Establishing democratic oversight of the intelligence community in developing democracies such as Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia is highly challenging, yet of vital importance. In any given state, intelligence services tend to have unparalleled powers to collect, analyse, disseminate, manage, and classify information. This makes the potential might of these services incomparable to that of other government agencies, and constitutes a very powerful tool in the hands of authoritarian leaders. Given the power of these services and the high potential for abuse, it becomes even more imperative to establish effective and efficient oversight mechanisms.
In Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, there are three main obstacles preventing the full materialisation of democratic oversight of intelligence. First, there is a persistent lack of domestic commitment toward democratic governance and an underdeveloped culture of accountability and oversight.
Second, a sound and unequivocal legislative framework, which would provide the foundation for effective and efficient intelligence oversight, is lacking. In the three countries, intelligence legislation is either incomplete, outdated, unperformed or a combination thereof.
Third, there is insufficient institutional and human capacity within oversight bodies to adequately hold the intelligence agencies to account.
Read the policy brief here: