>315 (25.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 – 45 years</td>
<td>199 (24.9%)</td>
<td>231 (28.9%)</td>
<td>429 (34.1%)</td>
<td>305 (24.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 – 65 years</td>
<td>237 (29.6%)</td>
<td>213 (26.6%)</td>
<td>422 (33.5%)</td>
<td>417 (33.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+ years</td>
<td>96 (12.0%)</td>
<td>105 (13.1%)</td>
<td>116 (9.2%)</td>
<td>219 (17.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No data</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>19 (2.4%)</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>800 (100%)</td>
<td>800 (100%)</td>
<td>1259 (100%)</td>
<td>1256 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 In Serbia, the survey in the field was carried out by the polling agency “TNS Medium Gallup” from Belgrade; in Bosnia and Herzegovina it was implemented by “Prism Research” from Sarajevo, while in Macedonia and in Kosovo, Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” Skopje and Social Research Kosova, organized surveying themselves. A standardized questionnaire with 90 questions was used and the interviews with the respondents lasted between 60 and 70 minutes.
A sample of this size permits population parameters to be assessed with 95% certainty, where the error is from 2.5% (with a maximum variance of 50%) to 1.5% (when variance is 10%) in case of the sample in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; or with the error from 3.1% (with a maximum variance of 50%) to 1.8% (with a variance of 10%) in case of the samples in Macedonia and Kosovo.

Step 1: Evaluation Of Transitional Changes
In Western Balkan Societies

In the first step, in all four countries, respondents were asked to evaluate socio-economic changes in the transitional period – the direction and range of change in citizens’ everyday lives compared to the period of socialism; macro-processes of democratization; re-establishment of the multi-party system, privatization of state possessions; and to express their attitude to the Euro-integration of their country.

Firstly, the respondents were asked to assess the extent and the direction in which the lives of ordinary people have changed since the end of socialism. The assessment was conducted on a scale from -5 (greatly deteriorated) to 5 (greatly improved) with 0 as the midpoint. Results show a difference between Kosovo, where the majority of respondents perceive the everyday lives of ordinary people as having improved compared to the period of socialism, Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a large majority of respondents assess the situation as having deteriorated, and Macedonia and Serbia, where the relationship between positive and negative assessments is more balanced.
About a quarter of the respondents in Kosovo (25.8%) share the opinion that the quality of life has deteriorated, which differs from the situation in the other three countries, where such a disposition is distributed among 51.2% of respondents in Macedonia, 55.8% in Serbia, and a high 87.5% in Bosnia.

The situation is somewhat different in the respondents’ evaluation of the development of democracy in their societies. While in the answers to the previous question there was a division between Kosovo, Bosnia and the other two societies, differences now appear between Bosnia and Serbia on the one hand, and Kosovo and Macedonia on the other.

About a third of the respondents in Kosovo (37.6%) and Macedonia (32.6%) are satisfied with how democracy in their societies has developed over the years. On the other hand, only 13.8% and 13.5% share the same opinion in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, respectively. Nevertheless, one should also note that in all four countries, the majority of the respondents are not satisfied with the current result of the democratization of their societies.
Table 6 – Evaluation of democracy development in Western Balkan societies

Q22. Are you satisfied with the development of democracy in our country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SRB</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
<th>BiH</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
<th>KOS</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
<th>MKD</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Valid %</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Valid %</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Valid %</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Valid %</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not quite satisfied</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all satisfied</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>96.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey additionally measured respondents’ (dis)agreement with several attitudes toward social and political changes in the transitional period. The idea was to measure the respondents’ opinion of the development of political pluralism, change in the redistribution of wealth, and social solidarity.

GRAPH 1
Do you agree with the statement: The multi-party political system has improved political life in the country (Q23a):

Respondents in Macedonia tend to agree more than respondents in other countries that the multi-party political system has improved political life in the country.
This is reflected in 43% of their responses, while 30.6% disagree that there was such an improvement. A more balanced distribution of answers is seen in Serbia, where 29.1% agree with the statement, while 33.8% disagree. A greater degree of skepticism is recorded in Kosovo, where 27.3% see an improvement of political life, whereas 46.6% disagree with the statement. The most skeptical are respondents in Bosnia, only 14.6% of whom think that a pluralistic system has improved political life as opposed to a majority of 52.3% respondents who do not support this position.

The next question related to the transition in these societies to a market economy. Taking into consideration the current difficult economic crisis, we offered the respondents the option of expressing their attitudes toward the statement that if privatization had not taken place, the economy of the country would be in an even worse state. In Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo, only about one fifth of the respondents agreed with the proposed statement, while nearly half of the respondents disagreed. The situation is, again, somewhat different in Macedonia, where 32.4% of the respondents agreed with the statement, while 37.1% disagreed with this proposition.

**GRAPH 2**

Q23c: Do you agree with the statement: If privatization had not taken place, the economy of our country would be in an even worse state.

When asked to agree or disagree with the statement that a society with social inequalities as they exist in their countries cannot be considered just, in all four countries the majority of the respondents agreed. The percentage is highest in Kosovo, where 70.6% of the respondents agree with the statement, followed by Serbia and Macedonia with about two thirds of the respondents sharing the same attitude.
The greatest difference is seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina where 56.4% agreed with the statement, while a large number of respondents (31.1%) remained undecided.

**GRAPH 3**

Q23b: Do you agree with the statement:
A society with social inequalities like in ours cannot be considered just

![Graph showing agreement levels in Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.](image)

With the last statement of this section, we tested the perception of solidarity in the new societies compared to the times of socialism. Results show very similar attitudes in all of the countries, with 58.6% of respondents in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 62.4% in Kosovo, 64.6% in Macedonia, and 65.3% in Serbia agreeing that today there is no solidarity comparable to that in the period of socialism.

**GRAPH 4**

Q23d: Do you agree with the statement: In our country today there is no solidarity similar to that in the period of socialism

![Graph showing agreement levels in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia.](image)
The final question measured the support of the respondents for integration into the European Union. The results reveal rather large differences between the countries. Less than half of the respondents in Serbia (47.5%) support EU integration, while a further quarter (24.2%) of the total number of respondents did not express an opinion on the issue. More than half of the respondents in Bosnia-Herzegovina (57.9%) support their country’s integration and another fifth (21.9%) remain undecided. In Macedonia, a large majority of respondents (71.8%) support integration. However, the largest support is seen in Kosovo, where EU integrations are supported by 82.6% of the respondents. What is interesting here is to note that the bulk of these responses, 63.9%, indicate ‘strong support’, which reveals a stronger determination of the respondents, as opposed to the other countries, where the majority of pro-integration support is recorded on the less intense support modality on the scale.

Table 7 – Support for Euro-integration in Western Balkan societies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q24. Do you support EU integration of our country?</th>
<th>SRB</th>
<th>BiH</th>
<th>KOS</th>
<th>MKD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid %</td>
<td>Cumulative %</td>
<td>Valid %</td>
<td>Cumulative %</td>
<td>Valid %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly support</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t support</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>95.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly resist</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>97.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A/Don’t know</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the data obtained indicate that the citizens of the countries observed are dissatisfied with socio-economic changes in the transitional period. The majority of respondents assessed negatively each of the processes which take place as part of this socio-economic transformation: the level of democratization of the country, contribution of the multi-party system to the development of political life, privatization and functioning of market economy, degree of social inequality, and level of social solidarity. The most striking examples are negative evaluation of present situation in comparison with the socialist
period by 87.5% respondents in Bosnia; dissatisfaction with the level of democra-
tization of society in Serbia (82.7%), with growing social inequalities in Kosovo (70.6%), the disappearance of solidarity among people in Macedonia (64.6%), and negative contribution of political pluralism to the development of political life in Bosnia-Herzegovina (52.3%, with 33% undecided). The exceptions are improvement of the situation of ordinary people in everyday life in Kosovo (as assessed by 63.3% of respondents) and mainly positive assessments of party pluralism in Macedonia (43%).

At the same time, respondents’ answers indicate that citizens in all societies surveyed support EU integrations overall, with lowest support (at the time of the survey, January and February 2013) in Serbia (47.5%), and highest in Kosovo (82.6%).

Step 2: Construction of Social Spaces
(A Representation of the Multidimensional Social Structure of the Societies Under Study)

Social space represents the first of the explanatory frameworks which we have used in an attempt to understand and explain these evaluations of socio-economic changes in the societies of the Western Balkans.

Social space, “the field of social classes” in Bourdieusian terms, represents a model of spatial conception of the social structure which, as is the case with other fields, stands for a “quasi-reality” which exists independently of those who are positioned within it. This structure of objective positions results from the combination of the most important powers and resources in a social formation – of economic capital, cultural capital and social capital – and their evolution over time.

Social space represents a relational map of existential conditions (one to all others) within a society. These existential conditions are primarily de-

4 As the respondents from Kosovo, similar to respondents from the other societies studied, assessed transitional processes mainly negatively, it is likely that their assessment that everyday life has improved is mainly linked to their support for Kosovo’s independence and related processes.

5 In an early article, “Class condition and class position” (“Condition de classe et position de classe”), published in 1966, Bourdieu argues that the social classes are in part determined by the material existential conditions of their members and the type of work that the members of that class perform. Bourdieu defines this as their class condition. But
determined by the overall volume of capital and a composition of capital (and their change over time), but indicators of capital and their absolute value are not in and of themselves relevant (what does count is their relative value in relation to other existential conditions).

We believe that it is important for social space to be literally understood as a field (in the Bourdieusian sense) and to be studied as one. Fields are fields of forces which are active within them. One of the numerous analogies which Bourdieu used to help readers gain a better understanding of the concept of the field is the magnetic field in which invisible forces are active and whose effects can be noted through the influence they have on objects (metal shards) which are found in the zone of field activity. The role of the indicators in social space is not much greater than the role of shards in a magnetic field. Their primary function is to make visible the “forces” which shape social space.\(^6\)

In addition, the “armor” of social groups (in terms of the volume of capital, capital composition and, often, the key capital which determines their existential conditions) is also manifestly present in the maps of social space. And from these maps, the preferred social mechanisms of resource allocation and social evaluation, which work in their favor and which they attempt to impose on other groups in society, can likewise be inferred.\(^7\)

\(^6\) Obviously, under the assumption that one does not hold that these mechanisms were discovered once and for all by Bourdieu and that there is no need for further research to be done.

\(^7\) In Western Balkan societies there are four major mechanisms which individuals and groups rely on in field struggles: mechanisms of social closure on the basis of belonging to party organizations and/or informal clan groupings; mechanisms of social closure on the basis of educational credentials; market mechanisms and, finally, crime.
However, the factual relationships between social groups (domination, exploitation, closure, etc.), the struggles between social groups ("armed" in such a way) and the attempts at establishing mechanisms which work in their favor can be analyzed (as in the case of other fields) only through the analysis of the concrete conflicts and problems which caused them (they cannot directly be read off the maps). 8

Constructed in this way, social space represents an exceptional predictive mechanism in relation to various types of social practices and attitudes which were not included in its construction (political practices and attitudes, educational practices, employment strategies, gender relations, attitudes to health, friendship and love, consumer practices in the material and cultural sphere, and so on), as well as the predictor of possible coalitions of social groups in the social struggles related to particular issues. 9

We constructed a social space in the societies of the Western Balkans using five indicators of economic capital (19 modalities); four indicators of cultural capital (13 modalities); three indicators of political capital (10 modalities); and four indicators of social capital (12 modalities) as active variables. 10

The indicators of economic capital referred to the respondent’s household income and wealth, and included: (1) the average monthly income of the respondent’s household per household member; (2) the size of the respondent’s dwelling (if the household members own it); (3) the size of the respondent’s summer house/cottage (if any); (4) the amount of land owned by the respondent or household members (if any); (5) the value of the car(s) owned by the respondent’s household members (if any).

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8 It would be pointless to attempt such a thing. The forces that are active in social fields are not independent of the actors. Fields are fields of struggle and they stand in opposition to the structuralist understanding of social structures, in which the activities of the actors are reduced to the embodiment of structural relations. The structure and dynamics of the field or, in other words, the configuration of the forces in the field, are demined by the extent and type of the capital characteristic for certain positions in the field. But the outcomes of the struggle do not depend only on the capital at the actors’ disposal, but also on the skills they use to fight within the field.

9 For examples in our own work, please see Cvetičanin & Popescu: (2011); Cvetičanin (ed), (2012), Cvetičanin & Birešev (eds) (2013) and Cvetičanin, Gavrilović, Spasić (2014).

10 In the data analysis performed using MCA, two types of variables were used: “active” variables, the inter-relations which make up the map of the social space, and the “supplementary” or “passive” variables, which are projected on top of the active variables. Supplementary variables do not change relations within the map; instead, their position within it is viewed in relation to the main axes which structure it and in relation to the active variables. For the analysis of the data collected in the survey we used software SPAD 7.3.
The four indicators of cultural capital included: (1) the highest level of the respondents’ education; (2) the respondents’ father’s highest level of education;11 (3) the respondents’ musical taste; 4) the respondents’ computer literacy (frequency of personal computer use).12

As the indicators of political capital, which we treated as holding formal, institutional positions of power, we used indicators obtained from the responses given to the following questions: 1) whether the respondents are members of the leadership of a political party (at the local, regional or national level); 2) whether the respondents are members of the assembly or executive branch of the government (at the local, regional or national level); and 3) whether at their workplace they hold an executive or managerial position and if so, which position it is.13

Finally, we relied on four indicators of social capital, which we studied as the source of informal social power emerging from social network membership, having in mind the function of these networks, their constituent members, and their extent or size.14 These indicators included: (1) the respondents’ membership in a political party;15 (2) whether the respondents had access to informal networks for the exchange of favors in state institutions; (3) whether other individuals ask the respondents for help when they need it, and (4) how many friends, acquaintances, relatives, colleagues and so on the respondents can count on when in need of assistance (how large their social networks are).

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11 As the indicators of institutionalized cultural capital.
12 As the indicators of embodied cultural capital.
13 Due to an exceptionally small number of respondents who actually held high-ranking positions (in political parties, the government or within the workplace), in order to be able to use these indicators in the construction of the social space (bearing in mind the demanding 5% threshold for modalities which can be used as active variables), we merged these indicators into a single indicator with binary modalities, which indicate whether the respondent holds a managerial position (Manager+) or not (Manager-), in any of the aforementioned domains of social life.
14 Bearing in mind the differences in the function, membership and size of these networks, we made a distinction between two types of social capital, namely, social capital of solidarity, which refers to the use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain goods and services in short supply, to skirt formal procedures and exchange “favors of access” to state resources [which is called “blat” in Russia (Ledeneva, 1998, 2006), “guanxi” in China (Smart, 1993; Yang: 1994) or “zalatwyć sprawy” in Poland (Wedel, 1986)]; and political social capital, which refers roughly to the operations of power networks within sistema which Ledeneva analyzed in Russia (Ledeneva, 2013) and represents the parallel, informal structure of power in the analyzed Western Balkan societies.
15 Membership in a political party, in itself, does not bring any kind of formal power, but does include participation in wide and various social networks for the exchange of informal services and can be a source of significant informal social power (social capital).
In addition to the construction of social spaces in Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, in an attempt to identify existential classes in these societies, we analyzed, separately, the income distribution in the social space (economic capital); the distribution of respondents with different levels of education and with different taste preferences (cultural capital); and the distribution of different instances of social capital in the social space (the size of their social networks and access to informal networks for favor exchange in public institutions).

Finally, having in mind a further analysis in this text, we projected onto social space in these societies, the respondents’ occupation and their party affiliation as supplementary variables.

In all four societies which we studied, social space proved to be clearly structured, first, by the total volume of capital (economic, political, social and cultural) - represented by the horizontal axis - which explains the greatest part of the variance. Along this axis, according to Bourdieu, objective or theoretical social classes are differentiated. Second, these social spaces are structured by the composition of capital (vertical axis) which includes combinations of the most important resources available to members of social groups.

Social Space In Serbia (2013)

Social space in Serbia (Map 1) is a good example of these divisions. It is structured by the axis of the total volume of capital (high total volume of capital on the left side of the map and low total volume of capital on the right), which explains 68.8% of the variance. As for the composition of capital, on the map it can clearly be seen that different parts of the social space are determined

16 First, we used the respondents’ occupation – measured in the survey with a scale of 67 occupations – to construct nine basic groups of occupations on the basis of the type and volume of resources used by the respondents in their work and life strategies. Care was also taken to ensure that respondents who belong to each of the nine groups have comparable levels of education and income and that their work conditions are also comparable. These nine occupational groups include: (1) farmers; (2) unskilled workers; (3) skilled workers; (4) small entrepreneurs and craftsmen; (5) clerks and lower management; (6) lower-level experts and technicians; (7) experts; (8) big entrepreneurs, CEOs and upper management; and (9) politicians and high ranking military and police officers.

17 More information on indicators used in the construction of social space is available upon request.
Social space in Serbia

Map 1
by different combinations of capital, with a frequent singling out of one type of capital as the key one.

To begin with, there is a clear difference between the lower left quadrant and the upper left quadrant of the map, both of which belong to the part of social space where indicators show the presence of high total volume of capital. In the lower left quadrant, one finds a concentration of the modalities of political capital and political social capital – holding upper management positions in the workplace, high ranking positions in political parties or government bodies (Manager+); membership in political parties (Party+); access to informal networks for favor exchange in many public institutions (Connect++ (5 – 7)); possessing extensive social networks (b.networks 21 – 150); a great number of people who turn to them when they are in trouble (Help++); and modalities showing significant possessions, such as apartments/houses which exceed 100 m² (Flat>100m²), possessing summer houses/cottages (Cottage+) and expensive automobiles (Car > 5000 EUR).18

As can be seen from Map 1, in this part of the social space one finds the big entrepreneurs, CEOs and upper management, politicians and high ranking military and police officers (label: CEO managers and big owners), which we, based on their low frequency in the sample, grouped together into a single category. In addition, one small number of small entrepreneurs (label: small owners and craftsmen) also make up a part of this segment of the social space.

On the other hand, in the upper left quadrant, cultural capital is clearly the key resource. Here one finds indicators of the higher education of the respondents (Resp_college+); the higher education of their fathers (Father_college+);19 daily use of a computer (PC_everyday), and the group of tastes which belong to what we labeled as the “global cultural capital”20 (labels: rock music; easy

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18 In some cases these automobiles were worth in excess of 100,000 EUR, but in order for us to be able to use ownership of an automobile as an active variable in the construction of the social space (which requires a frequency of more than 5%), we lowered this threshold to more than 5,000 EUR.

19 What we counted as higher education for the respondents and their fathers was a college degree, master’s degree or doctoral degree. We selected the level of education of the respondents’ fathers as the indicator of the inherited cultural capital, despite our conviction that the mothers play a decisive role in the transfer of cultural capital, since the number of mothers of the respondents in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo who had a tertiary level education was below 5% in our sample. Thus, this indicator could not be used as one of the active variables which construct the social space.

20 For more on the concepts of “global cultural capital” and “local cultural capital” see: Cvetičanin & Popescu, 2011
listening music and classical music).²¹ What is very interesting is that this part of the social space is one in which there are indicators of the highest levels of income per household member (labels: I:>500 EUR and I:301 – 500 EUR), with a simultaneous absence of the possession of significant assets – no ownership of apartments (Flat0), or any agricultural or construction land (Land0). Here one finds the experts²² and the groups of occupations which we, for lack of a better term, defined as “lower-level experts and technicians”.²³

On the opposite (right) side of the map, where the indicators of low total volume of capital are concentrated, there are the modalities of low income per household member (I:< 50 EUR and I: 51 – 150 EUR); modalities of low cultural capital: elementary education of the respondent (Resp_elementary-) and his/her father (Father elementary-) and a complete absence of the use of computers (PC_never); indicators of local cultural capital (labels: Traditional folk music and Neo-folk music), as well as the existence of small social networks (s.networks 0 – 5), the absence of “connections” in public institutions which might enable an informal exchange of services (Connect0) or of membership in political parties (Party-).

In the lower right quadrant, “occupied” mostly by farmers, the indicators which point to the significant possession of key resources – farmland (labels:

²¹ See Map 4: “Favorite musical genres”.

²² This group of occupations includes, for example, experts in basic and applied sciences (experts in the field of mathematics, physics, chemistry, geological and biological sciences, engineers, architects ...); health care experts (general practitioners, specialists, pharmacists, veterinarians); education specialists (professors and teaching assistants at the tertiary level); experts in the field of social sciences (philosophers, psychologists, political scientists, historians...); experts in information-communication technologies (information technology specialists and programmers); law experts (judges, lawyers, attorneys ...); experts in the field of culture and religion (artists, cultural managers, curators, art critics, translators, journalists, priests and theologians) and so on.

²³ For example, this includes technicians in the field of natural sciences and technology (physic-}

icals, chemistry, geology, electro-technology, mechanical engineering, civil engineering ...); technicians in information technology or communication technology (information technology operators, web administrators, camera technicians, audio technicians, film editors...); those employed in the field of law and social work (counselors, registrars, bailiffs, expert-associates in the field of social work...); teachers in schools and in kindergartens, nurses and health technicians; workers in the field of sport (athletes, sports-recreational workers...); employed in the field of culture and religion (photographers, designers, bookstore owners, stage workers, acolytes...), etc.
Ha<2 and Ha2+) can be observed, possession of houses/apartments between 76 and 100 m² (Flat: 76-100m²); and old or used cars of small value (Car < 1000 EUR).

In the upper right quadrant of the social space in Serbia, however, one finds grouped modalities which practically indicate an absence of significant social resources. The low level of education of the respondents (Resp_elementary-); the lack of any connections for the informal exchange of services in public institutions (Connect0); no membership in political parties (Party-); the lack of automobiles (Cars0) or summer houses (Cottage0), with the possession of relatively small houses/apartments (Flat<50m² or Flat 51-75). The only indicators of social resources which appear in this part of the social space are indicators of small social networks of relatives and friends (s.networks 0-5) which we termed the “social capital of solidarity”. This is a part of the social space which is “inhabited” primarily by unskilled workers.

We hope that the current trends of distribution of key resources (capitals), which represent the immanent structure of society in Serbia, are now quite clear. They will, we hope, become even more obvious through the representation of distribution of these key resources in the “clouds of individuals”. Unlike the maps which have been presented so far, and which indicated the interrelations of the modalities of the selected indicators, the maps of “clouds of individuals” show the distribution of the respondents in the (same) social space in relation to a selected characteristic, where the so-called “con-

24 These labels indicate the possession of farmland covering less than 2 hectares, that is, farmland covering an area greater than 2 hectares.

25 What is, at the same time, of grave importance, is to avoid any temptation to “reify” this essentially relational model. The position, in the social space, of the indicators of the high education of the respondents and their parents, the high income and absence of any significant possessions does not have the function to indicate the inherent characteristics of the experts in Serbia. Instead, their spatial distance from the indicators of low education, the lack of the use of computers, low income, listening to traditional folk and newly-composed folk music in the social space primarily indicates how they differ in relation to, for example “resource-poor existential classes”, or, within the “resource-rich existential classes”, in relation to the groups whose key resources are political capital and social capital and significant possessions.

26 MCA presents its results in two outputs: the so-called “clouds of modalities”, which reveal the spatial relations between variables, and the so-called “clouds of individuals”, within which it becomes possible to see the position of individuals in these same maps, according to certain characteristics (gender, age, education, occupational group, etc.). See: Lebart et al., 1984; Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010).
centration ellipses” include 88% of all the respondents in the social space who belong to a given group.

The distribution of respondents based on their highest level of education (Map 2) indicates a clear tendency of movement from the lower right quadrant of the map of social space (the respondents with a basic-level education and those with an incomplete elementary education) towards the upper left quadrant of the social space (respondents with a tertiary-level education and higher). At the same time this indicates cultural capital as the key resource in this part of the social space (in upper left quadrant).

Map 3 shows the grouping of respondents into two clusters, based on their favorite musical genre. On the right side of the map of social space, in two mostly overlapping concentration ellipses, there are grouped respondents whose favorite genres of music include “traditional folk music” and “newly-composed folk music” (which makes up a part of what we have termed the “local cultural capital”). At the same time, on the left side of social space one finds a cluster made up of the respondents whose favorite genres of music include “classical music”; rock music and easy-listening music, which we have treated as the indicators of the “global cultural capital”.

If the distribution of the indicators of economic and cultural capital extends from the lower right quadrant toward the upper left quadrant of the map of social space (from the farmers and unskilled workers, towards the experts), then the distribution of the modality of the high level of social capital mainly extends toward the lower left quadrant, where the large entrepreneurs, CEOs and upper management, politicians and high ranking military and police officers are grouped.

Studying the size of their social networks, we asked our respondents how many individuals they could rely on when in need of help. We offered them the possibility of classifying the individuals from whom they expect assistance and writing down an approximate number. 27 Map 4 shows the distribution

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27 As part of the question, we had 10 pre-defined categories (relatives, godparents, respondents’ best men and maids of honor, people from the same town as they were, neighbors, friends from school, colleagues from work, business acquaintances (outside their place of business/institution where they work), members of the party to whom the respondents belonged (if they were members of a political party), members of a religious community the respondents belonged to (if they were active practitioners), and acquaintances whom they had at some point done a service to). We also made it possible for the respondents to write in another category of individuals whom they could turn to for help themselves.
Map 2
Distribution of groups with different levels of education in the social space in Serbia

Map 3
Distribution of groups with different types of taste in music in the social space in Serbia

Map 4
Distribution of groups according to the size of their social networks in the social space in Serbia

Map 5
Distribution of groups according to the number of connections for informal exchange of favors in public institutions in the social space in Serbia
of the sizes of social networks in the social space, i.e. the overall number of people the respondents expect assistance from in times of crisis.

Map 5, however, shows the distribution of the “connections” in public institutions, which can serve for the informal exchange of services. Based on the obtained responses, we have constructed three groups: those respondents with an extensive number of “connections” (in 5 to 7 of the overall seven listed public institutions), those with an average number of connections (in 1 – 4 public institutions, in the lower left quadrant of the map), and those who have no “connections” in any of the institutions (in the upper right quadrant of the map).

As can be seen from Map 6, in the social space in Serbia five groups based on the average monthly income per household member can be identified, which hierarchically extend from the right side of the map of the social space, where one generally finds the modalities of a low level of capital, towards the left side of the map of social space, where the total volume of capitals is high. The lowest income per household member (I:< 50 EUR and I: 51 - 150 EUR) can be found in the part of social space where the farmers and unskilled workers are located; average income (I: 151 – 300 EUR) is grouped in the very center of the map, in the space mostly “inhabited” by skilled workers, clerks and lower management and lower-level experts and technicians; while the highest monthly income (I:> 500 EUR and I: 301 - 500 EUR) is located in the upper quadrant of the social space, where the expert professions can be found.

Based on the various distributions of these basic types of capital, it is possible to sketch out a class structure of the society of Serbia, where three existential classes can be identified: resource-poor existential classes (RPC) whose ranks are mostly filled by farmers and unskilled workers (Map 7a);
existential classes with average resources (ARC), which in Serbia mostly number clerks and members of lower management, lower-level experts and technicians, small entrepreneurs and craftsmen and skilled workers (Map 7b); and resource-rich existential classes (RRC) which usually include politicians and

to refer to very different phenomena. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, in this text the term “existential classes” denotes the Bourdieusian “objective or logical classes”. This, at the same time, is not only a terminological switch: it also indicates our understanding of the Bourdieusian concept of class. In the well-known part of his seminal study (Distinction, 1984: 106) Bourdieu writes that “Social class is not defined by a property (not even the most dominant one, such as the volume and composition of capital) nor by a collection of properties (of sex, age, social origin, ethnic origin – proportion of black and whites, for example, or natives and immigrants – income, educational level etc.), nor even by a chain of properties strung out for a fundamental property (position in the relations of production), in a relation of cause and effect, conditioner and conditioned, but by the structure of relations between all the pertinent properties which gives its specific value to each of them and to the effect they exert on practices”. Bearing this in mind, Rogers Brubaker argues that the Bourdieusian concept of class simply represents “a metaphor for the total set of social determinants”. According to him, Bourdieusian “classes” are not defined by their position in relations of production, but instead in social relations in general: various existential conditions, various systems of dispositions (which are a product of these existential conditions) and the various scopes and types of capital at their disposal. Thus, class, according to Brubaker, in Bourdieu’s work appears as a denotation of a group of biological individuals who, being the product of the same social conditions, share the same habitus. According to Brubaker, it is this correspondence between the external conditions of existence and the system of internalized dispositions that makes up the specificity (and problematic nature) of the Bourdieusian understanding of class. A similar approach is adopted by David Swartz, in what is probably the best study on Bourdieusian sociology: “Social class becomes a generic term for all social groups sharing similar life chances and dispositions. In this respect, classes, for Bourdieu, resemble a Durkheimian category of groups sharing experiences and collective representations” (Swartz: 1997, 154).

Following these conceptions, we argue that to “existential classes” belong all those who share similar existential conditions which are determined by (the internal) interrelations between the social determinants of that group (economic, social and cultural capital, but also gender, age, ethnicity and place of residence), as well as by the relationships with other social groups living in different existential conditions (through which class identity is constructed - how We differ from Others). Members of these existential classes “being placed in similar conditions and subjected to similar conditionings, have every likelihood of having similar dispositions and interests and therefore of producing similar practices and adopting similar stances”. We also argue that in the Western Balkan societies, within these groups which share the same existential conditions (existential classes), one can distinguish elites, social classes and status groups according to the standard sociological terminology.
Map 6
Income distribution in the social space in Serbia

Map 7A
Distribution of resource-poor existential classes in the social space in Serbia

Map 7B
Distribution of existential classes with average resources in the social space in Serbia

Map 7C
Distribution of resource-rich existential classes in the social space in Serbia
high ranking military and police officers, big entrepreneurs, CEOs and upper management and experts.

As can be seen from Map 7a, the existential conditions of both farmers and unskilled workers in Serbia is clearly influenced by the low total volume of capital. In the case of the farmers, their key resource is the possession of farmland, while the existential conditions of unskilled workers is characterized by an almost complete absence of social resources, except for small social networks (cousins and friends), which we have termed the “social capital of solidarity”.

Groups of skilled workers, small entrepreneurs and tradespeople, clerks and members of lower management and of lower-level experts in Serbia share a very similar overall extent of capital and are grouped in the center of the map of social space (Map 7b). Among them, lower-level experts are characterized by a somewhat higher level of cultural capital, while small entrepreneurs and craftsmen are characterized by the possession of more significant financial assets.

The basic division within the resource rich existential classes in Serbia is not that between the class fractions which primarily rely on economic capital (who at the same time are not rich in cultural capital) and those who have cultural capital (but who lack economic capital), as in the societies which Bourdieu studied. The basic opposition emerges between groups which primarily rely on cultural capital and those whose primary resources are political capital and political social capital (Map 7c).

What is also interesting is that in terms of economic capital, there is a clear division between these groups (a bifurcation of economic capital). The class fraction whose key resources are cultural capital is characterized by the highest level of income and (paradoxically) the simultaneous absence of significant possessions (apartments/houses, cars or land). On the other hand, the fraction whose primary resources are political capital and political social capital is characterized by large possessions (apartments/houses, summer houses or cottages, cars), which, considering that their income is not at the highest level, inevitably opens the question of the origin of these assets.

In the final step, we projected onto the social space of Serbia, as supplementary variables, the party affiliation of the respondents. We asked the respondents to indicate which party they would vote for if parliamentary elections were schedule to take place one day following the survey. As can be seen on Map 8,
the party affiliation of the respondents
Social space in Serbia with a projection of
POSSESSIONS (REAL ESTATE)
HIGH TOTAL VOLUME OF CAPITAL
HIGH INCOME
POSSSESSIONS (LAND)
LOW TOTAL VOLUME OF CAPITAL
high and cultural capital
low and cultural capital

Map 8
even under radically different political conditions\textsuperscript{29} at the beginning of 2013, one can clearly identify the differences in the electoral body of the political parties. The difference is obvious between supporters of the parties that emerged from the Democratic Party (DS, LDP, DSS),\textsuperscript{30} which belong to the better-off groups of society located to the left of the map of social space; and the electoral body of the parties currently in power, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS),\textsuperscript{31} (which still only slightly differs from the voters of the extremely nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS)),\textsuperscript{32} and who are jointly grouped on the right side of the map of the social space, which is characterized by a shortage of all types of capital.

\textsuperscript{29} In January 2013 when the survey took place, the coalition of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) was already in power, and headed the Serbian government. The leaders of these parties to a great extent denounced their past and determined EU assesion of Serbia as a foreign policy priority.

\textsuperscript{30} Even despite their extensive ideological differences. The Democratic Party (DS) is the center-left party in Serbia. It is a full member of the Socialist International, the Progressive Alliance, and is an associate member of the Party of European Socialists. After being a member of the Serbian government for 12 years (following the fall of Milosevic’s regime in 2000), since the elections of May 2012, the Democratic Party has been the opposition in the Serbian parliament. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is a liberal political party. At the European level, it is affiliated with the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party. It is one of the few political parties in Serbia to actively support Serbia’s membership in NATO, and openly supports the rights of the LGBT population. The Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) is a national conservative and Christian democratic political party characterized by a politics of Euro-skepticism. At the international level, it is affiliated with International Democrat Union, after leaving the European People’s Party in 2012. At the parliamentary elections in 2014, neither the LDP nor the DSS passed the census and are currently opposition parties with no representatives in the parliament.

\textsuperscript{31} The Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) is a center-right, conservative political party, led by former members of the Serbian Radical Party. The Serbian Progressive Party maintains special ties with the Freedom Party of Austria and United Russia, and in 2013 the SNS representatives in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe joined the Group of the European People’s Party. Following the elections of 2014, backed by 48.35% of the voters, SNS became the center of the Serbian government. The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) is a political party in Serbia which emerged from the League of Communists of Serbia and which had been led by Slobodan Milošević in the 1990s. The current political standing of the Socialist Party of Serbia is center-left and it is aspiring for membership in the Socialist International. Following the parliamentary elections in 2014, it has been a member of the Serbian government, in a coalition with the Serbian Progressive Party.

\textsuperscript{32} The Serbian Radical Party (SRS) is a far right, Serbian nationalist political party. The party was founded in 1991 by Vojislav Šešelj, who is suspected by the International Tribunal in the Hague of having committed war crimes.
Social Space in Macedonia

Social space in Macedonia is structured by the same axes as the one in Serbia, but significant differences can still be detected. The main axis is that of the total volume of capital (high total volume of capital on the left side of the map and low total volume of capital on the right), which explains 70.5% of the variance, indicating a strong division based on this criterion of general advantage within the society in Macedonia. The similarities are also reflected in the general distribution of key resources in the social space.

The differences can primarily be seen in the lower extent of differentiation within the resource-rich classes in Macedonia (in comparison to the situation in Serbia). On the left side of the map of the social space in Macedonia - where one finds the modalities of the high total volume of capital - traces of the division between the indicators of a high level of cultural capital and global cultural capital in the upper left quadrant [Resp_college+; Father_College+; PC_everyday; rock, jazz & pop music]; and, on the other hand, indicators of political capital (Manager+) of political social capital [Party+; Conn++, b.networks 21 -150] and the possession of significant assets (Flat > 100m²) in the lower left quadrant can be detected. They are, however, unlike in the social space in Serbia, considerably less differentiated, more closely grouped together and mutually intertwined. For example, the possession of high-end automobiles (Car 5000+ EUR) or large summer houses (Cottage > 50 m²) are found in the upper left quadrant, closer to the pole of the global cultural capital than to the indicators of the political capital and political capital of solidarity. Thus, bearing in mind also the mutual proximity of the centers of the concentration ellipses for the group of experts and CEO managers and big owners, it would seem that in Macedonia there is in terms of resources, a unified resource-rich group (which, as we will see, is strongly divided in terms of values).

On the opposite pole of the social space, as is the case in Serbia, in the upper right quadrant the absence of significant social resources can be found (I:< 50 EUR; Conn0; Resp_Elementary-), except for indicators of social capital of solidarity (s.networks 0-5). However, unlike Serbia, in this part of the social space in the immediate vicinity both low-skilled workers and farmers are located.33 What is particularly interesting is that the farmers in Macedonia are not to be found even remotely near the section of social space which is characterized

33 This being evidence of their worse social position than that of the farmers in Serbia.
Map 9
Social space in Macedonia (2013)
by the large possession of farmland (Land > 2 ha) which means that biggest arable land is owned by somebody else (and not farmers).

In the lower right quadrant, next to the indicators of possession of smaller tracts of arable land (Land<2 ha), one also find indicators of social networks of an average size (a.networks 5-20), average level of cultural capital (Resp_high-school) and local cultural capital (Traditional folk music & Neo-folk music). As can be seen from Map 9, in this part of the social space we find grouped together skilled workers, small owners and craftsmen.

Moving to the presentation of the “clouds of individuals”, distribution in terms of educational level in Macedonia follows the expected pattern of the average level of education in the map center, the lower level of education concentrated on the right side of the map of social space, that is, high education on the left side of the map (Map 10).

This kind of distribution is closely followed by the distribution of preferred musical genres, with an almost complete overlap between those who listen to traditional folk music and newly-composed folk music and have low level of education on the right side of the map of social space; the position in the center of the ellipsis indicates easy listening music as the favorite genre of music and posession of a high-school diploma; while the centers of the concentration ellipses indicate a near overlap between high level of education and rock, jazz and pop music as the preferred genres of music.

When it comes to the indicators of social capital – both in terms of the size of social networks which the respondents have access to, as well as the number of informal connections in public institutions – the maximum values are located on the left side of the map of social space, where the modalities of a large overall volume of capital can be found, but are still closer to the map’s center than is the case in Serbia, indicating once again a less pronounced differentiation between the resource-rich groups in Macedonia.

When we projected concentration ellipses which indicate the distribution of the groups in terms of income onto the map of “clouds of individuals” (Map 14), we could see that in terms of income in Macedonia, it is possible to note two groups: on the one hand, those with low average income per household member (I: 50 EUR and I: 51 – 150 EUR) and on the other, as one group, those with average and high income (I: 151 - 300 EUR; I: 301 – 500 EUR and I: > 500 EUR).

In terms of the distribution of occupational groups in social space, farmers, unskilled and skilled workers belong to the resource-poor existential classes in Macedonia (Map 15A). Unlike in Serbia, where in the group of the existential
Map 10
Distribution of groups with different levels of education in the social space in Macedonia

Map 11
Distribution of groups with different types of taste in music in the social space in Macedonia

Map 12
Distribution of groups according to the size of their social networks in the social space in Macedonia

Map 13
Distribution of groups according to the number of connections for informal exchange of favors in public institutions in the social space in Macedonia
Map 14
Income distribution in the social space in Macedonia

Map 15A
Distribution of resource-poor existential classes in the social space in Macedonia

Map 15B
Distribution of existential classes with average resources in the social space in Macedonia

Map 15C
Distribution of resource-rich existential classes in the social space in Macedonia
Map 16
Social space in Macedonia with a projection of the party affiliation of the respondents
classes with average resources one finds qualified workers and members of lower-level experts and technicians, in Macedonia in the center of the map of social space there are only clerks and small entrepreneurs and craftsmen (Map 15B). Among the resource-rich classes, in addition to the group made up of owners of large businesses, CEOs and politicians and the group of experts, in Macedonia there are also lower-level experts, all three groups covering practically the same part of the social space (Map 15C).

At the end of the analysis, as was the case in Serbia, we projected onto the social space in Macedonia the party affiliation of the respondents. It turned out that the voters of the coalition currently in power in Macedonia (VMRO-DPMNE and DUI) are mostly located in the lower left quadrant of the social space, where we find numerous indicators of political capital and political social capital. On the other hand, the opposition supporters, SDSM and DPA, are closer to the respondents who mainly rely on resources which

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34 The Macedonian system of political parties follows the general ethnic-based divisions of society. The system is therefore structured into two major blocs – the Macedonian and Albanian bloc. Within the party life in the Macedonian bloc, two major parties (VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM) form two broad coalitions that unite a number of smaller parties. There are only a few smaller parties that are not enlisted within these two broad coalitions. Outside of the so-called Macedonian bloc, Albanian parties constitute the other bloc, with DUI and DPA as the major ethnic Albanian parties and several other smaller parties.

VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) is a center-right political party that has been leading the government of Macedonia since 2006 and was also in power between 1998 and 2002. It declares itself as a demo-Christian party and is a member of the European People’s Party. VMRO-DPMNE is a nationalist party with a strong conservative stance on issues of family, tradition and national identity. Although declaratively pro-European, it has so far shown a lack of willingness to address international concerns over the decrease of democratic governance.

SDSM (Social-democratic Union of Macedonia) is a center-left political party and the major party of the opposition within the Macedonian bloc. It led the government in the 1990s and between 2002 and 2006. SDSM declares itself to be a social democratic party. It is a member of the Party of the European Socialists. Even though the values expressed in the manifestos of VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM converge to a degree, SDSM is less conservative and can be considered liberal, especially in terms of its handling of issues related to family, tradition and national identity.

DUI (Democratic Union for Integration) is the largest ethnic Albanian party and has been a member of the ruling coalition with VMRO-DPMNE since 2008. It can be considered a centrist party compared to their main opponent DPA. However, their chief point of interest is the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement which is the root of
belong to the corpus of cultural capital. It is interesting to note that the declared abstainers are to be found in the very center of the map, while the respondents with a low overall level of capital did not even bother to answer this question (which is likely to be indicative of a high level of disillusionment with politics).

Social space in Kosovo

The tendency which we have identified in Macedonia, that the most valuable resources are found concentrated in a small section of the social space, with no clear differentiation among them, is even more pronounced in Kosovo. In addition to a strong division along the first axis of the social space (which accounts for 66.9% of the variance), in the lower left quadrant of the social space one finds grouped all the most important social resources: the largest amounts of possessions (Flat > 100 m²; Flat 76 - 100 m²; Land > 2 ha; Car > 5000 EUR), greatest monthly income per household member (I: >200 EUR); the highest level of education (Resp_College+) and of social capital (Network++, Connect++, Help++).

On the same side of the social space, in the upper left corner of the social space of Kosovo, one can note the presence of high modalities of cultural capital (Father_College+), computer literacy (PC_everyday); global cultural capital (Rock/jazz/pop music as the preferred music genres), as well as (and this is a point of interest) the highest percentage of membership in political parties. However, these resources are in no way valorized through high income or more significant possessions.

On the other side of the social space in Kosovo, in the upper right quadrant, where indicators of low total volume of capital are located and where policies for the equitable representation of ethnic communities in Macedonian politics. Therefore, similar to DPA, DUI has only now begun to develop a broader ideological standing. DUI originates from the National Liberation Army’s combatants of 2001. However, it has significantly broadened its membership (and leadership) to encompass broader segments of the Albanian community.

DPA (Democratic Party of Albanians) is the second largest ethnic Albanian party and is the largest opposition party in the Albanian bloc. It is a center-right party and its tone is more nationalistic compared to DUI. They have been in the governing coalition with VMRO-DPMNE two times, from 1998 to 2002 and from 2006 to 2008. Their main focus is the advocacy of the rights of ethnic Albanians, and like DUI, have developed broader programs only recently.
Map 17
Social space in Kosovo
Map 18
Distribution of groups with different levels of education in the social space in Kosovo

Map 19
Distribution of groups with different types of taste in music in the social space in Kosovo

Map 20
Distribution of groups according to the size of their social networks in the social space in Kosovo

Map 21
Distribution of groups according to the number of connections for informal exchange of favors in public institutions in the social space in Kosovo
one mainly finds unskilled and skilled workers, there are also somewhat more significant resources in comparison to the other societies which we have analyzed: somewhat better income per household member (I:101-200 EUR; I:76 - 100 EUR), somewhat more significant assets (Flat 51-75 m²) and a higher level of computer literacy (PC_sometimes).

Unlike the maps of social space shown so far, in Kosovo the lowest level of social resources is present in the lower right quadrant of the map of social space. This is where one finds the lowest income per household member (I:>50 EUR); the lowest level of education of the respondents and their parents (Resp_elementary- and Father_elementary-); as well as the absence of computer literacy (PC_never), and the indicators of local cultural capital (Folk music). The only more significant social resource in this part of the social space is the possession of small tracts of farmland (Land>2 ha), which represents the only resource of socially isolated group of farmers.

Turning to individual instances of capitals, when we studied the distribution of the level of education in the social space in Kosovo in the “clouds of individuals” (Map 18) repeated division is found as in other societies, with respondents with the lowest level of education located in the lower right quadrant, and most of the respondents with a high school education located in the center of the map. However, as we have already pointed out, in Kosovo the respondents with the highest level of education are mostly located in the lower left quadrant, which in the other analyzed societies was the space in which the indicators of political and social capital were grouped (and not in the upper left quadrant, where indicators of cultural capital are usually located).

In terms of preferred musical genre (Map 19), one can clearly note a distinction between those whose preferred genres of music are traditional folk music and newly-composed folk music (which we have treated as indicators of local cultural capital) on the right side of the map, characterized by a low total volume of capital; and on the other hand, those who prefer rock/jazz/pop or easy-listening music (that is, indicators of global cultural capital), on the left side of the map of social space, where high total volume of capital is found.

Even when we moved on to the indicators of social capital in the social space of Kosovo, the tendency of the highest values grouping in the lower left quadrant still remained clear. The difference is that when it comes to the size of the social networks they use (Map 20), small or average size networks are located on the right side of the social space, while the most extensive social networks are located in its lower right quadrant. While, on the other hand,
as far as informal connections in public institutions are concerned (Map 21) both the average and large number of “connections” are grouped in the lower left quadrant of the map of social space.

Based on the distribution of income per household member in the social space in Kosovo (Map 22), three groups can be differentiated. In the lower right quadrant one finds the respondents with the lowest income (I:>50 EUR). In the upper hand quadrant of the social space there is an overlap between the three average levels of income (I:>51-75 EUR; I:>76-100 EUR; I:>101-200 EUR). Finally, the respondents with the highest income per household member (I:>200 EUR) are located in the lower left quadrant.

Based on these descriptions of the distribution of social resources per section of social space, we are able to provide an outline of the class structure in Kosovo. Unlike previous examples, in terms of the existential conditions in Kosovo we can determine four groups of class conditions, but almost all valuable resources are linked to only one segment of social space, i.e. in the hands of resource rich classes.

As previously indicated, the existential conditions of farmers in Kosovo are the most difficult and they are, in terms of class conditions, almost completely separated from the other social groups in this society (Map 23A). In addition, in resource-poor existential classes in Kosovo one also finds groups of unskilled workers, skilled workers and small owners and craftsmen, which are mostly located on the right side of the social space in Kosovo. Even though they are in a significantly better position than the farmers, they are still characterized by a relatively low level of total volume of capital (map 23B).

On the other hand, the average value of the total volume of capital and the grouping in the center of the map of social space in Kosovo are typical for occupational groups of clerks and lower-level experts and technicians (Map 23C).

Finally, in the group of resource-rich classes in Kosovo one finds a unified group35 of occupations made up of experts, politicians and high ranking military and police officers, big entrepreneurs, CEOs and representatives of upper management. They actually take up the lower left quadrant of the social space in which we find high modalities of all the more significant social resources.

35 Since the group of politicians, big entrepreneurs and CEOs in Kosovo numbered fewer than 10 respondents in the sample, we added them to the more numerous group of experts, whose resources in Kosovo were quite similar.
Map 22
Income distribution in the social space in Kosovo

Map 23A
Distribution of resource-poor existential classes in the social space in Kosovo

Map 23B
Distribution of resource-poor existential classes in the social space in Kosovo

Map 23C
Distribution of existential classes with average resources in the social space in Kosovo
In the final segment of the analysis, we projected party affiliation of the respondents onto the social space in Kosovo. The question posed to the respondents was which political party they would vote for if parliamentary elections were scheduled for the day following the survey. It is interesting that the voters of the key political parties in Kosovo (PDK, LDK, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (Albanian: Partia Demokratike e Kosovës, PDK) is the largest political party in Kosovo headed by Hashim Thaçi, the political leader of the former Kosovo Liberation Army. It was originally a social democratic party which emerged from the demilitarized KLA, but in January 2013, it re-positioned itself as a center-right party with strong social and economic liberalism tendencies. Even though in the last elections held in Kosovo in 2014 the PDK received the largest number of mandates in the Kosovo Parliament (37), they were not able to find coalition partners who would support Hashim Thaçi in his attempt to form a government as the prime minister. Following lengthy negotiations, in the beginning of December 2014 PDK formed, along with the LDK (The Democratic League of Kosovo), a coalition government headed by the LDK leader Isa Mustafa as the prime minister, and the leader of the PDK, Hashim Thaçi, as one of the vice-premiers and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

36 The Democratic Party of Kosovo (Albanian: Partia Demokratike e Kosovës, PDK) is the largest political party in Kosovo, which won 30 mandates in the last parliamentary elections. It is a conservative and liberal conservative party. One of the founding members, Ibrahim Rugova was president of the party, as well as President of Kosovo until his death in 2006, while the party is now being led by the new Prime Minister of Kosovo, Isa Mustafa.
Map 24
Social space in Kosovo with a projection of the party affiliation of the respondents
AAK, AKR are located in an almost incredibly small section of the social space in Kosovo, which is characterized by very good existential conditions. The only exception is Vetëvendosje (VV) which has as its voting base respondents/the population with a significant cultural capital, but without any other resources of social power. As in Macedonia, none of the parties in Kosovo have a voting base among the participants of the resource-poor classes and it is quite likely that in Kosovo class differences and class ideology do not have a decisive role in the determination of the voters among the parties and that this role is played mostly by other factors.

38 The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (Albanian: Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës, AAK) was formed in 2001. The current president of the party is Ramush Haradinaj. In December 2004, the parliament elected him Prime Minister of Kosovo and he formed a coalition government with then the largest party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). He resigned as Prime Minister in March 2005 after learning that he had been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for 37 counts of war crimes. During the last parliamentary elections in Kosovo in 2014, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo won 11 parliamentary seats.

39 The New Kosovo Alliance (Albanian: Aleanca Kosova e Re, AKR) is a liberal political party in Kosovo founded in 2006, by a businessman Behgjet Pacolli. In the previous government of Kosovo they were the minor partner in the coalition government made up by the PDK and AKR. In the 2014 elections, the AKR with 4.67 percent of the vote did not meet the census requirements and became a non-parliamentary political party.

40 VV - Vetëvendosje (eng. Self-determination) is a left-leaning political movement in Kosovo, which opposes foreign involvement in the internal affairs of Kosovo and campaigns for the sovereignty exercised by the people instead, as part of the right of self-determination. Vetëvendosje! was founded in 2004 and has been led, since its start, by Albin Kurti, as a consecutive of KAN (Kosova Action Network), a group promoting active citizenry and direct political participation of the masses. Their party ideology includes left-wing nationalism, radicalism and direct democracy. During the last parliamentary elections, Vetëvendosje received 16 parliamentary seats, becoming the third strongest party in Kosovo.
Social space in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The most radical division in terms of resource distribution is found in the social space of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where in a narrow segment of the social space there is a dense concentration of high modalities of all types of capital, while in the other parts of this space, with the exception of farmland, almost no significant resources are to be found. Axis 1, which shows the class division based on the total volume of capital in the social space in Bosnia-Herzegovina, accounts for 67.14% of the variance. But the capital composition in this case is also quite significant.

In the lower left quadrant of social space grouped together are the highest modalities of income per household member (I: 500 EUR); of possessions (Flat 100 m²; Flat 76-100 m², Car 5000+ EUR); indicator of holding managerial positions in party organizations, government institutions or companies (Manager+); indicators of possession of significant amounts of social capital - extensive social networks (big_networks 21-150); informal connections in public institutions (Connect++); and a large number of people who turn to them for help (Help++); but also the highest levels of education (Resp_college+ and Father_college+).

In contrast to this, in the upper left quadrant, one mainly finds average values of the modalities of the used indicators—average sized flats (Flat 51 – 75 m²); average income per household member (I: 151–300 EUR and I: 301–500 EUR); social networks of average size (a.network 6-20) and an average level of respondent education (Resp_college+) as well as that of their parents (Father_College+). It comes as no surprise that in this segment of social space clerks and lower-level experts are located.

As we have already mentioned, in the lower right quadrant the dominant indicators are those of possession of farmland (Land<2 ha; Land 2-10 ha; Land > 10 ha), which are followed by the indicators of low income (I: 51–150 EUR); small social networks (Network 0-5); a low level of cultural capital (Resp_elementary; Father_elementary; PC never) and indicators of the local cultural capital (Folk music). This is part of the social space in Bosnia-Herzegovina in which mostly farmers and unskilled workers can be found.

In the upper right quadrant, which is mostly “populated” by skilled workers and small owners and craftsmen, there are almost no indicators of any possessions (except for used cars– Car < 1000 EUR); the indicators of income

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41 This indirectly confirms the fact that acquaintances and friends perceive them as powerful individuals who could be able to provide them with the needed help.
Map 25
Social space in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2013)
are at the lowest level (I: < 50 EUR), and even the resources of social capital are missing (Connect0; Help-; Party-). It is here that one can also find indicators of local cultural capital (Neo-folk music).

The same model of the distribution of resources is found in most maps of “clouds of individuals” in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In terms of educational qualifications, the respondents with a tertiary education are mainly distributed in the lower left quadrant, while those with an average education are mostly located in the upper part of the social space. A relatively small group of respondents with an elementary education is densely concentrated in the lower right quadrant of the social space (Map 26).

In terms of the distribution of preferred genres of music (Map 27), it represents an exception in relation to the strictly divided society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Four different types of preferences – for rock/jazz/pop music, easy-listening music, newly-composed folk music and traditional folk music – are grouped together, in the vicinity of one another.

Another exception is the distribution of social networks in terms of their size (map 28). Even though the respondents with extensive social networks are mainly distributed in the lower left quadrant of the social space, the centers of the concentration ellipses which represent the scope of the respondents with small, average and large social networks are still found close to one another.

However, in the case of the number of informal connections in public institutions there is a spatial differentiation, where the respondents with the largest number of contacts in public institutions are found in the lower left quadrant of the social space in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while those with an average number of informal connections and those with a small number are located one next to the other in the upper right quadrant (Map 29).

A practically identical situation can be found in the distribution of average monthly income per household member (Map 30). The respondents with the greatest income per household member (I: > 500 EUR) are grouped in the lower left quadrant, while the other modalities of the indicators of income (I:< 50 EUR; I: 51–150; I: 151-300 EUR; and I: 301-500 EUR) are located in the immediate vicinity of each other, with mutually significant overlaps between the concentration ellipses.

This kind of division of social resources results in a tri-partite division of existential classes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which a large number of members of occupational groups (farmers, unskilled workers, skilled workers, small entrepreneurs and craftsmen) are found in the position of “resource-poor
Map 26
Distribution of groups with different levels of education in the social space in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Map 27
Distribution of groups with different types of taste in music in the social space in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Map 28
Distribution of groups according to the size of their social networks in the social space in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Map 29
Distribution of groups according to the number of connections for informal exchange of favors in public institutions in the social space in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Map 30
Income distribution in the social space in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Map 31 A
Distribution of resource-poor existential classes in the social space in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Map 31B
Distribution of existential classes with average resources in the social space in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Map 31C
Distribution of resource-rich existential classes in the social space in Bosnia-Herzegovina
classes” (map 31A). In the group of existential classes with average resources one find clerks and lower-level experts near the center of social space (Map 31B); while the grouped respondents belonging to expert occupations, and groups of politicians and high ranking military and police officers, big entrepreneurs, CEOs and representatives of upper management, all all belong to the resource-rich existential classes and occupy the lower left quadrant of the social space\(^42\) (Map 31C).

In the final step we projected onto the social space the choices that the respondents would make if they were voting on a parliamentary elections (Map 32). Unlike the situation in Macedonia and Kosovo, most of the respondents who indicated their preferences are located in the center of the map of the social space, while the Party of Democratic Action (SDA)\(^43\) and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)\(^44\) clearly have a voting base among the poorest members of the society. Support for the other parties (Alliance of Independent Social Democrats - SNSD)\(^45\) and the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP)\(^46\) is strongest among the members of the social groups

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42 As in the case of Kosovo, in the sample there were fewer than 10 respondents from the group of politicians, large business owners and CEOs, so we had to merge them with the group of experts.

43 The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) was founded in 1990 by Alija Izetbegović, who was afterwards the first president of Bosnia-Herzegovina (during the civil war), and who was later in two terms voted the Bosnian member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina (in 1996 and 1998). In terms of ideology, the SDA is a center-right political party with strong national orientation, and at the European level the party has the status of an observer member of the European People’s Party (EPP).

44 The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) is a national party of the Serbs with a right-wing political orientation, founded by dr Jovan Rašković. During 1991, the party was divided into the SDS of Bosnia-Herzegovina (what was later the Republic of Srpska), SDS of Croatia (later the Republic of Serbian Krajina) and a branch in what was then SRJ, that is, Serbia and Montenegro. The umbrella organization was the SDS of the Serb Lands whose president until 1996 was Radovan Karadžić (who was later accused of war crimes during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, before the International Tribunal in the Hague). The current leader of the party is Mladen Bosić.

45 The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata, SNSD) is a Serb political party in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats emerged through the merger of various smaller political parties which were, during the 1990s the opposition to what was then the ruling Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). Its president, Milorad Dodik, is currently the President of the Republic of Srpska.

46 The Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Socijaldemokratska Partija Bosne i Hercegovine, SDP BiH) is a multi-ethnic, but largely Bosnian Muslim social-democratic political
located in the middle of the social space, while only the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ)\textsuperscript{47} has the most voters in the section of the social space where one finds the group of respondents rich in resources.

Map 32
Social space in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a projection of the party affiliation of the respondents

47 The Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine or HDZ BiH) is the largest political party of Bosnian Croats. It is an observer member of the European People’s Party (EPP). Its current president is dr Dragan Čović.
Step 3: Construction of Maps of Value Patterns

In the third step of the analysis, as we have already mentioned, following the research of Ronald Inglehart we constructed maps of the value patterns found in the societies that we studied in order to document the influences of simultaneous and conflicting processes of re-traditionalization, first and second modernization taking place in them on the activities of people, and their assessment of socio-economic changes.

In the study “Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural Economic and Political Change in 43 societies” (1997) by analyzing the data collected during the second wave of the World Values Survey (1990/1991) Inglehart identified two important dimensions on the basis of which societies can be located on a global map of cross-cultural variation. These dimensions reflect the polarization between traditional values versus secular-rational orientation towards authority, and opposition between survival versus self-expression values.

Inglehart indicates that the first dimension separates the world-views of traditional and advanced industrial societies. In traditional societies, the family is crucial for survival, and the importance of the family, deference to parental authority and male dominance in economic and political life are emphasized. Accordingly, those who acquire traditional value orientations show a relatively low level of tolerance for abortion, divorce and homosexuality and place strong emphasis on religion. Advanced industrial societies and the value orientations of their citizens tend to have the opposite characteristics.

On the other hand, Inglehart points out that the survival/self-expression dimension represents a manifestation of the polarization between material and post-modern values, and that it refers to the level of tolerance, trust, subjective well-being and self-expression. High levels of self-expression values occur in post-material societies which provide their citizens with high levels of security.

In this study, we were primarily interested in the cultural/value differences within the four societies that we studied48 (even though we found the cultural differences between them interesting). In an attempt to understand and explain the attitude of the citizens in these societies towards socio-economic changes in the transition period, we used Multiple Correspondence

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48 Thus the unit of analysis was leveled down to the individual level.
Analysis\textsuperscript{49} to construct maps of value patterns. We derived indicators from answers to the questions which indicate personal life goal choices, attitudes toward possible national goals in the next ten years, values which children should acquire during the course of their upbringing, attitudes toward social phenomena such as divorce, cohabitation, abortion, and homosexuality, and, finally, choices of key identities and questions on religious beliefs.\textsuperscript{50} In this way we created a culturalist framework which enabled us to consider how respondents’ values related to their assessment of socio-economic changes in the transition period.

The results we obtained through the analysis of the respondents’ answers regarding their values to a great extent fit in with the value dimensions which Inglehart identified: traditional values versus secular-rational orientation towards authority; and opposition between survival versus self-expression values.

In the case of Serbia (Map 33), these two value dimensions can be determined quite clearly. In Serbia the dimension of survival versus self-expression values represent the most important axis in the map and accounts for 37.6% of the variance. On the left side of the map one finds grouped indicators of survival values showing high standard of living (Rich++) and being powerful, influential (Influential++) and politically active (Political++) as respondents most important personal goals. Close to these indicators one finds rejection of divorce, abortion and homosexuality. At the same time, on the opposite side of the map there are indicators of non-religiosity (not-religious), of the dismissal of material values of power (influential-) and wealth (rich-) and tolerance toward other lifestyles.

A clear differentiation can also be seen along the dimension of traditional versus secular-rational orientation towards authority. In the upper part of the map of the value patterns in Serbia, one finds grouped indicators of traditional value orientation which point to primary identification with religion (ID_Religion+) and with nation (ID_Nation+); membership in traditional religious communities (ReligiousTraditional), and the attitudes that politicians who

\textsuperscript{49} Constructing maps of value patterns using Multiple Correspondence Analysis represents an innovation of a sort. MCA is mainly used by researchers who work in the Bourdieusian tradition and who consider values to be an integral part of practice (hence, they cannot be considered independently of other aspects of practice). However, since the method itself is neutral in relation to the variables used, there is, in principle, no obstacle to using MCA for analysis of value patterns in these societies.

\textsuperscript{50} In shaping these questions we used the experiences and models used in the World Values Survey and European Values Survey.
do not believe in God are not suitable for public office (NoGodPoliticians+). This is accompanied by an assessment of divorce, abortion and homosexuality as unacceptable, irrespective of the circumstances. On the other pole of this dimension, in the bottom of the map of value patterns, the key indicators are the identity of a “citizen of the world” (ID_World+) and the one related to the respondent’s occupation (ID_Profession+); non-religiosity (God-; ID_religion-; religiousNo/New; NoGodPoliticians-), as well as a tolerant attitude toward homosexuality (Homosex+), abortion (Abortion+) and divorce (Divorce+). These are all examples of secular-rational orientation towards authority.

Map 34 shows the results which were obtained when we projected the socio-demographic data of the respondents onto the map of value patterns
in Serbia. Closest to the pole of traditional values are the elderly respondents (65+ years; 46 – 65 years) as well as the respondents with a lower level of education (elementary-) and a low level of income per member of household (I: 51 – 150 EUR); while the respondents who belong to the group of CEOs and large entrepreneurs and middle aged respondents (31-45 years) are closer to the pole of self-expression values.

In the case of the survival values pole, as could be expected, the respondents with the lowest income (I: > 50 EUR), farmers, unskilled workers and skilled workers, and which may come as a surprise, the youngest group of respondents (18 - 30 years) are grouped there. On the opposite pole of secular orientation toward authority, there are respondents with the highest education.
(College+), as well as those respondents who belong to the group of experts and have the highest income per member of household (I:>500 EUR).

Interesting insights were obtained when we projected the political affiliation of the participants onto the map of value patterns in Serbia. Political preferences are mostly differentiated along the dimension of traditional versus secular rational orientation, where on the part of secular-rational orientation one finds supporters of the Democratic Party and its various fractions (Democratic Party (DS), Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)). On the opposite side, close to the pole of traditional values, the voters of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) are located, as well as

51 See footnote 30 in this text.
those of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), who are also close to the pole of survival values (as are the voters of the Democratic Party of Serbia with it which shares a radical right-wing political orientation and opposition to Serbia’s joining the EU.

In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the poles of traditional value orientation and secular rational orientation towards authority switched places, but still remain clearly identifiable, while the axis of survival versus self-expression values has maintained its dominant position, accounting for 40.3% of the variation (map 36). As in Serbia, survival values are expressed in personal goals of be-

Map 36
Value patterns in Bosnia-Herzegovina

52 See footnotes 31 and 32.
coming rich, powerful, politically active and influential, while disregard of these goals and high level of tolerance toward alternative lifestyles testifies of the adoption of the self-expression values. The pole of traditional values is marked by indicators of religion and nation as the basis of one’s identity (ID: religion; ID: nation); belonging to traditional religious communities, the attitude that politicians who do not believe in God are not suitable for public office (NoGodPoliticians+), and with the attitude of complete unacceptance of divorce, abortion or homosexuality. The opposite pole, is, as in Serbia, characterized by nonreligiosity, identity tied to belonging to an occupational
group or the identity of a European or a “citizen of the world” and, thus a tolerant attitude towards social practices which the members of traditional value orientation condemn.

Traditional value orientation in Bosnia mostly characterizes the elderly respondents (65+ years, 46-65 years); respondents with the lowest level of education (Resp_elementary) and lowest income (I:<50 EUR; I> 51-150 EUR); unskilled workers, small owners and craftsmen. What is interesting is that near the pole of survival values in the map of value patterns in Bosnia-Herzegovina one finds experts and CEOs, as well as respondents who belong to the group of lower-level experts, and, as in Serbia, members of the youngest generation.
In the section of map marked by the self-expression values, following In-glart’s insight that the acquisition of self-expression values is directly connected to the increase in the level of existential security, there are the respondents with the highest income per member of the household in Bosnia-Herzegovina (I:>500), but also, which is unusual, highly skilled workers.

After projecting party preferences of the respondents onto the map of value patterns in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is clear that, with the exception of the voters of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), who were close to the pole of traditional value orientation, the supporters of other political parties are located in the center of the map of value patterns, at an equal distance from all the value poles of the map (that is, they do not show any particular preference for any of them).

Unlike the poles of value patterns in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the axis of survival versus self-expression values represents the domi-

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53 See footnote 43
nant dimension of differentiation and accounts for the greatest part of the variance, in the map of value patterns in Macedonia and in Kosovo, this role is taken over by the dimension of *traditional versus secular-rational approach to authority* (accounting for the 38.6% of the variance). The indicators of a traditional value orientation have remained the same as those in the case of previous examples, with the exception that in Macedonia the indicators of survival values are closer to the indicators of traditional value orientation, which can indicate their mutual permeation. At the same time, in the space of value patterns in Macedonia, a very small number of indicators point to the presence of secular-rational value orientation and self-expression values, even though these orientations can clearly be identified in the maps.

This “dominance” of traditional value orientation in Macedonia can also be read from Map 40, onto which we projected the socio-demographic data of the respondents. Almost all the modalities of the socio-demographic indicators which we used are located on the pole of traditional value orientation and what is especially interesting is that on this pole we indiscriminately find

Map 40
Value patterns in Macedonia (with projected socio-demographic data)
both those with the highest income (I: > 500 EUR) and those with the lowest income (I: < 50 EUR); the oldest (65+ years) and the middle-aged (31-45 years); as well as farmers, skilled workers and lower-level experts.

Outside of this value hub what is left are, up to a point, the most educated (college+); members of expert and managerial groups (experts; CEOs); respondents with average income (I: 151-300 EUR) and the youngest respondents (18-30 years), who along this axis are somewhat closer than the others to the other pole of secular rational orientation towards authority.

However, the absence of any differentiation did not hold up once we projected onto the map of value patterns of Macedonia the party affiliations of the respondents. On Map 41 one can clearly see that the voters of the two main parties of the Albanian block in Macedonia (the DUI and DPA)\(^54\) are closest to

\(^{54}\) See footnote 34.
the pole of traditional values, while the voting base of the VMRO-DPMNE,\textsuperscript{55} even though close to the pole of traditional values, is somewhere around the middle of the map. On the other hand the voting base of the Social-Democratic Party of Macedonia (SDSM)\textsuperscript{56} are more prone to manifesting values of secular-rational orientation, taking, at the moment, the role of not only political, but also the value opposition in Macedonia.

And finally, in Kosovo, even though the dimensions of traditional versus secular-rational orientation towards authority and survival versus self-expression values can also be noted the differences in the value orientations are not clearly marked.\textsuperscript{57} Close to the indicators which point to belonging to traditional

\textbf{Map 42}

\begin{flushright}
Value patterns in Kosovo
\end{flushright}

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55 See footnote 34.
56 See footnote 34.
57 As in Macedonia, in Kosovo the cleavage between traditional and secular-rational values is the main one, accounting for 43.7\% of the variance.
religious communities (Religious traditional), one also finds indicators of the great importance which is assigned to freedom of speech (CG_Speach+). Also, right next to the indicators which point to the respondents’ highly positive attitude towards more respect being awarded to the authorities and government in the future (Authority++), one find indicators which point out that the respondents see an increase in people’s rights to speak out about important government decisions as one of the most important social goals in the future.

It is not possible to determine the sources of the overlap between the values from different value orientations, but we can also assume that it is in part at least a consequence of the contradictory narratives that the people from Kosovo have been exposed to over the past few years (especially from the world centers of power, and in terms of what the preferred values are).

When we projected socio-demographic variables as supplementary values, as in the case of Macedonia, almost all the indicators were located in the pole of traditional values.
A somewhat differentiated image can be gained after projecting the party affiliation of the respondents onto the map of value patterns in Kosovo (map 44). The respondents who vote for the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the New Kosovo Alliance (AKR) show a tendency towards values of self-expression, while what may come as something of a surprise is that the voting base of the Vetëvendosje (VV) in terms of values does not differ from the voters of The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) of Hashim Thaçi and The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) of Ramus Haradinaj.

58 See footnote 37.
59 See footnote 39.
60 See footnote 40.
61 See footnote 36.
62 See footnote 38.
What is interesting is that (as the analyses which show the clouds of modalities on maps 45 – 48 indicate)\textsuperscript{63} in all four societies, a great majority of the respondents are located in the quadrants which are determined by survival values and traditional value orientation.

\textbf{Map 45}
Value patterns in Serbia (clouds of individuals)

\textbf{Map 46}
Value patterns in Bosnia-Herzegovina (clouds of individuals)

\textsuperscript{63} The dots represents position of survey respondents in them.
Map 47
Value patterns in Macedonia (clouds of individuals)

Map 46
Value patterns in Kosovo (clouds of individuals)
Evaluations Of Socio-Economic Changes In Western Balkan Societies

At the end of this overview of the social structure and value patterns in the societies which we studied as part of the project “Resistance to Socio-Economic Changes in Western Balkan Societies”, we return to the introductory question of how the citizens in these four societies rate the socio-economic changes in the period of transition.

In the construction of these maps, we used the responses to the questions of how respondents would rate the direction and range of change in citizens’ everyday lives compared to the period of socialism; the processes of democratization in their societies; the re-establishment of the multi-party system, privatization of state possessions; and what is their attitude to the Euro-integration of their country as the active variables in the construction of maps. Onto these maps we projected, as supplementary variables, the socio-demographic data on the respondents, as well as their party affiliation, so that we could see how the members of different social groups evaluate transition changes.

In three of the four analyzed societies (see Maps 49 – 51) it is possible to identify three clearly defined clusters. In the first cluster there are indicators which point to support for the transition changes: where the situation in everyday life is rated as improved in relation to the period of socialism; where the process of democratization, the privatization of state/public ownership and the establishment of a multi-party system is rated positively; where the current existing social inequality in all societies is assessed as not such that the societies could be rated unjust; and their attitude that in the transition period from socialism towards capitalism the solidarity that had once existed in society had not disappeared. And in the end, in this cluster one also finds indicators of support for the European integration of these societies.

On the other hand, in cluster 3 (in all three societies) one finds grouped the indicators which point in a completely opposite direction: attitudes that everyday life in relation to the period of socialism has significantly deteriorated; that the processes of democratization, privatization of social assets and the multi-party system have ended in disappointment; that unjust inequalities have emerged and that they have endangered the sense of solidarity in the society; and thus that for these societies it is better for the not to join the European Union.

Between these indicators one can see (again within the three societies) a cluster of “reconciliatory” indicators (we have marked it no. 2 on the maps)
Map 49
Evaluation of socio-economic changes in Serbia

Map 50
Evaluation of socio-economic changes in Kosovo
Map 51

Evaluation of socio-economic changes in Macedonia

Map 52

Evaluation of socio-economic changes in Bosnia-Herzegovina
which express the point of view that in the transition period, everyday life has almost not changed at all in relation to the period of socialism; thus that every one of the transition processes (and their consequences) have both their advantages and disadvantages.

In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was also possible to easily note the “reconciliatory” cluster of balanced evaluations of the transition, while the clusters which express support for the transition changes and those manifest opposition to it were mixed together in unusual ways (Map 52).

When we projected respondents’ socio-demographic data onto the maps of the evaluation of social changes, as supplementary variables, we obtained some interesting findings, some of them expected, others unexpected.

In the case of Serbia (Map 53), transition changes received positive evaluations from the respondents with the highest income per household member (I: > 500 EUR); with a high education (College+); and who were at the mid-point of their lives (31-45 years). Among those opposing the transition, one finds older
respondents (65+ years; 46-65 years), unskilled, skilled workers and small business owners; but also respondents with a relatively good average income per household member (I:301-500 EUR) and CEOs. Those in the worst social position, farmers with an elementary education, with an average income per household member of less than 50 EUR (but also the youngest respondents) are located closest to the cluster which indicates that almost nothing has changed in the transition period.

When the political affiliations of the respondents were projected onto the maps, the evaluations of socio-economic changes in Serbia became much clearer (Map 54). Transition changes in Serbia and European integrations were positively evaluated by those who had fought for them during the 1990s – supporters of the Democratic Party (DS) and the Liberal-Democratic Party.

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65 It is difficult, without further analysis, to determine why this is the case, but it can be assumed that we are dealing with public institution managers who have really lost quite a lot of their power and prestige in the course of transition.
(LDP). On the other hand, these changes are opposed by the supporters of those who were in power in Serbia during the period of the civil wars in the 1990s – the voters of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). The revealed paradox of the social development in Serbia, especially its political scene, is that Serbian society in the process of transition and European integrations is currently being led by those whose original voting body is opposed to these changes.

In the case of Kosovo, the influence of socio-demographic indicators on the choices of supporting or opposing the transition changes in much more evident (Map 55). The changes brought by the transition are supported by the youngest respondents (18-30 years); the most educated (college+); those with

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66 They separated from the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) in 2008.

67 The voting body of the Democratic Party of Serbia, of an equally right-wing orientation as the Serbian Radical Party, but of much better material wealth and education, occupy the position between these two extremes.
the highest income per household member (I: > 200 EUR); and those who hold managerial and expert positions. The opponents are those with the lowest income per household member (I: < 50 EUR; I: 50-75 EUR); the oldest respondents (65+ years; 46-65 years); farmers, unskilled workers, skilled workers, small business owners and craftsmen (all of whom in the social space in Kosovo belong to the resource-poor social classes). At the same time, this division between the supporters and opponents of the transition is quite drastic, so that the any significant social forces cannot be found occupying the moderate position on the scale of evaluation of the transition change.

In the case of Kosovo, the transition changes were positively evaluated by the voters of the parties which are currently in power. At the beginning of 2013. (when we conducted the survey) these were the voters of the coalition of The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and New Kosovo Alliance (AKR). At the same time, the members of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and the Vetëvendosje (VV) movement had a pronounced negative attitude toward

Map 56
Evaluation of socio-economic changes in Kosovo
(with projected party affiliation of the respondents)
the transition changes. The voters of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)\(^{68}\) were somewhere between these two extremes (Map 56).

In Macedonia, as in the case in Serbia, most of the respondents are grouped in the center of the map (Map 57). Most of the supporters of the transition changes were young respondents (18-30 years; 31 – 45 years); those with a better education (college+), and with the highest income per household member (I: > 500 EUR; I: 301-500 EUR). The opponents were mostly elderly citizens (65+ years; 46-65 years); those with a low-level education (elementary) and low income per household member (I: < 50 EUR). And once again (as in the case of Serbia), among the opponents of the transition among one finds both farmers, unskilled workers, skilled workers, but also CEOs.

However, as in the case of Kosovo, it was only after we projected the party affiliations of the respondents that the division between those who support

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\(^{68}\) It would be interesting to test whether the attitude of the voters of the LDK changed, since at the end of 2014 the party (along with Hashim Thaçi’s PDK) formed the government led by their president Isa Mustafa.
transition changes and those who oppose them became clear (Map 58). The transition was positively evaluated by the voters of the ruling parties in Macedonia – VMRO-DPMNE and their coalition partners of the Albanian political parties (DUI - Democratic Union for Integration). The voters of the second largest Albanian party in Macedonia, the DPA (Democratic Party of Albanians) were restrained in their evaluations, while the staunch opponents of the transition taking place in Macedonia were the voters of the Social-democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), who based on all their values, should, in fact, have been in support of it.

Finally, the projection of socio-demographic data on the respondents in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not significantly clarify the existence of contradictory evaluations of the process of transition (Map 59). If we expected to find the elderly respondents among the opponents of the transition, along with the
respondents with the lowest level of education and lowest income per household member, it is still unclear why among the supporters of this process one finds a mix of CEOs and experts, small business owners and farmers.

It would seem that again it was only the projection of political affiliation that could help us explain the puzzling relations towards the transition processes, just in this case the “organization” of the evaluations is even more interesting. Bearing in mind that based on what can be seen in Map 60, the voters...
of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) have the most positive attitude towards the transition; that the voters of the Democratic Action Party (SDA) and Social-Democratic party of Bosnia-Herzegovina (SDP) have a moderate attitude towards the success of the transition; and the voters of the Coalition of Independent Social-Democrats (SNSD) have a negative attitude towards the transition process, as does the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), it would seem that the relation toward the transition in Bosnia-Herzegovina could best be understood through the sense of belonging to the constitutive nations of this society – that the Croats in Bosnia see themselves as the winners in the transition; that the Serbs in Bosnia see themselves as the transition losers, and that the Bosniaks have a moderate attitude toward the transition processes.
These possible influences of national belonging on the evaluation of transitional socio-economic changes, in addition to the influence of the position in the social structure, value patterns, party membership, immediate daily interests, indicate the almost unbelievable complexity of the transition processes in the societies of the Western Balkans.

Conclusion

Our study was designed in a way that made it possible to combine quantitative and qualitative methods, materialistic and culturalist approaches in explaining and understanding social change. Its multidimensionality is our hope to capture the complexity of socio-economic changes in the transitional period in Western Balkan societies. As such, it represents the direct opposite to one-dimensional accounts often found in the “transitological” literature, which - quite similarly to the former communist paradigm - “blames” reality, not the theoretical model for exceptions, discords, misses, and resistance.

It seems that even our first analyses, as noted in this paper, have produced interesting results. They indicate that most of the inhabitants of the four societies we have studied are dissatisfied with transitional changes and point out the causes of such dissatisfaction. An analysis of social space and value patterns within them has shown that transition in the Western Balkans has created societies characterized by the utmost inequality and a return to traditional and survival values. And yet, that there are clear differences between them.

In Serbia, despite extreme social inequalities, we encountered a markedly differentiated society (with many groups which differ according to their existential conditions) and with sharply delineated class fractions within the resource-rich existential classes. On the one hand, one finds a group which relies primarily on cultural capital, which, in everyday struggles in the fields, relies on the mechanisms of social closure based on educational credentials and market mechanisms, which generates the most income and has almost no significant possessions (apartments, cars, or land). This fraction sees the transitional changes as an opportunity to decrease the extensive influence which political parties still have in Serbia and to obtain even more significance for the social mechanisms which it primarily uses. It views the European integration of Serbia and its opening up towards the world as an opportunity to valorize its primary resource (cultural capital) on the wider open market. On the other hand, the other fraction of the resource-rich existential classes,
which primarily relies on political capital and political social capital, perceives the transition as a threat which can endanger its mechanisms of acquiring resources and its position in society.

As far as the other social groups in Serbia are concerned, farmers and unskilled workers find themselves in dire circumstances, and lack of resources to change their position. Despite the constant decrease in the standard of living and the quality of life, most other groups in Serbia (the clerks and lower management, lower-level experts, small entrepreneurs, and craftsmen and skilled workers) are in a better position than their peers in the remaining three societies.

In a political sense, in the social space of Serbia it is possible to clearly note a division between those who opposed the regime during the 1990s, the supporters of the Democratic Party (DS), Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), who are now better off, and the main supporters of that regime, the voters of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and its “offspring”, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNP), which grew out of the ranks of the groups with limited resources, who were even more endangered by the transition.

In a value sense, what emerges in Serbian society as the basic political division is that between the representatives of the secular-rational orientation towards authority – the supporters of the Democratic Party (DS), Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) – and the “defenders” of traditional values who in 2013 (when this survey was carried out) made up the voting base of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS).

The analysis of social space in Macedonia has indicated the existence, in terms of resources, of a completely unified resource-rich class, without any fractions within it. Within this group, as the analyses of the value patterns have indicated, there is significant differentiation in terms of values and, thus, in terms of political orientation, but this group relies on the very same resources and probably uses similar social mechanisms. Unlike in Serbia, only groups employed primarily within the public sector (clerks, lower management and lower-level experts) have a somewhat better social position, while farmers and unskilled workers, as well as small entrepreneurs and skilled workers can be found in the part of the social space characterized by significant deficiency in terms of resources. In a political sense, the supporters of the political parties are clearly separated in social space according to the
current party coalitions – on the one hand, closer to pole of global cultural capital, one finds the supporters of the oppositional SDSM and DPA while, on the other, positioned at the pole of political capital and social capital, are the voters of the ruling VMRO-DPMNE and DUI. In the part of the social space “inhabited” by resource-poor classes, there were almost no responses to the question of who they would vote for if elections were to be held the day following the survey, indicating a high degree of political apathy among them. This represents a true paradox in a society in which more than 20% of the population belongs to political parties, indicating the primarily instrumental character of political party membership.

In a value sense, the basic cleavage in Macedonia is to be found between the representatives of traditional values and those who promote the values of self-expression, which is also the basic political division. Voters of the two main parties of the Albanian block in Macedonia (the DUI and DPA) are strong supporters of traditional values. The voting base of the VMRO-DPMNE, in terms of the type of value pattern (even though not of the values themselves), is quite close to them, while the voters of the Social-Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) stand in what may be termed a value, rather than solely political, opposition.

The results of the analysis indicate the existence of even more drastic social divisions and inequalities in the societies of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. In both cases, there is a relatively narrow social elite which has at its disposal all the resources, while the remainder of society has almost no resources whatsoever. In Kosovo, the farmers are in the most dire position and are almost in complete social isolation in relation to the other social groups. Among resource-poor classes one also finds unskilled and skilled workers, as well as small entrepreneurs and craftsmen, while even the position of clerks and lower-level experts is worse than in the examples we have illustrated so far. They mostly have cultural capital at their disposal, but their income and assets, as well as social resources, are quite limited. In Kosovo, the supporters of all political parties are grouped in a very narrow segment of social space, one next to the other, indicating the political activity of very small groups of people, which basically do not differ in terms of the resources they rely on.

Their differences are also not great in a value sense. The respondents who vote for the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the New Kosovo Alliance

69 In addition to that, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia are societies strongly divided along ethnic lines, which multiplies the potential for crises in them.
(AKR) show a tendency towards values of self-expression, while what may come as something of a surprise is that the voting base of the Vetëvendosje (VV) in terms of values does not differ from the voters of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) of Hashim Thaçi and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) of Ramus Haradinaj.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the position of the farmers is somewhat better than in Kosovo, and they are to be found grouped together with other occupations which belong to the resource-poor classes (unskilled and skilled workers, small entrepreneurs and craftsmen). But at the same time, the class which has all the available resources at its disposal (economic, social, and cultural) is even more markedly set apart from the rest of society, while the clerks and lower-level experts rely even more only on cultural capital. In Bosnia the voters are grouped around the center of the map of social space, indicating the essential apolitical nature of the highest and lowest ranks of society.

In terms of value patterns, our analyses have shown that the basic value division in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina is the one among survival values and self-expression values, while the key value cleavage in Macedonia and in Kosovo is that between a traditional value orientation and secular-rational orientation. We have also shown that in all four societies, the majority of participants are grouped in a value space delimited by a traditional value orientation and survival values. This indirectly also indicates the character of the transition in this part of Europe.

Contrary to what we expected, the influences of structural factors (ownership of capital or the acquisition of value patterns) proved not to have much direct influence on the evaluation of the success of transitional changes. It turned out that the situational variables have the most significant impact on the evaluation of transition processes and the process of European integrations.

In Macedonia, Serbia and in Kosovo, we identified three clusters of respondent attitudes: one in which support for the transition changes is expressed, another which reveals strong opposition to these changes, and a third which shows an “acquiescing” attitude towards the transition – that it had not significantly altered the situation in society and had brought with it both positive and negative effects.

However, in the evaluation of the transition by various socio-demographic groups, minimal differences emerged. Analyses have shown that the influence of the level of acquisition of certain value patterns is somewhat more significant, but that it was headed in a direction that was wholly unexpected.
Namely, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Macedonia, the transition is perceived primarily as a process of re-traditionalization (in comparison with the socialist period) and is positively valued by those who hold religious/traditional/authoritarian world-views. On the other hand, those who in these societies hold secular, non-authoritarian and self-expressive values are highly critical of these processes. In Serbia, transition is perceived the other way around – as the secularization and modernization of society, after a period of re-traditionalization, religious revival, and an authoritarian climate. Therefore, it is negatively valued by those who have a religious and traditional outlook, while it is supported by the representatives of a secular, this-worldly worldview.

Among the situational factors, the political orientation of the respondents proved to be most influential. The clusters that we have identified in these evaluations can be understood more easily when they are considered in the context of current party divisions between the supporters of the ruling and opposition parties. With the exception of Serbia (where socio-economic changes were positively evaluated by those who fought for them in the 1990s), in all other societies the political supporters of the current governing parties offered a positive evaluation both of socio-economic changes and of the process of European integration, whereas the supporters of the opposition parties were critical of them. Whether what we are dealing with here is a case of the respondents/citizens simply ideologically evaluating reality, in accordance with how a political party was guiding them, cannot be determined with any precision based on this general overview. Bearing in mind that in the societies of the Western Balkans the key social struggles are being waged for control over state resources, it might be the case that when the “respondents’” party is in power, this actually has positive consequences for them (hiring, promotions, obtaining permits and jobs, etc.), which leads to a positive evaluation of social and political processes at that time. Still, it remains an extremely intriguing area for further research.

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Civic and Political Activism in Western Balkan Societies

The transformation of the political systems in the Western Balkans created possibilities for change in the political behaviour and attitudes of the citizens in these countries. The democratic system opened up space and opportunities for greater citizens’ activism, but also presupposed a democratic political culture of citizens who would act as users and beneficiaries of the newly acquired democratic tools.

However, these changes did not occur as expected. The practice is still, by and large, determined by elements of parochial and patriarchal political culture. Furthermore, the economic and political transition has weakened the institutions and citizens find themselves in relatively uncertain conditions. This proves to be a fertile ground for a patronage system where scarce resources are managed by political parties in exchange for loyalty.

The citizens of the Western Balkans and, in particular, citizens of the Yugoslav federation successor states shared a similar political past up until the 1990s. In Yugoslavia, all federal units had the same political structure run by the Communist party, a centrally-planned economy and educational system. At the same time, despite systemic efforts to suppress them, ethno-national identities and religions, as key cultural determinants of the people living in these republics, “resurrected”, as the 1991 transition of the Yugoslav republics was more of a struggle for national independence and national level rights than a rebellion for more political and civil rights for the citizens.

The former Yugoslav republics also faced various obstacles and challenges in the past two decades. War, late independence, autocratic leaders, challenged international recognition, impeded integration have all affected the countries of the Western Balkans and hampered their political, economic and social development. None of them have been able to develop into effective, consolidated democracies.
This paper looks at two structural aspects of the democratization processes of Western Balkan societies, their adopting of a participative culture and achieving legitimacy for the “newly” established system. We consider both from the perspective of the citizens, how they practice participation and how they evaluate social change. If any political system is to take root in a given country, its rules, standards and practices need to be accepted and apprehended by the people. On the other hand, the system needs to establish itself as better than the previous one, as effective, efficient and to earn the trust of the people. In other words, the system needs to legitimize itself to the people.

The Change in the Change
According to theory, the level and types of citizens’ participation and influence in decision-making formally and substantially differs in a socialist compared to a democratic political system. The two political systems presuppose different types of political culture, political attitudes and behaviour of the citizens to complement the functioning of the system. In socialism, the prevalence of subjective political culture ensures that people will have awareness about the government, the political institutions and the political actors and they will accept their decisions without much possibility for dissent. On the other hand, in democracy, channels for citizen participation in decision making and possibilities to influence decision making are established and this setting requires that citizens apprehend a participant political culture, which means that they will be orientated and active in sharing ideas with and demands to the government (Almond and Verba, 1989).

Transformation from subjective to participant political culture is a process of social change which leads to social progress and human development. Advanced interpretations of modernization theory propose that social change, understood as social progress, should be measured through the capability of human beings to have ultimate power in deciding how they live their lives and for this a participant political culture is needed. Conceptualized as such, human development (Anand and Sen, 2000) is an end effect of interdependent and simultaneously ongoing socio-economic development, cultural change and democratization (Welzel, Inglehart and Klingeman, 2001). Welzel et al. (2001) explain this through a two level model of linkages, the means-motives linkage, which states that the amount of individual resources has a direct effect on the type of values a person holds. People from resource-poor countries
focus more on satisfying their basic needs, unlike those from rich societies (survival vs. self-expression values). If people lack sufficient resources to secure their existence, they will not be able to change their values from survival to self-expression orientation. The second type of linkage, motives-rules linkage, forms the relation between values and institutional effectiveness, meaning that stronger self-expression values stimulate demand for civil and political rights and more accountable institutions.

The revised theory of modernization proposed by Inglehart and Baker (2000) found that parallel to the evident and massive progress from survival towards self-expression values that comes as a result of economic development, cultural traditions and norms remain a strong imprint of a given country. This variance is most evident in cross-cultural differences among Orthodox, Catholic and Islamic societies. In the 1990s, the societies in the Western Balkans began a process of introducing and granting extensive political and civil rights which was rounded down after a decade of turmoil. At the same time the weakened economic conditions and the raised sentiments of nationalism were present and intensified in parallel to the process of developing participant political culture.

Though modernization theory does not link the development of self-expression values to legitimization of the democratic political system, other scholars have argued that social capital, understood as civic social capital and civic activism (Putnam, 1993, 2000), is correlated and has positive influence on institutional performance. Thus, if the people should have a participatory approach to decision-making, it is necessary that the system gains the trust of the people, they positively evaluate its performance, they consider it as better than the previous one, as a system which provides better conditions for the society in general. This kind of evaluation would legitimate the system to the people. Legitimacy understood as “the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate and the proper ones for society” is an affective and evaluative aspect of the system (Lipset, 87, 1959). Even if people demonstrate some type of dissatisfaction with the performance of the government, they should have awareness and feeling that they can address other institutions in the system, and this way they would be able to channel their intentions or complaints. This way a ‘reservoir’ of legitimacy is created and ‘passage of time’ is a key factor that contributes to stabilisation and legitimization of democracy (Moises, 1993).
Whether the democratic political system has managed to legitimize itself to the people and how participative the peoples in the Western Balkans have become living in unconducive circumstances are questions this paper explores. They are researched through investigating the civic and political behaviour of the people, as well as their attitude and comparative evaluation of the society before and after the transition. Have they democratized, have they acquired democratic values? How have the political behavior and attitudes of the people varied depending on the country? Which of the peoples in the Western Balkans have most turned to civic activities and which have been most politically engaged? What social group belonging best describes the democratic score of the country?

Methodological approach
This paper presents a Small-N research of the Western Balkans, specifically Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia. Before beginning the analysis, the paper gives a short overview of the specificities that differentiate the case-studies. The issues of interest were approached through public opinion field surveys conducted on representative samples (N = 800 in Macedonia and Kosovo, to 1256 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1259 in Serbia) in the four indicated countries in February through March 2013. The surveys were conducted based on uniformed questionnaires in order to be able to investigate the same attitudes and practices and to be able to gain comparable data. This is followed by data analysis based on multiple types of correlations dependent on variable types. These include Pearson’s r, Spearman’s rho, Phi and Cramer’s V. The significance of difference between means has been compared using ANOVA and is mostly used to explore the difference between results by country.

Variety in the Case Studies
Despite the necessity to study and analyze the Balkans as a whole, it is necessary to emphasize the different ethnic, religious and systemic features. These features, along with the diverging historical paths after 1990, inevitably affect the situation in any of these countries.
The violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia has brought about ethnic conflicts in all four societies. Bosnia experienced a conflict between representatives of all of its three major ethnic groups in the first half of the 1990s. The conflict between parts of the ethnic Albanian population and Serbian authorities in Kosovo has been going on since the 1980s in various degrees of intensity. This ended with the NATO intervention in Serbia (mainly Kosovo) in 1999. People in Macedonia were the last to experience an ethnic conflict, during 2001, between ethnic Albanian fighters and the Macedonian authorities.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only of the four researched countries which is federally organized. The cantonal design after the 1995 Dayton peace agreement, has created many levels of government and a fairly complicated decision making process which is often criticised.

Kosovo is the most recent independent state compared to the other four countries. After the conflict in the late nineties, and the NATO intervention of 1999, the territory of what is now Kosovo was administered under the supervision of the UN. The authorities in Kosovo eventually declared independence from Serbia in 2008. Parts of Northern Kosovo, where most of the ethnic Serbian minorities live do not recognize the new state.

The ethnic landscapes of the four countries divide them into two groups. Bosnia and Herzegovina has three significantly large populations, that of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. Macedonia has a large minority of ethnic Albanians and a majority of ethnic Macedonians. While ethnic identity is a fairly important issue in all four societies, ethnicity is deeply embedded in the political system and the decision making procedures of these two countries. This is a result of the processes which developed from the two peace agreements ending the ethnic conflicts in these countries: the Dayton agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Ohrid framework agreement (2001) in Macedonia. The other group consists of Kosovo and Serbia where ethnic minorities do not constitute a significant part of the total population.

The Ottoman legacy in all four countries has left a heterogeneous landscape of religious communities which is somewhat parallel to ethnic divisions. The majority of the religious population in Serbia and Macedonia are Orthodox Christian (mainly ethnic Serbs and Macedonians). About a third of the population in Macedonia are Muslim (mainly ethnic Albanians), which is also the case with the majority of the religious population in Kosovo. As with the significantly large ethnic groups in Bosnia, the same can be said about its
religious communities of Roman Catholics (ethnic Croats), Muslims (ethnic Bosniaks) and Orthodox Christians (ethnic Serbs).

None of these countries has been able to successfully undergo the privatisation process and to recover economically, with unemployment rates ranging from 20% to 45%. None of these Western Balkan countries has managed to consolidate a democratic system and effective rule of law. The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index in four consecutive assessments from 2006 to 2012 labels Macedonia and Serbia as flawed democracies and ranks BiH even lower as a hybrid regime. One of their key weaknesses is Functioning of government, where all three countries rank at the level of a hybrid regime (EIU). Though the EIU does not provide rankings for Kosovo, similar weaknesses of Kosovar democracy are widely evident.

Civic activism
In order to examine the distribution of civic activism, three types of activities were investigated: signing a petition, joining a boycott and participating in peaceful demonstrations. On average signing a petition has been the most practiced civic activity. People in Kosovo (31.5%) and Serbia (29.2%) have been more involved in signing a petition than people in BiH (20.9%) and Macedonia (22.9%). The lower percentage in doing so in Bosnia is somewhat compensated for by the readiness of its citizens to potentially undertake such action in future (28.6%). Both in Kosovo and in Serbia men, the more educated and those with more professional occupations are more likely to have signed a petition. In Kosovo, the younger can be added to this group, while the uneducated declare that they would not sign a petition.
Table 1. Participation in civic activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have you undertaken, would you undertake or would you not undertake each of the following?</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H)</th>
<th>Kosovo (KS)</th>
<th>Macedonia (MK)</th>
<th>Serbia (RS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) To sign a petition-done</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20,9</td>
<td>31,5</td>
<td>22,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Could</td>
<td>53,9</td>
<td>45,6</td>
<td>28,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never would</td>
<td>18,6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) To join a boycott</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6,1</td>
<td>12,8</td>
<td>15,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Could</td>
<td>43,6</td>
<td>57,1</td>
<td>39,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never would</td>
<td>40,7</td>
<td>25,1</td>
<td>34,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) To take part in a peaceful demonstration</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25,5</td>
<td>21,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Could</td>
<td>49,1</td>
<td>46,5</td>
<td>41,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never would</td>
<td>34,6</td>
<td>24,3</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Joining a boycott is least practiced by the countries compared. It was most practiced in Macedonia (15.6%), slightly less in Kosovo (12.8%) and Serbia (12.5%), and least in Bosnia (6.1%). Bosnians are also least willing to join a boycott, as 40.7% would not engage in one. Those who have done that are more likely to be men and more educated, while the uneducated and those aged 51-64 would not do it. In terms of likelihood to have joined a boycott in Macedonia the probability is similar among men, more educated, the more professional and those who are party members.

**Score of Potential for Civic Activism**

The presence and development of participant political culture was analyzed by developing concepts for civic activism - readiness of the citizens to undertake a certain civic activity or experience in doing that, and civic activism in the 1990s compared to the 2000s. As looking at certain specific civic activities might not be a sufficient indicator of civic activism, scores were also developed in order to cumulatively measure different types of activities and attitudes. We aggregated the data of citizens’ involvement in signing a petition, joining a boycott, participation in peaceful demonstration or occupying a factory or office building and created a total score of potential for civic activism. Though some
of these activities might have a political motivation or context, they can still be differentiated from activities that stem from a more distinctive political action. The mean score entails both actual practice of the specific civic activity and intent for such civic activity, however within the score actual practice is valued more than intent. For every activity in which the respondent has engaged, a score of 2 is assigned. The same goes if the respondent reported intent to engage, where a score of 1 is assigned. If the respondent declared unwillingness to participate in any of the activities, a score of 0 is assigned. The scores for each of the activities are then added towards a total score of potential for civic activism. The results reveal that the population in all four countries demonstrates similar potential for civic activism ranging from 2.36 in Macedonia, as the lowest level, and 2.97 in Kosovo as the highest level.

Table 2. Score of potential for civic activism (minimum = 0, maximum = 8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>B-H</th>
<th>KS</th>
<th>MK</th>
<th>RS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean score</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results were further analysed in order to explore the significance of differences between the mean scores of each country. The ANOVA analysis confirmed the significance of differences between Serbia and Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 43.5% of the respondents have a score above the average, which is similar to the results in Macedonia, where 43.1% of the respondents have a score above the average. In Serbia and Kosovo, the numbers of those who are above the average are higher, in Serbia almost half of the respondents (48%), while in Kosovo this is the case with 52% of the respondents, which is the highest percentage.

Results reveal that in all four countries, women are more likely to have scores below average than men. This outlines a gendered attitude towards civic practice, where men seem to be more likely to engage in civic activities. However, the strength of association between gender and potential for civic activism is mild. It is strongest in Kosovo (Phi 0.2), Macedonia (Phi 0.16) and 0.13 (Phi) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Serbia, this association is below 0.1.

The relation between education and the potential for civic activism is positively correlated and significant at the 0.05 level in all four countries and this correlation is strongest in Kosovo, where more of those with university and secondary education are involved in civic activities compared with those
with the same education in the other countries. Compared at the level of those with university education, the least potential for civic activities is detected among the university educated in BiH, as 48.8% (SC 0.137) of this category in Bosnia is above average, which demonstrates potential for civic activism, while the same is the case with somewhat more of the same category in Macedonia (54.7%, SC 0.198) and in Serbia (57.3% (SC 0.127). Kosovo university graduates have the highest potential for civic activism at 77.5% (SC 0.347).

The data also reveals that political party membership increases the chances that someone would engage or has engaged in a civic activity. The relation is most visible in Kosovo where 68.9% of those who are party members demonstrate potential for civic activism, followed by Serbia where that percentage is 61.4%. In Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina this relation is somewhat lower and similar, at 52.2% and 52.7%, respectively.

When ethnic groups are taken into consideration, the model suggests that potential for civic activism is largely dependent on the country context, as the same ethnic groups score differently in different countries. The analysis shows that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the majority of ethnic Croats (58.3%) have scored above the average, this is the case with somewhat less than half of the ethnic Bosnians (47.2%) and around a third of the respondents who were ethnic Serbs. In Serbia, this is the case with 48% of the ethnic Serbs. On the other hand, almost two thirds (63.4%) of the ethnic Serbs in Kosovo scored above average, as did almost half of the ethnic Albanians (49%). In Macedonia, however, 69.6% of the ethnic Albanians scored above average, which is the case with 36.6% of the ethnic Macedonians.

**Practice of Activism**

We extended the analysis in order to explore not only the potential for activism, but the actual practice in two different decades – the 1990s and 2000s. Looking at how practice of civic and political activities differs starting from the 1990s to the 2000s, we investigated several questions which follow this change. For this purpose, two types of scores were created, a score of practice of civic activism and a score of practice of political activism. The practice of civic activism score is a more complex composite which aggregates responses which report participation in peaceful protests, participation in strikes, volunteering for an NGO and practicing ethical shopping. Here the mean score entails only actual practice of the civic activity, however within the score the frequency
of engaging in the activity is valued differently. If the respondent engaged in such activity regularly that is allocated two points, if the respondnet has engaged occasionally then one point is allocated, and if the respondent has never engaged in such activity, it is measured as zero. To analyze the **practice of political activism** we computed data from two questions, *voting in elections and volunteering for a political party or a candidate*. As in the score for practice of civic activism, the higher the frequency of practice, the more points are allocated.

Table 3. Mean score of civic activism (minimum = 0, maximum = 8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>B-H</th>
<th>KS</th>
<th>MK</th>
<th>RS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Mean score of political activism (minimum = 0, maximum = 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>B-H</th>
<th>KS</th>
<th>MK</th>
<th>RS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Correlations between scores of potential and practice of civic activism by decades

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations between scores of potential for civic activism and practice</th>
<th>B-H</th>
<th>KS</th>
<th>MK</th>
<th>RS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Correlations between scores of potential and practice of political activism by decades

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations between scores of potential for civic activism and practice</th>
<th>B-H</th>
<th>KS</th>
<th>MK</th>
<th>RS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results reveal that the score of potential for civic activism correlates with the practice of civic activism in both decades of interest. However, there seems to be a lack of, or weak association between, the potential for civic activism and the practice of political activism. This may be explained by the sentiment felt throughout the region about a clear division between the political and the civic spheres.

**Political activism**

The relatively strong correlation between activism in the 1990s and 2000s suggests there are no significant shifts in the practice between these two decades. The scores of the respondents about the activism in the 1990s correspond with their scores in the 2000s. This means that it is very likely that those who had been active in the 1990s remained active in the next decade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations between 1990s and 2000s (Spearman's rho)</th>
<th>B-H</th>
<th>KS</th>
<th>MK</th>
<th>RS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political activism</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic activism</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most politically active citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s were the ethnic Serbs. The results show that 61.8% of them have scores of political activism above the average, and this is the case with 53.2% of the ethnic Bosnians and 56.4% of the ethnic Croats. In Macedonia, 26.7% of the ethnic Albanian respondents have scores above the average and 56.8% of the ethnic Macedonians.

The income distribution has been divided into five equal quintile groups going from the 1st, as the lowest income group, to the 5th, as the highest. In Bosnia the relationship between higher income and above average potential for civic activism is almost linear with the exception of the third quintile group which is less civically active than the second quintile group. In Kosovo, the majority of those who belong to the second, third and fifth quintile group demonstrate above average potential for civic activism. The relationship between income and above average civic activism is most straightforwardly positively correlated in Macedonia, where 60.7% of those from the fifth
quintile have above average potential for civic activism, while the same is the case with only 30.3% of those who belong to the first quintile. In Serbia there is no difference between the level of income and the potential for civic activism, with the exception of the first quintile, 64% of which demonstrate below average potential for civic activism.

The score of political activism in the 2000s is still the highest in Macedonia. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia have similar mean scores and the mean score for Kosovo is almost three times higher than in the 1990s; it is, however, still significantly different from those of all the other countries.

Analysis of the data reveals gender differences in the scores of political activism in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The correlation is higher in Kosovo. However, in both cases the level of association is relatively low.

The results suggest an increase in political activity of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. While 35.6% of them had scores above the average for activity in the 1990s, this rises in the 2000s as 57.2% of the respondents score above average. The level of political activity amongst the ethnic Serbs in Kosovo decreases, from a situation where a quarter of the respondents were above the country average towards 19.5% in the 2000s. The level of political activity rises in Macedonia as well, for both ethnic Albanians and Macedonians. In the 2000s, 39.8% of the ethnic Albanian and 77.8% of the ethnic Macedonian respondents score above the average.

### Civic activism

The results demonstrated that civic activism was undeveloped and very weak in the 1990s among peoples of all four countries. The ANOVA analysis found that in this regard, there are significant differences only between Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Similar to previous findings, women seem to have been less civically active in the 1990s than men in all four countries.

Moving from the 1990s to the 2000s, civism activism rose in all four countries. In Macedonia it almost doubled and Macedonia has the highest civic score compared to the other countries. The second highest rise is evidenced in Kosovo, while similarities are visible between the volume of civic activism in BiH and Serbia.

Civic activism in the 2000s somewhat positively correlates with age. In Kosovo, excluding the respondents above 65, an increase in the score follows
an increase in age. In Macedonia, 48% of those between the ages of 31 and 40 have a score above the country average. The least active are the youngest and oldest age groups. In Serbia, the activity sharply increases towards the age of 50 and then, within the two older age groups, a decline is noted.

In all four countries, there is a positive correlation between the levels of education and the political activism scores. This is most clearly expressed in Bosnia (0.26 SC) and Kosovo (0.21 SC), while it is somewhat less intense in Macedonia and Serbia (0.16 SC both). The same goes for party membership, which is positively correlated with civic activism in all four countries, although the association is weak.

Ethnicity is associated with level of civic activism in Bosnia and Macedonia, while this is not the case in Kosovo and Serbia. Almost a quarter of the ethnic Serbs in Bosnia have a score above the average, while this is the case with 34% of ethnic Bosnians and 42.3% of ethnic Croats.

The levels of civic activism are associated with income only in Bosnia. In this country, the level of civic activism rises with the increase of income. In this sense, 43.6% of the first quintile have scores above the average, compared to 63.8% in the fifth quintile.

**Party Membership**

Another aspect of political engagement was political party membership. The research revealed a varying degree of party membership in all four countries. The lowest engagement is seen in Kosovo, while the highest is recorded in Macedonia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members of political parties</th>
<th>BiH</th>
<th>KS</th>
<th>MK</th>
<th>SR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of total adult population</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This puts the degree of participation in political parties relatively high compared to the Eastern European average of 3.0% (Van Biezen, 2012). From the other countries of former Yugoslavia, Slovenia has just above 6% (Van Biezen, 2012) of the adult population involved in political parties which is comparable only to Kosovo, which records the lowest distribution of party members.
Furthermore, it is observed that post-communist states experience a decline in party membership and are below the EU average (Van Biezen, 2012).

This relatively high involvement in political parties might signal that these organisations are seen as replacements for civic activism - as we have demonstrated a relatively low scores in the previous section. However, this necessitates that political parties show a relatively high participatory democracy within its internal structure to be able to channel such civic needs. Assessments of internal party democracy in the Western Balkan countries reveal this is not the case (Karasimeonov, 2005).

The relatively high level of political party membership, especially in Macedonia, suggests an increased degree of patronage relations. These relations appear in situations where (mostly economic) uncertainty exists and parties appear as brokers for social services in exchange for political loyalty (Gjuzelov, 2013).

In a study on political culture in Macedonia, 84.9% of the respondents agreed that it is more important who you know than what you know (Markovic, 2012). This shows the predominance of a clientelistic over a merit system. The larger amounts of resources available to the State put the parties in the position where they can allocate jobs and other material benefits to their clients (Hopkin, 2006).

A recent survey in Macedonia reveals that people expect that political parties, or the State be significantly involved in providing jobs (IDSCS, 2014). More than a third of the respondents agree that it is a duty of the political parties to employ their members. A large majority of the respondents (74.9%) agreed that the state is responsible of securing jobs.

Seeing that unemployment rate is relatively high in all four countries, or that in general these countries are in need in economic development, it is not hard to see how political parties are seen as a solution to individual social gaps. Party members get preferential treatment.

**Evaluation of Changes**

The ability of the new political systems to legitimize themselves to the citizens was analyzed through several types of evaluations of the changes. In three of the researched countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia there is an overall consent that ordinary people have lost in comparison to how their life was in socialism. However, there are significant differences in the level (the mean of assessments) they evaluate the present compared to
socialism in every of the four countries. Only in Kosovo the average assessment of how life of ordinary people has changed in comparison to socialism is positive at 1.35. The most negative assessment is in Bosnia at -3.15, followed by Serbia at -1.33 and then Macedonia at -0.74.

The gender aspect is significant only in Kosovo and Macedonia. However, the gender position is reversed: while in Kosovo women have a more positive assessment (1.57 compared to 1.10 among men) in Macedonia men have a more positive assessment (-46 compared to -1.05), though overall it is still a negative view. Age is also a significant factor. The longer people had lived in socialism, the more disappointed they are with how life is today or, considered from a different standpoint, the younger give a more positive assessment of life today. This association is most linear in BiH, Kosovo and Macedonia, and with some erratic trend lines in Serbia, where those over 65 (-1.96) have slightly less negative assessment than those 51 to 64 (-2.14). The line of the assessment is the same but in the opposite direction in Kosovo.

Education is also a significant factor. In BiH, Macedonia and Serbia the influence of education is in the same direction, the more educated people are the less negative in their assessment of life today compared to the life ordinary people had in socialism. In Kosovo, those with incomplete elementary education and higher education give a more positive assessment of quality of life today compared to those with elementary and high school education.

Income per household is also significant in Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia. With some slight deviations in Macedonia and in Serbia people coming from more well off families give less negative assessment of life today compared to socialism. In Kosovo, the relation is not linear: those who belong to the first quintile give a more positive assessment than those in the second and the third. Still, those who belong to the fourth and fifth quintile comparatively give the most positive assessments.

Table 9. Satisfaction with Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are you satisfied with democracy in your country?</th>
<th>B-H</th>
<th>KS</th>
<th>MKD</th>
<th>SRB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied/satisfied</td>
<td>13,5</td>
<td>37,6</td>
<td>32,6</td>
<td>13,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfied/Very unsatisfied</td>
<td>81,1</td>
<td>60,4</td>
<td>63,5</td>
<td>82,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>2,6</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
People in Bosnia and Herzegovina (81.1%) and Serbia (82.6%) are least satisfied with the level of democracy in their country, while this is less the case in Macedonia and Kosovo. Still, the majority in Macedonia (63.5%) and Kosovo (60.4%) is also unsatisfied with how democracy has turned out. Comparatively, people in Kosovo demonstrate the highest level of satisfaction (37.6%). This is associated with ethnicity and minority vs majority status in three of the countries, with the exception of Serbia. In Kosovo ethnic Albanians and other ethnic groups express satisfaction, while Serbs are not satisfied at all. More educated are somewhat less satisfied with the development of democracy, and non-party members are more satisfied with democracy than party members. In Macedonia, ethnic Albanians more than the ethnic Macedonians and members of political parties are more satisfied with democracy. In BiH youth are somewhat more inclined to be satisfied with democracy and Bosnians are more satisfied than Serbs and Croats, while in Serbia there is no particular pattern among those who are satisfied or unsatisfied with democracy.

Income is not associated with evaluations on this issue in BiH and Macedonia. The results show that dissatisfaction is relatively equally distributed in various income groups. However, this is not the case with Kosovo and Serbia, where there is evidence of association: wealthier respondents are more satisfied with the development of democracy.

Satisfaction with democracy is also explored in terms of degree of agreement with the notion that the multi-party system has improved political life in the country.

Table 10. Views on the effects of the multi-party system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multi-party system improved political life</th>
<th>B-H</th>
<th>KS</th>
<th>MK</th>
<th>RS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are differences between the results in all four countries. Agreement with this attitude is highest in Macedonia and lowest in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The volume of disagreement is similarly distributed in Bosnia and Kosovo, where half of the people disagreed with the statement. In Macedonia and Serbia, about a third of the population would disagree that the multi-party
system improved political life. The difference is that in Macedonia, more people would agree than disagree, which is not the case in Serbia.

This correlates with the evaluation of privatisation, as one of the main processes of transition. The respondents were provided with a statement claiming that if privatisation had not occurred, the country would be in a worse state of economy.

Table 11. Correlation between evaluations of the multi-party system and the effects of privatisation in the countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>B-H</th>
<th>KS</th>
<th>MK</th>
<th>RS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>evaluations of multi-party system and the effects of privatisation in the countries (Spearman rho)</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusions

The results reveal that the majority of the population in all four of the countries is not satisfied with how democracy developed in their country. Furthermore, compared to socialism, in all but Kosovo, the evaluation of the present system is negative. This outlines the problem of legitimacy of the political systems in Western Balkan countries as popular opinion is somewhat dissatisfied with the change more than twenty years after the process of transformation started. In addition, beyond these general evaluations, the multi-party political system is also evaluated negatively as an alternative to a single party system.

Of course, one should note that the evaluations of political change in this study are not uniform, nor do they follow a single pattern across countries. This is, perhaps, to be expected. However, in light of understanding the region, it reminds the observer of the different paths transformation of society took in each of the countries and emphasises the region’s heterogeneity of experiences, dispositions and practice. The best evaluation of the way democracy developed is observed in Kosovo. The most negative evaluation is seen in Bosnia and Serbia.

The results suggest that the hypothesis of Moises (1993) about time as a factor of legitimacy might be true in the countries of the Western Balkans. The younger generations seem to evaluate change more positively than those generations with more experience of life during socialism. This is not to say
that ‘passage of time’ is the only item needed to increase legitimacy. However, it extends the argument that a previous and different reference point contributes to the benchmarking that people develop when asked to assess social change.

Furthermore, income is associated with satisfaction of how democracy has developed. Increase in income correlates with more positive evaluation of political change. This suggests that the level of satisfaction with democratic changes correlates with the outcome of the economic transformation at an individual level, for each of the citizens.

The score of potential for civic activism, meaning the willingness to participate in civic engagement, was also one important point of analysis. The highest mean score was observed in Kosovo and it is half of the maximum score of 10. This suggests a rather low level of interest in practicing different forms of civic activism. The weak practice of civil and political rights also confirms the motives-rules linkage hypothesis, that institutions do not have additional stimulus to be accountable to the citizens.

The assumption of this set of questions and scores is that they might be relatively independent of factual social conditions in each of the countries. This is so because one of the responses is willingness to participate, even if they have not done so already. There is a relatively low correlation between the potential for civic activism and the evaluations of change which might suggest such independence. In light of this, the most important finding is that not only are there differences across countries, differences exist between an apparently same ethnic group.

Political and civic activity has increased in the 2000s compared to the 1990s. Different aspects of these dimensions of engagement are emphasised in the countries, depending on political conditions. Most notably, the highest peak of difference between the two decades is the increase in voting in Kosovo in the 2000s, which is most probably associated with independence. Though there some slight disruptions, the means-motives linkage is confirmed in all the countries with the exception of Serbia, however, even there those who lack sufficient individual resources also demonstrate low interest in civil and political rights.

Lastly, a recurring pattern in all four countries is that the practice of political or civic activism is associated with gender. The results reveal that men engage in these activities more than women. The correlation is mild, however, the association exists. This suggests that the public sphere is still the domain of men and outlines the strong patriarchal set-up of these societies.
The research suggests that substantial transformation of the political system is dependent on deeper change in the political culture of the population. Although institutions have formally changed, there is still relatively low level of political and civic activism and a high degree of clientelism. Thus, the political field is highly hierarchical and asymmetric driven by the exchange of material benefits and loyalty. This leaves very little space for significant action independent of the complex of political parties and oligarchies. These two significantly overlap in three of the four countries which were subject of the research.

The low level of economic development exacerbates the predominantly parochial and patriarchal cultures. This creates a large set of individuals with low potential to develop meaningful civic life, or, at least, a capacity to support action of their fellows. The social life is by and large understood as a place for securing material existence.

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Beyond the Incomplete: Dynamics of Social Change in Kosovo

Introduction

This paper explores the dynamics of social change in Kosovo over the past two decades. It focuses on the analysis of power in social and political processes and the changes Kosovo has undergone: the collapse of the social state, war and forced displacement, post-war reconstruction and the international protectorate, and, lastly, independence and state-building. It aims to reveal continuities, as well as the neglected sets of changes that have been rendered invisible in the dominant ideologies and systems of representations. The approach adopted here pays attention to the historical contingencies of Kosovo within the political and cultural geography of South-Eastern Europe - to account for its specific dynamics, perspectives, constraints, as well as the legacies of the past in the present. More importantly, the text is set against the representations of the social, political and cultural dynamics in Kosovo through characterizations of failed hopes, disappointment, and/or hyped optimism that have accompanied the narratives on modernisation, westernisation and Europeanisation, as well as nation and state-building ideologies.

The world we are living in today it has been framed as ‘post-socialist’, ‘post-communist’, ‘post-modernist’, ‘post-colonialist’, or ‘post-war’ in the Kosovo context, referring to the end of the war of 1998-9. Certainly, the ‘post’ has come to signify the altered social, political and cultural conditions, but also the greater interdependence fostered by the processes of globalisation.¹

¹ Even if the term ‘globalisation’—whether used in academic, political or everyday discourse—is becoming increasingly problematic because of its diverse and ambiguous meanings it may be argued that it still has a generic function in describing the intensification of political, economic, and cultural cross-border flows. Certainly, it is highly debatable whether the ‘compression’ of time and space has fundamentally changed the ways in
Kosovo is not exempted from globalisation processes and the transformations they induce at the national level: political, economic and cultural. Yet, the sources of social change have sparked a diverse set of theories and body of knowledge such as: ‘reflexive modernity’ (Giddens et al., 1994), ‘liquid modernity’ (Bauman, 2000), ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992), ‘transition studies’ (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986), ‘path dependency’ (Levi, 1997; Paul, 2000), ‘multiple modernities and divergent social imaginaries’ (Taylor, 2004), and the paradigm of the ‘post political’ (Žižek, 1999). Certainly, as diverse modes of theoretical trajectories, they attest to the complexity of the exploration and understanding of temporalities, reversal trajectories, and social asymmetries shaping social formations, politics and culture.

This text aims to analyse the dynamics and patterns of social change in Kosovo as they stretch across space and are shaped by the ‘eventful temporalities’ (Sewell, 2005: 83) across time. As a ‘rythmanalysis’, to borrow Henri Lefebvre’s term, the study of social change in Kosovo is set in opposition to theories of ‘transition’. As a concept and a body of theory, ‘transition’ has signified the collapse of socialism and been adopted as an analytical tool of post-socialist/post-communist societies; it has also become a constitutive part of everyday politics and common sense (Gal and Kligman, 2000: 10). Moreover, the analysis here moves away from the concept of ‘transition’, because ‘transition’ has come to ‘assume a theory of history in which all aspects of society change in concert and in the same direction” (ibid: 11).

Avoiding the risk of ‘formulaic propositions’ of democratic development and democratic governance (ibid: 12), this text rejects the paradigm of seeking which human beings relate to each other and to their social networks (Scholte, 2000). As Ulrich Beck has pointed out, transnational integration and national integration take place simultaneously. Thus, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation are complementary processes – two sides of the same worldwide globalisation process of redistribution of wealth, sovereignty, power, and freedom of action within the international capitalist system (Beck, 2000). Moreover, Ronald Robertson’s conceptual hybrid of ‘glocalisation’ is perhaps the best way to account for this schizophrenic phenomenon (Robertson, 1992). In other words, globalisation cannot simply be reduced to the binary logic of the ‘The West and the Rest’ (Hutton and Giddens, 2000). Such concepts as ‘cultural hybridity’ and ‘creolisation’ draw attention to increased scholarly emphasis on the multiple and fluid characteristics of identity and identities (Appadurai, 2001). However, there is no denying that deep-seated hierarchies characterize the capitalist world system, with the West setting the agenda. As Joseph Stiglitz has stressed, globalisation often seems to replace the old dictatorships of national elites with new dictatorships of international finance (Stiglitz, 2002).
the ‘successes’ or ‘failures’ of ‘post 1989 transition’. Instead, it focuses on how changes in politics, the body, and culture have been conceptualized, understood, and resisted by the Kosovar citizens. It shows that in various forms, ranging from memory to agency, the legacies of socialism, the 1998-9 war, as well as the on-going nation and state building ideologies, shape the history, social landscape, and cultural practices across the public and private domains. Taking advantage of the concept of social capital of Pierre Bourdieu (1986), this study will explain the patterns of social change in Kosovo, highlighting the sources of power and power relations as they are acquired, as well as how they are enacted and legitimised culturally and symbolically. Hence, the aim is to offer a cultural interpretation of social change as mapped in social space: in the everyday expressions and practices, as well as in the emotive affiliations associated with social transformation at the collective and individual level.

Three specific points will be made. First, the paper seeks to explain that social change can be grasped through temporalities of social relationships, political and economic activities, and in the processes of ‘social imagination’ as practiced across social fields. Second, it shows that as part of the social structure, the processes of social identity constructions are embodied and maintained through the material and symbolic and practiced in everyday life. Third, the article will show that social change, while perceived in terms of an increased social and political platform for agency and self-realisation, has also generated ‘risks’ and uncertainties, yet the strategy Kosovars have adopted to counteract them is a heightened sense of optimism.

On the Method and Data Interpretation Strategies

The analysis here is grounded in empirical data from a larger study on social and economic change that has included Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia, obtained using combined quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques. Indeed, the first strand of the study was comprised of a quantitative survey, with a three-stage stratified sample of 800 respondents, representative of the Kosovo population.2 The questionnaire addressed the following topics: ideals and values, employment, socio-economic status

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2 The ethnic composition of the survey sample is as follows: 550 Kosovo Albanians, 150 Kosovo Serbs, 100 respondents of other ethnic groups: Turkish, Bosniac, and RAE. The respondents were residents of both urban and rural areas in Kosovo, with 50.3 per cent rural and 49.8 per cent urban. The field work and the survey data collection were con-
and wealth/possessions (family and individual), education, political participation, social networks, gender relations, cultural practices, and demographic data. The second strand of the survey included 30 in-depth interviews that aimed to register an inventory of practices across social fields, meanings given to them, and also to gather data on the ‘affective economy’, to borrow Sara Ahmed’s term (Ahmed, 2004:8), of the subjects in the course of exploring their perspectives on social change.

The empirical data obtained from the survey made possible the construction of a social space Kosovo. Moreover, the survey data served as a primary source for identification and selection of the respondents for the qualitative study: in-depth interviews. The location of respondents in social space was identified by the software SPAD 7.3. Hence, 30 participants were selected and all of them agreed to take part in the study. 3 The semi-structured questionnaire discussed the following themes and topics: the interviewees’ biography, education, employment, the most important changes since 1999 and actors of change, identity and belonging, class and social divisions, religion and, last but not least, gender and family relations. While the quantitative part of the study aimed at mapping the social space in Kosovo, the in-depth interviews focused at the level of the individual practices searching for agency, meaning making strategies, and pervading social sentiments on social change.

Aiming at methodological coherence, the analysis here is two-fold. First, it describes the social space in Kosovo. Second, it discusses the practices of actors in the social space as described by the subjects in the in-depth interviews. Attention here is also given to use of language and meaning making practices as an entry point for a broader cultural interpretation of social change and the dominant systems of representation.

ducted by Social Research Kosovo during January and February of 2013. The in-depth interviews took place during April and May of 2013.

3 The gender breakdown of the interviewees is 16 females and 14 males. Looking at the age of the interviewees, 12 are under the age of 30, 13 belong to the age group 31 to 45, and five are in the age group 45 to 65 years old. They come from different regions of Kosovo: eight from the capital Prishtina, three from Prizren, two from Gjakova, three from Peja, nine from Mitrovica, two from Gjilan, two from Zveqan and one from Zubin Potok. Half of the interviewees have completed a university education (15), 13 have completed secondary education, and two have not completed primary school. Regarding the interviewees’ occupations, four are unemployed, one is a dentist, five are school teachers, three students, one a farmer, one a nurse, one the owner of a small shop, one the owner of a restaurant, six are employed in the service industry, two are construction workers, and six are civil servants.
Embodied Social Structure: Identity and Class Formation in Kosovo

As Frederik Barth has noted long ago, in order to comprehend social change concepts are needed to enable the researchers to observe and describe “continuities in a sequence of change” and “institutionalization as an on-going process” (Barth, 1967:661). Hence, I began my analysis of social change in Kosovo by deploying the concept of social capital, defined by Pierre Bourdieu as: “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition - or, in other words, to membership in a group - which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital, a credential which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word (Bourdieu, 1986:249). In addition to this, as a set of positions, relations, possessions, and networks, social space in Kosovo, is constructed using indicators of economic and cultural capital.

The construction of the social map is premised on the survey data, more specifically, the data on economic capital has included the following parameters: 1) income (respondent and family); 2) the size of the housing in which respondents live; 3) possession and size of the summer houses respondents own (those who own a summer house); 4) possession of land and car, and their monetary value. Cultural capital is operationalized as a derivative of the respondent’s education and the education of the respondent’s parents and grandparents. With respect to the data on political relations and networks, the data feeding the construction of the social map consisted of the following parameters: 1) political party membership of respondents; and 2) kinship and friendships relations vis-á-vis the institutions of power.
As shown in Figure 1, on the right side of the map there are indicators of the low overall volume of capitals. Furthermore, in the upper right quadrant there are few indicators of social capital and indicators which point to the low level of social networking. The local cultural capital and average income are resources that individuals located in this part of social space (likely urban poor) rely on. While on the right side of the social space, in the lower right quadrant, possession of the small plots of land are the main resources. There are also modalities of local cultural capital premised on elementary education.
(of the respondents and their parents) and large kin social networks comprised of family and relatives. This part of social space, overall has a low volume of capital, but still enjoys possessions and dense social networks, yet mostly among small farmers.

On the opposite side of the map indicators of the high volume of all types of capital can be found clustered in close proximity, which points to the existence of the rather unified elite in Kosovar society. Most of the indicators are grouped in the middle ground between two quadrants: monthly income per household member (I:>200 EUR+); possession of expensive cars and cottage houses (Car>5000 EUR, cottage +); indicators of managerial position (Manager+) and being perceived as powerful and able to help (Help++). The only sign of differentiation is that in the upper left quadrant there are indicators of high and global cultural capital (EduCollege+, FatherEdu college+, and rock, jazz, pop as the favorite music genres), while in the lower left quadrant more indicators of political social capital are present (networks+, colleagues++). What is also interesting is that in the middle of the social space, close to the origin, where indicators of average level of education and average income are recorded, modalities of variables pointing to possession of large plots of land (land>2 ha) and biggest houses/flats (Flat>100m2) are also found.

Although this map of the social space is no more than an outline and represents only an entryway into the analysis, it clearly indicates the existence of a rather unified (new) dominant elite in Kosovo with almost no divisions when it comes to its resources, the existence of rural and urban poor with very few resources, and middle classes which partly rely for their economic standing on possession of land.

Yet, such an illustration of social space certainly raises questions regarding material and symbolic divisions, as well as the dynamics of social identity constructions. This drives home the point made by Pierre Bourdieu that “social order is progressively inscribed in people’s minds’ through ‘cultural products’ including systems of education, language, judgments, values, methods of classification and activities of everyday life (Bourdieu, 1986: 471).

Mapping social space in Kosovo has revealed class based stratification of the social topography. Indeed, class stretches beyond the material conditions of people’s lives and cultural practices to the processes of identity constructions as they are rooted in the subjective perceptions of social class vis-à-vis others. The empirical evidence at hand here indicates several strategies of self-identification with social groups. Yet the most fundamental identification
is through the distinction related to the conditions of existence (between rich and poor). True, this outweighs other axes of difference, but it does not undermine the importance, for example, of national identity and national identification, for the Kosovars who as a collective have placed much emphasis on national identity and have the highest loyalty index in the symbolic nation building project in South-East Europe (see Kolstø, 2014; Krasniqi, 2014).

In Kosovo, self-perceptions across the social space, however, have indicated a foremost attachment to the middle class. To be sure, identification with the middle class can be seen not only as an affirmative social classification, but also as an aspiring symbolic and material status to be attained in Kosovo society. The study reveals that education plays a central role in this pattern of social cognizance of group identity and social classification. However, these dynamics bring home the point made by Pierre Bourdieu that social fields not only restrict identities and identity formation but also regulate access to resources. He argued that identity imagining and performativity are contingent on resources; the poorer the resources, the more restricted the identities (Bourdieu, 1977, 1979).

Yet, as William H. Sewell Jr. has pointed out “a theory of change cannot be built into theory of structure until we adopt a far more multiple, contingent, and fractured conception of society - and of structure” (Sewell, 1992:16). When looking at perceptions of actors regarding major politics changes in the last two decades, it can be argued that Kosovars are disenchanted with ‘transition.’ To make this case here, I focus on how the processes of democracy and democratic consolidation are perceived by the subjects in the study. As shown in

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4 Kosovo is the poorest country in Europe. One out of every two Kosovars is without a job. Half of the population lives in poverty, on less than 1.40 euro a day. Two-thirds of the population is younger than 35, making Kosovo the youngest country in Europe. To be sure, fear and uncertainty about the future are relevant to the respondents’ narratives, with unemployment as the major concern. Poverty assessments conducted in Kosovo during the last fifteen years show that poverty is a widespread and persisting phenomenon. About 45 per cent of the population in Kosovo is considered poor and about 15 per cent estimated to be extremely poor, that is, not being able to meet basic nutritional needs. Poverty in Kosovo is defined to be shallow. Thus, the risk of poverty is constant and the vulnerability is high for the majority of Kosovo citizens. The poorest social categories in Kosovo are: families with six or more family members and with only dependents; households headed by females; the unemployed; people with low levels of education; and people living in rural areas. Poverty is widespread among children, too. They constitute over one third of all the extremely poor in Kosovo. (www.esk-ks.org, Poverty Assessment 2007)
Figure 2, the vast majority Kosovars have expressed dissatisfaction with the development of democracy. The same sentiments permeate the four tested variables: the multi-party system, the concept of social justice, economic reconstruction and privatisation, and, last but not least, social solidarity and trust.

Figure 2. Satisfaction with the development of democracy in Kosovo (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>DK/NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Grouped answers very satisfied & satisfied and not satisfied & not at all satisfied.
Source: Social Change in Kosovo Survey 2013

The dominant public perception of the multi-party political party system – as an indicator used to validate the evolving democratic processes – is that of dissatisfaction. Moreover, privatisation as a strategy of post-war economic reconstruction is rejected. Instead, the notion of social justice and a just society is given a paramount importance. Last but not the least, the reconfiguration of social networks and the weakening of social ties, fragmentation and atomisation, are lamented.5

Language, Agency and Social Imagination

*The foremost change is the end of war, liberation* (a male respondent, 36 years old, economist, Prizren).

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5 Respondents were asked to evaluate the changes from the socialist period to the current political system and arrangements on a scale from one to five; 0 – remained the same; +5 improved; or negative: 5 worsened.
Declaration of independence is the major change (a female respondent, 32 years old, teacher, Pejë).

The biggest change I could tell is related to education, especially to women’s and girls’ education. Nowadays more and more young women attend school (a female respondent, 27 years old, student of economy, Fushë Kosovë).

Infrastructure, roads, schools improved greatly. This is to me the biggest change (a male respondent, 29 years old, accountant, Prishtinë).

I have got a job. My husband could not provide for the family. I had to look for a job. (a female respondent, 36 years old, nurse, Mitrovicë).

I have become active in politics. (a female respondent, 26 years old, economist, political party activist, Mitrovicë).

The various accounts of the social changes provided by the participants in the study, material, symbolic and imagined, point out the relevance of exploring the use of language and meaning making strategies. As Stuart Hall has argued "the production of meaning rests in the practice of interpretation" (Hall, 1997). As previously noted, the research questions tracked experience, memory, and individual perceptions of several broadly defined topics pertaining to social change, including identity, work and employment practices, citizenship rights, cultural practices, education, wealth and economic resources. Yet, the focus on the language as an interpretative strategy is an intentional one - to enable agency by offering recollections and accounts as understood, experienced by the subjects in the research. Similarly to the ethnographic type of research, this approach enables different meanings and practices, different historical narratives, discourses and lived experiences to enter the ‘body’ of the research, re-directing ‘monologic’ modes of research to more ‘dialogic’ forms, in which the texts allow for multiplicity of ‘voices’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998: 127) to

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6 Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1986) theory argues for dialogism as a strategy for encountering ‘otherness’ through the potential of dialogue between people and/or with oneself. It involves the continual interaction between meanings, potentially conditioning each other. True, dialogism contends that people’s responses are conditional and human circumstances are contingent (Folch-Serra, 1990).
speak. And as Frederik Barth has argued: [...] “giving more scope to imagination and variation in cognition allows us to acknowledge and describe many more features of what we observe among people. Specifically, it allows us to trace more complex relationships between cognition, cultural representations and outcomes, and to analyse processes of change” (Barth, 2000:27).

Hence, this rendition of the processes of social change in Kosovo traces the interweaving threads of lived experience and agency, on the one hand, and politics and culture, on the other. Yet, in my application of the concept of agency, I move away from the theory of agency as laid out by Anthony Giddens, of social norms being reproduced through individual acts (Giddens, 1984). Instead, emphasis is placed on agency as a social and political force encompassing the ‘symbolic representations of experience, economic investments, and cultural legitimation of self-generating activity’ (Touraine, 1981:59).

Thus, to understand how agency is defined in the culture in Kosovo, I turn to the narratives at hand here (stemming from the in-depth interviews). These narratives are constitutive of the larger collective struggle over cultural understandings of social change. True, the narratives “are grounded in selectively remembered, interpreted experiences and projections [...] that resonate widely; yet there is not simple correspondence between narrative beliefs and actions” (Ross, 2009:8). Moreover, narratives are representations of the processes of ‘social imagination’, identity, politics and culture. They are seen as part of the “social imaginary”, to use the term developed by Charles Taylor to refer to the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underline these expectations (Taylor, 2004:23).

Hence, one way to ask what we might expect is to frame the social change in Kosovo in terms of temporality and shifting understanding of changes at the collective and individual levels. Attention is, therefore, paid to how subjects in the research identify change. What meaning do they assign to those changes? And, last but not least, what are the effects of the identified changes in the everyday life?

Looking at the accounts brought forward in the narratives of participants in the in-depth interviews, the major events that have been referred to social change in Kosovo are the end of the 1998-9 war, NATO intervention, and the declaration of independence. Indeed, the post-war reconstruction and improvement of the infrastructure comprise the groups of changes judged
most positively. This agency can be regarded as nationalistic. But, paying closer attention to how people in Kosovo came to terms with their lives, the narratives have indicated a sense of liberation and self-actualization. Social change is perceived in relation to an increased social platform for self-realisation and agency, especially among the female participants in the study. This distinctive feature of the social change is exemplified through the shift in gender roles, especially for women, through employment and participation in the political life.

However, this agency is not free of ambivalence, as the quotes presented here illustrate. Unfavorable economic conditions and having to grapple with severely limited employment opportunities\(^7\) have triggered both ‘victimhood’, with loss of jobs as a direct consequence of privatization, but also resilience through continuing education. Indeed, this “imagining of a new, free model of collective agency” (Taylor, 2004:164) in Kosovo is mediated by education and employment. Needless to say, education plays an important role in upward social mobility. As part of the ‘social imaginary’, education is granted an uncontested priority for social and individual development in Kosovo, as the following quotes attest.

*To get a job today, one needs a person in power position to put you forward* (a female respondent, 49 years old, dentist, Gjakovë).

*Those with strong family connections or political party membership can get a job.* (a male respondent, 53 years old, secondary education, security worker, Pejë).

Moreover, the ways in which inequalities and divisions are identified is discernable in ideas about the ‘rich’ and the sources generating social inequalities. The testimonies of the subjects in the research have referred to the *nouveau riche*, who have emerged in post-war Kosovo, as the dominant class. The wealth this new class has acquired is seen in connection with the privatisation of public enterprises and abuse of public funds and property.\(^8\) Indeed, this is

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\(^7\) In Kosovo 45.1 per cent of the Kosovars are unemployed making Kosovo the country with the highest unemployment rate in South-Eastern Europe. The vast majority of the unemployed are young people and women (UNDP, 2012: 23).

\(^8\) Public perceptions on the corruption index have given Kosovo a number of 105, which is far below other states in the region (see [http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20121205_corruption_is_still_hindering_the_prospect_of_kosovo](http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20121205_corruption_is_still_hindering_the_prospect_of_kosovo), (accessed 18 February 2014)).
an indication of a low level of trust in the public institutions and it also signifies a ‘state phobia’ to speak in Foucault’s terms (see Lemke, 2001). Yet the *nouveau riche* epitomizes the inequalities perpetuated at all levels of society and culture. I will focus here on work and employment practices across the social fields in Kosovo as one of the expressions of inequality.

True, transition towards a capitalist system in post-war Kosovo has been shaped by neo-liberal economic policies dictated by the ‘international community’ - a term used to signify the Western powers, with privatisation as a staple of the re-organization of the market, labor, and property. In the course of post-war reconstruction and state-building in Kosovo, a neo-liberal agenda has not only shaped the re-structuring of the economy and politics, but it has also impacted the re-definitions of identities, gender relations, and culture (see Siefert, 2009). Indeed, the neo-liberal post-war economic reconstruction has created an oligarchic and dependent capitalist system through the process, to use the term ‘accumulation by dispossession’ framed by David Harvey (2003) to point out to the privatization of social sectors and services.

It is a fact that the employment patterns across generations (respondents and their parents) have changed. A cross-generational shift of occupations is discerned with a larger prevalence of white collar jobs compared to those of the generation of the parents (fathers) who were mostly farmers or construction workers. They, however, comprised a much smaller percentage of civil servant jobs compared to the employment profiles of the respondents, at this present time. The generations which held jobs both in the socialist and the post-war neo-liberal economy, however, perceive the socialist time as more advantageous for employment, and based on their individual experiences of how they got a job. Yet, they hold a critical stance on the limited employment opportunities, while also joining the sentiments of disappointment with the current employment practices as experienced in Kosovo. The narratives in our study reveal a deeply felt belief that to obtain a paid job today is possible only through family connections and/or political party affiliations. Nepotism and favoritism are regarded as the *sine qua non* especially in the public service, which counts for one of the main economic sectors in Kosovo.\(^9\)

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\(^9\) Employment in public administration amounts to 9.8 per cent, in education 13.4 per cent, and in the health sector seven per cent. While looking at the main economic sectors and the share of GDP, the public administration accounts for 12.75 (see Kosovo Agency of Statistics at [https://esk.rks-gov.net/eng](https://esk.rks-gov.net/eng), see also Kosovo Industrial Relations Profile).
Another way to consider social change in/through the processes of social imagination is to look at the interplay between the collective practices, not only as they stand at present, but also in terms of how the future is envisioned. This implies being attentive to the ways of “an understanding that is both factual and normative” on how things ought to develop (Taylor, 2004:24). Herewith, as a specter of the future, the following quotes depict an optimistic vision of social change in Kosovo. A vision that is grounded in egalitarian and humanistic terms and stretching far beyond Kosovo.

*Things should change in a way that benefits everyone in Kosovo* (a female respondent, 41 years old, teacher, Skenderaj).

*Of course, in the right direction, and for the benefit of the entire Kosovar people* (a male respondent, 28 years old, waiter, Prizren).

*Social change is going in the right direction and for all mankind* (a female respondent, 40 years old, civil servant, Prishtinë).

It has been noted that optimism as a social sentiment runs high in Kosovo.\(^{10}\) To be sure, optimism can be read in at least two ways. First, optimism is a strategy to confront uncertainty. In the vein Zygmunt Bauman has argued that “certainty is the natural habitat of human life though the hope of escaping uncertainty is the engine of human life pursuits. Escaping uncertainty is a paramount ingredient, even if only tacitly presumed, of all and any composite images of happiness” (Bauman, 2008:20).

The second way of reading the strong sentiments of optimism, I have maintained, is to view optimism in relationship to the dramatic experiences in Kosovo’s recent history of the 1990s, especially of the 1998-9 war. Similar to Walter Benjamin’s reading of Paul Klee’s painting entitled “The Angel of History” [*Angelus Novus*], optimism in Kosovo can be conceptualized not as “the vision of bliss but as a sight of agony and wretchedness that propels them away from the past” (Bauman, 2008: 48). Hence, optimism as a social sentiment and, also,

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\(^{10}\) Kosovo scored very high on the level of optimism in various surveys conducted during the last 15 years. For example in 2008, Kosovo was the most optimistic country in the world, a study of Gallup International had revealed ([see](http://www.indexKosovo.com/?page=6&lang=2&item=8), accessed 19 February 2014).
as a cultural trope is to be considered through the interdependencies between the lived experience of a fractured past and the bleak present.

No failed ‘Transition’: Conclusions

Having highlighted social space in Kosovo as a departure for deeper explorations of social change at the level of the society and the individual over the last two decades, this paper has maintained that the meaning of change lies in the temporalities of contingent social relationships, practices and events. The analysis provided in this text focused on the group and individualistic perceptions of social change in Kosovo. Yet, it was set in opposition to an epistemology on “transition” and/or modernity and modernisation as a linear production of history and social change. It aimed to highlight the representations of continuities, ruptures, and habitations of different practices of hierarchy and inequality underpinning the social formations. In addition, having focused on the ‘social imaginaries’, lived experience, beliefs and hopes, the analysis has aimed at making visible the agency of actors narrating social change in Kosovo.

It is evident that the social topography in Kosovo is premised on a class based stratification, stretching beyond the material conditions of people’s lives, to cultural practices and social identity constructions. Yet the most fundamental distinction in the processes of social identity construction remains the difference between the rich and the poor.

Kosovars are disenchanted with ‘transition’. But this is not invoked to count for the failures of ‘transition to democracy’, even though Kosovars are dissatisfied with the multi-party political system, rejection of privatisation of the economy, and they also lament the weakening of social ties and solidarity. The end of the 1998-9 war and independence mark the most positively perceived social change in Kosovo, which is viewed in terms of liberation and self-actualisation, especially for women. Yet such an agency is not free of ambivalence. The dominance of the neo-liberal economy and state building ideology have created an oligarchic class and dependent capitalist system that has left the majority of the Kosovars on the margins, unemployed, and uncertain on what the future holds for them. Yet, optimism has been generated as a strategy and a cultural trope intertwined in social locations between the fractured past and the bleak present.
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The Inability to Change: Dogmatic Aspects of Political Ideology in the Macedonian Context

Social transformation in transitional societies is not often analyzed from the standpoint of political ideology. This is mostly because ideology is a complex term and needs to be broken down into categories suitable for scrutiny. In political science theory, the main categories that are usually related to ideology are political myth, political narrative and political culture. Given that ideology holds a specific relation to each of these categories, not being identical to any and, at the same time, common for all three, it is analysis of myth, narrative and political culture in society that enables one to see whether, how and to what degree ideology has changed in the last two and a half decades of democratic transition in any given transitional society, Macedonia included.

A separate analysis of all three categories (myth, narrative and political culture) tries to depict one very simple hypothesis: that ideological change in Macedonian society during the democratic transition has been very limited and still carries strong features of the socialist legacy. Notwithstanding that a visible difference might appear among all three analyzed categories, tracing recidivistic elements of ideological persistence from the previous regime in Macedonia alongside ideological lines remains the main occupation of this academic effort.

Using a combined approach of interpreting and applying theoretical concepts, utilizing discourse analysis as well as quantitative public opinion data, enables insight into the main ideological parameters of Macedonian society, as well as their change over time or, possibly, its deficiency.
Defining the terms – connecting and distinguishing points

Analyzing a specific ideological context and its change, or the lack of it, in periods of radical social transformation requires defining specific categories such as ideology, political myth, narrative and political culture. Moreover, solely defining these categories is far from sufficient when it comes to analyzing such contexts based on theory. Extracting the main features of the abovementioned categories and establishing relations among the main operative terms based on these often shared features is a step in the direction of finding an answer to the question whether and how ideology changed in the Macedonian case after more than two decades of democratic transition.

Speaking of ideology, one cannot but notice that this is one of the terms that have a very heterogeneous nature. Definitions of ideology are numerous and often point to different fractions of social reality. For instance, Seliger defines ideology as “action-oriented sets of beliefs which are organized into coherent systems” (Seliger, 1976: 11) while Adorno holds a similar view that ideology is “an organization of opinions, attitudes, and values - a way of thinking about man and society” (Adorno et al., 1950: 2). It is instantly clear that certain common ground appears in defining ideology relating to a specific value system (beliefs, attitudes, opinions) or, as McClosky puts it, a “system of belief that are elaborate, integrated, and coherent, that justify the exercise of power, explain and judge historical events, identify political right and wrong, set forth the interconnections (causal and moral) between politics and other spheres of activity” (McClosky, 1964: 362).

However, besides the value system as a common denominator, many authors point out additional distinctive features of ideology relevant to the present analysis. In this regard, Geertz notes that ideology is closely connected to “maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience” (Geertz, 1964: 220) where ideology advocates “a conduct and action pattern” (Lowenstein, 1953: 52), i.e. “encompasses content outside the political order” (Campbell et al., 1960: 192-193), being a ”high order of abstraction” (Ibid: 192-193). Therefore, besides being a value system, ideology has everything to do with the collective awareness and conduct as well and is often understood as a social and, especially, political meta-narrative, an abstract language within which collective political action is contextualized.

Along these lines ideology is never an individual phenomenon, nor is it a mechanical summa of social values but, rather, a “rationalizations of
group interests – but not necessarily the interest of groups espousing them” (Lane, 1962: 14-15), not an idle system but a “product of action” (Nettl, 1967: 100). This points to a very specific feature of ideology, its active component and, even more so, its collective but not popular dimension, meaning that rationalization of ideology does not often reflect the requirements of the collective but, rather, of a political elite steering ideological content in a given direction.

This elitist-driven logic by default requires modalities through which ideology will be enforced on the political community. One of these modalities is, certainly, political myth as a basic instrument through which ideology is deployed. One of the many definitions of ideology clearly shows the connection between ideology and myth, defining ideology as “an emotion-laden, myth-saturated, action-related system of beliefs and values (...) that is acquired to a large extent as a matter of faith and habit” (Rejai, 1991: 11). Moreover, the content of political myth is highly ideological by nature and is connected to certain social and political axiomatic meanings or, as Flood puts it, “myth is an ideologically marked narrative which purports to give a true account of a set of past, present, or predicted political events, and which is accepted as valid in its essential by a social group” (Flood, 2002: 44). The theoretical foundations given by Rejai and Flood clearly point to a connection between ideology and political myth, regardless of whether they treat ideology as myth-saturated or political myth as ideologically marked. This intertwining of both categories (ideology and myth) tells us little about their differences. Bottici presents an effort to explain the key difference between ideology and myth:

“To put it plainly, political myths are narratives that put a drama on stage. And it is from the impression of being part of such drama that the typically strong pathos of a political myth derives. I can theoretically share an ideology which leaves me completely indifferent on the emotional level, but no political myth can ever be shared and at the same time remain emotionally indifferent. In this case, it is simply not a political myth for me. And this, I think, is ultimately the reason why the concept of political myth and that of ideology should be kept separated.” (Bottici, 2007: 196)

The emotional component of political myth (not always present in ideology) seems to be the main difference between the categories of myth and ideology. However, this is not the only difference. Bottici adds that “in order to constitute a political myth, two (...) conditions must also be met. First, this set of ideas must take the form of a narrative, that is, of a series of events cast in a dramatic form” (ibid) pointing to the fact that “not all ideologies
have a narrative form” (ibid) adding that the second important feature is that “precisely on the basis of this narrative form, it (political myth) must be able to ground (begründen) or to coagulate and reproduce significance” (ibid). The first condition points to non-narrative and non-mythical forms of ideology, while the second (reproduction of significance – shared both by ideology and myth) constitutes a specific relation between myth and ideology which can be defined as myth being the signifying ground or the signifying adhesive component of a specific ideology.

The connection between political narrative, on one hand, and ideology and political myth, on the other, seems straightforward. As Flood has suggested, myth by definition is an “ideologically marked narrative” (Flood, 2002: 44) and this narrative helps create the “drama on stage” (Bottici, 2007: 196) within a specific political community. Nevertheless, one could object that this perception could be limited to political science and may not reflect the views of other disciplines. However, sociolinguists seem to hold similar positions on the relation between ideology and language (thus, narrative). Simpson suggests that:

“A central component of the critical linguistic creed is the conviction that language reproduces ideology. As an integrated form of social behavior, language will be inevitably and inextricably tied up with the socio-political context in which it functions. Language is not used in a contextless vacuum; rather, it is used in a host of discourse contexts, contexts which are impregnated with the ideology of social systems and institutions. Because language operates within this social dimension it must, of necessity reflect, and some would argue, construct ideology.” (Simpson, 1993: 5)

Although language and narrative are not synonyms per se, language is a fundamental component of narrative and, according to Simpson, a fundamental component of ideology. The content of political ideology is not determined solely by the emotional charge political myth contains, but also by the very language used to tell the stories vital to both myth and ideology.

Moving on to the connection between ideology and political culture, one must come back to fundamental definitions of ideology. In addition to the already proposed definitions and features, Thompson gives an additional definition saying that “as that which guides and defends political action, ideology must therefore be defined so as to refer to political belief systems, whether they are revolutionary, reformist or conservative (traditionalist) in outlook” (Thompson, 1984: 78) adding that “whether a belief system is conservative,
moderate or radical obviously depends upon the prevailing political culture and upon the attitude adopted towards it” (Ibid). It, thus, is obvious that the shared component of ideology and political culture is the value system characteristic of both categories. However, if one takes into consideration the classical definition of Almond and Verba, who have defined political culture as “attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system” (Almond and Verba, 1963: 12), then the difference between ideology and political culture could be extracted.

In a broader sense, one could say that political ideology is a materialized or effectuated form of political culture, notwithstanding that this relation does not exclude significant differences between the two categories. First, political culture, unlike ideology, consists of values and beliefs but is stripped of the meta-meanings of ideology or, as Campbell and associates have already stated, “high order of abstraction” (Campbell et al., 1960: 192-193). Second, political culture has more to do with individual beliefs and values, self-perception and the individual role of the political being, while ideology prefers the common terrain of the political community united through symbols, meanings and language.

Establishing a link between ideology, myth, narrative and political culture provides a means to analyze the specific Macedonian context precisely through the eye-lens of these specific categories. Answering the question of whether the general ideological framework of Macedonia has significantly changed during the democratic transition process is possible if one takes into consideration political myth, narrative and political culture as constitutive (related, to say the least) elements of ideology.

The new and the old political myth

The democratic transition in the Republic of Macedonia, as can be said of all transitional societies, has been a period of social transformation in every sphere, with varying success. Besides dramatic changes in economy, civil society, the functioning of the state organism and political plurality, certain other spheres of society have not been sufficiently explored from the viewpoint of social transformation. Having more than two-decades of distance from the very beginning of the democratic transition, one could claim that the general ideological framework of society has not been sufficiently analyzed, nor has a systematic examination of this phenomenon been undertaken in order to
answer the question of whether core ideological values have changed among the population.

What generally happened in ideological terms in all transitional, post-communist societies was a shift from a communist to a more nationally-colored ideology, or such is the perception. However, one thing must not pass unnoticed, and that is the identical fundament of both communist and nationalistic ideology and the easiness of converting one type of ideology into another. As Willmer puts it:

“So naturally the ideology of communism and ideology of nationalism were always here. Nationalism was used by the communists in a controlled way, but the ideology was already here, and it was not so difficult to transform and step forward from the socialist ideology to nationalistic ideology, from the socialist communist discourse to the nationalistic heuristic type of discourse. Because of the lack of democratic tradition, because one type of ideological discourse was replaced by another type of collectivistic discourse, people just came to have more or less the same type of public opinion, just with a different content, a different type of emotion, and different authorities, different colors, so to speak, different symbols (which is the case more or less in all of eastern Europe).” (Willmer, 2002: 186)

Willmer argues that the very fundament of both communist and nationalistic ideology in transitional societies had the same foundation, the same logic or, one could say, the same core. The social transformation of ideology did not proceed along the lines of changing this logic but, rather, along the lines of changing its content, its actors and its narrative (but not the fundamental emotion of narrative as presented further on). Speaking of actors, the same could be said of the central figures in mythical narrative in transitional societies and, more precisely, in Macedonian society.

The death of Josip Broz Tito¹ and his Yugoslav project left a vast hole in the mythopoetic social space in the Republic of Macedonia. The myth of Tito²

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¹ Josip Broz Tito was the leader of the Partisan movement in Yugoslavia during World War II and later on Prime Minister and life-long President of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

² The myth of Tito had several strongholds, the primary stronghold being his unifying role in Yugoslavia, given the diversity of peoples living in the country. However, the personality cult created around him was also based on his role as a leader of the Partisan movement in Yugoslavia during World War II, as well as his international role in the Non-aligned movement. For more see Brown, Archie. 2014. The myth of the strong leader: political leadership in the modern age. London: Basic Books. p.271.
slowly faded away as Yugoslavia entered a complete collapse along ethnic lines. The break-up of the old state and the newly gained independence of Macedonia required a redefining of the mythic “territory”, especially under the influence of the “Titoistic momentum”.

This meant that the former communists, who stayed in power in the early years of the transition, had to find a new center spot for filling the emptied symbolic space and it seems they tried to find it in Kiro Gligorov. Praised as experienced, prudent and wise, Gligorov would fit into a specific category of political myth known in theory as the “myth of Sinsinatus” (Girardeut, 2000). This type of myth envisages the old, strong against temptations, experienced, careful, coldblooded politician full of measure, balance and gravitas. However one should be very careful in judging whether Gligorov gained the weight of a political myth or was simply a mythicized political figure, given that political carriers of mythic content should never be identical to the myth itself in democratic societies (which Macedonia hardly was in the first decade of the transition).

On the one hand, the myth of Gligorov was a symbol of the soft transition from the previous regime, as Gligorov was a highly-regarded politician during socialist times. On the other hand, he was supposed to be the guarantee of a peaceful breaking off of Macedonia from the Yugoslav federation, which turned out to be the turn of events. In such dramatic times, it comes as no surprise that Gligorov was “mythicized” as a peaceful and very prudent politician and more or less successfully filled the mythic emptiness left after Tito’s death and the breakup of the Yugoslav federation, at least for a time.

Although the temporality of Gligorov’s myth could be a strong argument against even nominating Gligorov as a central figure of a new Macedonian political myth in the early transitional years, one could not argue that his role was intensively mythicized in that period. However, Gligorov’s myth faded with time, especially once the social and political circumstances changed. Macedonian society was no longer in need of stability only and, after a decade of one of the most failed transitions in the region, political demand turned to

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3 Kiro Gligorov was the first President of the Republic of Macedonia after its independence and break up with the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991. He was in office from 1991 to 1999 (two mandates) and was a central political figure in the newly established state. Bearing in mind his prior political experience under the communist regime (member of the Yugoslav Presidency, President of the Assembly of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia etc.) he established himself as a highly respected politician, especially after his success in the negotiations with the Yugoslav National Army and their peaceful withdrawal from the Republic of Macedonia in 1992 (Gligorov-Adzic Agreement).
prosperity requirements. Although the political right-wing forces in Macedonia led the government in the period between 1998 and 2002, it was not until their return to power in 2006 that one of the most potent political myths in Macedonian history was reborn.

The new political demand required adequate changes in the mythic core of society. After the return of the right-wing led government to power in 2006, a completely new mythopoeia was constituted. In fact, the mythic figure of Alexander of Macedon was anything but new (Dodovska, 2006) and it was the very fact that this myth was buried for more than a century that gave it such potency. The new conservative political elite wanted to be perceived exactly through the feature of the myth of Alexander of Macedon that has its special place in political theory of myth. The myth of Alexander of Macedon presents a young, conquering, with meteoric appearance, vital, invigorated (Girardeut, 2000) political leader capable of overcoming any obstacle. This was meant to be an answer to apathy and the disappointment that transition inflicted upon the citizens, at least in the symbolic field of political myth.

Speaking on behalf of political articulation of the myth of Alexander of Macedon, it is sufficient to say that one of the largest statues (22 meters) was erected at the very center of the main square in the capital Skopje, and that both the Skopje Airport and the main highway connecting Macedonia to Serbia and Greece have been renamed Alexander the Great (for more details see Markovic and Damjanovski, 2010). Similarly the efforts of the conservative political elite to exploit the symbolism of Alexander the Great had/have their reflection in society as well. Namely, the percentage of people who state that Alexander the Great is the most important historical figure has increased, in just two years’ time, from 9 per cent in 2009 to 13 per cent in 2011 (Simovska et al., 2011). This is a rather rapid development, especially taking into consideration the fact that the mythical content of society changes incrementally and over time. Furthermore, almost two thirds of ethnic Macedonians identify with Alexander the Great to a certain degree (ibid), and data point out that there is an “indicator of changes in the perception of historical antecedents” (ibid: 46), obviously influenced by political efforts to alter the mythological content of society. This perception is additionally strengthened among the population by the perception of Alexander of Macedon as a purely Macedonian historical figure, as is the case in 72.1 per cent of the respondents in a recent public opinion study (Klekovski, 2013), whereas only 14% of the respondents answered that he is a historical figure belonging to the whole world.
However, the enforcement of this myth has been accompanied by another type of myth known as the myth of Solon meaning a wise, establishing a new order, reformer, father of the nation, the good king, traditional type of leader (Girardeut, 2000). Enforcing traditional values and intensive social reform by the new right-wing political forces fits the very profile of this myth. The two myths combined, of Alexander and Solon, gave way to a completely new political setup, whereas the thing that most substantially changed was the “stage for the drama” (Bottici, 2007: 196), epitomized in the “Skopje 2014” project.  

Besides the obvious function of legitimizing the new political elite in power, the newly restituted political myths had/have several other social functions. First, alongside these myths, the myth of unity has been heavily enforced in Macedonian society in times when Macedonian identity has been challenged by at least three neighboring countries. In literature, this myth is based on the presumption that evil comes from the divisions among people (Girardeut, 2000), which calls to mind one of the myths of proletarian unity, with “brotherhood and unity” replaced by ethno-mobilization.  

Second, in cases where Macedonian economy is undergoing hard times and Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic integration is blocked by neighboring Greece, “myth removes tensions and uncertainties” (Matic, 1998: 20), i.e. serves as a “stabilizing force” (ibid: 22). This much needed social stabilization is also a counterpoint of the uncertainty of transition, one of the main political fundamentals of the Macedonian conservative political forces. However, if one instantly thinks that a huge social fabrication is in power, one should think twice given the fact that “myths are founded in history and reality of certain nations” (Ibid: 105) and are never “complete fabrications” (ibid). Along these lines, speaking of the myth of Alexander of Macedon, one cannot forego the fact that this myth has been one of the ideological strongholds of the Macedonian uprising against the Ottomans in the 19th century, as well as a leitmotif of poems of renowned Macedonian poets of the same period (Dodovska, 2006), which makes the often present stereotype of the myth of Alexander as a complete social novelty fallacious.

The project includes the complete re-esthetization of the wider city center and features tens of monuments of historical figures from different epochs in Macedonian history, an Orthodox church and several buildings in the “ancient” and neo-baroque style. The central point of the project is the 22 meter tall monument of Alexander the Great supported by a large fountain decorated with motifs from antiquity.
Considering that a myth is always “a mixture of rational elements and fiction (...) and dramatization” (Ibid: 108), the new political myth of Macedonian society represented through Alexander of Macedon occupies a vast social space especially in architectonic terms. It is rather early to say whether this myth will be of a temporary nature rather than a long-term political symbolism which could, in the future, open up new debates in this specific field of political philosophy. However, one thing can hardly be denied – the newly established political myths have utterly changed the political landscape of Macedonian society and the process of social transformation of Macedonian society during its democratic transition has witnessed at least two dramatic changes in the very core of political myth – its central figure. Political narrative, on the other hand, has not changed as much.

The revolutionary narrative

The socialist legacy in Yugoslavia, thus in Macedonia, left a strong heritage with regard to political narratives. Among many, the fundamental narrative of the communist elite was the one of the socialist revolution. This was, of course, a product of the political orientation of the post-WWII elite in the country, a legacy of the war itself, as well a tool for the legitimization of the new social order that brought radical change to post-war Yugoslav society. The revolutionary narrative of the socialist revolution had its specificities, among which Aron points out three fundamental ones (Aron in: Bottici, 2007):

1. Condemnation of the status quo (bourgeois society),
2. The depiction of what should be (communist ideal of stateless and classless society); and
3. The individuation of a subject capable of transforming the present into a future condition (the working people)

These fundamental features of socialist revolutionary narrative had one very specific social function: to hold the masses in a state of alertness against “enemies” and “contra-revolutionary” elements. However, discourse analysis of post-communist, transitional narrative shows stunning similarities to the revolutionary narrative of the communist elites. As Drtkovski claims “post-communism also has a revolutionary narrative – the narrative of a ‘never
to come social change” (Drtkovski, 2013: 147-162) with abundant usage of “words like “revolution”, “the people”, “radical change”, “uprising” etc.” (ibid).

It seems that this kind of specific narrative turned the democratic revolution into an “absurd revolution” (ibid: 150), and that transitional narrative, as one of main features of ideology, is anything but different in nature from its potent predecessor. If one comes back to analyzing the fundamental elements of revolutionary socialist narrative and applies them to the post-communist period in Macedonia, one would conclude that the similarities are astonishing:

1. Condemnation of the status quo – all political elites have utilized the democratic transition as a state of hardship, but one of a temporary nature, a state that will be overcome in time, but never, in fact, is. By underlining the constant awareness of the seriousness of the state of transition, political elites prolong their legitimization, which reminds one of socialism as a transitory phase to the classless society.

2. The depiction of what should be - democracy as a system is presented as the ideal-type system, a desired state, without really considering much the content of it (Dvornik, 2009). It appears as a desired goal that society strives towards, but that can never be reached. As did classless society, democracy presents itself as a constantly moving target.

3. The individuation of a subject capable of transforming the present into a future condition – the concept of the working class is being replaced with the concept of the democratic citizen, a type of “carrier” of social change. It is also an ideal-type of homo politicus, whose content also changes and shifts focus between political values.

All in all, one could say that the biggest similarity between communist and post-communist narrative is that “post-communist narrative holds the masses in a state of expectancy of change that never happens – alertness as a “state of emergency”” (Ibid: 147-162), which makes the fundamental logic of both political narratives quite identical. Quantitative data stemming from the field of political culture show that there are additional similarities between the ideologies of the two big epochs of Macedonian society.
The confused political values (the question of political culture)

The last closely connected element to ideology, political culture, in the Macedonian context is the most complex element to analyze. This is mostly because it is hard to draw linear conclusions and analogies due to the complexity and multitude of attitudes that political culture consists of.

Concerning the very features of political culture, the Macedonian case reveals a very specific idiosyncrasy, in that the attitudes of the population could be classified into three types. The first type specifically is connected to recidivistic values, i.e. values that are a clear recidivism from the communist regime. Many analyses of political culture from different institutions in the last decade in Macedonia show that recidivistic elements of communist political culture are still vibrant among the population (Ohrid Institute, 2007; MCMS, 2009; Markovic et al., 2012). Taking into consideration the most recent studies (Markovic et al., 2012), one could extract a specific set of recidivistic elements:

- Highly politicized society but refusal of politics in the intimate sphere – reminiscent of the communist paradigm of the “alienated” political process, alienation of the individual from the political collective, fear of politics but awareness of its importance;
- Limited belief in authoritarian rule but widespread belief in technocratic rule. The technocratic paradigm originates from the communist creed that “kadrovi rešavaju sve (the technocrats can solve it all)” (Lilly, 2001);
- Fundamental lack of individual responsibility and heavy state-dependency – leftover from the communist logic of centralized decision-making and trade-off between civil liberties and economic wellbeing, state dependency and heavy expectations from the political forces in power as a mechanism for denial of individual responsibility;
- Mass declared religiousness – substitutive and escapist function of religion. Although skepticism towards religious authorities and reserve towards the predominance of religion in society exists, people declare themselves to be religious. This could also be interpreted as a form of social conformism, much like the need for everybody to be a clearly declared communist during the previous regime;
- Nostalgia for Yugoslavia and the socialist system is still present – inability of the new regime to fulfill the expectations of the average citizen – failed transition;
• Low associational capacity and passive forms of citizens activism – feelings of powerlessness to influence the political processes;

• Greater confidence in repressive institutions than institutions of politics – repressive institutions are seen as functional and mission-fulfilling in contrast to political institutions.

The first set of values is clearly connected to the strong social inertia that still exists in Macedonian society and is an effective indicator that political culture as a fundamental element of ideology changes slowly and highly incrementally. Speaking of social change, the second set of values is connected to the re-traditionalization of society in transition (especially by right-wing political forces) as an attempt to stabilize the very field of political values. The most obvious rebirth of traditional elements can be seen in (ibid):

• Conservative values in political socialization and gender roles;

• Conservative values towards ethically challenging phenomena;

• Conservative attitudes towards marginalized groups;

• Massive rebirth of religiousness.

Religion has been deliberately classified as belonging to both recidivistic and traditional values, mostly because its rebirth has been heavily stimulated by right-wing political forces in the last two decades in the country. However, religion being a complex phenomenon, one could hardly delineate where re-traditionalization ends and social conformism begins. One could also claim that other elements were present even in socialist times, but the fundamental difference lies in the fact that the previous system did not embrace most of these conservative values (gender roles, ethnic divisions, attitudes towards marginalized groups, etc.), while transitional elites have been more than responsive to this type of values, with respective differences among right and left-wing governments.

The third type of values stands in relation to a limited liberal capacity and it concerns (ibid):

• Recognition of individual responsibility (at least on a declarative level - the awareness exists);

• Readiness for change in gender roles (also declaratory);

• Entrepreneurship among part of the population;
The liberal elements present the smallest group of values and one could confidently claim that the liberal capacity of Macedonian society is in its early stage. Along these lines, one parameter is possibly the most worrying of all and could hardly be classified in any of the three types. It is a typical product of the failed transitional process and presents an authentic transitional value. Namely, Macedonia has one of the lowest levels of social trust in the region (MCMS, 2009; Markovic et al., 2012), which speaks of a very serious degradation of social capital in the country, most specifically, in the last decade.

In conclusion, and speaking of social transformation, one could support the claim that “the post-communist profile of political culture is a mixture of communist, traditional and liberal-democratic elements creating a confusing model of political culture” (Drtkovski, 2013: 130-131). Although social transformation has taken political values more towards the conservative rather than the liberal pole of ideology, most of the values and attitudes of the population (and in crucial categories) still remain unchanged from the times prior to the transitional period.

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Ideological contexts of transitional, post-communist societies present a fertile ground for analysis of social transformation in the political, economic, social and cultural sense. However, not much attention has been devoted to one of the most important underpinnings of democratic society and that is ideology. This complex phenomenon is hard to analyze mostly because academia can hardly agree on what the elements fit for scrutiny are. However, if one tries to extract the main features of ideology, or its constitutive elements, one notices that political myth, political narrative and political culture can hardly be avoided. Although ideology is not identical to any of these elements, it cannot be claimed that ideology consists of only these three features. Myth, narrative and political culture seem to fill most of the content of ideology and revealing their nature reveals the level of ideological transformation of a specific society.

The case of the Republic of Macedonia seems to be no exception. Contextualizing the transformation of political myth from Tito, through Gligorov and ending with Alexander of Macedon reveals differences but also commonalities between the three political myths. Moreover, analyzing the political narrative of communism and post-communism reveals stunning similarities between
the two. Finally, deconstructing elements of political culture shows that most of the features of political culture, as fundaments for ideological content, apart from a mixture of limited liberal and considerable traditional capacity of society, remain recidivistic and originate from the pre-transitional period.

This provides an answer concerning the level of ideological transformation of Macedonian society. It could be argued that although the regime changed, ideological features of Macedonian society have changed very little in the last two decades. It seems that ideology has only changed symbols, characters and the stage, while the ideological fundaments of myth, narrative and political culture have undergone very little alteration. Theoretical models, discourse analysis and quantitative data available in the analysis of the Macedonian case seem to point to that conclusion.

**Bibliography**


The determinants of gender differences in responses to unemployment in post-transition countries: the case of Macedonia

Introduction
The process of transition in the European former socialist countries, which started at the beginning of the 1990s, had tremendous economic, political and social impacts. The initial transitional recession led in labour markets to declining participation rates and persistent high unemployment. One characteristic of the previous economic system in Central and South Eastern Europe was a highly compressed wage distribution and the claimed elimination of discrimination against women in the labour market (Massey et al., 1995; Lobodzinski, 1996; and Rijken and Ganzeboom, 2001). During the socialist period, female labour force participation and employment in this region were relatively high compared to similarly developed and even OECD economies, whilst official female unemployment rates were low (Saget, 1999). One reason for this was that employment was viewed as a political obligation. The relatively well-developed child-care systems also supported high employment rates amongst mothers. The advent of transition and the resulting restructuring of employment in the new market economies of Central and South Eastern Europe was associated with the emergence of large and increasing gender gaps in their labour markets. Countries such as Macedonia emerged from early
transition with employment gaps of over twenty percentage points, gaps that were significantly larger than those found in most EU countries.

The processes of ownership restructuring and sectoral reallocation were typically associated with a reallocation of a substantial part of the labour force from the manufacturing and agricultural sectors towards the expanding service sector (Blanchard, 1997). The experience of almost all European transition countries was that the creation of new jobs in the emerging private sector was not initially strong enough to absorb the mass of workers laid-off from the restructured state-owned firms. At the same time, the mismatch between the skill requirements of newly created jobs and effective skills possessed by the workers became a substantial problem (Svejnar, 2002). Consequently, the labour markets in early transition became less dynamic with a relatively stagnant unemployment pool and increases in unemployment, especially long-term unemployment (Cazes and Nesporova, 2003). The initial ‘transitional unemployment’ was characterised by pronounced labour market segmentation, long average duration of unemployment and a low probability of exiting unemployment into employment. Long spells of unemployment often led to degradation and dehumanisation of individuals in society, causing social exclusion and increasing the burden for the government of providing the necessary safety net. Thus, the problem of unemployment has not been only a personal problem for the people who experienced it, but has become a problem for the society as a whole.

According to Blanchflower (2001), in early transition there existed striking similarities between men and women regarding the probabilities of being unemployed. Previous research has suggested that gender gaps in participation are likely to be larger in countries where traditional households dominate and where attitudes to women working are less favourable (Contreras and Plaza, 2010; and Camussi, 2013). Here we concentrate upon the suggestion that the presence of these factors in South Eastern Europe (SEE) may cause men and women to differ in their responses to job loss, as well as in their various strategies adopted to cope with unemployment. According to the common stereotype, married women, whose income is considered secondary to their husbands’, are typically not viewed as being as severely affected by job loss as are the primary, male wage earners, since the loss of the former’s income is not viewed to be of crucial importance. In addition, women are assumed to be better able to adjust to job loss because work is regarded as less central to married women’s identities than it is to their husband’s (Leana and Feldman, 1991).
Labour markets in SEE experienced sharply rising unemployment rates at the beginning of transition, but unlike in the transition economies of Central Europe, unemployment has remained stubbornly high, reflecting the depressed labour market (WBIF, 2012). Under these circumstances, alongside the traditional forms of adjustment to unemployment, additional mechanisms have emerged, such as employment in the informal sector, inactivity and emigration. The investigation of the interrelation between unemployment and these adjustment mechanisms is of particular importance since it makes examining their role in cushioning the economic and social consequences of persistent unemployment possible. The alternative forms of labour market adjustment might be considered from the perspective of their capacity to absorb a part of the unemployed workforce and providing additional income for the households. In this context, we investigate whether there are differences between men and women in the ways they respond to unemployment and, in particular, to what extent the above stereotypes are an accurate representation of behaviour in South Eastern Europe.

In addressing these issues, the discussion is structured as follows. In the following section we present a broader gender perspective of labour market segmentation in transition countries. Next, we identify the gender gap among unemployed workers in Macedonia, followed by an empirical assessment of gender differences in responses to unemployment. In the final section, we summarise the main findings of this analysis and formulate suitable labour market policies that will promote more equitable labour market outcomes.

**Labour market segmentation by gender during transition**

Labour force participation rates in SEE countries by gender are presented on Figure 1. From this figure, it is evident that there are relatively large gender gaps in participation rates in all these SEE countries, with the gap being especially large in Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania.

To analyse the causes of these large gender gaps in participation and the related ones in unemployment, we investigate the nature of gender segmentation in SEE labour markets. Segmentation in the labour market context means that we can identify different segments where demand and supply for labour adjust independently of the other segments. In other words, the rules of behaviour of labour market participants differ between segments. The idea of non-competing groups has been developed in labour market segmentation
theory. According to this theory, segments can operate independently because jobs and workers in each segment have different demand and supply side characteristics (Cain, 1976). On the supply side, labour market segmentation occurs as a result of the differences among the workers, such as age, gender, level of education, skills, professional preferences etc. On the demand side, the segmentation refers to the characteristics of the jobs, such as stability, wage level, required skills and education etc. In our analysis we focus on the gender aspect of labour market segmentation, first, by providing the theoretical background and, second, by presenting the empirical evidence about the gender gap in unemployment rates in transition countries.

According to Azmat et al. (2006) there are four main theoretical explanations for the gender gap in unemployment rates. Firstly, human capital theory attributes the differences in unemployment rates between men and women to difference in human capital accumulation and, hence, potential productivity. In high unemployment economies, the more educated displace the less educated from even relatively low productivity jobs. To the extent that women in South Eastern European economies still suffer from an education gap, this will then contribute to the gender unemployment gap. For
example, in the case of Macedonia, the female participation rate for those without education is only 11.6 percent, as compared to the equivalent male participation rate of 34.8%. In contrast, for the category of those with higher education, there is no significant gender gap in participation rates (82.2 and 84.0 percent respectively).¹

Second, labour market institutions that reduce the turnover of labour, for example, high firing costs, are likely to increase the gap in unemployment rates between workers with low and high level of labour market attachment. Third, the gender gap in unemployment rates might be due to both direct discrimination and statistical discrimination based upon a traditional stereotype of female workers as having, on average, relatively low productivity and high turnover and absenteeism rates, the latter being due to both their maternity and dependent care responsibilities and the difficulty of combining those roles in the absence of opportunities for part-time employment and child/dependency care facilities.

Fourth, the high levels of unemployment prevalent in the SEE may contribute to the size of the gender gap in unemployment through two opposing hypotheses: the added worker and discouraged worker effects. In the presence of high unemployment, female participation rates may increase, as they enter the labour force to compensate for the unemployment of the male breadwinner(s) in the household: the added worker effect (Bhalotra and Umana-Aponte, 2010). This effect is likely to be stronger, other things being equal, where households disproportionately face liquidity constraints, such as in SEE countries with under-developed capital markets and low replacement rates (low unemployment benefits). On the other hand, female participation rates may fall due to the lower probability of a successful job search in regions of high unemployment (the discouraged worker effect). A discouraged worker is a woman who is willing and able to work but has left the labour force and become part of the hidden unemployed because she believes that no jobs are available or she lacks the skills to get a job in current market conditions (Elliott and Dockery, 2006). Empirical studies have typically found that the discouraged worker effect dominates the added worker effect. However, where households face severe liquidity constraints, the participation rate of married women can have a countercyclical trend, i.e. moving in the direction opposite to the business cycle (Bhalotra and Umana-Aponte, 2010; Klasen and Pieters, 2012).

¹ Source: Labour Force Survey, 2012
Euwals et al. (2011) find that women are less likely to participate in the labour market when the unemployment rates faced by individuals with their level of education are higher. This, the authors argue, suggests that the discouraged worker effect is larger than the added worker effect and that the latter is weaker in high unemployment regions.

The evidence suggests that transition has strengthened labour market segmentation by gender, particularly with the growth of informal employment and the decline of state-owned enterprises. Recent estimates suggest that the informal sector in Macedonia represents around 35 per cent of the GDP (Schneider and Buehn, 2012). Investigations of the gender composition find that the majority of the informally employed are male (65.8 per cent) and that they dominate in all types of informal employment, except in the group of contributing family workers (Nikoloski, 2009).

Previous research has concluded that not all workers in transition countries are equally affected by unemployment (Cazes and Nesporova, 2003; Rutkowski, 2006; Nikoloski, 2011). Certain groups have both a higher probability of becoming and remaining unemployed, specifically, the young, women, some ethnic minorities (for example, the Roma) and less skilled workers in general. Further, among female workers certain groups of women, such as those living in rural areas, the less educated, mothers of young children and those who belong to ethnic or religious minorities, face more obstacles in entering or re-entering the labour market (EBRD, 2011). The increased risk of unemployment and/or non-participation amongst these groups has important social implications, such as rising income inequality, poverty and social exclusion.

The gender gap in unemployment rates during transition has been systematically investigated by Lauerová and Terrell (2007), who found that gender differences in unemployment do not appear to manifest a consistent pattern across the transitional countries. For instance, women have suffered more than men from unemployment in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, even though women’s unemployment rates are similar to men’s in Bulgaria and Russia and even lower in Slovenia, Ukraine and Hungary. Similarly, Bičáková (2010) found that among the eight new EU member states the gender unemployment gap was significant in Central European countries but not in the Baltic States. Hence, we can conclude that there is no universal tendency for transition to create a positive gender unemployment gap. However, as noted above, in South Eastern Europe high unemployment has been associated with both the emergence of sizeable gender unemployment gaps and, perhaps more significantly, large participation gaps.
Is there a gender unemployment gap in Macedonia?

In order to assess the gender gap among unemployed workers in Macedonia we use the officially published data by the Macedonian Statistical Office. The first Labour Force Survey (LFS) in Macedonia was conducted in 1996 and as of that time we have detailed data concerning labour market trends. The LFS survey is conducted according to the methodology recommended by the International Labour Office (ILO) and the recommendations of the European Statistical Bureau (Eurostat). The goal of the LFS is to provide comparable data concerning the size and the structure of the active population according to international standards. Units under observation in the LFS are households and all the persons in them. If we first consider gender differences in participation rates in Macedonia, it is evident that the male labour force participation rate is higher than the female participation rate. Between 1996 and 2012, the male participation rate varies between 65 and 69 percent, while the female participation rate varies between 43 and 45 percent. The observed gender difference in participation rates is consistent with the findings from other transition countries, where relatively lower female participation have been attributed to the absence of maternity benefits, parental leave entitlements and childcare facilities, which influenced women in particular to leave the labour force in order to take care of their children (Cazes and Nesporova, 2003). However, as in most South Eastern European countries, the gender participation gap in Macedonia was relatively large even in the pre-transitional period.

According to the LFS, a person is classified as unemployed if during the reference period of the survey he/she is without work, currently available for work, and actively seeking work. The comparison of gender unemployment rates shows that during the first phase of transition the female unemployment rate was higher than that for males. However, from Figure 2 we can see that these unemployment rates converged between 1996 and 2003. For illustration, in 1997 the female-male gap in unemployment rates was 7.8 percentage points, while in 2003 it turned into a negative difference (-0.7 percentage points). This trend of a diminishing female unemployment rate up to 2001 compared to the relatively stable male unemployment rate in part reflects the changing structure of the Macedonian economy with a growing agricultural sector, which absorbs a larger share of female workers than other sectors. Subsequently, during the period 2005-2012 the gender unemployment gap did not exceed 2 percentage points. During the current recession,
male unemployment rates have risen from 31.6 to 33.4 per cent, whereas the female unemployment rate has declined slightly from 34.5 to 33.5 per cent. This finding is consistent with global labour market tendencies, since the recession has mostly affected the tradable goods sectors that predominantly employ male workers (Şahin et al., 2010).

The Macedonian labour market has been characterised by a relatively stagnant unemployment pool that has been translated into increasing long-term unemployment\(^2\) (Nikoloski, 2009). Long-term unemployment accounts for more than 80 percent of total unemployment and has persisted over the whole period of transition. Moreover, the so-called very-long-term unemployment, comprising the unemployed who have been looking for work for more than four years, is much higher than in most other European countries (OECD, 2002). Indeed, the proportion of very-long-term unemployed accounts for about two thirds of total number of the Macedonian unemployed population.

\(^2\) The long-term unemployed are those who have been unemployed for more than one year.
Surprisingly, there is no significant difference in the pattern of unemployment duration between the male and female unemployed population.

In general, long-term unemployment has significantly contributed to an erosion of skills and motivation of unemployed workers, making them less employable over time. The deterioration of their skills further reduces the attractiveness of the long-term unemployed and often contributes to a blurring of the difference between the states of unemployment and non-participation. After remaining unemployed for a long period of time, a considerable number of unemployed workers stop looking for jobs and quit the labour force. This is known as the phenomenon of ‘discouraged workers,’ a characteristic of depressed labour markets where labour demand is insufficient and unemployed workers face poor employment prospects. In these circumstances, alternative labour market adjustment mechanisms, such as seeking employment in the informal sector and emigration, arise as coping strategies for providing a household’s subsistence.

**Are there gender differences in responses to unemployment?**

Since the female unemployment rate is not considerably higher than the male rate, we could categorise Macedonia as a “low-gap” country, though the large gender participation gap suggests that this would be misleading. We next analyse gender differences among unemployed workers by investigating the importance of alternative coping strategies. These labour market adjustment mechanisms, particularly employment in the informal sector and emigration, may play a crucial role in alleviating poverty among marginalised labour market segments by absorbing part of the unemployed workforce and providing additional income for the households (Nikoloski et al., 2012; Nikoloski, 2012). In addition, we consider the personal perception of their unemployment status as an important source of delineation since it can affect the individual’s commitment to find employment. Finally, any differences in responses to unemployment between males and females might reflect unequal policy treatment.

In order to examine whether there is a gender difference in the response to being unemployed, a survey was conducted on a representative sample of registered unemployed workers. The survey was conducted from mid-October to mid-November 2011, with a sample consisting of 2,300 registered unemployed workers selected randomly in each of 30 branch offices of the Employment Service Agency (ESA) all over the country. Among the respon-
dents, 1157 (50.3%) were men and 1143 (49.7%) were women. The selection method was based on convenience sampling, meaning that interviewers had freedom of selecting eligible and readily accessible respondents. Moreover, the geographical distribution was maintained by selecting from each branch office a proportional number of respondents with respect to the total number of registered unemployed workers.

In order to assess the factors that influence gender responses to unemployment in Macedonia an econometric model was specified with a binary response variable. A Logit model was chosen to estimate the binary model, with the dependent variable taking the value one if the respondent is female and zero otherwise. Among the possible determinants of segmentation, we take into consideration the following personal traits: (i) the impact of unemployment on health, (ii) personal perception of future status, (iii) the intensity of searching for a job, (iv) intention to emigrate, and (v) engagement in the informal sector. Additionally, segmentation is estimated with respect to the following policy indicators: (i) being a health insurance beneficiary, (ii) being an unemployment benefit recipient, (iii) participation in active labour market programmes, and (iv) being a social assistance recipient. The results from the estimated model are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Estimated Logit model for the female unemployed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>Diff. in odd ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.7421</td>
<td>0.1580</td>
<td>4.6969***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment causes stressing situation or other health problems</td>
<td>0.0524</td>
<td>0.1164</td>
<td>0.4503</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceives herself as unemployed in five years’ time</td>
<td>0.3081</td>
<td>0.1267</td>
<td>2.4302**</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search for job</td>
<td>-0.0729</td>
<td>0.1154</td>
<td>-0.6314</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have intention to emigrate</td>
<td>-0.5198</td>
<td>0.0919</td>
<td>-5.6509***</td>
<td>-40.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earn income from additional activities</td>
<td>-0.5228</td>
<td>0.0913</td>
<td>-5.7217***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being health insurance beneficiary</td>
<td>-0.3214</td>
<td>0.0913</td>
<td>-3.5204***</td>
<td>-40.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment benefit recipient</td>
<td>-0.3929</td>
<td>0.1668</td>
<td>-2.3550**</td>
<td>-27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in the active programmes</td>
<td>-0.0802</td>
<td>0.1476</td>
<td>-0.5433</td>
<td>-32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social assistance recipient</td>
<td>-0.1160</td>
<td>0.1695</td>
<td>-0.6845</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
With respect to personal perceptions, the results suggest that there is no significant difference in the impact of unemployment on men’s and women’s psychological health. This finding is consistent with previous empirical studies that found similar incidences of mental and physical illness amongst male and female unemployed (Ensminger and Celentano, 1990). However, females were more pessimistic about being able to find employment. The results suggest that the probability of a female unemployed worker expecting that she will still be unemployed in five years’ time is about 36% higher than that for male unemployed workers. Considering the alternative adjustment mechanisms, the female unemployed have about a 40% lower intention of emigrating compared to unemployed men. Additionally, they are about 41% less likely to be engaged in informal economic activities. With respect to labour market policies, we notice that the female unemployed are about 28% less likely to be health insurance beneficiaries and 33% less likely to be unemployment benefit recipients. This result is consistent with other empirical analyses suggesting that women are less likely to receive unemployment and health benefits because of eligibility rules that disproportionately disqualify women (Mitchell, 2010). Finally, we found no gender differences in participation in active labour market policies or in ability to access social assistance benefits.

Overall, it is evident that the gender of an unemployed worker represents a significant source of delineation, overall, it seems that unemployed women are considerably more disadvantaged than their male counterparts. This is evidenced by their lower inclusion in alternative forms of labour market adjustment, as well as their lower ability to access passive labour market policies that, all together, have been translated into their more pessimistic perception of their ability to escape their current unemployment status.

Conclusions and policy recommendations

Two decades of transition have *inter alia* produced enormous changes, amongst which has been increasing segmentation of the labour markets from a gender perspective. Our analysis suggests that whilst Macedonia does not have a significant gender unemployment gap, there are large gender differences in participation rates and responses to unemployment with respect to the use of the alternative labour market adjustment mechanisms, coverage by passive policy measures and expectations regarding their ability to escape unemployment.
First, women face a significantly higher probability of being discouraged about their future employment status. Second, due to insufficient job creation in the formal sector, unemployed workers in Macedonia resort to various forms of labour market adjustment mechanisms that alleviate some of the negative social consequences of unemployment. However, our empirical analysis suggests that women are significantly underrepresented amongst the unemployed who use these alternative coping strategies. This could be attributed to female's greater engagement in household work such as meal planning, shopping, home maintenance, or taking care of children and the elderly. This is consistent with the dominance of the traditional male breadwinner model in Macedonia, i.e. it is predominantly the male members of the family who work outside the home to provide the family with income and the female members who disproportionately undertake household production activities. Third, equity considerations suggest that policy measures should target the most vulnerable segments of the unemployed population in order to support them financially and assist them in gaining employment in the formal sector. However, we found that female unemployed workers were less likely to benefit from passive labour market policies and gained no advantage in accessing active labour market programmes.

Generally, the incentives to register as unemployed in Macedonia originate in the relatively generous eligibility for other entitlements, such as health benefits and social assistance, rather than in the generosity of the unemployment benefits themselves. This is a situation common to other SEE countries. Furthermore, the relatively easy access to these entitlements renders some other adjustment mechanisms, such as employment in the informal sector or temporary/seasonal emigration, as more attractive alternatives for those not employed in the formal sector. Our results indicate a striking contrast between the male and female unemployed, with the former being more able to access these benefits and, at the same time, finding it easier to gain employment in the informal sector. As a consequence, when undertaking measures to restrict the generosity of unemployment benefits, the government has to account for at least two important issues. First, the incentives created by other entitlements tied to the registration status of the unemployed and, second, possible overlaps between registered unemployment and other labour market adjustment mechanisms. Namely, less generous passive labour market policies that are not accompanied by sufficient additional job creation in the formal sector are unlikely to cause a decrease in the unemployment rate.
Even though the scope of the active labour market programmes in Macedonia carried is relatively large, their coverage remains relatively modest. Preparatory programmes for employment provide training for registered unemployed workers from disadvantaged segments in order to improve their competitiveness and employability in the labour market, as well as to improve the matching process between the supply and demand of labour. Notwithstanding equity concerns and the promotion of women’s empowerment, rising female employment has been found to aid economic development (Duflo, 2012 and Bandiera and Natraj, 2013), reduce poverty (Kabeer, 2012), raise female happiness and life satisfaction (Berger, 2013) and reduce the female brain drain (Nejad, 2012). Hence, future labour market policy in Macedonia and elsewhere in SEE should target closing the large gender gaps through improved childcare provision, promotion of equal employment opportunities, measures to reduce the adverse impact of career breaks through paid leave and right of return to post and using active labour market policies to improve the prospects of the female unemployed.

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Retraditionalization or Reflexive Modernity: A Sociological Explanation of Fertility Trends in Mature Transitional Croatia

Introduction

A recent Eurostat report on fertility trends in Europe (Lanzieri, 2013) has brought to light some unexpected and apparently contradictory results related to the then-accession country of Croatia, which soon after the publication of the report became a full member of the European Union.¹ According to the data presented in the report, Croatia, on the whole, consistently followed the patterns of average total fertility rates in Central, Eastern and Southern European countries in the four successive three-year periods between the years 2000 and 2011. However, the data relating to the 2009-2011 period indicated a certain Croatian peculiarity: namely, that in that country employed women with higher educational attainment tended to give more births than unemployed women with lower educational attainment. In this respect, Croatia figured as the polar opposite of Germany. Likewise, the fertility of educated and employed women in Croatia was shown to be among the highest in Europe, while in some Eastern European EU member countries general fertility rates have returned to “lowest-low” levels.

¹ The manuscript for the Eurostat report in question was completed on May 7, 2013, and the Republic of Croatia became a full member of the European Union on July 1, 2013.
This paper aims to explain the apparent contradictions in socio-demographic patterns of fertility in late transitional Croatia, i.e. in the context in which the country – measured by the yardstick of readiness for EU accession – reached the stage of “mature transition”. The explanation offered in the paper is based on an interpretation of empirical data resulting from a survey of Croatian women carried out in 2005 on a nationally representative sample (Tomić-Koludrović, 2015, as well as on previous theoretical contextualizations of the social position, values and attitudes of women in Croatia in the periods of “early” (Tomić-Koludrović, Kunac, 2000) and “mature” transition (Tomić-Koludrović, Lončarić, 2007). The conclusion is that – in spite of the consistently high appreciation of family values among women in Croatia - the current sociodemographic fertility patterns are not attributable to either the alleged post-socialist retraditionalization or to a possible self-actualization tendency characteristic of reflexive modernity, but to a mixture of the socialist heritage regarding work practices, increasing self-expression values among young and educated women, and the continued existence in Croatia of the pre-austerity welfare state mechanisms related to maternity leave.

In the text that follows, we first summarize the findings of the above-mentioned Eurostat report on fertility trends in Europe (Lanzieri, 2013), with a special focus on the Croatian data in a comparative context. Following that, we comment on apparent contradictions implicit in these data, if viewed from a perspective which does not take into account a sociological explanation of the socio-cultural aspects (as expressed through values and attitudes) of the studied population (in this case, women of childbearing age). Finally, we interpret the Eurostat data from a perspective that takes into account the results of previous sociological research of women in Croatia, based on a theoretical

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2 The political and economic criteria for accession of the former socialist countries to the EU were laid down in 1993 in the form of the so-called Copenhagen criteria, which required stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, existence of a functioning market economy, and ability of the candidate country to take over the responsibility of membership. The fourth criterion was added at the European Council meeting in Madrid in 1995. This final criterion required adjustment of the administrative and judiciary structures to fit EU norms, so that the Copenhagen criteria could be successfully implemented. The countries meeting these criteria of “EU conditionality” and awaiting full membership in the Union are judged to have weathered the “early transition” period and entered the stage of “mature transition”.

3 It should be mentioned here that, as explained in the “Methodological notes” section of the quoted Eurostat report, “[m]ost of the statistics presented in [it] are experimental and are not part of the regular production of Eurostat. All input Eurostat data are provided
perspective informed by newer theories of modernization and complemented here by an analogy with the partial acquisition of “capitals” in a Bourdieuan theory of social stratification. Viewed from this perspective, the analyzed data do not appear as contradictory, but to express, instead, the intricate realities of the social position of women in “mature transitional” Croatia in relation to their idiosyncratic value orientations.

Croatian fertility trends in a comparative European context

Croatian total fertility rate (TFR)\(^4\) trends in a comparative European context can be most readily assessed from graphical depictions of the four three-year periods (2000-2002, 2003-2005, 2006-2008, 2009-2011), presented in Figure 3 of Eurostat’s report on the topic (Lanzieri, 2013: 3). It is evident from this representation that Croatia can be grouped together with the countries that mostly exhibited “low” (1.3 – 1.5) or occasionally “lowest low” levels (\(< =1.3\)) of total fertility rate (TFR). As has been mentioned above, these are the countries of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, which can in this regard be viewed as a group, i.e. relatively independently of whether they are “old” or “new” European Union member states. In contrast with this group of countries, in which the TFR variation alternated mostly between “low” and “lowest low” levels, the Scandinavian countries, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as Great Britain and Ireland, consistently exhibited comparatively high total fertility rates (mostly >1.7).\(^5\)

Relating fertility trends to the level of participation of women in the labor market, Akrap and Čipin (2011: 50) hypothesize that the relatively high TFR in the Scandinavian and Western European countries could be attributed to their earlier transition to the “dual-earner model”. They also mention the im-

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4 As succinctly explained in the Eurostat report, “[t]he total fertility rate (TFR) is the most common period indicator of fertility, measuring the average number of live births a woman would deliver if she were to experience the fertility rates of a given period (usually a year). It is computed as the sum over childbearing age of age-specific fertility rates, in their turn computed as the ratio of the number of live births from women of a given age to the number of women of the same age exposed to the risk of childbearing (usually estimated as the average number of women in that year)” (Lanzieri, 2013: 15).

5 The only – minor - exceptions to this pattern are Great Britain, Sweden and Belgium, which had second highest (1.5 – 1.7) TFR in the period 2000-2002.
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importance of institutional support for employed women with children, as well as the existence of possibilities for part-time employment after the maternity leave period (Akrap and Čipin, 2011: 51). From a sociological point of view, such a hypothesis could certainly be complemented by additional considerations of the specific “modes of modernity” (Touraine, 2009 [2007]) at work in these countries, all the more so because these are closely related to the accomplished levels of gender equality and general societal democratization.

However, regardless of the theoretical perspective one opts for when interpreting the data at hand, the fact remains that in the Scandinavian and Western European countries total fertility rates remain consistently higher and more stable than in the Central, Eastern, and Southern European countries. In the latter group, only Germany, Austria, Portugal and Croatia did not experience any variation in their low (1.3 – 1.5) total fertility rates in the entire twelve year period under discussion (2000-2011).6

Namely, in the period between 2000 and 2002, the Southern European countries of Spain, Italy and Greece experienced “lowest low” TFR levels (< =1.3), as did some of the Central and Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria). In the period from 2003 to 2005, TFRs for Spain, Italy and Greece rose to the 1.3 – 1.5 level, where they subsequently remained, while TFRs for almost all postsocialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe were at the “lowest low” levels (the only exception being Estonia, which remained at the previously recorded 1.3 – 1.5 level). In the 2006-2008 period, TFRs in the postsocialist countries mostly rose to the 1.3 – 1.5 level, with the exceptions of Slovakia (which remained at the “lowest low” level) and Estonia (which rose to the 1.5 – 1.7 level). Finally, in the 2009-2011 period, Hungary and Latvia returned to the “lowest low” level, while Slovenia, Bulgaria and Lithuania unexpectedly rose to the 1.5 – 1.7 level, alongside Estonia.

If Croatia is viewed in the context of the postsocialist group of Central and Eastern European countries, it is remarkable that - in contrast to what happened in these countries in the period around the 2004 EU enlargement - TFR in Croatia did not record a significant drop in what was one of the final pre-accession periods for that country (2009-2011).7 It remains to be seen

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6 It should be mentioned that for Croatia, as well as for Latvia, the 2000-2002 average is based only on the available data for the year 2002 (Lanzieri, 2013: 3).
7 According to the data presented in Lanzieri (2013: 4), the two Mediterranean (i.e. Southern European) countries that joined the EU in 2004 (Malta and Cyprus) also experienced a slight drop of TFRs in the three-year periods around and following the 2004 EU enlargement.
whether its TFR will drop in the post-accession years or whether it will stay within the Population Division of the United Nations Secretariat’s projection for Croatia for the 2010-2015 period, which stands at 1.49 (i.e. at the upper level of the stable Croatian 1.3-1.5 TFR) (UN DESA, 2012).

The latest available data for Croatia in the Eurostat report (for the years 2010 and 2011) suggest a certain drop from the peak 1.49 (recorded in 2009) to 1.46 in 2010 and to 1.40 in 2011. But, as Lanzieri (2013: 13) rightly points out, “[t]he continuation or reversal of past trends [...] may be due either to changes in the number of women of childbearing age and/or in fertility rates”. More accurate assessments for the period will therefore have to wait for future data (up to the year 2015) to become available for disaggregation.

Likewise, Lanzieri (2013: 5) – again rightly – suggests that it is not easy to disentangle a possible “natural” decrease in the number of live births (caused by the shrinking number of women of childbearing age and/or a continuing decline in their fertility rates) from the impact of occasional shocks, such as an economic crisis or prolonged periods of economic uncertainty. In an attempt to establish a solid analytical background for the discussion of a possible “baby recession” in Europe, he has correlated the time series of the changes in TFR with selected indicators of economic crisis for each of the discussed 31 European countries, using available annual data from 2000 to 2011.8 His general conclusion is that changes in fertility partially follow changes in the economy, with an average lag of about 19 months (Lanzieri, 2013: 5).

The same holds true for Croatia in all the correlations computed for available indicators of economic crisis for that country (GDP, AIC, UNE): the average lag of fertility changes in all three cases stands at two years. This makes it likely that the effects of EU accession, as well as of the intensification of fiscal austerity that followed it, will only be felt in the period for which the data are as yet not available. It is also interesting to note that – if one takes into consideration the uniformity of the duration of TFR lag with respect to the three mentioned indicators (GDP, AIC, UNE) – Croatia falls into the group of countries such as Norway, Island, Finland, the Netherlands and Estonia.

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8 The indicators of economic crisis Lanzieri used to make his correlations are Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Actual Individual Consumption (AIC), Annual Unemployment rate (UNE) for the age group 15-49, and, finally, Consumers’ Confidence Index (CCI). Computations for Croatia were made without the unavailable CCI data, meant to measure the sentiment of economic uncertainty.
and not into the group of those countries (including the postsocialist ones) in which variation in this respect is more pronounced.

But if grouping of Croatia with the aforementioned countries comes as a surprise, the discussion of Croatian specific total fertility rates (by employment status and educational attainment) in a European context holds even more surprises in stock. As Lanzieri remarks with regard to differential fertility trends, except for a general downward trend, it is “difficult to detect a common pattern across Europe” (Lanzieri, 2013: 8).

If we discuss TFR data for individual European countries in relation to the employment status of women, one notices that in Belgium, Germany, Austria, Romania, Finland and Norway non-employed women on the whole tend to have higher fertility rates from those that are employed. In other countries, the opposite was true (except for Greece, Luxemburg, and Malta, where rates vary). Likewise, in some countries differentials of this kind were further increased (for example, in Germany TFRs of unemployed women were on the rise, while those of employed women were falling). In other countries they were decreasing (in the cases of Spain and Greece, due to the rising TFRs of employed women), while in Norway there was a trend towards convergence (Lanzieri, 2013: 8).

In spite of all this variation, in the case of the polar opposites of Germany and Croatia, the trend is clear: while in Germany unemployed women with lower educational attainment tended to give most births, in Croatia this trend was reversed. For example, in the year 2011, employed women in Germany gave 1.8 fewer live births than non-employed women, while in Croatia exactly the opposite was true. ⁹ If educational attainment is taken into account, the structure of specific TFRs for Croatia for the year 2011 was as follows: for women with International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels 0-2, the TFR stood at 1.31, for those with ISCED levels 3-4 at 1.42, and those with ISCED 5-6 at 1.57. This comes as no surprise, since in Croatia TFRs for women with ISCED levels 5-6 have proved to be continually high since the beginning of measurement in 2008.

⁹ TFRs for nonemployed women in Germany for the years between 2007 and 2011 stood at 2.20, 2.22, 2.48, 2.58, and 2.66 respectively, while in Croatia in the same period TFRs stood at 0.75, 0.65, 0.69, 0.68, and 0.63. On the other hand, TFRs for employed women in Germany in the same period stood at 0.96, 0.98, 0.87, 0.90, 0.88, and in Croatia at 2.23, 2.44, 2.52, 2.51, and 2.44.
Generally speaking, in the period between 2008 and 2011, the values of Croatian specific TFRs related to educational attainment were close to the EU average in given ISCED categories, while their pattern resembled that characteristic of some former socialist and Scandinavian countries. This means that in these countries in the referent period women with ISCED 0-2 and 5-6 levels on the whole tended to have higher TFRs, and women with ISCED 3-4 levels, lower TFRs. In contrast to this, in countries like Greece, Spain and Austria, a linear decrease was recorded in the same period (with ISCED levels 0-2 women having higher, ISCED levels 3-4 having medium, and ISCED levels 5-6 women having lower TFRs).

From a demographer’s point of view, the fact that women with secondary education (ISCED-levels 3-4) actually represent the majority of women of child-bearing age in Croatia could be seen as a significant obstacle to upward fertility trends in the future. But from a sociologist’s point of view, it seems more interesting to try to explain the structure of the pattern relating educational attainment to fertility in Croatia and, in particular, the fact that employed women with high educational attainment give more births there than anywhere else in Europe.

On the one hand, the “Scandinavian-like” nature of patterns of childbearing in Croatia can be easily related to the relatively high levels of privilege in an undeconstructed welfare state context. Paid maternity leave and legal entitlement to job-protected maternity leave can certainly be seen as an incentive for women of child-bearing age to engage in rational choice decision-making. Likewise, as Čipin (2011: 27-28) reminds us, it is worth bearing in mind that

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10 According to Croatian Bureau of Statistics data from the 2011 census, 37% of women in Croatia at that time had primary education or less (ISCED levels 0-2), 46% had secondary education (ISCED levels 3-4), and 17% higher education (ISCED levels 5-6). Čipin’s approximation of the breakdown of educational status of women of child-bearing age (Čipin, 2011: 33) is consistent with these data: according to this author, it was logical to assume that the percentage of women between the ages of 20 and 39 with tertiary education grew in relation to 1991 and 2001 census data, while the percentage of women with primary or no education continued to fall.

11 The “Scandinavian” pattern of childbearing in Croatia was noted and highlighted by the popular press reporting on the findings of Eurostat’s report (cf. Turčin, 2013). In a different context, a comment of the Croatian government’s strategy of management of state property (Barukčić, 2013) also placed the country in the company of highly developed Scandinavian nations. In the article quoted, Croatia was said to be the fifth country in Europe in terms of unprivatized state property, after Norway, Finland, Island and Sweden.
for women with lower levels of educational attainment, it is not only more difficult to find employment, but that low salaries can also demotivate them to return to work after maternity leave.

On the other hand, when discussing decisions of educated and employed women in Croatia to have children, one should also take into account their attitudes, values and practices. Among other things, such a discussion should touch on the elements of socialist heritage (such as the importance of work for the identity of women), as well as on a possible influence of postsocialist “retraditionalization” (more precisely, ideological espousal of childbearing). But before the tension between the socialist and postsocialist elements of gender identity of women in Croatia is discussed in sociological terms, it is useful to present a demographer’s view of the phenomenon studied.

**A demographer’s interpretation of recent Croatian fertility trends**

As has already been mentioned, a decrease of Croatian TFR was recorded two years after the breakout of the global economic crisis in 2008. This is roughly consistent with Lanzieri’s conclusion that changes in fertility on the average lag about 19 months behind those in the economy (Lanzieri, 2013: 5). However, this decrease was not drastic, and for an attempt at the explanation of the “Scandinavian-like” pattern of the specific TFRs (employment and education-related), it would seem more relevant to discuss long-term Croatian fertility trends.

In a more long-term context, Lanzieri’s diagram with graphical depictions of European fertility trends between 2000 and 2011 (Lanzieri, 2013: 3) clearly places Croatia in the group of Central, Eastern and Southern European countries with lower and less stable fertility rates than is the case in the Scandinavian and Western European countries. Viewed in a still wider, historical perspective, Croatian fertility rates prove to have been low since the 1960s or even since the end of the 1950s, depending on measurement methodology (Čipin, 2011: 25).

Čipin (2011) bases his explanation of these long-term trends on a theory of “second demographic transition”, formulated in the contributions of au-

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12 TFR in Croatia in the year 2008 stood at 1.46, in the year 2009 at 1.49, in the year 2010 at 1.46, and then, in the year 2011, at 1.40 (Lanzieri, 2013: 4).
thors such as Van de Kaa (1987; 2001), Lesthaeghe (1995) and Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1988). These culturally inspired interpretations of low fertility trends center on the increased importance of self-actualization in the lives of individuals and couples, which is seen as a result of ever-stronger processes of individualization. Within this framework of reference, the decreasing importance of having children can be seen as related to the increasing importance of “postmaterialist” and “self-expression” values in Inglehart’s modernization theory.

Čipin (2011: 26) also mentions that some demographers claim that the ever-increasing number of women with tertiary education and their desire for economic autonomy can be seen as key factors leading to new family forms and higher rates of birth postponement. Prolonged education gives women better career prospects and globalization pressures lead to ever more women taking part in post degree professional education. In short, according to the theory of “second demographic transition”, tertiary education and values that go with it are not compatible with having children, especially at an early age.

According to Čipin (2011: 41), trends associated with “second demographic transition” have not as yet been fully realized in Croatia, but he expects they will be in the future. Namely, alongside Hungary and Slovenia, Croatia was one of the first socialist countries in which some characteristics of “second demographic transition” were recorded, such as postponement of first childbirth. However, in the post-socialist context, it is evident that this particular transition process has been left unfinished. Such an assessment is partly based on a 2007 survey carried out on a nationally representative sample and reported by Čipin (2011), the results of which indicated that there was no significant variation in motivation for fertility between secondary and tertiary educated women in Croatia.

The matter is further complicated by the fact that differences with regard to closeness to “postmaterial” values were recorded in the results of the same survey: employed women of higher educational status aspired to self-actualization much more so than women of lower educational status. To explain the contradiction between an even fertility motivation and evident differences in the level of aspirations for self-actualization, Čipin (2011: 41) quotes Obradović and Čudina-Obradović (2001), who claim that the correlation between fertility and tertiary education is “indirect” and operates through numerous other socio-psychological and socio-economic variables.
In this case, a newer demographic approach, which goes beyond macro-level statistics and takes into account values and practices, proves to be only partially helpful for understanding the complexities and contradictions of certain postsocialist fertility trends. The same goes for other potentially relevant monodimensional theories and approaches.

For example, speaking about the employment status of women, Akrap and Čipin (2011) mention that differences in fertility in this regard can be correlated with the achieved level of transformation of the traditional model of male bread-winner, i.e. with its substitution with the dual earner model. The latter is the norm in highly developed countries, such as the Scandinavian countries, where the “second demographic transition” has been completed and where there exist developed mechanisms of institutional support for women. In these countries, fertility rates are relatively high. In contrast to this, in the group of countries in which a genuine transformation in the direction of the dual earner model has still not taken place (such as in Southern European countries), fertility rates remain low.

Akrap and Čipin (2011) place Croatia in this group of countries and plead for increased state intervention in the development of institutional support for employed women with children. It is true that in the period of postsocialist transition women in Croatia were faced with increased expectations of fertility without a corresponding development of modern support institutions. This was due to the process of retraditionalization, a part of which was an attempted deconstruction of a socialist-style agenda for the emancipation of women through work: support measures were openly ideologically aimed at achieving “the domestification of motherhood” for the most part of transition and especially during its initial ten-year period. However, this ideological drive toward an effective re-establishment of the traditional model of male bread-winner or, at least, of its modernized version, did not succeed. This is evidenced by the very 2007 survey commented on by Akrap and Čipin (2011: 47), the results of which indicated that as much as 83.7% of the employed women in Croatia highly valued employment and preferred the dual-earner model (which had already – although perhaps not “genuinely” – been established in the socialist period).  

13 Akrap and Čipin (2011: 47) mention that, according to 2007 survey they comment on, the model of the male bread-winner was shown to be preferred by women with traditional conception of gender roles and with three or more children. The model of modernized bread-winner was preferred mostly by women with secondary education. But
All this goes to say that, due to its socialist past, the model of dual earner is not new to Croatia. What is more, during the socialist period it was ideologically advocated in the same way as “the domestification of motherhood” was in the initial postsocialist period. The results of the 2007 survey commented on by Akrap and Čipin (2011), as well as of other comparable surveys carried out in “mature transitional Croatia” (cf. Tomić-Koludrović, 2015) suggest that – in contrast with the “domestification of motherhood” – the importance of paid work outside the home has been firmly established not only as an element of emancipation, but also of identity of women in present-day Croatia. This would seem to support Čipin’s (2011: 41) belief in Croatia’s continued progression toward a fuller realization of the “second demographic transition”, as well as those views and analyses claiming that countries with lowest employment rates for women also tend to have lowest fertility rates (Akrap and Čipin 2011: 54; Lanzieri, 2013).

But how, then, to explain the component of “self-actualization” and “post-materialist” values associated with the theory of “second demographic transition”? Likewise, how to explain the reversal of the usually negative correlation between the levels of education and fertility rates in the country (Croatia) in which in the year 2011 women with highest education levels tended to have the highest TFR (Lanzieri, 2013: 11)? Furthermore, can high TFRs for educated and employed women in Croatia in the period between 2008 and 2011 be explained just by the rational choice decisions motivated by maternity leave benefits and legal entitlement to job-protected maternity leave? Or, are we in this case also talking about the elements of the trend noted by Zulehner (2003), according to which some educated, “postmodern” young women in Austria tended to choose motherhood as a mode of self-actualization? To attempt to provide answers to these questions, we need to engage in a more detailed sociological analysis of gender values, attitudes and practices of women in “mature transitional Croatia”. 

the mentioned high level of acceptance of dual earner model by the employed women is further emphasized by the fact that it cuts across the board, i.e. that it is preferred by the employed women regardless of their age or educational level.
A sociological reinterpretation of contradictions in Croatian fertility trends

A sociological reinterpretation of contradictions in Croatian fertility trends begins where a demographer’s interpretation has in actuality come to a stop, and that is at the assertion of the importance of value orientations in a discussion of fertility trends. What is blocking progress to an interpretation which would be relevant to the specific Croatian circumstances is a face value assumption that – consistent with the tenets of “second demographic transition” theory – “post-materialist” or “self-expression” values would lead to a decline in fertility.

Namely, if values are taken as predictive of practices and levels of education as related to value orientations, it would follow that women with higher levels of education would be more likely to exhibit values consistent with “post-materialist”, “self-expression” trends. This would, in turn, mean that they would be more prone to engage in “self-actualization” practices and, consequently, less likely to have children than women with lower levels of education. However, the empirical data from the 2007 survey commented on by Čipin (2011: 41) indicated that in Croatia at the time of the survey the sum of realized and intended numbers of children was almost identical for women with secondary and women with tertiary education. What is more, the data presented in Lanzieri (2013) show that the 2007 “intentions” of women with higher education levels in Croatia to have children were realized in the subsequent period.

Commenting on the conclusions of Lanzieri’s report, Čipin stated that “the trend was correct although surprising” (Turčin, 2013). Such a statement expresses well the predicament of a demographer who has painstakingly analyzed the available empirical data and equally conscientiously studied the value-related tenets of “second demographic transition” theory. It is at the same time a good starting point for an analysis that approaches value orientations in a different way: what is needed to arrive at an explanation of the apparent contradictions in Croatian fertility trends are multidimensional approaches taking into account the complex relations of different values, attitudes and practices in a specific social context. Sociology, as a multiparadigmatic science, is capable of offering such approaches to the subject-matter under discussion.

Starting from this general assumption, we will now first refer to a general conclusion of a discussion of value changes in Croatia from 1985 to 2010,
presented in Sekulić (2012). This will be followed by an account of a more comprehensive examination of the “modes of modernity” in which gender practices were reproduced in the contexts of “early” and “mature” transition, based on empirical surveys carried out in 1999 (Tomić-Koludrović and Kunac, 2000) and 2005 (Tomić-Koludrović, 2015).

Sekulić’s analysis of value changes in Croatia in the period extending between “late socialism” and “mature transition” shows that there can be no clear-cut designation of all of these changes as going in the direction of “retraditionalization” or “modernization”. Given the heavy ideological pressure on women to retraditionalize in Croatian political rhetoric of the 1990s, Sekulić’s conclusion that “retraditionalization” affected the dimensions associated with political identity (“national exclusivism” and “intensity of religiosity”) but not that of “gender conservatism”, might come across as somewhat surprising.

Contrary to expectations, Sekulić’s analysis shows that “gender conservatism” was the most accepted of the three analyzed values in late socialism, while this “strong[est] indicator of conservatism” was the least accepted one in 2010, i.e. as the transition period approached its completion. In other words, “during the postsocialist period [gender conservatism] constantly and permanently decrease[d]” (Sekulić, 2012: 254), which would, in turn, mean that the modernization process in this particular respect continued its course uninterruptedly.

Graph 2: Value orientations traditionalism – modernism in the observed intervals
Source: Sekulić (2012: 254)
This is perhaps the occasion to return for a moment to demographic analyses of fertility trends predicting that fertility rates will increase with the increase of gender equity within families. Analyzing Finnish realities, Miettinen, Basteen and Rotkirch (2011: 470) quote influential articles by Peter McDonald (2000a, 2000b), claiming that the imbalance between high gender equity in the context of education and employment and lower level of equity in family life have contributed to low fertility in advanced countries.

In the case of Croatia, the data presented in Lanzieri (2013) show that - although fertility in the country remains at low levels - in those populations of women where higher gender equity in the family can be presupposed (highly educated and employed), and is, furthermore, combined with favorable maternity leave conditions, fertility rates tend to grow. While there is no doubt that this is a cogent explanation of a demographic trend, a multidimensional sociological analysis reminds us that there can be no presupposition of linearity in the way modernization processes operate.

The analysis of the empirical data from the 2005 survey of Croatian women, in relation to the comparable data gathered by the survey carried out in 1999, leads to the conclusion which is consistent with Sekulić’s (2012), namely that “a move to modernity” (Tomić-Koludrović, 2015) took place. But a closer look at the empirical material resulting from the 2005 survey reveals ambivalences in values, attitudes and practices of the surveyed women, leading to possible interpretive ambiguities when discussing the level of modernity achieved.

The ambivalences at stake are primarily related to attitudes regarding paid work outside the home and family life or, in other words, “career” and “maternity”. In general, Croatian women value family life highly and when pressed to opt for either family or career, give preference to “family” in a very high percentage (83.4% of the surveyed). At the same time, the surveyed women value highly the importance of paid work outside the home: 58.5% “strongly agree” and “agree” that paid work is important for a “meaningful life” for women, and 67% “strongly agree” and “agree” that “paid work makes women independent from their partner”. Furthermore, 62.1% of the surveyed women “strongly agree” and “agree” that “emancipation is imperative and good for the general development of the society”.

How to explain these ambivalences, which appear as contradictions if they are not subjected to further theoretical elaboration? One possible explanation could be that a large number of women in postsocialist countries have socialized positive attitudes toward paid work outside the home due to
the systematic promotion of employment of women in the socialist period, as argued by Pascall and Manning (2000: 262). But such an attempt at explanation of the ambivalences at stake can only be partial. Namely, it does not explain the variation in the current level of support for paid work of women outside the home in different postsocialist countries, although they were all subjected to intense strategies of promotion of employment of women in the socialist period.

In this context, how to explain the fact that in Croatia in the 2005 survey, only 43.3% of the surveyed women agreed with the statement “a small child will certainly suffer if the mother is employed”, while in the 2004 Gender and Generation Survey (GGS Wave 1) it was supported by over 60% of Bulgarian and over 80% of Hungarian women? What is more, the level of support for this statement in Bulgaria and Hungary was much higher than in “old European member states” Germany and France, in which – according to the same survey – the support for the quoted statement stood at 40% and 49% respectively (Stoilova, Riebling and Hofäcker, 2011: 9). All of this goes to say that the issue of attitudes toward the employment of women in postsocialist countries should be correlated with other gender specific values, attitudes and practices, serving as more comprehensive indicators of the “modes of modernity” at work in specific contexts.

However, as soon as we attempt to do that, in the case of Croatia, we are faced with new ambivalences and contradictions. For example, while 60% of the women surveyed in 2005 supported the statement “an employed mother can establish as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work for pay”, 58.3% at the same time agreed with the statement “a job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children”. The question is again how to explain this ambivalence, especially in the light of all the already mentioned complexities and contradictions?

One possible explanation again relates to the socialist past of the country: it is indeed likely that attitudes on gender emancipation that are attributed to “modern” and “postmodern” women in the countries with a shorter tradition of significant participation of women in the labor market are in the Croatian context also held by women adhering to “traditional” and even “premodern”

14 In the case of Germany, one should take note of the fact that a part of the sample also contained women socialized in the former socialist East Germany. However, this does not alter significantly the rather drastic differences in the levels of support for the quoted statement between Germany and Bulgaria or Hungary.
values. This in turn would go to say that the gender identity of the majority of women is simultaneously related to both paid work outside the home and traditional female family roles. Hence, in spite of the high value attached to employment in terms of its contribution to independence and meaningfulness of female existence, a high percentage of the surveyed women still see men predominately in the bread-winning role.\(^{15}\)

Based on what has been said so far, it is possible to conclude that Croatian women have internalized both the role of a bread-winner (i.e. of a person contributing to the economic stability of the family by paid employment outside of home) and of a homemaker (i.e. of a person managing day-to-day operations in the family home). What is more, it appears that they consider being successful in both roles as a form of self-actualization. In a wider interpretive context, this would in turn go to say that one should be very careful not to take the positive attitudes of women in Croatia toward paid work outside of home as a clear-cut indicator of “modernity” or “postmodernity”, as is usually the case in interpretations of empirical research based on various forms of modernization theory (e.g. Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). That the Croatian gender-related modernization processes tend to be more non-linear than in a comparable case of a country without the element of socialist gender emancipation in its past has been shown by the analysis presented in Tomić-Koludrović and Lončarić (2007). The challenge now is how to explain this non-linearity in a wider theoretical context.

**Non-linear modernization and partial acquisition of values: keys to an explanation of contradictions in Croatian fertility trends**

Comparisons of the development of gender roles in Croatia and Austria, presented in the analysis of Tomić-Koludrović and Lončarić (2007), were made on the basis of empirical data from the studies of Tomić-Koludrović and

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\(^{15}\) Given the declared importance of employment outside the home for women's independence and self-fulfillment, the fact that in 2005 one quarter of the surveyed Croatian women “strongly agreed” or “agreed” with the statement “when jobs are scarce, men should have greater rights to a job than women” might come across as somewhat surprising. However, this percentage is roughly convergent with the percentages of women “strongly agreeing” or “agreeing” with this statement in the European Union countries, where they vary between 20 and 25% (Stoilova, Riebling and Hofäcker, 2011: 9).
Kunac (2000) (for Croatia) and Zulehner and Volz (1998) and Zulehner (2003) (for Austria). The analysis showed that in the Austrian case there existed traditional elements in gender roles, but that they were clearly separated from the modern ones. In the case of Croatia, different elements were mixed, confirming Tomić-Koludrović’s general hypothesis that in Croatian society there were two simultaneous modernization processes at work: one that can be described as characteristic of a “simple” modernity (in Ulrich Beck’s sense) and the other as more similar to “reflexive” or “second” modernity trends.

It was exactly this simultaneous evolvement of the two types of modernization processes that could be seen as leading to the fragmentary nature and contradictions in attitudes and values of Croatian women at the end of the 1990s. In contrast with Austria, where traditional and modern values and attitudes were clearly separate, and where modern values and attitudes predominated, in Croatia traditional and even premodern values and attitudes coexisted side by side with modern and postmodern ones. It was not uncommon that the same respondent opted for traditional or even premodern values and attitudes concerning the upbringing of children, modern values and attitudes in relation to paid employment outside of home, and postmodern values in leisure practices.

Such contradictory developments in the values and attitudes of women at the end of the initial phase of the postsocialist transition can perhaps be better understood in the light of Zulehner and Steinmair-Pösel’s (2014) account of gender-related developments in Austria in the period between 1992 and 2012. According to the authors, the changes of gender roles in that country in the twenty years under examination can by no means be described as linear (Zulehner and Steinmair-Pösel, 2014: 180).

While the first ten years of emancipation of gender roles (1992-2002) were characterized by a “rapidly changing dynamics”, in the second decade (2002-2012) this trend did not continue unabatedly but underwent significant modifications (Zulehner and Steinmair-Pösel, 2014: 180). Between the years 1992 and 2012, the percentage of “moderns” among both men and women grew from 20% to 32%. But in the second decade, the share of “moderns” fell from 32% to barely 17%, i.e. to the value below that recorded in 1992. At the same time, the share of “traditionals” in the surveyed population grew by 3% and that of the “pragmatics” by 16%, while the share of those “searching” fell by 5% (Zulehner and Steinmair-Pösel, 2014: 181).
In the light of such data, gender-related contradictions of the first decade of Croatian postsocialist transition perhaps become somewhat more understandable. It could even be hypothesized that they were due to an earlier beginning of the emancipation process of work-related gender roles in Croatia in the context of Yugoslav socialism, which was then brought into question by the difficulties of the initial period of postsocialist transition. A parallel process can perhaps now be noted in the Austrian case, where social realities connected with the outbreak of the global economic crisis must have contributed to the changed dynamics of the gender emancipation process, which began under different circumstances in the 1990s.

More generally, regardless of the details of concrete societal circumstances in both cases under discussion, it is clear that contradictions and reversals in the process of gender emancipation can be explained by the non-linear nature of the modernization processes at work in the two societies. Such non-linearity results in ambivalences that can - in the case of Croatia - already be noted in the names of the types resulting from the factor and cluster analyses of the data gathered in the 2005 survey of women. While a general conclusion to the analysis of this data is that a further “move to modernity” was recorded in relation to the 1999 survey (Tomić-Koludrović, 2015), its ambivalent and transitional nature is evident in the labels for types such as “indecisively modern” and “transitionally reflexive”.16

Finally, in order to explain the unevenness in the nature of the process of acquisition of values predictive of gender attitudes and practices, it could be productive to turn to a potential explanation inspired by a Bourdieuan description of unevenness in the acquisition of different types of capitals (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2012). In the same way as, for example, a transitional entrepreneur can be in possession of large quantities of economic and social capital, while at the same time possess low cultural capital, it is likewise possible for transitional Croatian women surveyed in 1999 and 2005 to possess and exhibit different types of values in different domains related to gender roles.

16 The remaining two types resulting from factor and cluster analyses of the data from the Croatian 2005 survey are “traditional” and “premodern”. It is worth noting that these two types are specific to the analyzed Croatian social context in the same way as are the two “ambivalent” types mentioned in the text above. This is evidenced by the difference in the nature and “clarity” of the labels describing different types in Zulehner and Steinmair-Pösel’s (2014) account of gender role developments in Austria, where the field is divided by “traditional”, “pragmatic”, “searching” and “modern” types.
While any more elaborate explanation of the nature of the process of acquisition of values in question would require a painstaking analysis of empirical data, at a more general level it is safe to say that Touraine’s insistence on the analysis of different “modes of modernity” (Touraine, 2009) would, in this case, prove more fruitful than even an analysis inspired by Eisenstadt’s concept of “multiple modernities” (Eisenstadt, 2000), especially if it is approached at a level of larger “cultural” or “national containers”. As has already been mentioned, Touraine’s proposal seems to be particularly stimulating for the analysis of gender emancipation, not only because this author considers it as the most important indicator of the level of general modernization of a given society, but also because it presupposes an integrated approach to values, attitudes and practices in a given socio-historical context.

Concluding remarks
This text set out to try to explain what the demographers found to be an unexpected trend in Croatian fertility patterns in the period of “mature transition” (or, more precisely, in the 2009-2011 segment of this period.) Namely, the data relating to this period indicated that employed Croatian women with higher educational attainment tended to give more births than unemployed women with lower educational attainment. Furthermore, in this respect Croatia proved to be the polar opposite of Germany and resembled Scandinavian fertility patterns, rather than those considered typical of a postsocialist transition country.

A sociological analysis of this allegedly unexpected trend has shown that the analyzed data are in actuality not contradictory, but express the intricate realities of the social position of women in “mature transitional” Croatia. What is more, demographic and sociological surveys carried out in 2007 (Čipin, 2011) and 2005 (Tomić-Koludrović, 2015) already indicated that women in Croatia with tertiary education inclined toward having children and that there appeared a type of mostly highly educated young women (labeled as “transitionally reflexive”) who showed potential for combining fertility motivation with employment and for approaching child rearing as a means of self-actualization. If this potential is further combined with guaranteed paid maternity leave and legal entitlement to job-protected maternity leave, the mentioned fertility trend can be seen as all but “unexpected”.

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However, apart from the wish to try to explain an apparent oddity and contradiction, this text has been written in the belief that a multidimensional sociological approach can be helpful in setting the ground for the formulation of social policies more so than any monodimensional approach can be. By definition more complex, such approaches perhaps require more interpretive effort but, as a consequence, result in richer and potentially more useful insights. This is why – at the methodological level - we suggest a continuing further complexification of ways of researching of various “modes of modernity”, and – at the level of the studied subject matter – a complementation of studies of women by studies of men, which has proved so successful in the studies of Austrian gender relations (cf. Zulehner and Volz, 1998; Zulehner, 2003; Zulehner and Steinmair-Pösel, 2014). With regard to the subject matter of this text, we are convinced that such research would show with even more certainty that fertility motivation and child rearing practices in “mature transitional” Croatia cannot be explained either by the simple allegations of the postsocialist “retraditionalization” or by the premature intimations of advanced “retraditionalization” or by the premature intimations of advanced “reflexive modernity” trends.

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Buffer culture in Montenegro: bratstvo, kumstvo and other kin-related structures

Introduction
Mary Edith Durham, an English traveller and anthropologist, journeyed through Montenegro in the early 20th century witnessing, as she wrote, “the last example of the development of a wholly tribal nation into a State in Europe” (Durham, 1979:34). The transformation process was fast and Durham added: “Montenegro is now changing rapidly. Too rapidly. Modern and Western ideas are poured into medieval minds that are totally unable to assimilate them” (Durham, 1909:86). Some half a century later, in the 1960s, the American anthropologist Christopher Boehm, after spending three years in a remote village in Montenegrin Gornja (Upper) Morača, wrote that ‘the Slavic-speaking Montenegrins are among the few “tribal” peoples surviving today in Europe” (Boehm, 1984:5), adding that “in spite of [...] radical changes, the tribe of Upper Morača [...] still existed strongly in the minds of its members” (Boehm, 1984:7). In an article published in 1983, Halpern and Kideckel (Halpern and Kideckel 1983) sum up the anthropological research interests in the region and conclude that the central theme then was documenting and analysing the intense transformation of the society under socialism. I visited Montenegro more than 10 times over the period between 2001 and 2008, staying there from a couple of weeks to six months at a time and again witnessed a period of ‘rapid change’ during which new ideas were “poured” into the minds of the local people. That makes about a century during which consecutive radical changes were observed. This should have produced a country that has said a
definite good-bye to its “tribal origins”, as Durham put it. Nevertheless, when I went to Montenegro, the traditional forms of organisation were still quite visible. I did not go to a remote village that would be connected to the nearest motorway by a journey on foot lasting four hours, like Boehm did. My fieldwork was generally connected with people who spent most of their time in the well-connected two capitals or the coastal towns of Kotor Bay. My informants spoke of plemena (tribes) and bratstva (mostly exogamous patrilineages) as something belonging to the past. But my observations showed that the ideas and structures that Durham and Boehm saw as nearly vanished constituted much of the everyday lives of the people I met in the early 21st century.

In this paper I will argue that the apparent conservatism of Montenegrin society is not simply an expression of unwillingness to change and, therefore, does not represent a kind of intrinsic and problematic cultural feature, an obstacle to development, but is, rather, a self-preserving reaction to the very progression of an almost never-ending stream of changes happening at the state level. Sticking to the values and organisational principles of kin-based institutions (especially those that are linked with the family, bratstva and kumstvo) is an expression of the buffer culture – a complex of cultural features geared to withstand frequent and radical changes at the state level, especially if these transformations are originating outside the immediate control of the society in question (I discuss the concept of buffer culture in more detail in Sedlenieks 2013). In order to describe the kin-related institutions as an expression of the buffer culture, I will first contrast the turbulence of the state system with the apparent stability and continuity of kin-related institutions in Montenegro. In the second part of the paper I will put the Montenegrin buffer culture in a wider context arguing for a change of perspective from a state-oriented to the society-oriented one. This perspective problematizes the ever permuting state rather than the social reactions to it.

The fluctuating state of Montenegro
When discussing relations and attitudes towards the state, people in Montenegro usually refer to certain historical legacies. For instance, they speak of the tradition of centralising power in the hands of a narrow circle of people (having in mind the phenomenon of Milo Đukanović) or some particular features (often linked with corruption) of dealing with state affairs that they trace to Byzantine or Turkish traditions. However, the experience of the actual state in Montenegro
has much less of a continuation. This is especially true of the last 150 years. The state system and the associated ideologies have been in constant shift. Since the mid 19th century in Montenegro (like in many other parts of the Eastern/Central Europe) the foundations of the governance of the society have undergone radical changes. Moreover, the new regimes were often antagonistic to the previous ones and, therefore, also to the supporters of the previous systems.

A small proportion of what is now the territory of Montenegro (known as the Old Montenegro) was the cradle of an independent state. The 18th and 19th centuries were turbulent and dotted with wars. The territory of the state of Montenegro increased several times. However, the image of Montenegrins throwing off the yoke of the Turks and joining the free state of Montenegro is far too simplistic. Not all plemena were happy to be subjects of the state, which found expression in several uprisings against the rule of the Old Montenegro (see Fleming, 2002: 97 for more details). Territories that were added to Montenegro as a result of war or post-war treaties were, and to this day still are, not uniformly inhabited by people who are in favour of being citizens of Montenegro. Therefore, territorially, for many regions of what is now Montenegro, this citizenship was a novelty and, sometimes, not a particularly welcome one.

However, the composition of the Montenegrin state itself, once established, was prone to radical changes. It started off by theocracy ruled by prince-bishops (vladika) and democratic gatherings of patriarchal elders. In the second part of the 19th century, this state was transformed into a centralised absolute monarchy. In 1905 the Montenegrin prince Nikola I drew up the first constitution, establishing a partly elected and partly nominated parliament, but left himself with a significant portion of power (Roberts, 2007: 271). Five years later, in 1910, he elevated himself into the rank of king. This arrangement did not last long. By the end of World War I, in 1918, Montenegro joined the state that later became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In about 20 years this state, after bloody participation in World War II, was transformed into a federation of socialist republics. The period of socialism was not particularly stable regarding the ruling ideologies either. The pro-Stalinist mood, to which many Montenegrins adhered due to their traditional friendliness to all things Russian, was inverted in 1948. The following 30 years was a period of relative continuity, which started to change with the death of long-time communist leader Josip Broz Tito in 1980. The 1990s came with the demise of socialism, wars and ‘transition’ to liberal democracy and a free market economy.
Some of the transformations that I have sketched out in a very brief and superficial manner in the previous paragraph were somehow perpetuating the previous regime, but some of the new regimes were outright hostile to what happened before. Thus, for instance, the transformation of the state of Montenegro from principality into a parliamentary democracy and kingdom did not require changing any loyalties. Joining the Yugoslav state was a different matter, as this new state had a different centre of the power, with new ideologies, laws and even borders of the local territorial units (Roberts, 2007: 338). The experience in both world wars did not ensure the stability of the state system as luck often slipped from one side to the other. The arrival of the socialist state denied the previous system completely and deeply. The dismissal of the socialist state inverted the denial. Thus the experience at the level of everyday life for local Montenegrins was of a constant shift and transmutation at the state level.

The periods between these shifts were somewhere in the range from 20 to 30 years, which means that most of the people at any particular period experienced at least one of the transformations but some experienced more. This personal experience might have left some influence on the perception of citizens towards the state even if such an impact was not always consciously recognised and verbally expressed by the people themselves.

Nevertheless I also found some indications of a conscious recognition that the state system is not particularly permanent and is prone to being overthrown by another power at some point in the future. A conversation that I had with two Montenegrin foresters was particularly revealing.

The discussion was about the necessity of ignoring some of the laws in the daily routine of a forester. Thus, for instance, some people would illegally cut wood in the state forests. But as long as Petar, one of the foresters, classified the activity as necessary for survival and personal consumption, he would not press charges. Eventually Petar put the situation in the historic perspective arguing that:

Every 50 years somebody came and brought their own laws. As soon as the countries vanished, the laws vanished with them. That’s why it became clear that there were no real laws.
The list of the regimes that Petar mentioned included Spanish, Italian, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, German and communist (the Ottoman Turks went without saying). In the end he concluded:

Yes, there is nobody who has not been here. And all of them brought their own laws. But the people always believed in their own beliefs and believed in those laws of nature.

In the eyes of Petar the experience of the official rules and ideologies that governed society in Montenegro is saturated with radical changes.

In many situations the power-centre of these transformations was outside the reach or influence of the local people. According to the economist Elenor Ostrom, being able to participate in the design of the rules greatly increases the level to which the rules are internalised, i.e. the working rules are usually the locally-made ones (Ostrom, 2000: 147). Some of the reforms introduced by Nikola I were there because of the pressure from the would-be allies and in order to secure loans for the state (Roberts, 2007: 271). The same reason also stood behind several reforms introduced in Montenegro in the post-socialist transformation period. The kingdom of Yugoslavia was governed from a rather distant Belgrade, while the communist ideas were imported en masse from Russia, not to speak of the occupation forces during wars. This said, it would be of course impossible to deny the importance of the local power centres. However, those were and still are based on many other, comparatively more stable considerations and principles and to the description of which I now turn.

**The seemingly stable kin institutions**

To a certain degree it is possible to say that life in Montenegro is structured around the principles related to institutions of kin. Among these, two stand out as more important for contemporary Montenegro: *bratstvo* and *kumstvo*.

*Bratstvo* (*bratstva* in the plural) in the basic meaning of the word is a patrilineage, i.e. a lineage of descent where membership is inherited through the male line. The origins and history of the lineage are often carefully guarded, recorded and re-told from generation to generation. In many cases the *bratstva* trace their origins to the events surrounding the famous Kosovo battle in 1389, while some authors (Boehm, 1984: 41) argue that some *bratstva* are much older than that. With time, a *bratstvo* may grow and develop multiple
branches. Contemporary surnames of Montenegrins are in most cases names of these sub-secions of bratstva. This means that a bratstvo membership is demonstrated publicly every time a person announces his or her surname.

When asked, Montenegrins usually would deny that bratstva still have a significant meaning in their contemporary lives. This view, however, is challenged by several other observations and facts. Lists and histories of bratstva (or families) are collected, researched and published. One prominent example of such work is a book written by Vukota and Akim Miljanić (2002), a collection and brief explanation of the origins of approximately 14,000 surnames in Montenegro. A digitalised index of Montenegrin surnames can also be found on the web page of the Montenegrin Ethnic Association of Australia – a reflection of the migration of Montenegrins and the importance of this kind of information in their global lives.

Bratstvo membership is also strongly observed and investigated when it comes to questions of marriage. Although, again, at first glance people might deny its importance, it does not take long to find out that flirting between young people is cut short as soon as they discover that their surnames are the same. Marriage inside a bratstvo is generally considered incestuous. Only some of the largest bratstva consider the possibility that there could be marriage between representatives of distant branches and even then it is not a preferred situation.

When a person announces his or her family name, a wealth of stereotypical information is announced as well. Among this comes the reputation of the bratstvo – in some cases it may be good, in others – not so flattering. Some basic political affiliations can also be derived from the surname. People whose bratstva originate from the Old Montenegro would be perceived to be in favour of the independence of Montenegro, while those from some northern areas – more in favour of strong links with Serbia. Strong hints about one’s religious and, therefore, ethnic affiliation is also clear from the surname. Thus, a person who is born in Montenegro is already embedded in a set of assumptions that link him or her to some points in history (e.g. the battle of Kosovo field), geography (the origin and the routes of historical migration of the bratsvo, memories of which are also often carefully guarded and passed to the new generation) or in the political web, which, of course, is connected to the previous two points of reference.

Belonging to a particular bratstvo gives a certain structure to what one can and cannot do in his or her life. I already mentioned wedding prospects, but public life is also influenced by the support one can get from his or her
own relatives and the rivalry of people who belong to other groups. Slobodan, whom I met in a village in the mountains of the Old Montenegro, described the situation in the following manner, starting from general perspectives and ending with marriage prospects:

There are strong bratstva and weak bratstva (jaka bratstva i tanka bratstva). The bratstva whose people have been in power and who have many people are strong. That bratstvo which is small – others look down on it. If there is somebody in the weak bratstvo who is smart and has studied a lot and is otherwise a good person – he cannot do anything and cannot get to the top positions. But if you are from a strong bratstvo, things are different. Everybody knows your family and knows that the family is healthy. People don’t want their children to marry into unknown families.

Another kin-related institution that is of a great importance in contemporary Montenegro is kumstvo. The term can be translated as ‘godparenthood’ or ‘compadrazgo’, as a similar institution in countries of the Mediterranean and Latin world is often described in the anthropological literature. What differs Montenegrin kumstvo from many other institutions of godparenthood is its collective and egalitarian nature. The term kum (or kuma) refers to both involved parties – to the godparent and godchild equally. Moreover, Montenegrin kumstvo traditionally involves not only the two individuals, but also the extended families that have produced the godparent and the godchild. The ties of kumstvo are treated similarly to blood-ties, which, in turn, means that the same restrictions regarding marriage would be expected to exist among the families involved in kumstvo relationships. Kumstvo is something that people in Montenegro often refer to with the greatest level of admiration, often calling it ‘the sanctuary’ (svetinje).

In comparison to bratstvo membership, into which one is born and which is quite visible publicly, the ties of kumstvo are more flexible and more concealed from the public eye. Although one cannot choose the kum that baptises him or her (unless the baptism happens at a conscious age, when one is expected to choose his or her kum), one can decide on the wedding kum or the kum of his or her children. Kumstvo does involve certain obligations of the persons involved towards each other. In case of the baptismal kumstvo, the godparent is expected to become a sponsor of the godchild. However, my observations
in Montenegro (as compared to what has been recorded elsewhere) are that here such calculation is not treated as a normal state of being and is often despised. As a process and institution of the highest moral value, *kumstvo* is supposed ideally to be free of any kind of calculation and to be based on a purely affective wish to strengthen the bonds between the two people and their families. In other words, *kumstvo* is institutionalised friendship and close friends are expected to become one another’s *kumovi* (the plural form of *kum*).

If *bratstvo* membership is publicly quite visible, then *kumstvo* ties are much less visible. Nevertheless, such ties cannot be totally concealed and people often are quite knowledgeable about who baptised whose children or who was the *vjenčani* (wedding) *kum* to whom (see for instance the journalistic analysis in Koprivica 2007, revealing such ties in the government).

Combined with more mundane and much less sacred relations of friendship and more casual acquaintanceship, *bratstvo* and *kumstvo* form a very important part of contemporary life of the society in Montenegro. In case of need, one has a group of relatives that one can rely upon, a circle of *kumovi* who would provide the same. At the same time, the same principle, of course, imposes certain restraints. Moreover, the connections do not work automatically and in a fail-safe mode. One still is expected to invest a lot of effort and care to maintain these and other networks.

However, there is one certain advantage of this system – it has the tendency (or at least an appearance) to be more or less stable. Despite the changes that might be happening at the official level of the state and governance, the principle of *kumstvo* or the structure and history of a *bratstvo* seem to be more or less stable. If one day Montenegro joins the European Union or loses its independence in some unexpected war, the principle of finding ones *kum* or the knowledge of one’s *bratstvo* history and other members of the family will not need to change.

Having said that, it is important to note that the stability of kin-related institutions is only relative and to a certain degree – illusive. If one would compare the importance of *bratstva* and *kumovi* in previous generations, the diminished importance is obvious. However, what is important here is the perception of the stability. In comparison to the state that seems in the eyes of many Montenegrins to be changing every now and then, the principles of kin-related institutions seem ancient (which they are to a certain degree) and unchanging. What is more important – these are things that get associated with some morally superior ideas – like friendship, loyalty, trust and unselfishness.
The current state with its associated laws, regulations, ideologies and structures in this world-view is often associated with quite the opposite qualities and, as a result, the state cannot and should not be trusted, but it can and will be exploited if there is such an opportunity.

From state-oriented to citizen-oriented perspective

When looking from the perspective of the current state, the tendency of Montenegrins to stick to their bratstva and kumovi constitutes a problem, especially when the networks of relatives come into conflict with certain ideas on which the modern state is established. The principle of treating one’s relatives or fictive kin (as in the case of kumstvo) as a priority goes against Webberian principles of proper state bureaucracy, which is built on the rule of equality of citizens in the face of a law-abiding bureaucracy. From this perspective what one can observe in Montenegro seems to be a sign of backward conservatism where people are harming themselves by not following the enlightened principles of fair law.

I suggest taking another perspective. Instead of adopting the perspective of the state, I urge adopting the point of view of an ordinary citizen who may or may not be able to influence the political turmoil and whose priority is to survive individually and to satisfy the needs of his or her immediate family. Changing the world or even society is a problem of a different level, which an ordinary citizen is not necessarily concerned with.

Adoption of the state perspective entails assuming that the state in itself is a definite good, the aim of rational human development. Certainly there are multiple problems inside the state. It might not take care well enough of all the citizens, it might embody oppression of some groups, it might be unfair towards some citizens or it might leave too much power in the hands of those who do not deserve it or who abuse the entrusted power. There can also be various problems of the administrative kind, e.g., the bureaucrats might not work efficiently enough or they might be altogether corrupt. But from the state perspective these are all just deficiencies of the structure that is in principle correct and desirable.

According to Michael Herzfeld, the bureaucratic mode of governance has become entwined in the cosmology of the European mind with rational thought. Therefore, bureaucracy becomes the embodiment of rationality (and at the same time of Europeanness) (Herzfeld, 1993: 67) and failures of the ideal bureaucratic system become expressions of symbolic pollution (Herzfeld, 1993: 67).
Consequently the nation state that is rooted in democracy and structured by rational bureaucracy becomes an idea that is impossible to refute. However, it is quite possible to argue that this particular belief system (Herzfeld actually compares it with religious doctrine, see Herzfeld (1993: 17)) is a product of European intellectual history and therefore should not be treated as a kind of a natural fact but as a social construct. Therefore, the inevitability of the state as a consequence of human development or as the ultimate solution of human existence should be treated critically.

James Scott (2009) argues that to a large extent the idea of the inevitability of the state is a result of state ideology, which is based on the viewpoint from the centre of the state. States produce their histories, which include only the moments and events that are connected with state building (Scott, 2009: 34). States are also the origins of the hegemonic ideologies that portray everything that lies outside of the state as something that simply has failed to be transformed into the state and, consequently, all the societies and territories that are not brought under the ideal control of the state are treated as remnants of some ancient order, as primitives (in the sense that they represent some kind of previous state of development) or, as "living ancestors of ours" (Scott, 2009: 8).

Scott, however, argues against such an interpretation of the societies that are not incorporated into the state system. Rather than treating non-state groups or societies as having left behind or having failed to adapt their lifestyles to more advanced and more enlightened life, Scott argues that these forms of social organisation are the result of conscious decisions to evade the state system. For the societies that are analysed by Scott, the reasons for such evasion lie in the oppressive nature of the state. Instead of providing the citizens with the benefits of the state, it has subjected them to exploitation and the benefits that the state could provide could not outweigh the burdens. As a result, Scott argues, the features that are usually enumerated as an expression of backwardness of stateless people should be, instead, treated as expressions of a specific mode of adaptation to the life on the margins of states:

[..]their location at the margins, their physical mobility, their swidden agriculture, their flexible social structure, their religious heterodoxy, their egalitarianism, and even the nonliterate, oral cultures – far from being the mark of primitives left behind by civilizations, are better seen on a long view as adaptations designed to evade both state capture and state formation (Scott, 2009: 9).
Pierre Clastres comes to similar conclusions by analysing Amazonian Guaraní Indians, who also are often treated as representing some ancient form of organisation that has simply failed to learn the more advanced ways of the state societies (Clastres and Hurley, 1989). Clastres convincingly demonstrates that the swidden cultivators of the Amazonia are not isolated societies that did not have access to knowledge and technology essential for transformation into a sedentary, agricultural, and state-organised society. As Clastres argues, Guarani have lived in close contact with people of the states and they did possess knowledge of permanent agriculture. However, he also argues that many features of their culture (for instance, insistence on the political impotence of the leaders or rotation of authorities) are specifically designed to prevent concentration of power in the hands of a single individual and, thus, to prevent even the very germs of state. Clastres, therefore, argues that the non-state societies of Amazonia should not be interpreted as “overdue embryos of subsequent societies” (Clastres and Hurley, 1989: 99). The reason they have not adapted an agriculture-based economy and state-based social system is that they do not want to have it, rather than because they failed in doing so.

Although there are certain similarities between the above mentioned societies and Montenegro, it is not necessary to draw direct parallels to use the general idea. Scott primarily writes about the Southeast Asian massif of Zomia (Scott, 2009: 13). Like Montenegro it has a terrain that throughout history has been difficult to access and has a history of a refuge area. Some cultural features like emphasis on egalitarianism and refusal of vertical relationships, lower level of literacy and somewhat unorthodox religious practices can be seen as similar in both areas. The societies described by Clastres are more distant from Montenegro in their cultural expressions. However, both Scott and Clastres argue in favour of treating the seemingly pre-state features of culture as functional adaptations precisely to life in direct contact with the state.

The similarity between these three cases is that in all of them the self-evidence of the existence of the state system is challenged. But in order to see it, one needs to adapt the position of the individual or the society that is refusing to become incorporated into the state.

In the case of Montenegro one could legitimately ask how it is possible to have a meaningful life in the presence of the ever-permutating state, which often turns against those who got too close to the previous regime. The situation is rather different from the cases where a traumatic change happens once and, after a longer or shorter period of transformation, things return to
more or less the same order as before or are permanently changed into a new one (see multiple accounts of such cases in Greenhouse, Mertz, and Warren 2002). What is happening in Montenegro is a situation of permanent change. If the society can be expected to adapt to the changes in the environment in which it exists, then, in this situation, it is rather impossible to adapt to the current situation because history teaches that the next change might not be far away. Therefore the adaptation will be aimed towards the persistence of change itself.

Montenegrin buffer culture

In this particular case the adaptation that I am talking about is geared towards withstanding the regular and rather predictable change of the state system and ideologies – a cultural feature that I call the buffer culture. The idea of buffer is borrowed from colloidal chemistry which deals with so called buffer solutions that possess the capability of maintaining the acidity level unchanged even if a certain amount of acid or alkali is added to the solution. The buffer culture works in a similar manner – it allows the maintenance of social stability and more or less meaningful life despite radical changes at the state level. Just like there are many buffer solutions in nature (the most common being blood), there are many buffers in any culture – they allow for life to continue more or less in the same manner even if some changes in the environment happen. Housing and clothing in part are such buffers that guard against problematic changes in air temperature and humidity. However, I do not use the term buffer culture to describe features that allow neutralising or withstanding any such change, but rather only the change that happens at the level of state system and ideology.

One of the expressions of the buffer culture is the continuous importance of kin-related structures in Montenegrin society. Interestingly, these institutions are not only observable in the more or less private sphere (as would be in the case of helping one’s own relatives or fictive relatives, even if this takes place under the roof of a municipal or state institution), but also in public sphere. I observed this in the small village of Gorica (name changed) in the area of Old Montenegro. Despite the fact that there is an officially existing municipality that is elected according to the existing laws and regulations and that is common for a whole group of similar villages, Gorica also has a local, informal, kin-related self-government that is known as skup (gathering). The
The existence of the *skup* of Gorica contrasts to the general attitude towards political participation in contemporary Montenegro. Usually politicians and party members are treated with a significant dose of distrust and in some cases even – disgust. In the same manner participation in NGOs also does not receive too much support from those who are not themselves members of the organisations. If one would analyse the official political scene, public participation (apart from going to political demonstrations) would be very low. However, the *skup* of Gorica did not receive this dose of scepticism and distrust. This can be explained by the fact that this kind of organisation is first of all related not to the state system, but to the more permanent organisational principles that are kin-related. No matter what would happen to the current state system or ideology in Montenegro, the *skup* of Gorica will be able to come together and decide the same kind of matters. Thus, it represents some kind of continuity in the face of a frequently changing state system. In a sense, the *skup* is the institutional embodiment of what Petar, the forester, meant when he was speaking about the people who despite the passing powers, armies and ideologies kept believing in their own beliefs and ‘natural laws’. This kind of behaviour is the core of permanence that allowed and still allows people to maintain some integrity and find meaning in their lives.

The effect of the buffer culture on the behaviour of the citizens vis-a-vis the state is, of course, adverse, because the buffer culture allows people to treat the laws of the current state regime as if they were somehow unimportant. That does not mean people do not see the benefits that the state can offer or that they would restrain from using these benefits. If there are some subsidies or weaknesses of the system, exploiting them is quite possible and permissible. In comparison to the kin-related world, the state system is not treated as any kind of sanctuary and may be abused. That does not mean the unscrupulous bureaucrats are treated with sympathy. Quite the contrary – they are
despised but at the same time one can understand them; to a certain level such behaviour is even expected. From the perspective of the ideal rational bureaucracy, the effects of buffer culture are quite devastating. Buffer culture does not mean an active resistance, but rather implies passive ignoring of the initiatives that representatives of the state are so eager to implement.

At the individual level values of the buffer culture may be expressed in cynicism towards the struggles of the current regime. The post-socialist transformations of the 1990s and early 2000s demonstrated a large-scale suffering. Apart from actual physical violence and economic hardship, a significant part of this suffering was caused by the collapse of the system of values promoted by the communists. Numbers of studies have been dedicated to understanding the suffering of the people whose world and belief system were crushed by the arrival of the new era (see, for instance, Bridger and Pine, 1998; Verdery and Burawoy, 1999). However, much less has been published on the experience of those who managed to transfer smoothly from one side to the other and for whom the ‘transition’ was not ideologically difficult or challenging, those who managed to exchange the trenches of communism for the opportunities of capitalism with no particular difficulty. In Montenegro, perhaps a good and visible example of such transition is the case of Milo Đukanović. He started off as a young and promising leader of the new generation of communists and ended up as a leader of an independent capitalist country, allegedly also managing rather lucrative unofficial businesses.

Although this paper concentrated on Montenegro, similar expressions of the buffer culture can be observed elsewhere, especially in post-socialist Eastern Europe. Widespread disregard towards rule of the law, tax avoidance and corruption that still is rather widespread in Eastern Europe can be attributed at least partly to this phenomenon. Thus, for instance, people in Latvia often express their distrust in the permanency of the current state system, believing that they can only rely on themselves and their closest relatives (Sedlenieks, 2012).

**Conclusions: a call for stagnation**

I have argued in this paper that what seems to be a particular conservativism of Montengrin society should be analysed in the context of the historical changes of the state system. These changes have occurred frequently and comparatively often, most of them have been beyond the reach of influence
for ordinary citizens. Moreover, in many cases the new regime stigmatised its predecessor and the people who were associated with it.

This sequence of regimes may, on the one hand, produce a situation of complete uncertainty. A person who tends to associate his or her well-being and world-view with a particular regime will be at disadvantage when the regime changes. This did happen all over the post-socialist world when it collapsed. When one such period follows the other and so on in a regular sequence, the only certainty is that the current stability is not here for long. This is, as I have argued, the situation in Montenegro, as well as in many other post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The buffer culture, the persistence of kin-related forms of organisation is an adaptive feature of Montenegrin society. It’s meaning is to make life possible in the face of the unstoppable, yet predictable onslaught of new transformations that will, as experience has shown, hit again sooner or later.

The causality of the resistance towards new ideas and introductions that one might associate with some kin-related traditions in Montenegro, in my report is shifted from the conservative nature of the society to the nature of the state itself, which is not only changing at a high pace but where the new regime is also actively denying the values of the previous regimes and is trying to discriminate against the people who hold dear the ideas of the previous regime.

If the buffer culture actually exists in the manner that I describe in the previous pages, then the only solution to the dissonance of the state and private values would be to reduce the pace of changes, provide the country in question with a period during which not much will change. That is to say – a counterintuitive period of stagnation regarding the state power might be what is needed.

**Bibliography:**


The Importance of Clientelism and Informal Practices for Employment Among Political Party Members After the 2000s in Serbia - An Explorative Enquiry -

The party finds jobs for members, their family members, their friends, certain votes, and these are all certain votes.

Introduction
In the paper, we focus on one particular segment of informal practices within political parties and that is how the issue of employment in the public sector structures informal networks and actions within political parties. We consider this mechanism as crucial for influencing the dynamics of everyday political functioning in Serbia. Taking into account the unemployment rate in Serbia and the belated and slow development of the private sector, which cannot absorb the labor force, employment in the public sector is considered to be an important resource. We will explore how political players create their strategies in order to satisfy personal or collective interest, specifically, employment in the public sector, “navigating between formal rules and informal norms” (Ledeneva, 2001: 15).
First, this article addresses the use and dominance of informal networks, clientelism, and patronage in the political sphere (specifically, political parties) within the post-socialist Serbian development of a democratic system. Second, we present models and mechanisms of informal institutions, networks, and rules in political parties that are important for the employment of party members in public administration. Third, we analyze the normative framework which follows these informal institutions and enables their creation and reproduction.

**Theoretical framework**

The interest to explore informal economy appeared in the 1970s and it has not yet abated. This interest in studying informality expanded to other areas of social life, including different informal structures, institutions, and norms in the political sphere. It is presumed that a conceptual shift, referred to as “the governance turn”, took place in the political sciences. This turn emphasizes governance over government, which means that “non-binding arrangements, voluntary agreements, soft law” should be taken into account (Christianen and Neuhold, 2012: 1). Therefore, informal institutions such as personal and patron-client relations networks, clientelism, and patronage should be analyzed taking into account that they affect political structures and behaviors significantly, thus forming parallel hidden structures, institutions, and rules of the game. Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 726) point out that “good institutional analysis requires rigorous attention to both formal and informal rules. Careful attention to informal institutions is critical for understanding the incentives that enable and constrain political behavior. Political actors respond to a mix of formal and informal incentives, and in some instances, informal incentives trump the formal ones”. Scientific exploration of informal structures and institutions is an especially demanding task because “in much of the developing and post-communist world, patterns of clientelism, corruption, and patrimonialism coexist with (and often subvert) new democratic, market, and state institutions” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 725). Therefore, informal and formal structures are two integrated scenes on which social actions take place; they influence political and economic systems and individual life chances. Usually, this kind of informal constraints are linked to “traditions, customs and cultural backgrounds” (North, 1990: 6) and they are perceived as “rudiments of traditional societies” or “by-products of contemporary soci-
Formal and informal institutions may interact in different ways. For example, Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 725) distinguish four types of interactions between formal and informal institutions: complementary, competing, accommodating, and substitutive. Grødeland (2007: 220) defines an informal network as “an informal circle of people able and willing to help each other. People linked together in an informal network derive some benefit from belonging to it and therefore have an interest in maintaining the network over time.”

In this paper, we intend to shed light on the key phenomenon we want to investigate - clientelism. For this purpose, we will rely on Van Biezen (2007: 241) definition of “party clientelism”: “a form of representation based on the selective release of public (material) resources – contracts, housing, subsidies, pork-barrel legislation, etc. – in order to secure electoral support from individuals or selected sectors of society”. Where informal practices and structures are concerned, it is especially important to stress the significance of patron-client relations between different levels of party structure and how they interconnect. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 7) state that clientelism represents “a particular mode of “exchange” between electoral constituencies as principals and politicians as agents in democratic systems”. In other words, individuals and/or groups realize certain interests at the expense of the public good. The main goal which drives political parties is to survive on the political parliamentary scene and/or in power. In this power game, the main risk of increasing clientelism lies in the way parties are funded (Fisher, Eisenstadt, 2006; Hopkin, 2004). These dangers of clientelism are especially prevalent in developing and post-socialist countries. (Protsyk, Wilson, 2003; Roper, 2002). Political parties can offer their clients a range of goods and services such as “non-material status improvements, jobs in the civil service, jobs in the public-sector firms, government contracts and licenses, subsidies and grants (including tax reliefs), public construction works” in order to achieve party goals (Muller, 2000: 141-142). Kitschelt and Wilkinson point out that such links and interconnections are long-term relations that form hierarchically organized exchange networks accompanied by shared norms (2007: 3-4). They further distinguish “electoral clients at the ground floor of the system, various levels of brokers organized in a pyramidal fashion, and patrons at the top” (8). Finally, the creation and maintenance of clientelist networks is organized in a secretive manner (19). Authors consider countries with a multiparty system and a low level of economic development to be fertile
ground for the development of clientelist relations. A low level of economic development which is accompanied by a high level of state distribution (van Biezen, 2004) opens up possibilities for a wide range of clientelist relations. They are perceived as rational strategies for both sides in dealing with which are dealt with various organizational, institutional and personal problems in the context of institutional underdevelopment and lack of resources.

Even though informal networks and clientelist connections exist in all political and economic systems, it is important to examine the significance of informal structures and practices in the post-socialist context. During the post-socialist period, social players create strategies and institutions “not on the ruins but with the ruins of communism” (Stark, 1996: 995). Therefore, informal and personal networks that predate the socialist period are extremely important for the development of the multiparty system. In the context of weak and blurred institutional and normative framework, in particular, individuals tend to rely more on informal institutions. As a result, patterns of clientelism and the issue of the “culture of informality” (Grødeland, 2007: 218) are prevalent in the literature on the post-socialist context and the development of democratic political institutions.

Alena Ledeneva explores the institution of blat or the ‘economy of favors’ in Russia. She explains the phenomenon of blat as “the use of personal networks for obtaining goods and services in short supply and for circumventing formal procedures” (Ledeneva, 2009: 257; Ledeneva, 1998). Furthermore, Lonkila (1997) shares Ledeneva’s opinion that despite the changes in the economic system, “on the micro-level of Russian society many things have not changed”. Personal contacts still play an important role in contemporary Russian society (Ledeneva, 1998: 200). Other authors also point out that the informal norms and institutions are still more important than formal counterparts. Gel’man (2004: 1021) terms the prevalence of informal practices in Russian society as “the unrule of law”. We can presuppose that Serbian post-socialist society can be similarly characterized.

In a situation of institutional vacuum, the state cannot guarantee stability and a peaceful environment in a “low-trust” (Radaev, 2004: 91) or “public mistrust societies” (Giordano, 2013). State institutions are too weak to implement regulative measures and sanctions against opportunism and informalization. In other words, weak formal institutions and regulations lead to decreasing levels of interpersonal trust and social solidarity. In a context of distrust, uncertainty, and instability, individuals are obliged to create interpersonal
networks of support in order to reduce risks. Aleksandar Štulhofer (2000) notes that post-socialist societies have undergone an erosion of socio-cultural capital (deficit of trust, reciprocity, and solidarity). He explains the process as “the mechanism of transitional anomie, characterized by decline in trust in institutions and civic participation”. Formal and informal control mechanisms fail to prevent involvement of individuals in informal practices and other infringements. In such a situation, opportunistic informal practices are excused by survival necessity.

Having established that individuals in post-socialist countries cope with organizational, institutional, and normative obstacles, the question that follows is how they create their political strategy in practice within an uncertain economic, political, and cultural context. Since formal institutions and regulations are insufficient and ambiguous, the actors have to rely on informal networks and strategies in order to create a more trustworthy environment. Therefore, lack of belief in an impersonalized power of institutions and rule of law can be compensated for by reliance on personal networks of trust in kin and friends. Likewise, relationships in the informal sector are characterized by reciprocity and trustworthiness due to the semi-legality/illegality of participants’ activities. Therefore, we can conclude that social capital plays an important role in the informal market, as well as in the regular sector. In order to create a trustworthy environment, actors rely on members with whom they share more interests and they participate together in different social groups or networks.

Methodology
We relied on qualitative methods in order to focus on individual actors and their interactions. As a result of using this methodology, phenomena of the informal structures and practices in political life will be observed through micro lenses and in that way light will be shed on individual behavior, relations with other actors, their norms and values. For this purpose, we used in-depth, face-to-face, semi-structured interviews. The paper is based on six different life-narratives which provide insight into the everyday life and decision-making processes of political parties. We conducted interviews with middle level politicians from five different political parties who hold or have held important positions in political structures and public administration.
As a result, we believe that the qualitative approach will shed new light on hidden informal structures and networks within political parties in Serbia. Due to the ‘sensitivity’ of the topic, it was difficult to find appropriate respondents who would answer freely and honestly. Since the interview included some sensitive questions, a very important task was to assure the anonymity of the respondents. The limitations with which researchers are faced when they investigate informal practices are noteworthy: their investigation is unlikely to capture all informal activities, especially activities connected with higher earnings and with illegal activities at the top of the political structure. This notion influenced our decision to narrow down the focus of our research onto some elements of informal practices (employment in the public sector) among middle level politicians. Their narratives are important because the politicians at the top positions had opportunity to directly influence employment of (potential) party members. Additionally, their perspective covers inter-party dynamics and sheds light on all levels of informal party structuring.

Context

During the period of socialism, the collective-owner class or nomenclature controlled the entire system of social reproduction (Lazić, 1987, 1994, 2011). In addition to the state command-planning program, this group controlled the functioning of the political, economic, and cultural subsystem. The key infrastructural basis of this class was the Communist Party, which brought together and integrated the system through formal and informal channels. Individuals and other social groups created through a process of social differentiation (classes, professional groups, intellectuals, and others) were very limited and atomized in their action potential. Since the members of the nomenclature occupied high-ranking positions, formal affiliation with the political party was a necessary condition to reach these positions. The loss of a monopoly of one (Communist) political party over public resources occurred very slowly and rather late in Serbia. Namely, even after the beginning of the process of systemic change in Serbia (political pluralization), the nomenclature remained in power and was a key player in the redistribution of economic wealth (through privatization) to their own advantage. This group led the systemic changes and thus ensured itself a privileged position in the social structure (Lazić, 2011: 69).
However, the inherited model of integration of social spheres survived until the other autonomous actors were reinforced (economic, cultural elite, political opposition), and they refused to obey the political leadership. Fighting in the political field eventually led to the establishment of a polyarchy system (Robinson, 1996) and the need for a higher level of negotiation between the key social/political actors (political parties, industry, academia, military, police, etc.), namely a new form of integration. These changes have led to a higher degree of instability of the government since political parties can lose their political position due to competition in the elections. Given that the electoral system is legitimized as the only means of coming to power, the basis for the survival of the actors on the political scene depended primarily on their ability to mobilize voters during the election process. Reaching the election census depends on the infrastructural strength of a party (organizational potential) and the amount of resources that a political party can mobilize. In a situation where the economic resources of society are low and much distribution is done through the state, the importance of the public sector is evident and the political parties are trying to gain as much direct control over the key resources – governance and public enterprises – as possible. This leads to a situation where state institutions are captured by political parties (Pešić, 2007). Although the share of public spending in Serbia is at the European average mark (in 2011, it amounted to 40.4%, for the Euro area, 38.7%, 39.4% for the European Union, World DataBank), the share allocated to employees is among the highest in Europe. Specifically, 25.6% of all payments of the state go toward salaries and social transfers of employees (as opposed to 15% of the Euro area, the European Union 13.5%, World DataBank). At the same time, 44.7% of employees receives wages directly from the state (Labour Force Survey RS, 2012). This percentage is among the highest in Europe and together with 25% of unemployed in 2013 puts a great deal of pressure on the government not to reduce the existing staff and, if possible, to reduce the pressure from loss of jobs in the private sector. That is why a part of party activities – which are informal due to their semi-legal character – are structured in order to monopolize as many jobs as possible in the public sector for their (potential) membership and thus directly and indirectly achieve two benefits for the party - financial support and voters. This structuring effects the establishment and maintenance of informal networks of trust within the parties and personal clientelist relationships within the party and with (potential) voters. On the other hand, political engagement is perceived by
the population as a key mechanism of social promotion which leads to a high level of membership in political parties and a high degree of fluctuating membership in proportion to their current ownership of resources. The share of people who are members of political parties in Serbia is among the highest in Europe (12.2%, World Values Survey database, 2008) and it has been constant since the period of late socialism. Likewise, the fluctuation of membership is very high and is largely determined by whether the party is in power and the range in which membership of certain parties moves over time is 1:10 (Goati, 2006: 134-136).

When it comes to the perception of the channels of social mobility, a survey of youth in Serbia (Mojić, 2012: 103) points out that informal channels dominate among them. More than two thirds of young people stated that knowing the right people is crucial, while about half of them think it is political affiliation that is key (only one third of young people list education as an important factor). Studies have revealed a low level of confidence not only in state institutions and political parties, but also in other civil society organizations. A high degree of atomization of individuals and reliance solely on oneself and family networks points to the low importance of institutional arrangements and reliance on kinship and friendship connections in important dealings with public administration. This behavior has its justification in the political culture that favors non-institutional forms of political life.

**Competition over resources**

The importance of the political party in the economy and its impact on personal promotion was largely legitimate during socialism, as the Party was a key player in the integration and coordination of social life. During the period of socialism, the Party served as a reservoir and training ground for the creation of key personnel in public administration and enterprises (which were political functions in both cases), so there was no need for immediate clientelist relations with the wider population because the position of the party itself was unquestioned. Membership in the Communist Party was a kind of privilege and in the course of the economic and political crisis of the late 1970s; it became a form of legitimating of the Party’s activities and a channel for the promotion and employment of a wider circle of people. However, in this period, the party was an important channel of vertical mobility and social reproduction, especially of the middle and higher social strata (Cvejić, 2006).
From the beginning of the post-socialist transformation, competition between parties led to competition for resources that had previously been owned only by the Communist Party. Since the existence on the political scene was no longer guaranteed and as it is ultimately dependent on election results, political parties are faced with the critical challenge of securing votes. As early as in the first decades of political pluralism there was a need for parties to mobilize as many voters and activists as possible. Given the political legacy that involves continuing significant political (direct or indirect) control of economic life during the so-called blocked transformation (Lazić, 2011), clientelism occurs as one of the mechanisms of mobilization, among others, in the form of employment of members and their relatives. Although there were no more solid party channels to regulate entire social life by creating a new economic elite from the ranks of the former nomenclature and, further, by controlling most of cultural (media) life, the ruling Socialist Party secured the loyalty of its members by guaranteeing them positions in public companies and institutions and giving them jobs. With the fall of Milošević, there was an intensification of the struggle for public resources between the parties, as his departure opened up space that other parties sought to fill. In a society that has suffered wars and which is still in a deep economic crisis, with high unemployment, the criteria for choosing a political party for many is not its political (and economic) program; instead, it is direct benefit. Political parties have realized the importance of this relationship with the voting body, while their mutual competition further intensifies the need to maintain this system of compensation.

*Competition between the parties exists and it led to it. You are faced with a choice: to be a debate club or a serious party that must be populist and that makes more than 10%. You look up to the largest parties. It is an empirical conclusion on what to do. (Interview 1)*

*... if the pressure widens, the party opens the door. ‘Party Army’, ‘army’, which is created by a system of numbers and informal influence on the electorate, starting from what is talked about on slavas, streets, faculties, firms creates fundamental basic election result. Mass parties are able to mobilize more people on the election. Personal interests of the people that are subject to manipulation are legitimized. (Interview 6)*
If you know someone needs a job, you do not promote politics or certain attitudes but you do manipulate people’s interests and thus buy loyalty. This system has limits because it can be rounded to a number of people, but when it becomes massive you cannot find a job for 1,000 people. (Interview 3)

The mechanism of employment

After the election in accordance with the percentage of votes won, apart from the places in legislative and executive power, management positions in public companies are distributed. Both parts of the negotiations are very important for the parties, having in mind that the amount of resources that the party will be controlling depends on both. In the allocation of the resources in domestic politics, the whole sector or management of a public company is taken by a certain party; there is no mixed management. This model leads to almost complete control of a party over a part of public resources.

Division of public companies is parties’ loot. Companies are categorized according to their potential ... and in accordance with the percentages won, they are shared after election. (Interview 2)

Who gets a public company, that’s his feud; they can do what they want. (Interview 4)

One of the self-evident tasks of people appointed to public administration and enterprises is to redress their party’s membership and to build a wider electoral base. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to reward party activists and to bind the (potential) membership to themselves, most often in the form of permanent or temporary employment in the public sector – the government or a public company. By coming to power, the party brings in to state administration the people it trusts and hires new members to operative positions, which leads to expansion of personnel in the public sector and “bureaucratic clientelism” (Lyrintzis, 1984, cf. Hopkin, 2006: 10). Since the public sector is largely overcrowded and it is difficult to open a new position, the clientele gets jobs when someone retires or, more frequently, through fixed-term contracts or temporary jobs.
The director of a public company is pressured to bring people. ... The one who appoints you, they put pressure. It does not matter whether you left the company in losses but how many people are employed - this is a measure of cooperation and loyalty, commitment to the party. My task in the public company, when it comes to the party, is to hire someone. There was a decision that says when the three are retired, one can be employed. I came to the director and told him that I was aware he would be pressured since I was and that we can make an agreement that for every three of his people I get one. He said «All right, I understand». So it is how I was able to hire three people for a year. (Interview 2)

One respondent states that most of the employment positions are uncertain, contractual potions, because the political party can obtain them quickly. These jobs are not permanent and they last until the next elections.

Perceptions about the importance of political parties in the economy indicate that parties are primarily seen as channels for securing a living or as channels of social promotion. Although the party is working on strengthening members’ bonds to their own interests, at the same time the problems of dynamics of intra-party life is recognized.

Minority of people enters the political party because of ideology, and most of the people engage in the political life because they do not have other way to find a job. People think, they have perception that you need some „political support’ in order to find a job. When they get into the party they rarely say openly that they are there because of the job, but some of them who are active ask something as a return. (Interview 4)

There is a pressure by members which affect the political life. Since a party meeting starts like this: ‘When are you going to help some of us? Let the talking’. The political life within the parties is suspended and what is created is a flea market or relocated employment services. (Interview 3)

The pressure is unbearable, people join the party like they come in the National Employment Agency. Especially when they detect that director of a company is a member of the party. (Interview 1)
Active middle range members of political parties are aware of this overall perception of political parties as tools for securing employment. By all means, they are aware of pressure from party members for securing more employment for them. However, they state that this perception is unrealistic, that people have a perception that it is easy to get a job, but the reality is usually different and it is necessary to wait for a job and be more active in the political party than expected. However, none of the respondents question the legitimacy of these informal employment practices; they find different ways of justifying and explaining these actions as ordinary and acceptable. Thus, in the interviews, we found a prevalent discourse of normality and legitimization of this practice, which is used to justify individual positions.

Given that a small number of members pays a fee, parties imply that ongoing activities are partly funded by persons appointed to public office, in public administration or public companies. This fee includes a part of the salary that a person receives in that position on a monthly basis and that sum is paid or brought in to the party in the form of grants. The amount ranges vary according to the importance of the position and the wage and it amounts to 10% of the income for certain positions at the municipal or city level and 20% for positions at the national level. This practice also exists in other parties in Europe (Goati, 2006: 198-199). However, some political parties have the practice in place for those persons for whom the party found a job (permanent or temporary), which is not an appointment: they also to give a certain percentage of their personal income to the party.

At lower operative levels, there is a need for party operatives who can mobilize people to promote the party.

*You need a man who will agitate in the neighborhood. Experts, teachers are redundant in the party. You have opportunism where the following groups are present – housewives, unemployed, loafers, while the smallest part are young activists, students. At this level, persons who can motivate these people are needed.* (Interview 4)

The profile of middle and lower level politicians is specific and special skills are desirable. One of the most important is to be an active player for particular interests of political parties, such as obtaining money, employment, contacts with business people or votes. At the lower level, it is important that they obtain “electoral clienteles” (Della Porta, 2004). When party members employ
somebody, they have specific expectations from that person to create a web of dependent patron-client relations. A party needs operatives who are ready to be at the party’s disposal.

Our respondents have the impression that there is, in all political parties, a negative selection of human resources. People who are selected for the most important positions are not the most professional and successful.

*They are not accomplished and prominent in their profession, so they are not known outside the party structure. That is way they are obedient, accept to do whatever they are told to do, they are operative, and they do not think and ask too much.* (Interview 3)

### The importance of informality

Formal rules of distribution of power within the party (positioning within the party by nominating) have little or no significance. According to previous findings (Goati, 2006: 118-122), most parties are organized according to a centralized model that implies appointing from above. The key personnel at the highest level are not questioned and this is the level at which they are usually selected. Each higher level favors, often through informal channels, key people for a level that is hierarchically lower.

*Within the party there are no really free, democratic elections, one team is always favored and members are always trying to be close to those who are responsible for employment within the party.* (Interview 2)

*Every political party is a big authoritarian family where all family members try to be close to the leader in order to get more love and resources.* (Interview 3)

Although formal positions within the party hierarchy are important, power is not distributed exclusively through them. Not all members at the same position have the same amount of influence. In addition to formal structures, informal decision-making structures are also in place. These are structured both horizontally and vertically and they represent the actual decision-making channel. Given that all the major political parties in Serbia are very central-
ized and that there is no possibility of establishing fractions, recomposing of power within the party is moved into the informal part of their operation (Pavlović, 2007). This phenomenon becomes evident during periods of large turbulences in the life of political parties, ‘big replacement’ of leadership occurs. The conflict in the party leadership moves to lower and lower levels and crystallizes in the battle for committees at all lower levels. When deciding on an appointment to public office, leading party figures have the greatest influence (although there are personnel committees in the party, their function is rarely significant in key appointments). However, their decisions are not based exclusively on the expertise and efficiency of the candidate, but, most often, on personal loyalty instead. This relationship creates a top-down network of trust within the party.

We observed that at different levels of political party structures, different mechanisms for promotion and employment (co)exist and influence the final shape of the ‘cadre mosaic’ of political parties. At the three hierarchical levels, informal networks and connections have different importance and transparency.

At the highest level, the top of the party nomenclature informally decides on the promotion of higher functions. Trust and loyalty are important preconditions for entering into key positions, as revealed by the practice of direct appointment of persons who are not the party’s cadres by the leaders or other influential people in the party, without consultation or explanation. These people are usually members of their family or their friends.

*In our party, it happens that the party chief informs us who will take which key position, and then we as the body that should decide on that are not asked anything. Some of his choices were very strange because, for some key position, he did not appoint persons from the party but his friends. There were here also sincere intentions because for some work he trusts his friends the most and appoints them to get the job well done, but there were probably other cases.* (Interview 4)

On the second level, there are more formal institutions for the promotion of middle political cadre: Central Cadre Commission [Centralna kadrovska komisija]. These institutions cannot discuss the first echelon of state officials, only members of steering committees. This function gives them a certain exclusivity, formal, as well as informal, power in the party. Members of the
Commission have “informal power, influence and all rituals which come with that position” (Interview 1). In other words, members of the Central Cadre Commission have a certain amount of power and responsibility for some party and public positions. These individuals in the Central Cadre Commission are loyal to the clique at the top of the political party and they can select cadres in line with the agreement, anticipating a good solution for party cliques. Nonetheless, they have a certain amount of independence in their job.

At the third level, mobility and promotion of party members seems more transparent than at the higher levels. One of the respondents explains that they had a list during the campaign with party members who were active in the campaign. At the end of the campaign they were able to quantify how much an individual was active and thus determine who could get employment if there were any ‘spare positions’. The positions depend on activists’ ambition and formal qualifications. Usually, they are invited to an informal interview with party officials where they are asked what they would like to get, what kind of position.

There are informal connections on all levels. Someone who is not active and knows president of Municipal Committee (as a kin, business partner or acquaintance) can benefit from that. There are emotional as well as interest links. Somebody who has a private firm and knows president of Municipal Committee, will, for example, print material for campaign. If you climb higher on the level, informal connections are more and more important and they are less transparent. The most democratic and transparent is the municipal level. On the top of the political parties, there are number of people who are informal consultants and they do not have any responsibility, but they have power. (Interview 5)

Furthermore, employment in public administration serves as a valuable resource and tool for creating loyalty and patron-client relations. These contacts facilitate a connection between elected bodies and public administration, creating the possibility of abuse of public sinecures and resources. Party members use the opportunity for individual upward mobility by occupying positions in public administration. In this way, a base of informal structures is formed with reciprocity networks inside political parties. Members of party ‘oligarchies’ and ‘sub-oligarchies’ make useful personal ties with members of lower party structures which can be easily mobilized for obtaining or maintaining
resources and positions within the political party. Party members who are elected for presidents of public services create their own parallel structure. They employ party members and simultaneously form an informal structure in the political party. This enables them to create and favor their own people, members of the same cliques. In this way, politicians create long-term social relationships with "unequal levels of resources or power between the partners of the exchange: patron-client exchange is ‘asymmetrical reciprocity’" (Lomnitz, 1988: 48). Della Porta (2004), in a study of the Italian political scene, labels these political actors 'business politicians'.

In selecting political and bureaucratic personnel, an important role is played by patronage, loyalty, and trust which shape the informal, hardly visible structure underneath formal hierarchy. On rare occasions, promotions inside or outside political parties are based on individual competence, professionalism, or merit. If they want to climb the ladder of political structure, individuals need contacts and connections and they need to be ‘part of the gang’. Studies of informal networks in post-socialist countries reveal the existence and prevalence of these informal contacts in the political sphere (Grødeland, 2007).

The condition for promotion is loyalty to certain group, because there are always many groups in the political party. Loyalty means that you know who your boss is. That is the man who is higher on the hierarchy, and you have special relations, you are committed to him. (Interview 6)

Everybody chooses his/her own contributor which are appropriate according to many factors. I do not want to say that they pick poltroon, but you choose people with whom you know you can work well and that they will do things properly. (Interview 2)

If a certain fraction is dominant, loyalty opens the door to mobility within the party hierarchy.

Nonetheless, apart from these expected interests and identities, party members can develop other interest connections and networks beyond party divisions. In this way they create inter-party collusion. There is solidarity between members of the same levels from different parties and on that level they solve the problems of power and resource division in public companies. One of the respondents gave us an illustration of this not-so-rare practice.
Sometimes it is easier to reach agreement and compromise with other party members. That is why communication between politicians who are members of different parties is often better: they have a shared interest and they create informal coalitions against their own party members who are members of the clique with which they are in conflict. The reason behind this practice is that members of the same party “fight for the same resources and position inside one structure”. (Interview 3) That is why they can place more in a member of some other party.

Last but not least, it is important to mention that informal networks are characterized by shared norms, rules of the game, customs, and vocabulary easily understood by members of the same group. In our interviews, respondents used specific phrases which are connected with informal practices such as: ‘I know the man’ [‘Znam čoveka’], ‘See what can be done!’ [‘Vidi šta može da se uradi’], ‘It will be taken care of’ [‘Biće sređeno’]. These rules of the game are taken for granted and reified, so they can always be expressed. When some of the members find themselves in certain situations and positions, they know what to do without receiving special orders. The rules of the game are accepted by both sides. Party members have a sense of obligation towards the party officials who are responsible for their employment and relations of reciprocity are enacted among party members. On the normative level, these relations are perceived as completely legitimate and as the inherent structure of political parties. The mechanism which enables long-term loyalty is mutual dependence and coalitions in enacting practices which can be morally and legally sanctioned. In that manner, social networks can facilitate trust among interconnected members. This is especially important in an untrustworthy environment with weak institutional support.

This sort of ‘bonding’ and ‘teambuilding’ between close political comrades and patron-client actors usually takes place behind closed doors and in a more informal atmosphere. Some respondents claimed that the traditional Serbian kafana is still an important site of different sorts of informal meetings and negotiations where people can speak freely and openly. Kafana is a crucial informal political institution and it is an important part of Serbian political culture in which personal contacts and favors play a prominent role. The role of kafana in the early development of the Serbian party system in the 19th and 20th centuries is described in historical studies (Stojanović, 2012). Our study shows that the kafana as an informal social institution still shapes political life in Serbia.
Finally, these aspects of culture and norms of informality, which we have only briefly mentioned here, definitely deserve more in-depth and careful study.

**Conclusion**

Based on the main characteristics of clientelism (within the parties’ structure and the voters’ networks) in Serbia, we can conclude that it is very similar to that in other developing and post-socialist states. Its two leading characteristics are a high level of competition between political parties and a low level of available resources. Political parties hold a dominant position in distributing available resources in society and they use this state of affairs as a foundation for ensuring loyalty of future voters. Although the monopoly that parties enjoy is sometimes overestimated, these semi-legal activities lead to a strengthening of uninformed connections within the parties’ structures as well.

At the higher structural level within the party, there is a higher degree of informal arrangements. At this level the parties’ leaders decide on the leading positions within the parties themselves, public administration, and public companies. These positions are usually filled by the most trusted parties’ people. In this way a loyalty network is created for the very purpose of keeping the party in power. Thus, this type of clientelism is grounded in very tight personal connections; they are deeply individualized by citizens’ functional dependence on public resources.

The exchange with the lowest (potential) party members is their vote (their own, that of their family members or friends) and the long-term support they express in return for employment. From the citizens’ perspective, this relation is rational because they would rather accept a personal arrangement and direct exchange than political programs in public discourses which are not trustworthy. Inside the party structure, the exchange unfolds between the top of the party and every other layer. The basis of this exchange is loyalty to the higher level (clique) in exchange for providing (in)formal power in their current position, which can lead to improving their status. One of the main findings is that loyalty to informal party rules is perceived as more important than the formal tasks which are prescribed for some political positions in public administration. These political practices are followed and supported by a normative framework which serves as a rationalization and justification of informality. In this situation, the uncertain environment is extended,
maintaining blurred boundaries between the formal and the informal, illegal, legal and legitimate, moral and amoral. This leads to a changed perception of formal and informal rules.

**Appendix**

1. Interview 1. – male, graduated from Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade, Serbia middle range politician, he was employed in a public enterprise.

2. Interview 2. – female, graduated from Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia; middle range politician, she was employed as a Deputy Director of a public company.

3. Interview 3. – male, graduated from Faculty of Medicine, University of Belgrade, Serbia; middle range politician, board member of a public enterprise.

4. Interview 4. – female, graduated from Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade; middle range politician, member of the employment commission in a political party.

5. Interview 5. – male, student, middle range politician, board member in a political party and president of the Youth of a party.

6. Interview 6. – male, graduated from Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia middle range politician, Director of a public company.

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The Role of Informal Connections in Macedonian Society: Social Capital or Corruption?

Introduction

The years after the fall of communism were marked with the difficult process of transition and consolidation of the newly formed democracies. The challenge was to build democratic institutions which would set the new ‘rules of the game’ in society (North, 1990) and develop Western-like democracies out of the remains of communism. However, this process proved to be very difficult and lengthy: the sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf, estimated in 1990 that the newly established post-socialist democracies it would need roughly six months to draft a constitution, six years to build a market economy, and sixty years to create a fully functional democracy. Today, more than twenty years later, we can argue that while some countries were remarkably successful, others are still struggling with the ‘dark ages’ of transition and experiencing great difficulties in building impartial democratic institutions which function according to the principles of universalism and good governance.

Macedonia is a good example of Dahrendorf’s predictions: although the state has formally reformed its institutions and has built a market economy, the current state of democratic settings in society is still far from the desired end of a fully functional democracy. A recent study of Macedonian political culture showed that 84.9% of those surveyed agreed that in Macedonian society “it is more important who you know than what you know” (Markovic et al, 2013). This shows that having the right connections (popularly called
vrski in Macedonian) is seen as the key precondition for achieving success and wellbeing. Therefore, this paper will discuss the meaning and influence of informal connections in Macedonian society from two different perspectives: as a form of social capital and as a source of corruption. Informal connections are similar to the Russian phenomenon of blat, defined by Ledeneva (1998) as use of informal contacts based on mutual sympathy and trust, that is, using friends, acquaintances, and occasional contacts to provide specific favors which put people in position of advantage. Such services are, for instance, performed when one arranges a good job for another or when, in otherwise equal conditions, the one who is familiar or recommended is chosen.

This paper will deliberate on the following two dilemmas: whether informal connections in Macedonia can be seen as a form of social capital or as a source of corruptive behavior, and how informal connections impact on the impartiality of democratic institutions. Mainstream social capital theorists will argue that there is nothing wrong in people having mutual connections, because that, as a form of social capital, is good for the community (Putnam, 1993, 2000, 2002) and the market (Fukuyama, 1995). However, not all forms of social capital have a beneficial impact on the community and democratic settings in society. When the social capital in question has characteristics of negative non-communitarian social capital, as will be evidenced later on, it can be a source of nepotism, cronyism, and corruption. Consequently, the main argument of this paper is that informal connections in Macedonia, although a form of social capital, generate corruptive behavior which has a negative impact on the development and functioning of democratic institutions.

The paper presents an overview of the current academic debate on the different understandings and types of social capital and their application in the Macedonian and South East European context. The Macedonian case is not unique nor isolated, but rather shares many common features with the other post-socialist countries in the region, so that the conclusions which will draw here are not very different from the ones which can be drawn from other post socialist countries in the region. Further, due to lack of specific local research and the fact that this paper is mostly based on secondary sources, possible methodological limitations are taken into consideration.

In the following pages, a brief introduction to the concept of social capital will first be given (section 2). Subsequently (section 3), the discussion will narrow in on two possible understandings of informal connections: as a form of social capital, and as a source of corruptive behavior. In section 4,
the impact that informal connections have on formal institutions will be deliberated. Last, the arguments will be summed up and brief conclusion will be given (section 5).

The Concept of Social Capital
Social capital is a broad concept concerning the value of social relations in society. Although there is a large variety of definitions, most of them share the main idea that social networks have value (Putnam, 1993, 2000, 2002). Social capital can also be understood as the software of democracy (Constable, 1999), that together with formal institutions (the hardware), makes democracy effective. Social capital can have private and public good character. Pierre Bourdieu, who is considered its first conceptual father, identified three forms of capital: economic, cultural and social capital. Bourdieu defined social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition - or in other words, to membership in a group - which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a 'credential' which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word” (1986: 51). Consequently, Bourdieu's definition of social capital defines it as a private resource of individuals and their families.

Social capital became a mainstream concern in political science with the works of Robert Putnam (Mihaylova, 2004), who related social capital to de Tocqueville’s concept of “civicness” and democracy. De Tocqueville noted that: “Feelings and opinions are recruited, the hearth is enlarged, and the human mind is developed only by the reciprocal influence of men upon one another” (Tocqueville, [1840] 1945: 108-109). He argued that this reciprocal influence can be created only by membership in associations. Putnam followed de Tocqueville in celebrating associations and their importance for democracy, claiming that membership in associations connects people, which has an important value for society: connected citizens are able to resolve dilemmas of collective action more easily, they cooperate more and develop mutual relations of trust and reciprocity. Furthermore, by describing social capital as a “civic virtue”, Putnam (1993, 2000) wanted to point out that social capital has a significant importance for institutions. In his first book on social capital, "Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy" (1993), he argued that social capital affects institutional performance and that differences in
social capital can explain why same policies function in one region or one country, but do not function in another. In his second book, "Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Communities" (2000), he argued that social capital has a significant impact not just on institutions and democracy, but also on the whole community in general. Concerned with the evident decline of social capital in the United States, he criticized modern American individualism and argued that the decrease in community life may have a seriously negative impact on American democracy. He stated that “social capital keeps bad things from happening to good kids” (Putnam, 2000: 296) and concluded that social capital is the key for a happier, wealthier, and safer community. To put it briefly, Putnam understood social capital as a public good, which may have a positive effect on the society in general.

Because social capital is a broad concept, there are several important distinctions which provide a better understanding of the various forms and characteristics that social capital may have. Probably the most important distinction is the one between bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital is understood as the social capital shared between members of a certain group, while bridging social capital is the capital that arises from interactions between members of different groups. Therefore, bridging social capital generates broader identities and reciprocity whereas “bonding social capital bolsters our narrower selves” (Putnam, 2000: 23). In addition, bonding social capital, when not accompanied by bridging capital, can easily have illiberal effects on society (Putnam, 2000).

In his later work, Putnam (2002) identified three more distinctions: he distinguished between thin versus thick social capital, informal versus formal social capital, and inward-looking versus outward-looking social capital. The first distinction, that between thin and thick social capital, is based mainly on the quality and quantity of the relationships: thick social capital is present in conditions when individuals have repeated and close contact, which forms strong ties. On the other hand, thin social capital is an outcome of loose connections that can be characterized as weak ties. The next distinction, that between formal and informal social capital, is based on the character of the networks that form social capital, whether they are an outcome of some formal associating (like membership in a club or a political party) or an outcome of spontaneously generated friendships. Another distinction, which is especially important for the impact that social capital has on society, is the one between inward-looking and outward-looking social capital. This
distinction is similar to that of bonding versus bridging social capital, but it is more focused on the interests that subjects in the networks have and less so on the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the network. In other words, the inward and outward looking distinction is about the purposes and outcomes of the networks: while inward-looking social capital serves only the members of the network, outward-looking social capital is more community-oriented and the networks are made and maintained to deliver benefits for the public good as well.

The last important distinction is the one between the meanings of relational and system social capital, developed by Hartmut Esser (2008). This distinction emerges from the debate on the public or private character of social capital and recognizes two types of social capital: the one which can be considered a private good and which is the property of the individuals is called relational social capital, while the other one, which can be considered a public good, owned by society, is called system social capital. He argued that: “relational social capital can generally be regarded as an actor’s ‘personal’ resource, whose value depends on earlier investments in it” (Esser, 2008: 26). On the other hand, “system social capital is a collective good, or more precisely a public good whose production does not merely depend on the individual actor’s interest and investment” (Esser, 2008: 37).

Out of these distinctions, the following question emerges: are all these forms of social capital beneficial for the community? That largely depends on the character of its elements. According to one of the several definitions provided by Putnam, “social capital refers to the connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (2000: 19). Out of this definition the following three elements of social capital can be derived: trust, networks, and norms of reciprocity. These three elements are mutually interconnected and self-enforcing. Trust is the first main element of social capital and it can be found in two ideal type forms: as generalized trust, which is trust in people we do not personally know and particularized trust, which is trust in people we already know. According to Putnam, high generalized trust helps people resolve collective action problems, fosters cooperation, reduces transaction costs of the society, and, therefore, it “lubricates civic life” (2000). On the other hand, particularized trust is faith only in “people like us” (Uslaner, 2008) and it appears in tight closed circles that have an exclusivist character. This form of trust often does not have a positive impact on the wider community, but rather, it may have a negative
effect, as in the case of the mafia (Gambetta, 1996) or the Italian “amoral familism” (Banfield, 1967). The other two elements of social capital, social networks and norms of reciprocity, are very closely related to the element of trust. Social networks are networks of social interaction, within which people develop trust and norms of reciprocity. They can have open (bridging) or closed (bonding) character. Norms of reciprocity serve to reconcile the self-interest and solidarity of the citizens (Putnam, 1993) and, similar to trust, they can also be distinguished in terms of norms of particularized and generalized reciprocity.

Herein lie the main differences between good (civic) and the bad (non-civic) social capital. While civic social capital, celebrated in the works of Putnam, was seen as a public good and an important benefit for the community, because it was based on generalized trust, bridging networks, and norms of generalized reciprocity, social capital based on particularized trust and norms of particularized reciprocity developed in closed (bonding) networks can be seen as non-civic social capital because it generates good for private individuals only and not for the whole community.

The Role of Informal Connections in Macedonian Society

Informal connections, commonly known in Macedonian as vrski, play a vital role in Macedonian society. As previously noted, an overwhelming majority of surveyed citizens (84,9 %) agreed with the statement “it is more important whom you know, than what you know”. Moreover, 62,4% of the surveyed agreed that “a favor should be returned, regardless of what is asked for return” (Markovic et al., 2013). These figures show that informal connections and the exchange of smaller and larger favors which arises from these connections plays a vital role in citizens’ everyday lives. Similar are the conclusions from a study on the informal behavior of political elites, based on interviews with representatives of political parties, state institutions, the NGO sector, and business sector: the biggest proportion of the interviewed (84%) agreed that informal networks have a remarkable influence in Macedonian society and that people connected through ‘informal networks’ have huge benefits from being part of them (Babunski, 2010: 102). This phenomenon was also identified in the 2012 report of the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, which noted that “networking or using ‘connections’ is often necessary in order for a person to complete even the simplest administrative tasks” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012: 17).
This shows clear evidence that in Macedonian society informal connections are considered to be a key precondition for success in life. However, while informal connections play such a vital role in society, the level of generalized trust is among the lowest in the whole world: the latest report on political culture revealed that only a small minority of respondents (11.9%) believed that people generally can be trusted, while a significant majority of them (86%) expressed their doubt and answered that one should be careful in establishing relations with other people (Markovic et al., 2013). These findings are not isolated. In 2010, another study revealed similar evidence: only 9.7% of people agreed with the statement ‘most people can be trusted’ (Klekovski et al., 2010). Moreover, trust placed in institutions, despite showing some positive trends, remains quite low. For instance, confidence in the police and judiciary is still below 50% (Markovic et al., 2013).

This evidence shows that in Macedonia, while kinship and friendship connections are widespread and important, generalized trust in other members of the society is low. Moreover, since formal institutions are still mistrusted, citizens find informal networking to be an important alternative for the often unsatisfactory and corrupt functioning of the institutions.

**Informal Connections as a Form of Social Capital**

As discussed previously, social capital can be understood as a private (Bourdieu) or as public good (Putnam) and it can have a positive or a negative impact on the community. With regard to informal connections, in Macedonia they can be seen as a form of social capital, however their character and main features have not been sufficiently theorized.

The main argument in favor of considering connections as a form of social capital lies in the fact that individuals with connections can wield a considerable advantage in comparison with those who do not have them. This advantage can be materialized and considered to be a form of social capital. This fits into Bourdieu’s definition of social capital as an important individual asset for people (1986: 51). Informal connections, in this case, should be considered to be ‘less institutionalized relationships’, a valuable resource that can provide its owners with considerable advantage in society.

Moreover, informal connections in Macedonia should be considered to be relational social capital as conceptualized by Hartmut Eser: serving as a private property of the individuals that have vital benefit from it. On the
other hand, informal connections cannot be seen as system social capital because they cannot be considered a public good and because they do not bring any benefit to the wider community. Therefore, informal connections in Macedonia are relational social capital, which consists of particularized trust, relatively closed networks, and norms of reciprocity. Often, they last longer than just one transaction and form durable norms of reciprocity, based on the knowledge that a favor done today will be repaid later. Informal connections mostly form norms of particularized reciprocity, because the tie between the individuals has preserved a strong exclusivist and bonding character, and do not apply to outsiders of the network.

Consequently, informal connections can be seen as a specific type of social capital which has a non-civic character, referred to in the literature non–communitarian social capital (Aberg, 2000). This type of social capital is not only relational social capital, as opposed to system social capital, but it also has a strong bonding, inward-looking, and informal character, because it is based on closed networks of people who enjoy all the benefits of their relationship, while the wider community does not have any benefit. Unlike civic social capital, this relational non-civic social capital does not generate any positive conditions for some authentic bottom-up civic activism in Macedonia that will serve the community. On the contrary, they serve only personal, group, family, or clan interests and deliver benefits just to members of the group, rather than to the wider community (Miladinovic, 2012). For these reasons, this social capital does not lubricate cooperation, but might rather make it even more difficult, because connections operate in an informal system which exists as an alternative to the formal, institutionalized one and creates conditions of parallel institutional settings based on double standards, depending on the number of informal connections that individuals have.

**Connections as a Source of Corruptive Behavior**

Relational non-civic social capital in Macedonia can be interpreted as one of the key reasons for high corruption in Macedonian society. Because of their widespread acceptance, informal networks in Macedonia are considered a kind of “incubator for corruption” (Babunski, 2010: 104). Namely, while informal connections provide people with an advantaged position in dealing with various social transactions based on exchange of smaller or larger favors, they
lead to various forms of corruptive behavior and, therefore, they seriously undermine the principles of equal treatment, universalism, and meritocracy.

Today in Macedonia, on the one hand, corruption has been identified as one of the three main problems of Macedonian society (UNODC, 2011) while, on the other, corruption is by many considered by many to be an established norm, a way of getting things done (Stojanoska, 2012). The citizens’ opinion is that corruption is a regular means to achieve any goal and that this is visible in trivial conversations between people, as the first thing that people mention is how to find some person in order to accomplish an objective (Mangova, 2012). Often, “corruption is not recognized as such and is accepted as a common occurrence in society, especially since many corrupt acts are very frequently carried without money involved: as a return for a favor, or a reason to ask for a favor” (Stojanoska, 2012: 276). Moreover, as previously mentioned, the fact that 62,4% of citizens are ready to return a favor, regardless of what is asked in return (Markovic et al., 2013), shows that personal exchange of favors is seen as an established practice, regardless of its potential corruptive effects. This moneyless corruption and trade with favors is largely an outcome of the presence and the strength of informal connections in society. For instance, the UNODC report shows that public sector recruitment is strongly affected by various forms of moneyless corruption: 70% of those who did not get a job think that somebody else was employed either due to cronyism, nepotism, or simple bribery (2011).

In conclusion, informal connections in Macedonia should be considered a form of corruption mainly because of their informal character. This follows from the fact that while corruption was defined as “misuse of public office for private gains” (Rose-Ackerman, 2008), the use of informal connections largely incentivizes such behavior because public officials constantly engage in a private exchange of favors while performing their public duty. For instance, while the relatives, friends, and acquaintances of public officials are receiving preferential treatment in various institutions, they transform the same into a corrupt establishment, which then serves the private and not the public interest. Under these conditions, formal rules become only a façade for the informal practices of nepotism, cronyism, and clientelism. Therefore, the vital role of informal connections in Macedonian society is compromising the impartiality of the formal democratic institutions meant to provide equal and non-corrupt treatment for all citizens, regardless of their social status and the quality of informal connections they have.
Informal Connections and Their Impact on Formal Institutions

So far, we have seen that the wide presence of informal practices should be considered both a form of non-communitarian social capital and a source of corruptive behavior. One of the reasons why informal connections affect formal institutions in such a way is because they have been embedded for a longer period than the relatively recently established post-socialist ‘democratic’ rules of the game. According to Ledeneva, informal connections (termed blat in Russian), involve reciprocity of favors, thanks to which it was possible to accomplish what money could not. Namely, during socialism, in non-market conditions of planned economy, money did not function as the main element in economic transactions, things could often be sorted out through mutual help and barter (1998). Basically, it was the amount of individual social capital, not economic capital, that was the main variable which distinguished the rich from the poor and, in the absence of any private capital, individuals’ amount of social capital (informal connections) was the main factor that distinguished ‘winners’ from ‘losers’ in society. Consequently, the social power that the dominant class possessed gave them, as a whole, the ability to dispose with state owned economic capital absolutely (Miladinovic, 2012). As a result, members of the dominant class included their spouses, parents, children, close and distant relatives, and friends (who, for the most part, already belonged to this class) in the developing social network which, in itself, created bonding social capital as a substitute for economic capital (ibid, 2012).

Similarly to this argument, and in regards to the weak institutional performance of the socialist state apparatus, Martin Aberg argued that non-communitarian social capital, formed by the extensive use of informal connections is a “legacy of and a reaction to inadequate and inefficient state socialist institutional arrangements, particularistic networks and informal connections [that are related with] phenomena such as clientelism and corruption” (Aberg, 2000: 295). According to him, these features remained in existence even after the fall of communism and creation of new democratic institutions.

In that context, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, claimed that in societies where informal rules (and, therefore, informal connections as well) have a significant impact and are standardized as informal ‘rules of the game’, they form a parallel institutional setting based on particularism and not on universalism. According to her, particularism characterizes collectivist societies, where standards for the way a person is treated depend on the group to which he or
she belongs. This is the opposite of universalism, which is characterized as a practice of individualist societies, where everyone is treated equally regardless of the group to which he or she belongs (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2005). She argued that universalism is mainly a characteristic of western democratic societies where formal and informal institutions (understood as the ‘rules of the game’) present little or no contradiction. Under such conditions, formal institutions prevail, rules apply to all, and everyone enjoys equal treatment. Because of this, formal institutions do not have difficulties in maintaining the rule of law (ibid, 2005). On the other hand, in particularistic societies, there is a huge discrepancy between formal institutions with their formal norms and informal institutions and their informal practices. This is especially evident in newly formed democracies, where the new formal institutions were established following the model of the western ones, while the old ‘particularistic’ practices from the time of communism continued to be the informal ‘rules of the game’. Due to this imbalance between formal and informal institutions, most often the informal ‘rules of the game’, as already established and learned, prevailed against the formal ones, which were recognized as imported and unnatural. “Rule of law cannot coexist with particularism and informal behavior”, she concluded (2005: 51). The same is true of democracy: “Where the norm of universalism is not enforced and widely respected, democracy does not take root, even if elections are held regularly” (Mungui-Pippidi, 2006:91).

Therefore, the newly established post-socialist democratic institutions and their new formal norms even today remain weaker and less efficient than the old informal practices. This has made the newly formed institutions even more fragile because people are distrustful of them, which has reinforced the need for informal connections, which continue to represent a more efficient tool for ‘getting things done’ than formal institutions. Therefore, a perpetuation vicious circle was formed, encompassing extensive use of informal connections and fragile institutions that fail to function under principles of universalism.

This vicious circle describes the specific situation in which ineffective institutions are both a cause and an outcome of informal connections. For example, if the institutions were more effective, informal connections would not be necessary, nor would ‘trade of favors’ (i.e. non-communitarian social capital), while if there were less use of informal connections, the institutions would not face the problem of informal behavior and would function more efficiently. Finally, today the formal state institutions still have difficulties in providing everyone with equal treatment and impartially guaranteeing
the rule of law because informal connections (and other forms of informal behavior) quite often prove to be stronger than the formal institutional settings. This is clear argues that informal connections, although a form of social capital, have negative and corruptive effects on the impartiality of the formal institutions, and, thus, generate society which is over-networked with networks of a particularistic character.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, we return to this dilemma: should informal connections be considered a form of social capital or a source of corruption? I have argued that they are a combination of both. In Macedonia, informal connections form a unique type of non-civic, bonding, inward-looking, and relational social capital. This social capital is different than the desired, civic one, celebrated in the works of Putnam and other mainstream social capital theorists: although informal connections have most of the elements necessary to be considered a form of social capital, they are not improving the functioning of the institutions, nor are they raising the level of trust in society, as civic social capital does. At the same time, the widespread use of informal connections often hinders, due to their informal character, formal institutions and should be considered a source of corruption. Additionally, because of their particularistic character, they are in strong conflict with the principle of equality of opportunity and universalism. Consequently, this leads to the notion that Macedonian society is an over-networked society where informal connections have a serious corruptive effect on the impartiality of formal institutions.
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§ 1

There are two faculties at the University of Sarajevo, that of law and of philosophy, from the capable and skillful (lat. *facultas* – capability) people of which one has expected (and some are still awaiting) to speak up profoundly on the Dayton Peace Accords. Profoundly means, in this case, from the standpoint of philosophy of right. Learned men there, however, are chiefly silent. The reason for their silence, perhaps, is that philosophers do not have an interest in reality, for they consider it banal, profane and vulgar, while jurists deem that it does not make sense to deal with philosophy, as it is abstract, inapprehensible and – useless.

For this reason, presumably, ordinary people began to deal with the Dayton Accords. There is, of course, no reason to resent them for that. However, there is also no reason to expect great benefit of such a populist treatment of the Dayton Accords, which implies the FB’s call for the creation of a new constitution, the appeal to dismiss the three-headed Presidency, European positive right pressure to solve the case of Finci-Sejdić, etc.
Reasonable people are supposed to deal with reality. For, “philosophy is, as I have already observed, an inquisition into the rational, and therefore the apprehension of the real and present. Hence it cannot be the exposition of a world beyond, which is merely a castle in the air...” (G.W.F. Hegel: 1989 (1820): 16).

For the sake of not only Sarajevo’s and Bosnia’s universities, Hegel will, hence, shout:

\[
\textit{What is rational is real;}
\]
\[
\textit{And what is real is rational.}
\]

And then also:

\[
\textit{Hic Rhodus, hic saltus.}
\]

But, alas! For learned men to be able to deal with the real, that of the here and now, they themselves have to be reasonable. Sarajevo’s learned men forget that “here”, Rhodus, is part of the universal, and the present, just this moment, part of eternity.

§ 2

It was, thus, the philosophy of right, which took into consideration, without asking for permission, the Dayton Accords, long before it was perfunctorily made. G.W.F. Hegel in “Grundlinien…” (“Philosophy of Right”) utters his judgment on this juristic wonder. If you do not believe it, have a look. If you decide to look, do it only if you have a sense for the essential. And, if you look and do not find it, then – there’s nothing to be done – you do not have a sense for the profound.

The Dayton Accords is, Hegel considers, the result of “circumstances”. The constitution contained in the Accords has its “meaning and appropriateness in circumstances...” (ibidem: 28) What are the circumstances under which the Dayton Accords emerged and which have determined its meaning and appropriateness – that is the question now.

The circumstances under which the Dayton Accords emerged and which gave it, more than one can imagine, meaning and appropriateness, have been, in part, the war and, in the main, crimes, small and huge, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and, as the worst one, although tailored according to the ICC mini fashion and reduced simply to the case of Srebrenica, genocide.

For this reason, the Dayton Accords is the paradigm of positive right and the Constitution of BiH, comprised in it, is a positive law. But, wait a bit: what is ‘positive right’?

§ 3
Before answering this question, and in order to answer it, let us continue, for a while longer, with ‘circumstances’. Why do ‘circumstances’ matter? What in laws is determined by circumstances? Circumstances are that which makes laws valuable, workable and, thus, positive. The circumstances under which the Dayton Accords emerged and which gave it meaning and appropriateness, both war and crimes, however, no longer exist. Ergo, the Dayton Accords has, eo ipso, lost both its appropriateness and meaning. Such as it is, the Dayton Accords has lost its raison d’être. Unlike Sarajevo’s jurists and philosophers, Hegel has expressed such a standpoint. He says that such, ‘positive’ laws, which find their meaning and appropriateness in circumstances, quite logically, “have only an historic value. For this reason they are in their nature transient.” (ibidem: 28) The Dayton Accords, therefore, is to be, with all due respect to its worth and outcomes, resigned to history.

However, just because of that, one should not say that the Dayton Accords is negative. Populist FB opinion does not grasp that it is not nice to speak badly. Dayton is dead and this means that Bosnia is deadened and one should speak nicely about the dead and with respect, for the sake of those who are living, of those who made Dayton, Americans, but also because of us who are deadened, or lulled, or pretending to be lulled, as is the case with jurists and philosophers. The silence of learned men is neither casual nor without reason, and the hubbub of public opinion expressed on FB will not wake them up, for those pretending to sleep cannot be woken up.

§ 4
The Dayton Accords, however, firmly stands, although its assumptions – circumstances – have expired. It stands firmly because it is not true that it fits only those guilty of circumstances – war and crimes – but it also responds
to those who were on the side of the victim and were, even, the victims of circumstance. About this aspect of the Dayton Accords, Hegel says: “A phase of right may be shown to rest upon and follow from the circumstances and existing institutions of right, and yet may be absolutely unreasonable and void of right. This is the case in Roman law with many aspects of private right...” (ibidem: 26). And do not say that it meets the interests of politicians and tycoons only. The Dayton Accords meets the interests of professors too, both Bosnian jurists and philosophers, let alone “war profiteers” (as Hamza Bakšić called them) among professors. That is the reason why jurists do not wish to deal with the righteousness of right, i.e. ethics, while philosophers deal with ethics only until it raises the question of the righteousness of laws.

§ 5
Circumstances which engendered the Dayton Accords and the supreme legal act of the state comprised in it do not exist anymore. However, “circumstances and existing institutions of right”, which do not allow it to be abolished or overcome, all the same, have been established and multiplied. As a matter of fact, these “circumstances and existing institutions of right” are multiplied by the Dayton accords. They are multiplied by the Constitution which defined Bosnia as a three-nation state, dividing it into two entities set up on a national basis, one of which, the smaller one, is one-national, and the other, larger one, two-national. Such a di(stribution)vision of the country and state of Bosnia emerged from the ‘circumstances’ (war and crime) which do not exist anymore. In the two-national entity, which was supposed to be proof of the possibility of a multi-national political solution, these ‘circumstances’ are further multiplied by its division into ten either one- or two-national cantons. Although it “rests upon and follow from the circumstances” perfectly, this “phase of right” (Constitution of B-H) is both “void of right” and “unreasonable”, just as “many aspects of Roman private right”. By reminding us of Roman right, Hegel actually refers to civil society: one cannot build civil society on the assumptions – Roman right, which stem from Roman circumstances. Roman right, namely, “give no satisfaction to the smallest demands of reason” (Ibidem: 29); the problem of Europe, the one in Hegel’s time and the current one, is that civil society needs the right which will be reasonable, at least minimally. Dayton’s Constitution of B-H, although made in America, and although contending to American circumstances, as well as American
principles of right, is adapted to European circumstances; the problem of Bosnia is that its Constitution rests on the best tradition of positive right foundations of Europe. When Americans made the Dayton Accords and the Constitution, it was made, instead, in tune with their own principles, and circumstances, in tune with European circumstances. For that reason it is, instead of being just and reasonable, only positive. The Dayton Accords, thus, did not spring from American reason, but from the consciousness which came from the (American) light to the darkness of the (European) cave. In order for Bosnia to fit in with the European idea of right, Europe has to come to the conception of right and the realization of the conception. Europe, not Bosnia, must satisfy “demands of reason”, at least minimal, in order for Bosnia to be reasonable. And this is the subject of “the philosophic science of right” (ibidem: 20). However, it would be too demanding a task even for European philosophy of right, let alone Sarajevo’s one.

§ 6

Roman right was a positive right, for it rested on the circumstances then, i.e. slavery. Today European right is also a positive right, for it rests on today’s circumstances, i.e. nation. At last, Dayton’s Constitution of B-H is a positive act of right, for it rests on European circumstances.

Hegel makes a parallel between Roman right and the laws of European states. “Thus in Roman law, for instance, no definition of man was possible, because it excluded the slave. The conception of man was destroyed by the fact of slavery…” (ibidem: 22) And then, he concludes: “Thank God, the definition of man in our states – as capable of right – can be put at the head of law – and without falling into a danger that one will meet provisions about man’s right and duties of man which contradict to the conception of man.” (ibidem: 23-24) Is it possible, using the same comparative method, to make a parallel between Europe and Bosnia? Let us try.

Thus, for instance, in the current state of European positive right, no definition of citizen would be possible, because the French, Germans or Italians, as members of nation, and members of national minorities in particular, could not be subsumed under it, i.e. the definition of citizen. In his identity, the identity of European, or better to say - for it is questionable if such an identity exist at all – in their identities, that is the identity of nationally defined, either minority or majority, the definition of citizen, moreover, is destroyed.
Not only are ‘citizens’ Finci and Sejdić politically destroyed by the Constitution in Bosnia, but also all Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. In the term ‘constitutive peoples’, constituted by the Dayton’s Constitution of BiH, it is not only the members of minorities that are destroyed, but the citizen as such is destroyed. In the Europe of nation states – additionally defined as Christian – anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, hate of the Roma, racism, even lately anti-Americanism, in a word – xenophobia, is a blatant circumstance for the sake of which Europe cannot go beyond positive right to the conception of right and its realization.

§ 7

The EU hypocritically raises the question of Finci and Sejdić,1 while at the same time one of the EU member states does not even recognize the existence of minorities in its society. What Europe requires from Bosnia is exactly what Europe lacks. Apart from the fact that this is just what just Bosnia had before the Dayton Accords and before autochthonic Bosnian nationalist crimes. Bosnians used to be citizens without having been destroyed by being pulled down to the level of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats in order to gain the status of citizens at all. The responsibility of Europe does not consist of her incapability to regenerate, through the Office of the High Representative, the multiethnic character of Bosnian society by the right which would be reasonable, for Europe itself lacks that. Europe is responsible because it allowed a society, in which no one was a minority, because no one was a majority, to be degenerated by nationalism, in front of its eyes, and in the middle of itself. Europe is responsible because it allowed the disappearance of the only European “no man’s land”, for it was the only European land of all people. Europe is responsible because it permitted the disappearance of an autochthonous civil society which might have been and had to be her own paragon. The right of people to be citizens was in Bosnia real even before they approached the idea of right.

1 Mr Jakov Finci and Mr Dervo Sejdić are members of two among many ethnic minority groups in Bosnia. According to the current Constitution of BiH they are not allowed to run for, for instance, the Presidency of BiH. Only members of so-called constitutive peoples – Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, are allowed to do so. Mr. Finci and Mr. Sejdic have approached the European Court in Strasbourg. The Court has ordered the State of BiH to make necessary improvements to the Bosnian Constitution in terms of ensuring the same right of members of minority groups. However, politicians from majority groups have unsuccessfully been trying to meet the demands of Europe for many years.
Bosnians achieved the conception of citizen from their existence, which was neither mono-nationalist nor mono-religious. Or, to be consistent to Hegel's vocabulary: one reached soul there from body (ibidem: 21).

§ 8
If Bosnians, I have in mind those who will the change of the Constitution, thus Bosniaks, want a civil Bosnia indeed, then they do not need to wait for Europe, nor are they dependent on Republika “S”. If Bosniaks’ political elite genuinely wants the civil instead of the national, then they can start with that on their own threshold, in their own avlija (courtyard). Nobody would mind if they give up on their own entity, also founded on national circumstances. If the standpoint of those willing to abolish the Dayton Constitution of B-H is the citizen, then such a reasonable, righteous and the standpoint of natural right may be realized at least on the level of current one- and two-national cantons. Hic Rodus, hic salta!

§ 9
The Dayton Accords is thus the highest, and hence the most apparent, sample of “laws of right”. (ibidem, Preface, p. 10, Addition)
Besides the laws of right there are also “laws of nature”. (ibidem) The Dayton Accords is not the law of nature or natural law.
Hence, it is very important, and necessary, to find out what it means that the Dayton Accords is what it is, namely, ‘law of right’ or, more precisely – the law of positive right, on the one hand, and what it means, on the other, that the Dayton Accords is not what it should be, namely ‘law of nature’, or more precisely – the law of natural right. Let us see how Hegel clarifies the distinction between the laws of nature and laws of right. “The laws of nature are simply there, and are valid as they are...Of these laws the measure is outside of us. Our knowledge adds nothing to them, and does not further their operation. Only our knowledge of them expends.” (ibidem) Vis-à-vis these laws are the laws of right. “Laws of right are established and handed down by man...for always his inner being (interest) says to him how a thing ought to be...In right a thing is not valid because it is, since every one demands that it shall conform to his standard.” (ibidem) Interests are thus what hinder laws to be
made in the way as the reason say how it ought to be. That is why the ‘laws of right’ are in the conflict not only with the ‘laws of nature’, but are also the soil of conflicts within positive right as conflict between “what is and what ought to be, between absolute unchanging right and the arbitrary decision of what ought to be right.” (ibidem) The laws of right are, hence, different; moreover, same laws are differently perceived and as such, differently seen, for being observed from the standpoint of interests, and not reason, they are the source of conflict. For this, Hegel will say that “our attention is turned to the fact that the laws, because they are different, are not absolute.” (Ibidem)

§ 10
The Dayton Accords, thus, is not absolute; anything that is not absolute is subject to change. It should be changed not because it is bad, for it is not bad, but it should be changed because the perceptions of it and of the Constitution comprised in it are different. The change of the Dayton Accords is indispensable because it sparks the difference of interests. As such the Dayton Accords become the source of conflicts – forthcoming ones. For that reason the Dayton Accords is very bad. What was good, perhaps very good, under the given circumstances, for it stopped the war and crimes, now became very bad, for it can lead towards new conflict, new war, and new crimes. That is what only a few understand, just as there were only a few able to comprehend that the Dayton Accords will not be good when it was made and signed and when it was good. And there were such people. Few, but they existed. Because there were people then who knew that it is possible to make laws from the standpoint of natural right, standpoint of the ‘laws of nature’, standpoint of reason. The Dayton Accords were, thus, not good because it could have been better, more reasonable, more righteous, while it was made even. And yet, Americans have not made a mistake while making the Accords when they accommodated it to European circumstances; Americans are doing wrong today for they believe that Europe is capable of improving the Dayton Accords in tune with American principles. The Dayton Accords, nowadays Bosnia, are a mine made by necessity and arbitrariness. And by the lack of knowledge about the laws of nature, i.e. the lack of reason.
§ 11

“But it is exactly in the opposition arising between absolute right, and that which the arbitrary will seeks to make right, that the need lies of knowing thoroughly what right is.” (ibidem: 11) To be able to grasp what is right man must be reasonable. “The rationality of right” is in contrast with “positive science of right” (ibidem). The rationality of right thus opposes the Dayton Accords. “Every man has fingers, and may have brush and colors, but he is not by reason of that a painter. So is it with thought.” (ibidem). All those who thought out the Dayton Accords and those who signed it in particular – I am almost convinced – have a brain, thus the organ for thought. But it does not mean that they know by virtue of that to think. All those who want to change the Constitution of BiH, including the Council of Europe, have brain, fingers, brush and colors. However, will they know, such as they are, to paint Bosnia, at least such as it used to be?

If the rationality is an assumption of Bosnia, then Bosnia is the assumption of Europe. For the that reason I am worried about Europe. Bosnia might be only – collateral damage.

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The term Balkan is usually associated with the region of the Balkan Peninsula, where several countries and peoples share history, tradition and, most notably, territory. There are several popular notions about the origin of the name, but the one that is fascinating by all accounts is that it is supposed to arise from the words Baal and Kan that stand for “Sweet Blood”. Some thirty years ago, the term Balkan was used for the region incorporating Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia (Јелавиќ, 1999: vii). After the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the expansion of the European Union in the region, the term Western Balkans became widely accepted for the countries in the region that failed to become members of the EU. It is also a substitute phrase for Balkan which gained a rather negative and pejorative meaning due to the wars and conflicts in the region.

Despite much conventional wisdom, regrettably armored from time to time by the combination of noted historical and traditional ties and, most importantly, conflicts of the peoples inhabiting the peninsula, contemporary political issues and the ideological rationalization of the superpower’s positions in the international system, it is difficult, if not altogether impossible, from an empirical point of view, to portray the region of the Balkans as a homoge-
nous entity (Kuhlman, 1980). To outsiders it often appears as a complex and confusing puzzle (Јелавиќ, 1999: vii) and is therefore mistaken for a uniform entity. For insiders, it stands for a shared history, tradition and long-term intermingling, and, as history shows, just as much conflict and bloodshed.

One of the most conventional ways of regarding the Balkans is as an object, target and victim of the power thrust and power projections of others – be they the Ottomans, Germans, Russians or the West (Rothschild, 1993:263). And even though the ethno-political map of the region has suffered serious alterations, according to Rothschild, it remains too convoluted, too complex, too Macedonian, to allow any smooth congruence between state borders and ethno-cultural ones, because no matter how carefully or benignly maps may be redrawn, this region will always have ethnic minorities within states (Rothschild, 1993: 263).

The region has been part of the Ancient Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, Habsburg and Yugoslav empires. Certain parts of the region have experienced the creation and rise of sovereign and independent nations and nation states, while others have been the object of long standing conflict and power struggles. The Balkans are located where the continents of Europe and Asia meet and they have been affected and borne the burden of interceptions of currents of imperial origin and rival ideologies. The Balkans are the meeting point of main political and cultural frontier lines - imperial, religious and political ideology borders (Јелавиќ, 1999: vii). They incorporate few linguistic and religious groups, but many ethnic groups, all of which is compounded by the blurring and blending of these three social indexes as they are spatially and functionally distributed across the region (Kuhlman, 1980: 149).

The closer you reside, the inclination to collision is larger; the more similar your culture is and the more mutually involved your history is, the greater is the possibility for conflict. The fragmentation that occurred after the dissolution of the last great state on the peninsula – SFRY – promulgated a new wave of heavy differentiations across this space, a phenomenon already acute when we add this dimension to the matrix with time. Empires rising and falling, boundary changes and nation state formations are historical events which seem to possess an extraordinary inertia in this Balkan setting (Kuhlman, 1980: 149). Consequently, Balkan heterogeneity has been complicated by the inexact and blurry boundaries in time and space and that is probably the main cause for the underling diversity of the region and source of balkanization, i.e. fragmentation that has affected the democratization and consolidation of Balkan societies.
THE PAST – same old, same old nationalism

If we consider the history of the Balkans in the past century, Jelavic’s (Јелавић, 1999: vii) claim that the Balkans, considered the powder keg of Europe for a very long time, have proved their reputation, seems quite correct. Moreover, it’s a commonly held wisdom that the region has too much history per square meter, especially in terms of confrontation and conflicts. Although some (like Dimitrijević, 1998: 147) claim that while nationalism and its consequences regarding national and other minorities had been predominantly present in most of these countries, the real infestation of political life occurred during the period between the World Wars, we must recall the time of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the rising nationalisms that contributed to it some decades before. Along the time of the fall of that Empire, the rise of nationalism led to the creation of several nation states, but also to the impossibility for others to come alive. Hence, nationalism has not been a strange or new phenomenon in the region; it has been so only for some of the peoples inhabiting it. Furthermore, the emergence of nationalism at the end of the twentieth century was a direct result of that unfinished and unlived trend of creating nation states and several unanswered national questions (Troebst, 1997: 97), such as the Albanian one.

Nationalism is very similar to adolescence. It has to be lived through. If it does not occur at the proper time, it will burst out later on, with even more obscure manifestations and dire consequences. Yugoslavia was often portrayed as an example of successful ethnic integration and nation building. It had long periods of populations mixing freely, living in peace and even intermarrying (Јелавић, 1999: 326). And although everyone understood that memories of past conflicts had not disappeared, almost no one was prepared for the rapidity and savagery of the subsequent disintegration (Kuran, 1998: 37). Amidst nationalistic waves and upcoming balkanization, oblivion with regard to past confrontations was impossible.

Under the umbrella of SFRY as an ideologically compromised state, nationalism for the peoples involved was swept under the carpet. The working motto that drove Yugoslavia’s machine was “balancing the West-East ideological divide”, which was translated into good relations with capitalist and communist regimes at the same time. One of its direct benefits was the design of the SFR Yugoslavia’s system of minority rights, one of the most developed in Europe after World War II (Ortakovski, 1997: 110). But the dissolution of this state gave legitimacy to the idea that the time of nemesis had finally come, so all the underlying heterogeneities surfaced in the arena. In all probability the
biggest failure of Yugoslavian and other related politicians was the incorrect assessment of the ideology and potency of particular nationalisms - mainly Serbian, but also Croatian and Albanian (Rothschild, 1993: 258). In addition, the anemic facelessness of Yugoslavia’s post-Tito leaders led to the emergence of politicians such as Milosevic and Tudjman as power figures in Serbia and Croatia, respectively, while in other parts this process was delayed and eventually apprehensively completed by the rise of the new “old” and/or mostly rebranded elite. Hence, the conventional imperative that in times of crisis authoritarian rulers easily surface proved true once again.

The dissolution of SFRY was accompanied by two simultaneous processes: nation-building and state-building. The cumulative effect of those two phenomena led to the creation of dystopia Balkanika as a benchmark of the region’s recent history, but also as a confirmation of the notion that the potency of the Balkan powder keg can be unleashed once again.

The hallmark of the last Balkan transition was nationalism or the return to diversities. When the “really existing socialism”, as Dimitrijević (Dimitrijević, 1998: 147) and other scholars name communism in South-East Europe, collapsed, nationalism not only re-emerged, but did so virulently (ibid: 147). From this return to diversity, the rise of ethnic struggles, conflicts and fragmentation, popularly known as balkanization, spiraled. Consequently, the notion that nationalism had replaced communism as the prevailing ideology (Dimitrijević, 1993: 59) in the region became widely acknowledged. For this reason, one might state that the transition in the Western Balkan region is marked by slippage into nationalism and, in a way, it meant a return to the past instead of a sliding into democracy.

TRANSITION – the new game in town?

Transition is commonly explained as the interval between one political regime and another (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 6). The aftermath of transition is the consolidation of a new regime and a new ideology. Political theorists agree that there are three main possible outcomes of the transitional process:

1. installation of some form of democracy,
2. return of some form of authoritarian rule, and
Transition is usually associated with democratization, modernization and liberalization. This is the reason why political scientists tend to explain the new school of transition as a replacement for the old school of development (Dogan, 1998: 119). Albeit there is a trend by some to enact transitology as a new discipline, the fact is that political science can be labeled an exact science, whereas politics cannot (as claimed by Otto Von Bismarck, 1863).

Transition is often coupled with uncertainty. As some analysts put it, transition usually progresses from certain authoritarian regimes towards an uncertain “something else”, which can be the instauration of a political democracy or the restoration of a new and possibly more severe form of authoritarian rule, or the outcome can also simply be confusion, i.e. the rotation in power of successive governments which fail to provide any enduring or predictable solution to the problem of institutionalizing political power (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 3). The transition is over when abnormality is no longer the central feature of political life (ibid: 65), that is, the development should lead towards some sort of normality, which is usually recognized as a political democracy. Thus, transition is often regarded as an abnormality (ibid).

The typical sign that transition has begun comes when these authoritarian incumbents, for whatever reason, begin to modify their own rules in the direction of providing more secure guarantees for the rights of individuals and groups (ibid: 6). In modern times, transition is broadly understood as the process of heading towards democracy and liberalism, towards globalism and away from tribalism. If we consider the transition in the particular case of the Balkans, we must underline that it was not the new game in town. On the contrary, it has been an underlying characteristic of the region’s development. It has been said that a shift of ideology can happen in an instant, the creation of institutions can happen in a relative period of several months, but reviving them can last up to a human lifetime. Political history shows us that this scheme happened too often and, at times, too rapidly in the region. So in a way, the Balkans have already had the transitional experience, continuously and repeatedly.

One of the main characteristics of transition is the absence of clear rules of the political game (ibid: 6). The last transitional experience of the Balkans translated into major institutional and governance problems affecting the societies of those countries and weak and, in some cases, utterly complex state structures, political elites with very limited vision and lack of statehood, in addition to corruption and organized crime in some of them, especially in the
beginning of the 1990s. In addition to the political vacuum, Balkan societies suffered from the politicization of ethno-national and socio-political self-determination, religious affiliation, an overwhelming vacuum in moral, ethical and civilization values (Parvanov, 1997:73) and grave economic disturbances that brought social instability and the emergence of the new poor. We can almost claim that a typical Balkan transitional country had a deep state, where the real power lay, and a shallow state, were politics happened (Mead, 2013). Therefore, getting lost in transition for Homo Balkanicus was inevitable.

Generally speaking, most of the Western Balkan countries have shared characteristics of suspiciousness of pluralistic societies, mainly as a product of their long history within the Ottoman Empire (Rothschild, 1993: 258), but also related to other phenomena. In particular cases this was due to the fact that nation state reality was never achieved (like Macedonia), while in others (like Serbia, Bulgaria or, at one point, Greece) due to the incremental process by which they eventually re-achieved independent statehood and periodically enlarged the borders of their state during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries (ibid: 258). The lack of a nation state and deficiency of nationalistic experience have contributed to the development of parochial and subject political culture. Due to subordination to foreign/alien governance and the impossibility of enacting government from their own core has produced, for some of the Balkan nations, a strongly obedient political culture. In Balkan terms this is known as „disciplina kičme“ - discipline of the spine. Its impact on local traditionalism (namely, Macedonia) even created a personal name often given to children born at the beginning of the twentieth century – Trpe or Trpana (freely translated into Sufferer). Fashioning the Homo politicus in such a setting is an immense venture. In addition to change of the political culture’s mold, it requires a strong civil society, actual political opposition and viable leadership.

**Transition to EU – solution to all problems?**

Ozawa (Ozawa, 1995: 75) has asserted that weak political leadership is an imposition on other countries. Since the time of autarchic communities is long gone and we live in the age of interdependence, disruptive leadership in some countries has affected the whole region. From a political point of view, external implications of the transitional process in the Balkans included:
1. geo-political reconfiguration of the region, especially with the appearance of new sovereign and independent states (Parvanov, 1997: 65);

2. increased instability in the internal political sphere of the countries in the region and of the relations of respective political powers and factors, which very often lead to sharp changes or essential corrections of their foreign policy course, provoke mutual distrust and make the political behavior of a number of states less predictable (ibid: 65);

3. strained mutual relations within the ethnicity-religion-state triad, which directly influence the stability of the Balkan states and the region as a whole (ibid: 66);

4. delay of democratic advancement of the region and ultimately achievement of European integration.

The fourth point is, in reality, one of the most important aspects of transition in the Balkans. Namely, research has continually asserted that in a typical Balkan country, public opinion broadly expects integration into NATO and the EU as the final step of the transition process. Furthermore, this notion is usually associated with resolution of some conflict or crisis and the advancement of economies.

If we consider the first part of this equation, we must point out that although integration can prove a pleasing incentive for conflict or crisis resolution (as in the cases of Slovenia and Croatia or Serbia and Kosovo), it is not the essential part. The carrot and stick in the hands of NATO and the EU do not possess magical powers (as evident in the case of the Greek-Macedonian name dispute) and cannot substitute a real solution for bilateral problems. Moreover, their use is endorsed by the interests of member states or the club in general. The cases of Cyprus and Turkey are evident illustrations of this practice.

The second part of the equation, the advancement of economies, is related, in reality, to the democratization of the country, i.e. to achieving the democratic goal. Lipset (Lipset, 1969: 67) has asserted that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy. He argues that high levels of industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education correlate with democracy. These conditions are most certainly present in many countries of the Western hemisphere. Lipset (Lipset, 1969: 64) asserts that Max Weber (Weber, 1906) was right in saying that modern democracy is the product of capitalist industrialization because stable democracies are only visible in
industrialized capitalist countries. He also mentions that although it is very difficult to draw conclusions from correlations, there are significant determinants like urbanization, industrialization, income, education and literacy which are positively correlated with democracy (Lipset, 1969: 77).

There was a saying in the former Yugoslavia: “što južnije to tužnije” – the further to the south, the sadder it gets. The more peripheral was the country’s position, the more fertile were the conditions for construing irrational economic structure, poorly developed industry and one-dimensional political culture. Allied with the Lipset point, it seems to be one of the great truths in the context of the post-communist Balkans. Slovenia, for example, had almost identical population and land parameters as Macedonia, but the former had a much higher level of industrialization, urbanization, income and literacy than the latter. In addition to the traditional reality of north-south relations, where the north is usually regarded as the more developed, precise, hard-working and the south as less developed, slower, hedonistic, there were also political decisions by successive Yugoslav leaders which maintained this discrepancy. Therefore, the former Yugoslav countries that were closer to Western Europe experienced higher levels of development and a more rapid course to consolidated democracies. Amidst the various circumstances that led this process forward, Europeanization and an improved economy seem to be the leading ones. In this sense, arguing that integration with the West will most probably bring incentives for economic progress is fairly legitimate. Becoming a member of NATO and the EU should yield a stable economic unification among neighboring entities, globalization and economic prosperity of the region in the future. In fact, it can be maintained that there would be a transition from combat to cooperation through commerce (Tanter and Psarouthakis, 1999: xix).

However, democratization and economic prospects do not go well together. Besides the significant human cost (since transition has proven to be particularly unhealthy in correlation to life expectancy and the shock of the reforms (Wyzan, 1997: 14)), transitional societies also bear a massive economic burden and the process is, therefore, also known as “age of miserabilism” (Zigic, 1997: 90). Galenson (Galenson, 1959) points out that democracy may endanger economic development by allowing public pressure for consumption to divert resources from investment. Even if democracy is achieved by an underdeveloped nation, it is under constant pressure from the conflict inherent in the development process (Lipset, 1969: 65). That is to say, democracy is
expensive. Hence, instead of promoting Homo politicus, perhaps the Balkan countries need to concentrate on the Homo economicus.

Waiting for the “end of history”

Transition is completely reflected in the matrix of time. Political history has taught us that achieving the outcomes can last up to several decades. Democratization has advanced globally in waves that actually translate into decades. The durability of the process and the constant comparison to Western developed societies has proved troublesome and, at times, difficult to digest by the Balkan people. Since liberal democracy has been propelled as the last, best idea of human history, most development and change is measured by its standards (Фукуйама, 1994). Therefore, the endgame of this wave of transition should be liberal democracy.

The rise of democracy has shaped the world over the last century as the leading trend, so we can most surely claim that we live in a democratic age (Zakaria, 2004: 13). Democracy is a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders (competitors) for political office (Lipset, 1969: 63). Political democracy builds on both a normative base and a set of causal beliefs (Hughes, 2000: 194-195). As a result, if a country holds competitive, multiparty elections, we call it “democratic” (Zakaria, 2004: 19). Having free and fair elections, however, is only one side of the coin. Or to put it more precisely, democracy is the form, while the content is (political) liberalism, i.e. rule of law, separation of powers, protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property (ibid: 17). These two aspects are not fundamentally bonded and, most importantly, have not always gone hand-in-hand, even in the most developed countries of the West (ibid: 17). Having a good democratic record, but poor liberal substance is what Zakaria terms illiberal democracy (ibid: 17-21). The examples of some former Yugoslav nations and, most notably, Turkey show that liberalism is unavoidable when it comes to progress, the modernization, democratization and Europeanization of a country. But, inside this template of black and white, we can also recognize varieties of democratic regimes. Dogan, for instance, talks about a limited, partial, façade or embryonic kind of democracy (Goodin and Klingemann, 1998: 119) and Lijphart and others (Lijphart, 1969: 207-
O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 41) talk about consociational solutions for deep-seated ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious conflicts as a stable, quasi-permanent form of democratic rule. In this manner, we can elaborate numerous patterns of democratic anomalies that occur all over the world. Recognizing the levels of development in the democratization of a country has been a proven practice supported by empirical evidence. One important source is the Freedom House index. It validates and measures several aspects, of which the level of democratic progress and freedom rating are the most essential. According to the latest index (Freedom House, 2013), Western Balkan countries’ development is yet to be improved.

The advancement of a region’s prospects requires change and a reshaping of ideology. Or, to put it bluntly, we need a new transition. The latest developments (such as Croatia’s entry into the EU and the resolution of the Serbia and Kosovo crisis) could be treated as the end of an era. It should be expected that nationalism will lose its driving force (although it will probably never die away) and a new “ism” will take its place. The proximity of the region and shared history with its European neighbors stands, in a way, as a guarantee that Balkan countries will not become stranded on something other than liberalism.

**Concluding remarks**

Democracy may be best defined as ‘institutionalized uncertainty’ because, in a democracy, all outcomes are unknown and are open to contest among key players and the only certainty is that such outcomes will be determined within the framework of pre-established democratic rules (Menocal, Fritz and Rakner, 2007: 4). Therefore, in a sense, the transition to political democracy sets up the possibility – but by no means, the inevitability – of another transition (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 11). The crossing over from an undemocratic to a democratic system (usually labeled consolidation of democracy) entails several sub-processes, such as change of ideology, creation of new institutions, empowerment of civil society, shift in political culture and so forth. The assembled product of all of these elements is the new social contract, while the vital stipulations for the success of the process include understanding of and belief in the new ideology.

The last wave of transition in the Balkan countries has been extremely difficult and enduring. Observing it objectively, we can claim that it has been
semi-successful and, as one would expect, uneasy. Observing it subjectively is sometimes reminiscent of a popular Macedonian dance - three steps forward, one step back. The paradigm shift will almost certainly be lengthy, the prospects may be somewhat cloudy (as in the case of the Macedonian-Greek name dispute), but the endgame will most probably spare the Balkans from further fragmentation, prevent additional conflicts and improve lives.

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